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Selected Bibliography on the History of the Ontological Argument from Anselm of Canterbury to Duns Scotus

A Selection of Primary Authors

Legenda: P = Pro (accept the proof); C = Contra (rejected the proof); I = indifferent (take no position on the proof); ca. = circa; fl = flourished; d. died.

References are to the most important works where ontological argument is discussed.

Gaunilo of Marmoutiers (fl. XI century)

Texts and translations

  1. Gaunilo, of Marmoutiers. 1938. Liber Pro insipiente (Quid ad haec respondeat quidam pro insipiente). Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons.

    Written in 1078.

    Printed in the Opera Omnia by Anselm of Canterbury, edited by Franciscus Salesius Schmitt - Vol. I pp. 123-129.

    For the translations, see the editions of Anselm's Proslogion.


  1. "Gaunilo's "Lost Island" argument is his most famous objection to Anselm's ontological proof, and Anselm is known to provide quite an unsatisfactory response to it. So someone sympathetic to Anselm might ask: is there something that Anselm is not saying, some point he has perhaps made elsewhere and he might be implicitly appealing to which would give substance to his disappointing statement? I believe there is, and this paper provides my answer."

  2. Burgess-Jackson, Keith. 1994. "Anselm, Gaunilo, and Lost Island." Philosophy and Theology no. 8:243-249.

    "The received view is that Gaunilo's attempted refutation of Anselm's ontological argument fails. But those who believe this do not agree as to why it fails. The aim of this essay is to show that "whether" the attempted refutation succeeds depends crucially on how one formulates the so-called greatmaking principle on which Anselm's argument rests. This principle has largely been ignored by contemporary philosophers, who have chosen to focus on other aspects of the argument. I sketch two analyses of metaphysical greatness and suggest that on one of them, which Anselm may have held, his argument avoids Gaunilo's criticism."

  3. Davis, Stephen T. 1975. "Anselm and Gaunilo on the Lost Island." Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 13:435-448.

  4. Hopkins, Jasper. 1976. "Anselm's debate with Gaunilo." In Saint Anselme ses précurseurs et ses contemporains, edited by Kohlenberger, Helmut, 25-33. Frankfurt: Minerva.

    "Gaunilo, monk of Marmoutier, is known almost exclusively for his attempted refutation of Anselm's ontological argument around 1079. Indeed, both his counterexample about the alleged island which is more excellent than all others and Anselm's rebuttal thereof have nowadays become standard items for courses in medieval philosophy. Over the past decade or so, which has witnessed a revival of interest in the ontological argument, Gaunilo has been either lauded for his brilliancy or disparaged for his mediocrity. Thus, R. W. Southern judges that, "in words which are as trenchant as, and in some details strikingly similar to, those of Kant", Gaunilo pointed out the main difficulty in accepting Anselm's argument. (1) By contrast, the most Charles Hartshorne can say on Gaunilo's behalf is that he is "a clever, but essentially commonplace mind". (2) Those who praise Gaunilo tend to do so because he "wisely" discerned the illegitimacy of inferring a factual statement from an a priori description. Those who speak derogatorily of his achievement tend to side with Anselm's two criticisms: (I) that he misunderstood the phrase aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest - replacing it by maius omnibus - and (II) that his definition of "understanding" is inconsistent with his having maintained that what is unreal can be understood. (3) Now, if Gaunilo did commit himself to two blatantly inconsistent statements within a few lines of each other, as the second criticism maintains, then to call him a clever mind would itself be an overstatement.

    In this paper I want to cleat up several misinterpretations both within and about the debate between Anselm and Gaunilo. At the same time, I want to articulate the reformulations of the ontological argument as they occur in Reply to Gaunilo 1. I shall not take up the issue of whether or not any of these reformulations presents a sound argument for the existence of God, though in my judgment none does. Nor shall I worry about the respective degrees of brilliancy attributable to our two opponents, though on the present interpretation Gaunilo will fare better than Hartshorne supposes but not as well as Southern fancies." (pp.25-26)

    (1) The Life of St Anselm by Eadmer, ed., introd., and trans. by R. W. Southern (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962), 31 n.

    (2) Charles Hartshorne, Anselm's Discovery: A Re-examination of the Ontological Proof for God's Existence (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1965), 20. See also p. 151.

    (3) Hartshorne complains that Gaunilo, and others like him, neglected the principle of Proslogion 3 that to exist without conceivable alternative of not existing is better than to exist with such alternative. Anselm's Discovery, 88 (verbatim).

  5. Imbrisevic, Miroslav. 2007. "Gaunilo's Cogito argument." Saint Anselm Journal no. 5:50-56.

    "Gaunilo presents Anselm with a dilemma in section 7 of his Responsio: I know most certainly that I exist. But If I cannot think my non-existence at the same time, then Anselm's claim in Proslogion 3 (that my inability to think God's non-existence, while knowing most certainly that He exists, is a unique property of God) would be false. If I can do so, however, then I should also be able to know most certainly that God exists and, at the same time, think his non-existence. I will show that Anselm's response to Gaunilo's attack is not adequate because it does not address the issue of certainty, which is at the heart of Gaunilo's objection."

  6. Losoncy, Thomas. 1996. "The Anselm-Gaunilo dispute about Man's knowledge of God's existence: an examination." In Twenty-five years (1969-1994) of Anselm studies, edited by Fleteren, Frederick van and Schnaubelt, Joseph C., 161-181. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

    "The existence of major disagreement between Saint Anselm and Gaunilo concerning reason's ability (unaided by faith) to attain any knowledge of God's hence is easily recognized by reading their famous exchanges. What has received minimal notice is the extent of this disagreement and its significance for interpreting Anselm's argument in the Proslogion. This study will seek to establish to what extent knowledge of God's existence is / is not attainable and what said knowledge includes according to these two thinkers. The method for conducting this endeavor will be to examine the kinds, range, and origins of human knowledge of existence as variously held and disputed by Anselm and Gaunilo. Such a survey should help to place this aspect of the two protagonists' thought in sharper relief. Moreover, expanding the parameters of our consideration of Anselm's argument in this fashion will free us from the, for many, enslaving fascination of Anselm's logic in Proslogion II-IV and allow a clearer insight into the metaphysics at work in these three chapters and the work as a whole. Additionally, such freedom of inquiry will permit a due recognition of chapter one's role in posing the problematic according to Anselm.

    Finally, the metaphysical notions stated obliquely in Proslogion II-IV, and especially in III, will be better heard by examining their elaboration in later chapters of Proslogion and the subsequent exchanges between Anselm and Gaunilo.

    It is necessary, then, to turn to the originals to see if, indeed, such insights are forthcoming."

William of Auxerre (ca. 1140-1231)


  1. William, of Auxerre. 1980. Summa Aurea. Paris: Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique.

    Written ca. 1215-1229.

    Magistri Guillelmi Altissiodorensis Summa aurea - Cura et studio Jean Ribaillier - Grottaferrata, Romae: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1980-1987 (4 v. in 6) + 1 volume titled: Introduction générale.

    Prologue 15-23;

    Daniels (1909) pp. 25-27: Liber I. Quid sit fides et propter quid ad probationem fidei adducantur rationes naturales.

  2. Solère, Jean-Luc. 2008. "Présentation, traduction et annotation de Guillaume d'Auxerre, Summa aurea, I, traité XI (extraits)." In La Puissance et son ombre. De Pierre Lombard à Luther, edited by Boulnois, Oliver, 99-127. Paris: Aubier.


  1. Ottaviano, Carmelo. 1929. Guglielmo D'Auxerre (+1231). La vita, le opere, il pensiero. Roma: L'universale Tipografia Poliglotta.

  2. Principe, Walter Henry. 1963. William of Auxerre's theology of the hypostatic union. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

Alexander of Hales (1185-1245)


  1. Alexander, of Hales. 1924. Summa Theologica seu sic ab origine dicta 'Summa fratris Alexandri. Quaracchi: Editiones Collegii s. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas.

    Written after 1245.

    Studio et cura PP. Collegii s. Bonaventurae ad fidem codicum edita (reprinted 1979)

    The Summa Alexandri, attributed to Alexander, is a compilation put together by his students after his death.

    Daniels (1909) pp. 28-35): Pars I Quaestio III. De essentialitate divinae Substantie Membrum. I, II et III.


  1. Gál, Gideon. 1998. "Alexander of Hales." In The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Craig, Edward, 176-178. New York: Routledge.

    Vol. I.

  2. Schumacher, Lydia. 2020. "The Proof for a Necessary Existent in the Summa Halensis." In The Summa Halensis. Doctrines and Debates, edited by Schumacher, Lydia. Berlin: de Gruyter.

    Abstract: "Since the late medieval period, Anselm of Canterbury has been heralded in the West as the first proponent of the so-called ontological argument for God’s existence.

    This kind of argument purports to provide proof for the reality of God, which is derived from the very definition of God as the supreme being. Although Anselm’s work has garnered considerable attention in the late medieval and modern periods, it was largely neglected in the century between his death and the first years of the University of Paris in the early 13th century. A few other precedents notwithstanding, Alexander of Hales and the authors of the Summa Halensis were the first extensively to appropriate and popularise the work of Anselm, not least, the famous argument which can be found in chapters 2–3 of his Proslogion. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, however, the Summa’s version of Anselm’s argument represents a significant development beyond Anselm’s own iteration. Through an assessment of Anselm’s argument on its own terms and a study of the Summa’s presentation of the argument in relation to its sources—above all, Richard of St Victor and Avicenna— I will argue that early Franciscans rather than Anselm are responsible for developing the version of the ontological argument that has been associated in some form with Anselm’s legacy to this day."

Richard Fishacre (ca. 1205-1248)


  1. Richard, Fishacre. 1240. Commentarias super I-IV Sententiam.

    Written ca. 1240, this work, the first Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard written at Oxford, is unpublished; a critical edition is in preparation.

    Daniels (1909) pp. 21-24: Liber I, Distinctio III.

  2. ———. 2003. In tertium Librum Sententiarum. München: Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

    Vol. II Dist. 23-40.


  1. Long, Raymond James. 1987. "Richard Fishacre's way to God." In A straight path. Studies in medieval philosophy and culture. Essays in honor of Arthur Hyman, edited by Link-Salinger, Ruth, Hackett, Jeremiah, Manekin, C.H., Long, Raymond James and Hyman, M.S., 174-182. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

  2. ———. 1999. The life and works of Richard Fishacre OP. Prolegomena to the edition of his Commentary on the Sentences. München: Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

  3. ———. 2002. "The significance of Richard Fishacre's Sentences-Commentary." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch fur Antike und Mittelalter no. 6:214-216.

Richard Rufus of Cornwall (fl. 1231-1256)


  1. Richard, Rufus of Cornwall. 1250. Sententia Oxoniensis I-III.

    Ca. 1250, available in only one manuscript: Oxford, Balliol College (B62 cols. 57-59), partially edited by Gedeon Gal in Viae ad existentiam Dei probandum in doctrina Richardi Rufi OFM, Franziskanische Studien 1956, 38 pp. 187-202.


  1. Gál, Gideon. 1956. "Viae ad exsistentiam Dei probandum in doctrina Richardi Rufi OFM." Franziskanische Studien no. 38:177-202.

    "Publishes substantial excerpts from Rufus' Oxford theology lectures and brief excerpts from Assisi 138. Shows that Rufus anticipated both Thomas' criticism of Anselm's Proslogion proof for God's existence and Scotus' modal proof for the existence of God." Rega Wood - The Richard Rufus of Cornwall Project.

  2. Long, Raymond James, and DeWitt, Richard. 2007. "Richard Rufus's reformulations of Anselm's Proslogion argument." International Philosophical Quarterly no. 47:329-340.

  3. Raedts, Peter. 1987. Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the tradition of Oxford theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  4. Wood, Rega. 2003. "Richard Rufus of Cornwall." In A Companion to philosophy in the Middle Ages, edited by Gracia, Jorge J.E. and Noone, Timothy B., 579-587. Malden: Blackwell.

  5. ———. 2006. "Richard Rufus' response to Saint Anselm." In Anselm and Abelard. Investigations and juxtapositions, edited by Gasper, Giles and Kohlenberger, Helmut, 87-102. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

    "In previous articles, Fr. Gedeon Gàl and I have shown that after rejecting Anselm's argument in its original form, Rufus, like John Duns Scotus, and like the modern American analytical philosopher, Norman Malcolm, proposed another ontological argument in its place. To oversimplify: either as a gloss on Anselm or as a substitute for his argument, they claimed that God's existence, or rather the existence of a per se being, could be inferred by modus tollens: a per se being is necessary if possible, a variety of arguments show that a per se being is possible, therefore a per se being is necessary. (3) Here, I want to look at Rufus' criticism and very briefly at another proposed substitute argument for God's existence." (p. 88)

    (3) G. Gàl, 'Viae ad exsistentiam Dei probandum in doctrina Richardi' Franziskanische Studien, 38 (1956), 183-186, 194-196. R. Wood, 'Scotus's Argument for the Existence of God,' Franciscan Studies, 47 (1987), 270-274 and an unpublished paper, Scotus' Ontological Argument'.

    In Appendix (pp. 99-102) is given the Latin text of Rufus (Sententia Oxoniensis 1.2, B62.20ra-va).

Bonaventure of Bagnorea (1221-1274)

Texts and translations

  1. Bonaventure, of Bagnorea. 1882. Commentarium in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum. Claras Aquas (Quaracchi): Typographia Collegii S.Bonaventurae.

    Written in 1251-1253.

    Edita studio et cura PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura.

    See also the Editio Minor Quaracchi, Firenze, Ex typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae (1934).

    Daniels (1909) pp. 38-39: Liber I, Distinctio VIII, Pars I. De veritate et immutabilitate Dei. Articulus I. De veritate Dei.

  2. ———. 1953. The minds road to God. New York: Macmillan.

    Translated with an introduction by George Boas.

  3. ———. 1979. Disputed Questions on the Mystery of Trinity. St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute.

    Works of Saint Bonaventure Vol. III.

    Introduction and translation by Zachary Hayes (reprinted 2000).

  4. ———. 1993. Quaestionum Disputatarum. De mysterio Trinitatis. Roma: Città Nuova.

    Written in 1254-1255.

    Sancti Bonaventurae Opuscola theologica (Opera V/1) - Latin text and Italian translation.

    Daniels (1909) pp. 39-40: Quaestio I, Articulo I. Utrum Deum esse sit verum.

  5. ———. 2003. Itinerarium mentis in Deum. Saint Bonaventure NY: Francsican Institute.

    Written in 1259.

    Latin text and English translation by Zachary Hayes; introduction and commentary by Philotheus Boehner.


  1. Bougerol, Jacques. 1972. "Saint Bonaventure and Saint Anselme." Antonianum no. 47:333-361.

  2. Doyle, John Patrick. 1974. "Saint Bonaventure and the Ontological Argument." Modern Schoolman no. 52:27-48.

    "For St Bonaventure the self-evident truth of God's existence can be shown forth by 'intellectual exercises' like that of st Anselm. Such exercises are not simple-minded transits from the ideal to the real order. Rather they are based upon a sophisticated metaphysics. They involve the experience of common intelligibility. With Plato, they accept the 'really real' character of that intelligibility. implicitly, they also accept a plurality and a one-way hierarchy of intelligibles leading up to a 'First'. Turning then precisely upon the unprincipiated nature of this 'First', they spread before us its absolute necessity both in reality and for thought."

  3. Mathias, Thomas. 1976. "Bonaventurian ways to God through reason (First part)." Franciscan Studies no. 36:192-232.

  4. ———. 1977. "Bonaventurian ways to God through reason (Second part)." Franciscan Studies no. 37:153-206.

  5. Oeing-Hanhoff, Ludger. 1973. "Note sur l'argument ontologique chez Descartes et Bonaventure." Archives de Philosophie no. 36:643-655.

  6. ———. 1975. "Der sogennante ontologische Gottesbeweis bei Descartes und Bonaventura." In Analecta anselmiana. Frankfurt.

    Vol. 4/1.

  7. Pegis, Anton Charles. 1967. "The Bonaventurean way to God." Mediaeval Studies no. 29:206-242.

  8. Platzek, E.W. 1975. "Die Verwendung der 'via Anselmiana' bei Bonaventura." In Analecta anselmiana. Frankfurt.

    Vol. 4/1.

  9. Rivera de Ventosa, Enrique. 1974. "Supuestos filosofico-religiosos de la pruebas de la existencia de Dios en San Bonaventura." In S. Bonaventura 1274-1974, edited by Bougerol, Jacques, 201-258. Grottaferrata: Collegio S. Bonaventura.

  10. Seifert, Josef. 1992. "Si Deus est, Deus est. Reflections on St. Bonaventure's interpretation of St. Anselm's ontological argument." Franciscan Studies no. 52:215-231.

    "The formula (if God is God, God exists) is the shortest summary of the ontological argument. The article tries to demonstrate that this argument, as interpreted by Bonaventure, in no way is guilty of the logical mistakes with which one reproaches it. It proceeds not from a subjective idea or concept but from an intrinsically necessary and supremely intelligible divine nature and therefore applies to no other being but to the divine being. Bonaventure's basic thesis is that the inner truth (necessity) of the divine nature imposes itself on the mind and contains objectively the real existence of God. Only someone who does not understand this inner necessary truth can deny God's existence."

Albert the Great (ca. 1200-1280)

Texts and translations

  1. Albert, the Great. 1978. Summa Theologiae, sive De mirabili scientia Dei. Monasterii Westfalorum: Aschendorff.

    Written ca. 1270-1280

    Edidit Dionysius Siedler, collaborantibus Wilhelmo Kübel et Henrico Georgio Vogels.

    Daniels (1909) pp. 36-37: Pars I. Tractatus III, Quaestio XVII; Tractatus IV, Quaestio XIX, Membrum II.


  1. Noone, Timothy B. 1992. "Albert the Great on the Subject of Metaphysics and Demonstrating the Existence of God." Medieval Philosophy and Theology no. 2:31-52.

Thomas Aquinas (1225/6-1274)

Texts and translations

  1. Thomas, Aquinas. 1961. Summa contra Gentiles. Torino: Marietti.

    Written ca. 1257-1273.

    S. Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici Liber de veritate catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium, qui dicitur Summa contra Gentiles, cura et studio Petri Marc, coadiuvantur Ceslao Pera, et Petro Caramello (3 vols. I: Introductio; II-III: Textus Leoninus diligenter recognitus, 1961-1967).

    Texts selected by Daniels (1909) pp. 64-67:

    1) In librum Boethii de Trinitate Expositio: Quaestio I Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit primum quad a mente cognoscitur.

    2) Sententiarum Liber I Distinctio III Quaestio I Articulus II Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum.

    3) Summa Contra Gentiles Liber I Capitulo X et Capitulo XI.

    4) De Veritate Queastio X Articulus XII. Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum menti humnae sicut prima principia demonstrationis quae non possunt cogitari non esse.

    5) Summa Theologica Pars I. Quaestio II Articulus I. Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum.

  2. ———. 1962. Summa theologiae. Torino: Marietti.

    Written ca. 1266-1273.

    S. Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici Summa theologiae, cura et studio Petri Caramello, cum textu ex recensione leonina.

    (3 vols. I: Pars prima et Prima secundae; II: Pars Secunda secundae; III: Tertia pars et Supplementum, 1962-1963).


  1. Bassler, Wolfgang. 1970. Die Kritik des Thomas von Aquin am ontologischen Gottesbeweis . Köln: Walter Kleikamp.

  2. Cosgrove, Matthew R. 1974. "Thomas Aquinas on Anselm's Argument." Review of Metaphysics no. 27:513-530.

  3. Matthews, Gareth B. 1963. "Aquinas on saying that God doesn't exist." Monist.An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry :472-477.

    "The article discusses inadequacies in Aquinas' criticism of Anselm's ontological argument. Aquinas is commonly credited with criticizing Anselm by distinguishing two kinds of self-evidence, a distinction which for the purpose of criticizing Anselm, is not very helpful, and instead of an effective rebuttal of Anselm, Aquinas provides mostly a mere denial that his argument is cogent. The article attempts to show how Anselm's ontological argument can be defeated."

  4. Rikhof, Herwi. 1990. "Aquinas and the "ratio Anselmi". A theo-logical analysis of Aquinas' criticism." In L'argomento Ontologico , edited by Olivetti, Marco M., 137-202. Padova: CEDAM.

  5. Wippel, John. 1992. "Thomas Aquinas on what philosophers can know about God." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 66 (3):279-297.

Peter of Tarentaise (1225-1276)


  1. Peter, of Tarentaise. 1259. Innocentii Quinti in IV libros Sententiarum Commentaria.

    Written ca 1259.

    The last printed edition is that of Toulouse: Vol. I. (1652); Vol. II (1649); Vol. III. (1652); Vol. IV. (1651).

    Daniels (1909): Sententiarum I Distinctio III. Quaestio I. De cognitine Dei. Articulus I. An Deus a creatura sit cognoscibilis. Articulus Ii. Qualiter possit cognosci et probari Deum esse (pp. 68-71).


John Peckham (ca. 1230-1292)


  1. John, Peckham. 1260. Commentariius in IV libros Sententiarum.

    Unpublished; a manuscript of Book I (written ca. 1260-1270): Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze Conv. G. 854.

    Daniels (1909) pp. 41-50: Liber I Distinctio II, Quaestio I. Quaesitum primum. Circa primum quaeritur an Deus sit, et ostenditur.


Henry of Ghent (ca. 1217-1293)

Texts and translations

  1. Henry, of Ghent. 2005. Henry of Ghent's Summa. The Questions on God's Existence and Essence (Articles 21-24). Leuven: Peeters.

    Written 1280-1293.

    Latin text, introduction, and notes by Roland J. Teske; translation by Jos Decorte and Roland J. Teske.

    N.B. Daniels (1909) edition of: Summae Quaestionum Ordianrium Tous I. Articulus XXI. De Deo an sit in se absolute. Quaestio I. Utrum Deus habest esse. Articulus XXII. De Deo an sit in comparatione ad nostram notitiam. Questio II. Utrum Deum esse sit homini notum naturaliter per se (pp. 79-81) is now supersed by the new edtion by R. J. Teske.

  2. ———. 2006. Henry of Ghent's Summa. The Questions on God's Unity and Simplicity (Articles 25-30). Leuven: Peeters.

    Written 1280-1293.

    Latin text, introduction, translation and notes by Roland J. Teske.


  1. Paulus, Jean. 1936. "Henri de Gand et l'argument ontologique." Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age no. 10-11:265-323.

  2. Pegis, Anton Charles. 1968. "Toward a new way to God: Henry of Ghent." Mediaeval Studies no. 30:226-247.

  3. ———. 1969. "A new way to God: Henry of Ghent (II)." Mediaeval Studies no. 31:93-116.

  4. ———. 1970. "Four medieval ways to God." Monist.An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry no. 54:317-358.

    "St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent represent three medieval philosophical traditions in proving the existence of God, namely, the Platonic, the Aristotelian and the Avicennian. Platonic hierarchy and participation, leading to a supreme term, govern the proof of God in St. Bonaventure and St. Anselm. St. Thomas, beginning with data in nature (e.g. motion), reaches God as the cause of these data before reaching him as he is in his own absoluteness. St. Thomas' argumentation and method are Aristotelian. The proofs of God in St. Anselm (specifically, in the Proslogion ), in St. Bonaventure and in St. Thomas are all empirical and "a posteriori". but the proof of God in Henry of Ghent, Avicennian in origin, is "a priori" and seeks to reach God in his unity as the necessary being. Henry's proof is the model and perhaps the origin of the ontological argument."

  5. ———. 1971. "A new way to God: Henry of Ghent (III)." Mediaeval Studies no. 33:158-179.

  6. Teske, Roland J. 2005. "Henry of Ghent's metaphysical argument for the existence of God." Modern Schoolman no. 83:19-38.

Nicolaus of Ockham (fl. XII century)


  1. Nicolaus, of Ockham. 1260. Commentaria in Sententiarum.

    Unpublished manuscript (ca. 1260-1270) - Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze Conv. G5, 858.

    Daniels (1909) pp. 82-83: Sententiarum Libro I Distinctio III. Quaestio II. Quaeritur secundo an Deum esse sit per se notum.


Matthew of Aquasparta (ca. 1240-1302)


  1. Matthew, of Acquasparta. 1280. Commentarius in Primum, Secondum et Quartum Librum Sententiarum.

    Written ca. 1271-1280; unpublished.

    See the introduction by Victorin Doucet to Fr. Matthaei ab Aquasparta, O.F.M. ... Quaestiones disputatae de gratia ... cum introductione critica de magisterio et scriptis eiusdem doctoris, Quaracchi, Florence, 1935, pp. LVIII-CLV (on the Commentatius see pp.LXXI-CVI. Daniels (1909) pp. 51-63: Liber I Distinctio II Articulus Primus. De Unitate divina. Quaestio I: Utrum Deum esse sit verum; Quaestio III: Utrum Deum esse sit verum indubitabile.


Giles of Rome (ca. 1243-1316)


  1. Giles, of Rome. 1492. Super Librum I Sententiarum (Reportatio).

    Written ca. 1280-1290; last printed edition: Venezia (1492).

    Daniels (1909) pp. 72-78: Sententiarum Liber I Distinctio III. Quaestio I. De cognitione Dei in se. Articulus I. Utrum Deum possium cognoscere in vita ist (*); Articulus II. Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum. Articulus III. Utrum Deum esse possit demonstrari.

  2. Luna, Concetta. 1990. "Fragments d'une reportation du commentaire de Gilles de Rome sur le premier livre des Sentences. Les extraits des mss. Clm. 8005 et Paris, B. N. Lat. 15819 (First Part)." Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques no. 74:205-254.

  3. ———. 1990. "Fragments d'une reportation du commentaire de Gilles de Rome sur le premier livre des Sentences. Les extraits des mss. Clm. 8005 et Paris, B. N. Lat. 15819 (Second Part)." Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques no. 74:437-456.

Richard of Middletown (1249-1308)


  1. Richard, of Middleton. 1591. Super quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae.

    Written ca. 1290-1300; last printed edition Bussels, 1591.

    Daniels (1909) pp. 84-88: Sententiarum I. Distinctio III. Articulus I. De cognitione Dei a creatura. Quaestio II. Utrum Deum esse sit nobis per se notum. Quaestio III: Utrum Deum esse possit demonstrari.


William of Ware (fl. 1290-1305)


  1. William, of Ware. 1424. Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum.

    Written ca. 1290-1300; available only in manuscript.

    Daniels (1909) pp. 89-104: Quaestio XIV. Quaeritur utrum Deus sit. Questio XXI. Quaeritur utrum Deum esse per se sit notum.


John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308)

Texts and translations

  1. John, Duns Scotus. 1960. Lectura in librum primum Sententiarum. Civitas Vaticana: Typis Poliglottis Vaticanis.

    Written 1298-1299.

    Opera Omnia. ("The Vatican edition"), vol. XVI: Librum I Distinctio II, Quaestio I, nn. 38-135.

  2. ———. 1982. A treatise on God as first principle. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press.

    Written in 1308.

    A Latin text and English translation of the De Primo Principio. Second edition, revised, with a commentary by Allan B. Wolter.

    Firs edition 1966.

  3. ———. 2003. Opus Oxoniense.

    Written 1300-1306.

    Opera Omnia. ("The Vatican edition") Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950-.

    Vol. I Librum I, Distinctio II, Quaestio I, nn. 39-190.


  1. Bonansea, Bernardino. 1967. "Duns Scotus and St. Anselm's ontological argument." Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy no. 4:128-141.

  2. Doyle, John Patrick. 1979. "Some Thoughts on Duns Scotus and the Ontological Argument." New Scholasticism no. 53:234-241.

    "Called since Kant “ the Ontological Argument,” the famous reasoning originally offered by St. Anselm of Canterbury passes from a concept of God as “ that than which a greater cannot be thought ” (id quo maius cogitari nequit ) to the very fact of God’s existence. (1) Our present first concern is with Duns Scotus’ reduction of Anselm’s “ that than which a greater cannot be thought ” to another notion, namely, that of “ the Highest Thinkable ” (Summum cogitabile ). (2)

    Between the Anselmian and the Scotistic concepts there is an evident disparity. While “ the Highest Thinkable ” is something which, as high as it might be, is still “ thinkable,” “ that than which a greater cannot be thought ” need not be itself a thinkable. All that Anselm’s expression on its face requires is that nothing be thinkable beyond it. Anselm himself seems to recognize this when, in reply to Gaunilo, he all but admits the unthinkability of “ that thing (res illa ) than which a greater cannot be thought.” (3)

    Steeped as he was in medieval respect for “ authorities ”, Scotus most certainly knew Anselm's position. Yet he ignored it. Indeed, even as he accepts the basic validity of Anselm's argument, in apparent opposition to Anselm, Scotus understands it as turning on the notion of “ the Highest Thinkable ”. The question is, why?

    For answer, we must look to where Scotus has employed Anselm's reasoning, but only after adding some ” coloration “ (coloratio ) to it. (4)" (pp. 234-235)


    "Being compossible with something else is manifestly different from having a cause adequate to one’s production or to being possible in the full sense of having both internal and external possibility together. Being incompossible with something else, e. g. the Highest Thinkable with one yet higher—which is actually all Scotus has aimed at showing—is even more removed from having real adequate possibility. For incompossibility with a higher already falls short of compossibility with any or all others, whether the incompossibility and the compossibility in question be real or merely logical. Much more then does such incompossibility fall short of real adequate (ordinarily including external as well as internal) possibility.

    In conclusion accordingly, Scotus must (as he in fact does) advance his argument principally from his first “without contradiction That is to say, God is a Highest Thinkable inasmuch as such a notion is without contradiction. But the Subtle Doctor still must bridge the gap which he himself acknowledges between thinkability and real possibility. And notwithstanding success in this, he has yet reached only a real internal possibility and any further passage to actual existence is very much subject to Descartes’ criticism." (p. 241)

    (1) Cf. St. Anselm, Proslogion , cc. 2-4, in Obras completas de San Anselmo (Madrid, 1952), I, pp. 366-370.

    (2) Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 2 (ed. Vat. II, pp. 208-209, nn. 137-138); De primo principio , c. 4 (ed. Muller and Roche [Madrid, 1950], p. 687.

    (3) Quid ad haee respondeat editor ipsius libelli (more commonly called: Liber apologeticus ) c. 9 (ed. Madrid, 1952), p. 434.

    (4) Cf. note 2, above.

  3. Grabs, Harmut. 1997. "Johannes Duns Scotus' Rezeption des Anselmianischen Arguments." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch fur Antike und Mittelalter no. 2:105-125.

    "In his "Ordinatio", Scotus disregards the constitutive function of thinking inherent to Anselm's "ratio". Scotus's representation of the argument in "Ordinatio" I d. 2 p. 1 q. 2, which lays no claim to "coloratio", eliminates this constitutive function, proving instead by means of a syllogism containing the terms "being", "non-being" and "the highest" the existence of the highest. In the "coloratio" ("Ord." I d. 2 p. 1 q. 1), then, Scotus replaces Anselm's expression "that than which nothing greater can be thought" with the concept "the highest thinkable", by which he means an infinite being. The introduction of an infinite being taken as the highest thinkable, however, destroys the structure of Anselm's argument with its innate coherence. In fact, Scotus proves the existence of the highest thinkable not by means of this argumentative structure, but instead on the basis of his own analysis of certain ontological structures. This proof has no real connection in content to Anselm's argument and does not foster its comprehension; instead, Scotus merely couches his argument in Anselm's terms, so that it is more appropriate to talk about a "coloration rationum Scoti". "

  4. Kielkopf, Charles. 1978. "Duns Scotus's rejection of 'Necessarily Exists' as a predicate." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 16:13-21.

    "The paper begins with a reconstruction of Scotus's argument in chapter three (3.23) of his Treatise about the first principle that there can be at most one necessary being. This argument is shown to presuppose that 'necessarily exists' is not a predicate. Scotus' argument is modified to show that he also has to accept that 'exists' is not a predicate. The remaining problem is, then, to explain how Scotus can still accept a "colored" ontological argument. This problem is met by suggesting that the nature of an existing being has more perfections than any nature of a non-existing being but that, still, existence is not one of the features -l et alone anything which can be called a perfection -- making up the nature."

  5. Wolter, Allan, and Adams, McCord Marilyn. 1982. "Duns Scotus Parisian proof for the existence of God." Franciscan Studies no. 42:248-321.

  6. Wood, Rega. 1987. "Scotus argument for the existence of God." Franciscan Studies no. 47:259-277.

Bibliography on the Ancient Period (before Anselm of Canterbury)

  1. Audet, Thomas-André. 1949. Une source augustinienne de l'argument de S. Anselme. In Rencontres

    Étienne Gilson, philosophe de la Chrétienté.

  2. Baldassarri, Mariano. 1971. "Lo stoicismo antico e l'argomento ontologico." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica no. 63:391-418.

  3. Beckaert, A. 1959. "Une justification platonicienne de l'argument a priori." In Spicilegium Beccense I. Congrés International du IX centenaire de l'arrivée d'Anselme au Bec, 185-190. Paris: Vrin.

    Translated in English as: A Platonic justification for the argument a priori in: J. Hick and A. C. McGill (eds.), The many-faced argument. Recent studies on the ontological argument for the existence of God, London: Macmillan 1967, pp. 111-118.

  4. Brunschwig, Jacques. 1994. "Did Diogenes of Babylon invent the ontological argument?" In Papers in Hellenistic philosophy, 170-189. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Translated by Janet Lloyd.

  5. Burrell, David. 1986. Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

  6. Davidson, Herbert Alan. 1979. "Avicenna's proof of the existence of God as a necessarily existent Being." In Islamic philosophical theology, edited by Morewedge, Parviz, 165-187. Albany: State University of New York Press.

    "The first philosopher known to use the concept of necessary existence in order to construct a proof of the existence of God was Avicenna. Avicenna's proof, it will appear, neither is, nor inevitably reduces itself to, an ontological proof. It is rather a certain kind of cosmological proof.

    The concept of necessary existence is used by Avicenna to prove the existence of God in two works, at length in the Najat, briefly and somewhat obscurely in the Isharat. The concept is also discussed fully in two other works, the Shifa and Danesh Namesh, but there Avicenna employs it only to define the nature of God, not, as far as I can see, to establish His existence."

  7. ———. 1987. Proofs for eternity, creation and the existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

  8. Dumont, Jean-Paul. 1982. "Diogène de Babylone et la preuve ontologique." Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger:391-395.

  9. Faggiotto, Pietro. 1954. "La fonte platonica dell'argomento ontologico di Anselmo d'Aosta." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica no. 46:495-497.

  10. Fakhry, Majid. 1968. "The ontological argument in the Arabic tradition: the case of Alfarabi." Studia Islamica no. 64:5-17.

  11. Gelinas, Luke. 2006. "The Stoic argument Ex gradibus entium." Phronesis no. 51:49-73.

    "In this paper I offer an interpretation of the Stoic argumentum ex gradibus entium as it appears in Book II of Cicero's De Natura Deorum. In addition to displaying certain similarities to later formulations of the so-called "ontological argument," particularly Anselm's, I argue that the argument ex gradibus entium was a versatile feature of Stoic philosophical theology, capable of employment in relation to two distinct topics: the existence of god and the identification of god's essential nature with the world. I claim that the instance of the argument ex gradibus entium at ND II 18-21 is a token of this latter type, and show that there are no textual reasons precluding this interpretation. In light of the fact that the argument can be analyzed more effectively in this role, I suggest that this particular instance of the argument is best thought of as an attempt on the part of the Stoics to identify the world with god rather than as a strict proof for god's bare existence. I end with some reflections on the general type of the Stoic argument qua precursor to two of Anselm's ontological proofs. Although I think it is a mistake to call the Stoic argument "ontological" in a strict sense, it may, I suggest, have shared a similar conceptual underpinning with at least one of Anselm's famous formulations."

  12. Gerogiorgakis, Stamatios. 2005. "Wenn die Möglichkeit in Notwendigkeit umschlägt. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte modaler ontologischer Beweise." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter no. 10:21-36.

    "Aristotle produced several arguments to vindicate the futura contingentia and to refute the conception of modalities which do not allow incidental facts. This conception was coined mainly by Diodorus Cronus and implied the view that whatever may happen, is to happen necessarily. Although Aristotle condemned this view and refuted the theology which it implies, Diodorean modalities were employed by the Scholastics (at least since Abelard, as Leibniz pointed out) to support their theology. Abelard's Diodorean formula reads: God wishes no more and no less than what He is able to do -- i.e., God's ability to do something implies necessity. In the Summa theologiae, Thomas Aquinas employed Diodorean modalities along with this result of Abelard's. Leibniz himself confessed his debt to Diodorean modalities as well as to the work of Abelard in formulating his own ontological proof. For the Greek-speaking scholars of the Middle Ages, however, Aristotelian influences were stronger than Diodorean as regards theory building on modalities. The absence of Leibniz-like modal ontological proofs in the Greek tradition seems more plausible under these circumstances."

  13. Halfwassen, Jens. 2002. "Sein als uneingeschränkte Fülle. Zur Vorgeschichte des ontologischen Gottesbeweises im antiken Platonismus." Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung no. 56.

  14. Held, Klaus. 1983. "Zur Vorgeschichte des ontologischen Gottesbeweis. Anselm und Parmenides." Perspektiven der Philosophie no. 9:217-234.

  15. Johnson, J.Prescott. 1953. "The ontological argument in Plato." Personalist no. 44:24-34.

  16. Mayer, Tony. 2001. "Ibn Sina's 'Burhan Al-Siddiqin'." Journal of Islamic Studies no. 12:18-39.

    "Ibn Sina (d.429/1037) gave a distinctive argument for the existence of God in his works. Scholars disagree on the exact structure and character of his argument (admittedly, Ibn Sina gives it in more than one form). This paper tries to determine the argument's precise shape and classify it in relation to other such proofs. It attempts this through a detailed analysis of one of the best known presentations of the proof, in Ibn Sina's Isharat, which is cross-checked with other versions and the commentaries. The argument is found to build on the proposition that existence occurs in the mind dichotomically, as either necessary or contingent. Ibn Sina claims that an extramental Necessary Existent follows from both modes. In the first case, it is contradictory to posit 'necessary existence' in the mind and deny it outside the mind. In the second case 'contingent existence' is such that it could not be self-explanatory. Most space in Ibn Sina's argument is taken up with showing that contingent existence, even if temporally infinite, ultimately implies necessary existence. On these grounds, it is concluded that Ibn Sina's proof must be classified as both ontological and cosmological, without paradox. It is ontological insofar as 'necessary existence' in intellect is the first basis for arguing for a Necessary Existent in re. It is, however, also cosmological insofar as most of it is taken up with arguing that contingent existents cannot stand alone and must end up in a Necessary Existent."

  17. Moreau, Joseph. 1947. "L'argument ontologique dans le Phédon." Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger no. 137:320-343.

  18. Morewedge, Parviz. 1979. "A third version of the ontological argument in the Ibn Sinian metaphysics." In Islamic philosophical theology, edited by Morewedge, Parviz, 182-222. New York: State University of New York Press.

    Reprinted in: P. Morewedge, The mystical philosophy of Avicenna, Binghamton: Global Publications, 2001 pp. 117-163.

  19. Papazian, Micharl. 2007. "The Ontological Argument of Diogenes of Babylon." Phronesis no. 52:188-209.

    "An argument for the existence of gods given by the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon and reported by Sextus Empiricus appears to be an ancient version of the ontological argument. In this paper I present a new reconstruction of Diogenes' argument that differs in certain important respects from the reconstruction presented by Jacques Brunschwig. I argue that my reconstruction makes better sense of how Diogenes' argument emerged as a response to an attack on an earlier Stoic argument presented by Zeno of Citium. Diogenes' argument as reconstructed here is an example of a modal ontological argument that makes use of the concept of being of such a nature as to exist. I argue that this concept is a modal concept that is based on the Philonian definition of possibility, and thus that Diogenes' argument is a source of important evidence about the use of non-Stoic modalities in the post-Chrysippean Stoa. I conclude by arguing that the objections made against considering Diogenes' argument as ontological are unfounded and that Diogenes' argument clearly resembles modern versions of modal ontological arguments."

  20. Vergnes, Jules. 1924. "Les sources de l'argument de Saint Anselme." Revue des Sciences Religeuses no. 4:576-579.

Bibliography on the Medieval Period

  1. Bettoni, Efrem. 1950. Il problema della conoscibilità di Dio nella scuola francescana. Padova: Cedam.

  2. Bonansea, Bernardino. 1973. "The Ontological Argument: Proponents and Opponents." Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy no. 6:135-192.

    "This study is a follow-up to my previous article, Duns Scotus and St Anselm's ontological argument, and traces the history of the controversy about the Anselmian proof from the time when it was first proposed up to the present day. The argument found its strongest opponents in Gaunilo, Aquinas, and Kant, who objected to it on more or less the same ground but from a different perspective, while Bonaventure, Descartes, Leibniz, and Barth came to its support. Between these two opposite positions there is the view of Malcolm and Hartshorne, who see in the "ratio Anselmi" two distinct pieces of reasoning and claim that only one is valid. Koyré and Gilson view the argument within the context of the whole Proslogion and other Anselmian works. Each position is carefully analyzed and evaluated."

  3. ———. 1979. "The Ontological Argument." In God and Atheism. A Philosophical Approach to the Problem of God, 107-170. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

    This chapter is a combination, with some minor changes, of two essays which appeared in Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, ed. John K. Ryan (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press), i.e., "Duns Scotus and St. Anselm's Ontological Argument," vol. IV (1969), pp. 128-41, and "The Ontological Argument: Proponents and Opponents," vol. VI (1973), pp. 135-92.

    "St. Anselm's ontological argument is one of the most provocative and fascinating topics in the field of philosophy. Although the subject of endless discussion, the argument continues to draw the attention of philosophers of different persuasions. New interpretations have superseded those of the past and new insights into the controversy have been revealed which point out, among other things, the difficulty and complexity of the issue.

    It has been customary to dismiss the Anselmian argument for the existence of God on the ground that it involves a transition from the ideal to the real order, from a concept in our mind to the existence of the being so conceived. This transition, it is asserted, is never permissible, not even in the case of the greatest conceivable being, as the argument seems to imply. The fact that many great thinkers, such as Aquinas and Kant, have felt a need to refute the argument is a further proof, so it is claimed, that the ratio Anselmi has little more than a historical value. St. Anselm would have fallen victim to an illusion, and no dialectical effort could ever rescue his argument from the attacks of its critics, even though no serious scholar would subscribe today to Schopenhauer's view that the ratio Anselmi is merely a charming joke.

    Yet, despite the many attacks and "refutations", the argument has a peculiar power of survival. There is a growing realization, even among those whose philosophical background is very different from St. Anselm's way of thinking, that the argument is not as simple as it first appears to be and that much of the criticism directed against it is due to a superficial knowledge of its context and the general framework of Anselm's thought. As a contemporary author points out, "If Anselm is to be refuted, it should be for what he said, taken in something like the context which he provided, and not for something someone else said he said, or a fragment of what he said, torn wholly out of context.'' (1) The Anselmian argument, which has been called "one of the boldest creations of man's reason and a credit not only to its inventor, but to human reason itself," (2) is not to be treated lightly, nor are some of its later formulations.

    An objective study of the Anselmian argument in its actual context and historical development may reveal that, while undue credit has been given to certain modern and contemporary thinkers for their role in the controversy about it, the actual contribution of philosophers who long preceded them in the academic arena has often been neglected or even completely ignored. Yet it is perhaps in the writings of these forgotten masters, who both historically and intellectually are closer to the "father of scholasticism" than their later contenders, that one may find a clue to a better appreciation of the celebrated argument.

    To avoid misunderstanding, a distinction must be made at the very outset between two different issues: first, the nature and scope of the argument in the mind of its author, and second, the validity of the argument as an attempt to prove the existence of God. The first issue must be solved in terms of the argument's original text as contained in the Proslogion and set in relation to Anselm's other writings where his philosophical, and especially his epistemological, doctrines are more clearly stated. The solution of the second issue rests to a great extent on the critic's conviction as regards the possibility, ways, and means of attaining to any knowledge of a Supreme Being by unaided reason. The failure to make such a distinction has contributed to much of the confusion in appraisals of the Anselmian proof.

    The purpose of this chapter is to present the essential features of the ontological argument as stated in the Proslogion and follow the history of the controversy it has generated from Anselm's first debate with his fellow-monk Gaunilo down to the present day. The presentation will be followed by a critical evaluation of the argument itself and of the argument's interpretations by succeeding philosophers and commentators." pp. 107-108

    (1) Charles Hartshorne, Introduction to the Second Edition of Saint Anselm: Basic Writings, trans. by S. W. Deane (La Salle, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1962), p. 2.

    (2) Richard Taylor, Introduction to The Ontological Argument from St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers, ed. by Alvin Plantinga (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday "Anchor Books, 1965), p. XVIII.

  4. Gómez Caffarena, José. 1963. "Review of: Die ontologische Gottesbeweis by Dieter Henrich." International Philosophical Quarterly no. 3:617-624.

  5. Javelet, Robert. 1984. "L'argument dit ontologique et la speculatio." In Spicilegium Beccense (vol. II), 501-510. Paris.

  6. Johnson, H.J. 1981. "The Ontological Argument and the Languages of "Being"." In Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter (vol. II), 724-737. Berlin, New York.

  7. Pegis, Anton. 1970. "Four Medieval Ways to God." Monist no. 54:317-358.

    About St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas amd Henry of Ghent.

  8. Streveler, Paul. 1976. "Two "New" Critiques of the Ontological Argument." In Saint Anselme ses précurseurs et ses contemporains, edited by Kohlenberger, Helmut, 55-64. Frankfurt: Minerva.

    "We need only look back upon the history of medieval philosophy to become immediately aware that it was not only Gaunilon who saw reason to criticise Anselm's famous argument. I would like to examine here, in a rather sketchy manner, two medieval critiques of Anselm's argument which, to my mind, are quite unique and which, in many ways, far surpass in cogency and relevancy the common criticisms found in textbooks. The first I gather from certain remarks of William of Occam which, are not directed precisely at Anselm's argument, but which are naturally applicable to it. The second is the critique of Gregory of Rimini.

    Occam's critique, it will be seen, rests upon a very subtle logical point, which is somewhat unique in medieval philosophy and which anticipates views in modern symbolic logic. Occam was recognized even in his own day as somewhat of an innovator, although we have since learned that there were others of his contemporaries of even more radical stature.

    The second critique I gather from Gregory of Rimini, a younger contemporary of Occam, whose thought evinces certain affinities to that of the latter. Rimini's fame among logicians of modern symbolic logic who attempt to see anticipations of later more sophisticated developments in medieval philosophy, rests upon his doctrine of the cornplexe significabile which seems to be a subtle anticipation of our modern notion of a proposition, or at least of the Fregean notion of the "object" of thought.

    It should be remarked also, by way of introduction, that a great deal of the ideas and interpretations as well as of the scholarly references utilized in this paper came to me through discussions with my former teacher and friend of happy memory, the late, Julius R. Weinberg." (pp. 55-56)<