Bibliographia

Raul Corazzzon
This website is devoted to bibliographical resources on philosophy and religion.

I will begin with Bibliographies on the history of early Christianity; the planned sections are:

*Bibliographies of philosophy:* on arguments not treated in my other websites.

*Hebrew Bible:* Bibliographies on the formation of the Pentateuch, the Canon, the psuedepigrapha, textual criticism and the history of the research.

*New Testament:* Bibliographies on the synoptic question, the gospels, the letters, Acts of Apostles and Revelation, the formation of the Canon, the psuedepigrapha, textual criticism and the history of the research.

*Literature of the Early Christianity:* Bibliographies on the Apostolic Fathers, orthodoxy and heresy.

*Literature of the Early Judaism:* Bibliographies on the birth of Judaism and the Parting of the Ways between Christianity and
Judaism.

*Philosophy and Phenomenology of Religion*: Definition of 'Religion', Analytic and Continental perspectives; the dichotomy between Sacred and Profane; the debate over the existence of God.

*Sociology of Religion*: The Sociology of Early Christianity; Charisma and Its Routinization in Early Christianity; Messianism and Millenarism from a sociological perspective.

*Study Guides*: this section contains Bibliographies on dictionaries and encyclopedias of philosophy, manuals of style for philosophy students and a selection of introductory readings on history of philosophy, metaphysics, ontology and the philosophy of logic.

Currently this site is in an early stage of development: the only sections available are those on the synoptic problem, the ontological argument for the existence of God and the Study Guides. If you are interested, please be patient: in the next future I will add more pages. This is my third website after “Theory and History of Ontology and “History of Logic” that I will continue to develope.
What's New on This Site: Recently Modified Pages

RECENT UPDATES

September 16th, 2021: Updated the bibliography on the Synoptic Problem
Contents of the projected pages

Bibliographies on Philosophy

Peter Abelard. Bibliography on His theology and the doctrine of the Trinity

Peter Abelard. Bibliography on His Ethics and Moral Philosophy

Questions of Biblical Criticism

Hebrew Bible Textual Criticism

History of the Hebrew Bible Critical Research

New Testament Textual Criticism

History of New Testament Critical Research

Hebrew Bible
New Testament

The Synoptic Gospels

The Synoptic Problem

The Gospel of Matthew

The Gospel of Mark

The Gospel of Luke

The Pauline Epistles

1 Thessalonians, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, Philippians, Philemon, Galatians, Romans

Early Developments of Christianity

The Acts of the Apostles

Deutero-Pauline Epistles

2 Thessalonians, Colossians, Ephesians

Pastoral Epistles

1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus

The Epistle to the Hebrews
The Catholic Epistles: James, 1 Peter, 2 Peter, Judas

**The Johannine Literature**

The Gospel of John
The Epistles: 1, 2, 3 John

**The Christian Apocalyptic**

The Book of Revelation

**The Canon of the New Testament**

The Formation of the Canon
The New Testament Apocrypha
on the Apocryphal Literature
General Studies on the Apocryphal Literature

**New Testament Apocrypha**
Apocryphal Gospels
Apocryphal Acts
Apocryphal Letters
Apocryphal Apocalypses

Early Christian Orthodox Literature (I-II Centuries)

Apostolic Fathers

Clement of Rome (fl. c. 95)
Ignatius of Antioch (fl. c. 100-115)
Polycarp of Smyrna (69-155)
Didaché (100-150)
The Epistle of Barnabas (130-131)
Papias of Hierapolis (c. 60-130)
Quadratus of Athens (d. 129)
Papias of Hierapolis (c. 60-130)
Epistle to Diognetus (130? - late 2nd century?)
The Shepherd of Hermas (90-150)
Christian Writers of the Second Century

Justin Martyr (c. 100-165)

Aristide of Athens, Apology (c. 120-138)

Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215)

Tertullian (155-c. 220)

Melito of Sardis (d. 180)

Irenaeus (early 2nd century – died c. 202)

Athenagoras of Athens (c. 133-c.190)

Theophilus of Antioch (d. 183-185)

Hippolitus of Rome (170-235)

Bibliography on the Early Christian Heterodox Literature (I-II Centuries))

The Problem of the Birth of Heresy
Dissent in the First Century

The Bauer Thesis: The Origins of Orthodoxy and Heresy

Simon Magus

Ebionism

Nicolaism

Heresies of the Second Century

Christian Gnosticism

Sethianism

Marcionism

Montanism

Ebionites

Nazarenes

Elchasaites

Philosophy and Phenomenology of Religion

History of the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God
General Introduction

General Works on the History of the Ontological Argument

The Medieval Period from Anselm of Canterbury to Duns Scotus

The Modern Period from Suárez to Frege

The Contemporary Period from Barth to the Present Time

A Selection of Primary Texts

Fundamental Questions

The Sacred

Monotheism and Polytheism

Sociology of Religion

The Sociology of Early Christianity
Charisma and Its Routinization in Early Christianity

Messianism

Millenarism

Bibliographical study guides

Study Guides on Western Philosophy

Introductory Works, Dictionaries, Encyclopedias

Bibliography of Philosophy and Manuals of Style

General Works on the History of Philosophy

Formal and Descriptive Metaphysics

Formal and Descriptive Ontology

Philosophical Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Bibliographies on Philosophy

(Under construction)

Peter Abelard

Peter Abelard. Bibliography on His theology and the doctrine of the Trinity

Peter Abelard. Bibliography on His Ethics and Moral Philosophy
Peter Abelard. Bibliography on His theology and the doctrine of the Trinity

Bibliography


"This paper supports the claim that what "nominalism" meant to twelfth-century thinkers was the doctrine of the univocal signification of nouns and verbs, with their oblique or tensed forms conveying consignification of the things or actions they signify in the nominative case or present tense, respectively. The paper shows that both Peter Abelard and Peter Lombard called upon this doctrine in their argument over whether God can do better that He does, indicating that nominalism so defined has a perceived utility for exponents of differing logical and theological persuasions at the time."

"With respect to the Lombard's contribution to the history of nominalism in the twelfth century, then, we may offer three conclusions. First, from our consideration of Abelard's case, it is clear that the *opinio Nominalium* could be, and was, yoked to a post-Aristotelian kind of logic. From our consideration of the Lombard's case, it is equally clear that the *opinio Nominalium* could just as easily be yoked to a mode of reasoning deemed capable of
yielding cogent ontological conclusions. In this respect, the fact that a twelfth-century thinker espouses the *opinio Nominalium* does not mean that he is automatically or necessarily required to embrace one rather than the other of these different conceptions of logic. Second, it was not just the fact that the Lombard was a theologian but his particular agenda as a theologian who sought to affirm God's omnipotence and God's essence as the transcendent metaphysical reality that accounts for both his borrowings from Abelard and his more fundamental hostility to Abelard in this area. And, finally, thanks to the rapid and enduring success of the Lombard's *Sentences'* as a textbook, he was able to place both his position on divine transcendence, the distinction between God's absolute and ordained power, and the *opinio Nominalium* with which he bolstered these teachings squarely before the eyes of his scholastic contemporaries and successors." (pp. 155-156.)


Abstract: "As a theologian no less than as a logician, Peter Abelard has been hailed as the father of scholasticism. Both in the rules for critiquing authorities laid out at the beginning of his Sic et non and in his challenge in the Dialogus, that believers need to bolster their creeds with rational arguments, he takes to the field as the emblematic opponent of Bernard of Clairvaux, their standoff representing the last ditch effort of monastic obscurantism to halt the advance of scholastic enlightenment. In this essay, I wish to question this standard picture of Abelard the theologian. Despite his insistence on the need to apply reason and critical analysis to the Christian tradition, his project turns out to be better stated in theory than it was worked out in actual practice. And, in some of the substantive areas where he
is deemed the most radical, he emerges as closer to the theological mainstream than is often appreciated.

  Abstract: "Like many of his medieval successors, Peter Abelard offers principles for ranking sins. Moral self-knowledge, after all, requires that we recognize not just our sinfulness, but also the extent of our offense. The most important distinction among sins is that between venial and mortal sins: venial sinners show less contempt and may also be victims of bad moral luck, and so they are far less blameworthy. However, the subjective principle which Abelard uses to protect the venial sinner from blame appears to have absurd consequences: some agents whom we intuitively find saintly turn out to be mortal sinners, while other agents whom we intuitively judge wicked turn out to be mere venial sinners. I argue that Abelard suggests promising replies to these objections, but these replies themselves depend on controversial views about moral psychology."
• ———. 1985. "Peter Abelard's (Theologia Christiana) and (Theologia 'Scholarium') Re-examined." Recherches de Theologie et Philosophie Medievales no. 52:109-158.


—. 2014. "Abelard and His Contemporaries on Faith: From the "Sic et non" to the "Theologia Scholarium" and Beyond " In Fides Virtus: The Virtue of Faith from the Twelfth to the Early Sixteenth Century edited by Forlivesi, Marco, Quinto, Riccardo and Vecchio, Silvana, 137-150. Münster: Aschendorff.


On Abelard see p. 369-379.


Abstract: "In this paper I am making the argument that the brief excursus on the Song of Songs in Abelard’s second letter to Heloise (the fifth in the Correspondence) contains exegesis of a few phrases of this biblical book that is so far out of the ordinary that it cannot be taken seriously and was not intended to be. This argument is based on the following observations: the lines presented as being from the Song of Songs are not really biblical verses; no remotely comparable exegesis of these phrases exists in earlier and contemporaneous exegesis; the literal interpretation that Abelard applies besides an allegorical reading was expressly forbidden by authorities both old and new; and finally Abelard’s alleged exegesis conflicts absolutely with his own exegesis of the same elements in authenticated works.

Dans cet article, je démontre que la brève digression sur le Cantique des Cantiques dans la deuxième lettre d’Abélard à Héloise (la cinquième dans la Correspondance) contient une exégèse de quelques phrases de ce livre biblique s’écartant tellement de
l’ordinaire, que l’on ne peut pas la prendre au sérieux et que telle n’en fut pas l’intention. Cette affirmation se base sur les observations suivantes: les phrases présentées comme provenant du Cantique des Cantiques ne sont pas réellement des versets de la Bible; il n’existe pas la moindre exégèse de ces phrases comparable dans l’exégèse antérieure et contemporaine; l’interprétation littérale à laquelle Abélard se prête de pair avec une lecture allégorique, était formellement interdite par les autorités tant anciennes que nouvelles; et, enfin, la soi-disant exégèse d’Abélard est en opposition absolue avec sa propre exégèse des mêmes éléments dans des œuvres reconnues comme authentiques."


Peter Abelard. Bibliography on His Ethics and Moral Philosophy

Bibliography

- Bejczy, István. 2003. "Deeds Without Value: exploring a Weak Spot in Abelard's Ethics." *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* no. 70:1-21. Abstract: "In his ethical writings Peter Abelard declared the accomplishment of good deeds irrelevant to a person’s merit. Also, he denied that acts had any moral value in themselves. The article argues that both theses are contradicted by the purport of Abelard’s ethical teaching. If the opportunity to act is present, good intentions must be followed by good deeds in order not to lose their meritorious character. Moreover, the intrinsic morality of intended acts determines the morality of human intentions, whereas the moral evaluation of these acts determines whether consenting to them is sinful. Good acts can become neutral or bad on account of improper intentions, but evil deeds always retain their evil character. In the early-twentieth-century debate on Abelard’s alleged moral subjectivism, both sides appear to have been at fault to a certain degree. Those who charged Abelard with subjectivism mistook his theses on the indifference of human actions for the essence of his ethical teaching. Those who defended Abelard against the said charge have pointed to his use of objective criteria of..."
right and wrong either with regard to intentions or with regard to deeds. In the first case, they did not notice that Abelard’s notion of objectively right or wrong intentions implies a judgment on the intrinsic moral value of material deeds; in the second case, they failed to account for the inconsistency with Abelard’s theses on the moral indifference of human actions."

- Findley, Brooke Heidenreich. 2006. "Does the Habit Make the Nun? A Case Study of Heloise's Influence on Abelard's Ethical Philosophy." *Vivarium* no. 44:248-275. Abstract: "A careful reading of Heloise's letters reveals both her contribution to Abelard's ethical thought and the differences between her ethical concerns and his. In her letters, Heloise focuses on the innate moral qualities of the inner person or animus. Hypocrisy—the misrepresentation of the inner person through false outer appearance, exemplified by the potentially deceitful religious habit or habitus—is a matter of great moral concern to her. When Abelard responds to Heloise's ideas, first in his letters to her and later in his Collationes and Scito te ipsum, he turns the discussion away from her original interests. He transforms her metaphor of the habitus as false appearance into a discussion of another type of habitus, the habitual process of acquiring virtue, and integrates her focus on the animus into his developing ideas about sin as intention. Examining the differences between Heloise's ethical thought and Abelard's allows us to appreciate the distinct contributions of both."
Abstract: "In the Ethics, Abelard discusses the example of a judge who knowingly convicts an innocent defendant. He claims that this judge does rightly when he punishes the innocent man to the full extent of the law. Yet this claim seems counterintuitive, and, at first glance, contrary to Abelard’s own ethical system. Nevertheless, I argue that Abelard’s ethical system cannot be viewed as completely subjective, since the rightness of an individual act of consent is grounded in objective standards established by God. Likewise, any particular civil government must derive its authority objectively from the natural and/or Christian laws, which ground its possibility and function. In this paper, I examine Abelard’s explication of the natural law, discoverable through reason, and the divine laws, knowable only through revelation, in order to explore what form an adequate civil law would have to take under which the judge could be said to have acted rightly."

  Chapter 10: Boethius 125-128; Anselm: 129-132; Abelard: 132-135; Bibliography 136-137.
• McAleer, G. J. 1995. "Reason, the Ethical Subject and Sin in the Thought of Peter Abelard." Mediaevalia. Textos e Estudos no. 7-8:177-198.
  Abstract: "Peter Abelard is perhaps best known for having taken the role of master in the schools to celebrity status. Yet dramatically public as his life was, the analyses he develops in his commentary on the letter to the Romans (c. 1134) and in the Ethica (c. 1138) of moral action, sacramental efficacy, even the atonement, center on interior subjectivity. The rightness of an act is determined in the first instance by the agent's intention, and ultimately by God's. The sacraments, such as baptism and penance, represent what God is accomplishing through his relation to the recipient, independently of the actions themselves or the work of the priest. Further, just
as sin involves a turning away from God, so our redemption consists in the love aroused in us by the sacrifice of his Son. All of this displays Abelard's capacity for analytic nuance; but it foreshadows, too, the shift that will divide Christian theology in the sixteenth century.

  Abstract: "Abelard’s most famous spokesman for the ancient and abiding moral and religious worth of the Law of Moses is probably the character of the Jew, invented for one of two fictional dialogues in the Collationes. The equally fictive Philosopher, a rationalist theist who gets the last word in his exchange with the Jew, condemns the Law as a useless addition to the natural law, a threat to genuine morality with a highly dubious claim to divine origin. The Philosopher’s condemnation, however, does not go unanswered. Abelard himself, writing in his own voice in two major treatments of the Law, defends the ancient worth of the Law as a revolution in moral understanding and a potential guarantor of salvation. The Law is just and rational, he argues, in every one of its precepts, even when interpreted according to the letter. As such, the letter of the Law has been and ought to be retained in Christianity: its moral precepts are binding everywhere and always; its non-moral precepts are binding, when, in the changing circumstances of the Church, they are found to be useful and not conducive to scandal."


Abstract: "This article reassesses Peter Abelard's account of moral intention, or, better, consent, in light of recent work on his own thought and on the twelfth-century background of that thought. The author argues (1) that Abelard's focus on consent as the determining factor for morality does not rule out, but, on the contrary, presupposes objective criteria for moral judgment and (2) that Abelard's real innovation does not lie in his doctrine of consent as the sole source of merit or guilt, but, rather, in his exploration of the ways in which this doctrine affects our understanding of the objective criteria for moral judgment. In particular, Abelard is led by his doctrine of consent to a thoroughgoing reassessment of the moral significance of the passions, which, in turn, leads him to reject the view that actions should be evaluated in terms of the praiseworthy or vicious character of the passions they express."

"When speaking of ethics in this connection, we are not referring to a 'doctrine on human behaviour'; rather it is to be understood as the philosophical (or theological) pursuit concerning the justification of such a theory. Beforehand it must be said that Abelard's *Ethica seu Scito te ipsum* can be regarded as a theological work in being part of the curriculum presented in theological training. The central question this work deals with can be expressed as follows: what are the exact standards by which human behaviour is judged good or evil? One should not ask whether Abelard's *Ethics* is a theological or philosophical work, for that is not the point. As we have already mentioned, ethics was part of theological enquiry and teaching. This answer is not a final one, however. For Abelard's conception of theology was such that philosophy, as an ultimate rational justification, was certainly admitted to theology, but,
moreover, it even implied that philosophy was an essential constituent of fundamental theological enquiry. We must examine his Ethics in detail in order to see how Abelard in fact discusses the issue." (p. 1)


Table of Contents: I. Introduction 1; II. Abelard's Self Presentation 11; III. The Realm of Reason; 45; IV. The Goodness of God and the Dignity of man 63; V. The Gift of Grace 85; VI. The Trinity 91; VII. The Person of Christ 103; VIII. The Vindication of Pagan Philosophy 111; IX. The Objective Basis of Abelard's Subjective Ethics 125; X, The Meaning of Christ's Work 151; Bibliography 173-185.

"It is the intended purpose of this study to approach Abelard’s doctrine of Christ's work on its own terms and in context with the general direction of his thought. But one can only accomplish this by subterranean means, by probing beneath the surface in order to uncover the motivating reason behind his rejection of extreme realism and the doctrine of original sin, as well as the
fundamental intentionality behind his vindication of pagan philosophy and the utilization of the dialectic. It is in such acts of intention and meaning that the stance and selfhood of a person are revealed. Selfhood, Robinson writes, is constituted by a commitment to a context. (7) And Abelard reveals himself as one committed to a strict following of all the injunctions of the most uncompromising interpretation of the Christian calling. (…)

Abelard proceeds to the next stage of his thought which is an elaboration of a rigorist system of ethics with its sharp emphasis upon man's complete accountability for the character of his life. Virtue, he argues in line with his logical conclusions, is a natural quality acquired by human effort. It is not, as the realists maintain, something synonymous with grace. A man becomes virtuous by struggling to attain virtue, not by a passive participation in this quality. Without the struggle, he maintained, there can be no crown. Abelard's charted course never alters. It is anchored in his rigid commitment. Thus, he leads one step-by-step to the foot of the cross and his "subjective" view of the Atonement which is the final station of his thought." (pp. 4-5)

(…)

"And yet, his celebrated theory which has prompted pages upon pages of exposition consists of only a few meager paragraphs in his Commentary on Romans. Abelard never set out to fully elaborate this doctrine, and, for this reason, it remained a brief excursus on the question of redemption. And yet — as St. Bernard rightly perceived — this is the very heart of Abelardianism. His view of the Summum Bonum, his Logos theology, his ethics, and even his logical views are knotted together in these three terse paragraphs.[*] Abelard simply could not mouth the Pauline view of Christ's work. And so, he struggled to equate God's justice (iustitia) with His love (charitatis) by a bizarre twisting of the apostle's words.
He writes: "Ad ostensionem suae iustitiae, id est charitatis, quae nos, ut dictum est, apud eum iustificat, id est ad exhibendam nobis suam dilectionem, vel ad insinuandum nobis quantum eum diligere debeamus, qui proprio Filio suo non pepercit pro nobis." (9) Christ died, he asserts, not to meet the demands of God’s justice, but to fulfill the demands of His love. His intransigent moral sense necessitated his manipulation of the apostle’s meaning. His moral perspective challenged the faith which he cherished, and eventually caused his condemnation." (p. 6)


(9) *Epist. ad Romanos*, II, 833B.

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

  Abstract: "Recent study of the history of the Synoptic Problem has suggested that, in the 19th century, the theory of Marcan priority was adopted, and the Griesbach hypothesis rejected, as part of an attempt to counter the historical scepticism of D.F. Strauss and others in the 'Tübingen school', and to restore the historical reliability of the gospel account.
  This article examines this question, and suggests that, in fact, the Griesbach hypothesis was considered, and rejected, quite independently of any associations with the Tübingen school. A brief survey of some of the arguments which were brought against the Griesbach hypothesis suggests that what is lacking is a set of convincing reasons for Mark's having proceeded in the way which the Griesbach hypothesis alleges he did."


This paper has analyzed some of the parallels between material in different parts of the Didache and material in the synoptic gospels.
The result has been that these parallels can be best explained if the Didache presupposes the finished gospels of Matthew and Luke.
Further, this result seems to apply to all parts of the Didache examined here. Precisely how the gospels were available to the author of the Didache is impossible to say: they may have been available as separate texts; they may have been already combined to form a single harmonized text. However, the evidence of the Didache seems to show that the text is primarily a witness to the post-redactional history of the synoptic tradition. It is not a witness to any pre-redactional developments." (p. 128)
"As we come to the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the 2GH has waned somewhat in significance. Farmer and Dungan, perhaps the most vocal and energetic of the defenders of the 2GH in the recent past, have both died. Today, lip service is regularly and explicitly paid to the 2GH as a theoretical alternative to the 2DH, but I know of no great new discussions or analyses of the theory in recent years. Meanwhile, Goulder has also now died, but his mantle has been taken over by others, so that the FH has gained considerable momentum through the work of scholars such as Goodacre, Poitier, Watson, and others, and now would appear to command a significant level of support. For some at least, it has inherited the place of the 2GH as the main alternative theory to the 2DH. In any scholarly context, the debates that take place are as often as not generated by, and reflect, the interests and positions of the participants involved. Hence today, in many contexts (colloquia, volumes of essays, etc.), space is regularly given to advocates of the FH to argue their case, and the hypothesis is also often noted and discussed in detail by advocates of the 2DH. By contrast, the 2GH today is effectively rather sidelined." (p. 4, note omitted)

"We cannot and should not expect scholars of the past to have anticipated the problems (and postulated solutions) that arose subsequently to the time they wrote, especially in relation to the Synoptic Problem where so many theoretical possibilities exist, and it is simply not possible to consider them all in detail within a finite time. In looking to the past, we have to seek to engage in "fair play" in considering how others at the time argued and debated and not impose our own agendas, and presuppositions, on them. In considering then "theological issues at stake" in past discussions of the Synoptic Problem, I look first at the
possible issues that those engaged in the discussions at the time may have thought were at stake. In a final section I offer some brief critical reflections on those issues from a contemporary standpoint from where, with hindsight, it is all too easy to be critical! However, perhaps initially one owes it to those being considered to try to understand what they thought were the key issues concerned." (p. 6)


"In contemporary gospel study, the word 'doublet' is used for doubly attested sayings or narratives in one and the same gospel. Its use was originally limited to saying doublets (*logia*), especially in Mt and Lk. The great number of doublets in these gospels became a classic argument for the two-source hypothesis: besides their knowledge and use of Mk, Matthew and Luke used a second common source (a sayings collection, *Logienquelle*, which was later called Q). At the times this explanation of the doublets was something new in the study of the synoptic gospels.

Before the rise of historical criticism it had been common to say that the evangelist, who wrote twice the same saying of Jesus, was convinced that Jesus had spoken these words on two different occasions." (p. 278, notes omitted)

(...)

"At the end of the 19th century, with the priority of Mark established, the search for Mark's literary sources will be elaborated in the many theories of a primitive Markan gospel and of a double miracle cycle. It will create a debate in Markan exegesis of the twentieth century." (p. 306)


"This is not a mysterious issue. The main figures are Loisy, Lagrange, their reception of Harnack, the Biblical Commission Decree of June 26, 1912, Leon Vaganay (1882-1969), and the happy ending in the heroic figure of Bruno de Solages, whose story should be better known." (p. 151)

(...)

"This report on French Catholic scholarship on the Synoptic Problem in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries does not come to a happy ending. From 1911 to 1956, French Catholic scholars who expected an *imprimatur* for their studies of the gospels felt that they were obliged to accept the decrees of the Biblical Commission on this matter. The Commission gave a particular reading of the words of Papias, as preserved in Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 3.39. Papias briefly mentions that Matthew wrote the oracles in the Hebrew language. The Commission took this to mean the whole gospel of canonical Matthew, but in Hebrew or Aramaic. This brief notice in Papias/Eusebius was continuously repeated by those ancient authors who discussed gospel origins, and they added the chronological nuance that Matthew wrote before Mark, although Papias does not say this. This ghost of an Aramaic Matthew nearly identical with our canonical Greek Matthew dominates Vaganay and still hovers over Boismard's intermediate Matthew.

Boismard's three-volume work remains the most important work in our purview. It culminates in a rich


"The question this raises is whether the Q consensus that established itself in the later nineteenth century was the all-but-inevitable conclusion of a century of intensive synoptic research, or the product of contingencies-decisions that might have gone the other way given a different set of scholarly priorities. In addressing this
question, the case of H.J. Holtzmann (1832-1910) will prove to be exemplarily. Spanning the last four decades of the nineteenth century, the period of transition between the diversity of early synoptic research and the triumph of the two-source hypothesis, Holtzmann's work both contributes to that triumph and discloses the uncertainties on which it is founded." (p. 39)

For more than one hundred years, research on the Synoptic Problem has tended to deny any direct interdependence between the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. There are several well-known (but partly fallacious) arguments against the assumption that one author used the text of the other, but as a rule, dismissal of the dependence idea no longer seem to require explanation."

(p. 3)

"The present study deals with that period in New Testament studies when it was considered quite natural that Luke should have been a sort of critic and one who deconstructed the Gospel of Matthew. This starting point even dominated scholarship in the nineteenth century. The contemporary authors of the time, mostly German, would have been surprised to hear that precisely the "scattering" should be seen as a huge problem with regard to Luke’s dependence on Matthew. These scholars, who have been unmeritedly forgotten, can in part be considered as the predecessors of Austin Farrer, Michael Goulder, Mark Goodacre and especially - as we will see below - Eric Franklin, and their works therefore need to be reexamined and integrated into the ongoing discussion." (p. 4)
"It will be seen that the essential feature in the line of argument adopted is the importance attached to parallelism of sequence between the three Synoptics, as distinguished from mere resemblance in subject-matter and even language." (p. 1)

("I will now give the reasons which seem to me to prove conclusively that the original basis of the Synoptical Gospels coincided in its range and order with our St. Mark(A)."

1. The earliest and the latest parallels in all three Gospels coincide with the beginning and end of St. Mark. The first is the ministry of St. John the Baptist, the last the visit of the women to our Saviour's tomb.

2. With but few exceptions we find parallels to the whole of St. Mark in either St. Matthew or St. Luke, and to by far the larger part in both.

3. The order of the whole of St. Mark, excepting of course what is peculiar to that Gospel, is confirmed either by St. Matthew or St. Luke, and the greater part of it by both.

4. A passage parallel in all three Synoptists is never immediately followed in both St. Matthew and St. Luke by a separate incident or discourse common to these two evangelists alone.

5. Similarly in the parts common to St. Matthew and St. Luke alone, no considerable fragments, with some doubtful exceptions(B), occur in the same relative order, so that it is unlikely that they formed part of the original source."
(6) To this we may add the fact that in the same parts the differences between St. Matthew and St. Luke are generally greater than in those which are common to all three.

Not one of these arguments is of itself necessary to prove our point. That the Synoptists should have preserved so much of the original source and of its order, is for the Gospel student a happy accident which enables him to determine its limits with a certain degree of exactness. It may be added that arguments of a like kind could not be adduced to prove the priority of a Gospel resembling St. Matthew or St. Luke." (pp. 61-62)

(A) By our St. Mark here and throughout is meant our present Gospel according to the best critical texts, and excluding therefore xvi. 9-20, against the genuineness of which this inquiry alone will be found to add strong evidence.

No Marcan section of anything like the same importance is absent from St. Matthew and St. Luke.

(B) 1 Cf. Matt. xii. 22-30 with Luke xi. 14-23; xii. 38-42 with xi. 29-32; xii. 43-45 with xi. 24-26. See pp. 77, 78. Perhaps we should add Matt xii.33-35 compared with Luke vi. 43-45.

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of the main studies in English from 1964 (Buc - Day)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

  "In recent article, Professors Talbert and McKnight have attempted to falsify, or at least cast doubt upon the Griesbach hypothesis.(1) This is a legitimate and timely undertaking, because the synoptic problem is currently receiving more attention than it has commanded since Sanday's seminar at Oxford and Streeter's publication of *The Four Gospels.*(2) Like all other hypotheses, the Griesbach hypothesis should be re-analyzed periodically to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses." (p. 550) (...) "Conclusion. McKnight's work is certainly a contribution to the discussion which attempts to describe the literary relationships which exist between Matthew and Luke. His method of selecting parallel passages and comparing poetry with poetry or prose with poetry is one of the ways this might be done. The results of the study, however, did not falsify the Griesbach hypothesis. For the first example, there is a reasonable, alternative explanation for the literary phenomena described. Matthew and Luke appear to contain different Greek translations of the same
Semitic poetry, but that does not prove that either gospel used the other or was written without access to the other during its own composition. The second example included *chreias* upon which both gospel writers had elaborated. It appears, however, that the absence of the phrase "scribes and Pharisees" may be explained as the sort of omission one would expect in a gospel approved by Marcion. This suggestion is at least as likely as the proposal that the addition was made by a Palestinian author. The argument is not very convincing either way, and it seems wise to acknowledge ignorance of the precise way in which these gospel writers put together these particular sources. The third example shows that in this case Luke did not use Matthew as his source but it does not show that Luke is earlier than Matthew or was the source Matthew used. It seems reasonable to suggest that Matthew and Luke are not directly related here but have instead used a common source. None of Talbert’s and McKnight's efforts to falsify the Griesbach hypothesis turn out, upon analysis, to be conclusive. Indeed, some of the passages point the critic toward the Griesbach hypothesis rather than away from it. The purpose of this response, however, has not been to prove the validity hypothesis, but to analyze an attempt made to falsify it. A careful case against the Griesbach hypothesis suggests the verdict: "Not proved." (pp.571-572)

1. C. H. Talbert and E. V. McKnight, "Can the Griesbach Hypothesis" *JBL* 91 (1972) 338-68.


"The Old Testament and Previous Scholarship

For many years scholars have understood that the Matthaean Beatitudes were closely related to the Old Testament, especially Isaiah 57, 61, 66, and Psalms 24,
This Old Testament information, however, has not led scholars to realize fully the unity of the message and structure of these Beatitudes. This may be true, because New Testament scholars have not approached the Beatitudes from a midrashic point of view, realizing the influence that an Old Testament text can have upon the meaning of the midrash. They may not have understood some of the thought forms that were basic to the Old Testament texts which the author of the Beatitudes took for granted. Therefore, this essay will begin with an introduction to some of these presuppositions: first, concerning the influence of the whole text to the message of a midrash." (p. 161)


Abstract: "The two-document theory as to the relations of the Synoptic Gospels so generally held twenty years ago has proved to be insufficient to explain the facts. In this article recent developments of synoptic criticism are indicated. The method of investigation, called Formgeschichte, undertakes to discover the various elements in the Gospels by means of typical forms of literary style. On the basis of this study it becomes possible to discover the nature of editorial redaction in the Gospels and to distinguish those portions of the tradition which are original from the secondary elements supplied by the Gospel writers. By comparing the literary styles in the Gospels with parallel literary expressions of Hellenistic and rabbinical literature, light is thrown on the question as to whether a given utterance originated on Palestinian or on Hellenistic soil. It is the conviction of the advocates of formgeschichtliche investigation that this method marks a genuine advance in the task of ascertaining what the historical facts are concerning the preaching of Jesus and the rise of the early Christian community."

Revised edition 1968.

"The following investigation therefore sets out to give an account of the history of the individual units of the tradition, and how the tradition passed from a fluid state to the fixed form in which it meets us in the Synoptics and in some instances even outside them. I am entirely in agreement with M. Dibelius when he maintains that form-criticism is not simply an exercise in aesthetics nor yet simply a process of description and classification; that is to say, it does not consist in identifying the individual units of the tradition according to their aesthetic or other characteristics and placing them in their various categories. It is much rather 'to rediscover the origin and history of the tradition before it took literary form'. The proper understanding of form-criticism rests upon the judgement that the literature in which the life of a given community, even the primitive Christian community, has taken shape, springs out of quite definite style and quite specific form and categories. Thus every literary category has its 'life situation' (Sitz im Leben: Gunkel), whether it be worship in its different forms, or work, or hunting, or war. The Sitz im Leben is not, however, an individual historical event, but a typical situation or occupation in the life of a community. In the same way, the literary 'category', or 'form', through which a particular item is classified is a sociological concept and not an aesthetic one, however much it may be possible by its subsequent development to use such form as aesthetic media in some particular literary product. But in the literature of primitive Christianity, which is essentially 'popular' (Dibelius) in kind, this development had not yet taken place, and it is possible to understand its forms and categories in connection with their 'life situation', i.e. the
influences at work in the life of the community." (p. 6, notes omitted)


  "The two-document hypothesis "affirms that Matthew and Luke drew material from both Mark and a source or sources, now lost, designated "Q" In an expanded form of the theory, Matthew also used other material designated "M" while Luke used other material designated "L"." (p. 1)

  "In this study I am concerned primarily with the material in Mark with its parallels in Matthew and/or Luke. Hence the subtitle of my study designates its limits: "from Proto-Mark to Mark." With respect to the "double tradition" found in Matthew and Luke, I do not challenge the validity of the Q hypothesis.

  My own theory includes something that could be called Q, though I will not develop this aspect of the theory in the present work. While my theory includes the hypothesis of Q, as well as M and L, it goes beyond the scope of the present study to delineate the contents of these sources or to discuss how they have been incorporated into Matthew and Luke.

  Chapters 2 through 6 present new data that leads to five major conclusions. 1) The Gospel of Mark did not serve as a source for either Matthew or Luke. 2) The Gospel of Matthew did not serve as a source for either Mark or Luke. 3) Matthew did not use Mark, nor did Mark use Matthew, but both used the same three sources. 4) Luke did not use Mark, nor did Mark use Luke, but both used the same sources. 5) Mark often conflated two or more sources that were also used by Matthew and Luke respectively. Chapter 7 uses these five major conclusions as criteria to evaluate current theories of Synoptic relations. Since no current theory meets all five criteria, I present a new multi-source theory that does.

  This theory proposes that a primitive gospel (Proto-
Mark) underwent two revisions (Proto-Mark A and Proto-Mark B). Matthew knew Proto-Mark A, Luke knew Proto-Mark B, while Mark knew and conflated both. In addition, several smaller sources also contributed material. Chapters 8 to 11 discuss all these sources in greater detail. Finally, Chapter 12 gives examples of how this theory would account for the composition of Mark." (pp. 5-6)


Abstract: "In my book Rethinking the Gospel Sources: From Proto-Mark to Mark, I presented evidence for a new theory of Synoptic relations, in which all three Synoptics depended on earlier sources, including some form of a 'Proto-Mark'. My arguments for this theory have been criticized in two articles by David Neville.[*] Neville’s criticisms fall into three categories: general criticisms, criticisms of my evidence against direct dependence of one Synoptic on another (Chapters 2 and 3 of my book), and criticisms of the constructive portion of my book. An examination of his critique suggests that it does not damage my case as much as Neville supposed. Ultimately, Neville’s disagreements with my work are less significant than his agreements. We both recognize that theories of Markan or Matthean priority have had their day and that future progress in solving the Synoptic Problem will require a hypothesis of some form of Proto-Mark."

[*] Neville, 2006 and 2008.


"This book constitutes the second of a series on the Synoptic Problem. The first volume, Rethinking the Gospel Sources: From Proto-Mark to Mark (T&T Clark, 2004), offered a new theory about the sources of the material that Mark shares with Matthew and/or Luke. The present book continues the former by examining “Q,”
the presumed source of the non-Markan material common to Matthew and Luke. I address two disputed issues in the study of Q: Is it necessary to hypothesize such a source, and, if so, did the Q material come from a single source or more than one? In chapter 1, I address the first issue and conclude that some form of the Q hypothesis is necessary. In chapters 2–11, I address the second issue. I conclude that Q existed as a single written source unified by recurring features of style and theme. I then identify the reasons why Matthew and Luke often disagree in the wording of Q. Chapter 12 summarizes my conclusions. Several appendices then set out significant results of this study." (from the Preface)

———. 2018. The Case for Proto-Mark: A Study in the Synoptic Problem. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. "The present monograph makes a contribution to the study of the Synoptic Problem, the question of what literary sources were used by the Synoptic Gospels (Matthew, Mark, and Luke). It does not consider every aspect of the Synoptic Problem but addresses a single question: If the Q hypothesis is adopted to explain the double tradition, then what theory best explains the Markan material? I examine three theories that are compatible with the Q hypothesis: the standard theory of Markan priority, the Deutero-Mark hypothesis, and the Proto-Mark hypothesis. The first two of these are theories of Markan priority, while the Proto-Mark hypothesis is not. I conclude that the Proto-Mark hypothesis best accounts for the Markan material. Any theory of Synoptic relations must account for two types of material: the material that Matthew and Luke share with Mark (the Markan material) and the non-Markan material common to Matthew and Luke (the double tradition). Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the most common explanation for the double tradition has been the Q hypothesis, the theory that Matthew and Luke took the double tradition from a hypothetical source, now lost, called Q. This theory has
been challenged, especially by proponents of the Griesbach hypothesis and proponents of the Farrer hypothesis. However, it remains the most widely held theory to explain the double tradition. In the present study, I do not enter into the debate over the Q hypothesis but simply adopt it as a reasonable working hypothesis. The question then becomes, if we adopt the Q hypothesis to account for the double tradition, what theory best accounts for the Markan material? This question is the focus of the present study." (Introduction, p. 1)

---. 2019. An Introduction to the New Testament and the Origins of Christianity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Second revised edition (First edition 2002); Chapter 10: The Synoptic Problem, pp. 144-155. "The first three gospels in the New Testament (Matthew, Mark, and Luke) share many of the same sayings and stories about Jesus. For instance, nearly every story and saying in Mark’s gospel also occurs in one or both of the other gospels. In the material that they share, they also tend to say the same things about Jesus. They relate the same stories and sayings in the same order with much the same wording. Because of these similarities, scholars began to place all three texts on the same page in parallel columns in order to more easily compare them. Such a comparative view is called a synopsis, literally a “viewing together.” Because these three gospels could be viewed together in this way, they acquired the designation Synoptic Gospels. The similarities among the Synoptic Gospels give rise to the Synoptic Problem. That is, why are these gospels so much alike? What is the relationship between them? Most scholars believe that the Synoptic Gospels have similarities because they shared some of the same written sources. The attempt to determine the sources of the gospels is called “source criticism”." (p. 144)


"It is becoming increasingly popular to reject the hypothesis of Q and to accept a direct literary connection between Matthew and Luke, usually the use of Matthew by Luke. One main argument in favour of a direct connection is provided by the agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark in passages common to all three gospels, which, it is alleged, have not been adequately accounted for by those who believe that Matthew and Luke were written independently. Apart from the possible overlapping of Mark and Q the two explanations usually given (as for example by Streeter) are independent revision and textual corruption. To many critics of this view textual corruption looks suspiciously like an easy way out: surely we cannot alter the text of the gospels to fit in with a literary theory? Are there valid textual criteria that support the proposed revisions of the text? We may distinguish two main ways in which textual study has been used to explain some of the agreements." (p. 87)


Contents: I. The Q Hypothesis Tested 1; II. II Arguments for Q 23; III. The Great Sermon 37; IV. Further Evidence 49; V. The Lachmann Fallacy 62; VI. Matthew's Great Discourses 72; VII. Streeter and Burney on Mark's Use of Q 107; VIII. Miscellaneous Passages 123; IX. Doublets in Matthew 138; X. Inclusio, Formulae and Aramaism 147; XI. St Mark's Gospel 157; Epilogue 170; Index of New Testament Passages 173-178.

"At the end of the first quarter of the present century the Two-Document hypothesis, the theory, that is to say, that our First and Third Gospels depend on the Second Gospel and on a conjectural source of which Q has become the usual designation, was regarded in many scholarly circles as no longer requiring proof, criticism or defence. It was
on the way to becoming, if it had not already become, less a hypothesis than a dogma.

But criticism does not stand still. Wellhausen’s work on the editorial aspect of St Mark’s Gospel was the prelude to the rise of the school of Form Criticism, which contemptuously rejected the supposition that that Gospel is virtually a mere transcript of the oral teaching of an eyewitness. On the other side of the Atlantic the eminent Professor J. H. Ropes admitted that the grounds on which Q’s existence is inferred by modern scholars are ‘far less secure than is commonly represented or supposed’, and that the theory that St Luke’s Gospel draws its Q passages from St Matthew’s ‘has never been shown to be impossible’.

The investigation recorded in the following pages was not, in the main, carried out with direct reference to the Form Critics. Yet it is hoped that what it has in fact achieved is to make possible a synthesis of all that is objectively sound in the work of that modern school with the elements of truth discovered by the documentary critics of the generations preceding them. If the outcome of the investigation may be said to contradict the conclusions of the older critics, it will I hope be agreed that this has been the result of a faithful application of their methods.

In the following pages ‘Matthew’, ‘Mark’, etc., mean respectively the several Gospels, and their authors are referred to as ‘St Matthew’, etc. ‘Triple tradition’ means those sections in which all three Synoptic Gospels are parallel, excepting only those where Mark is not the connecting-link between Matthew and Luke. ‘Marcan passage’ means a passage in Matthew or Luke directly (as is usually maintained) connected with a parallel passage in Mark; these passages constitute the ‘Marcan tradition’, a more inclusive term than *Triple tradition*. By ‘Q passages’ I mean such parts of Matthew and Luke as are parallel with one another but are not parts of the Marcan
tradition. These terms are all used for convenience and without prejudice." (From the Preface)


Butler proceeds to a detailed examination of certain aspects of the Two-Document Hypothesis: (1) a seven-part critique of the so-called Q passages, and (2) a three-part critique of the priority of Mark as opposed to the priority of Matthew. He concludes that the evidence requires that Mark depends on Matthew, and that Luke depends on both Matthew (for his so-called Q material) and on Mark. If conjectural sources are not excluded from consideration, then Butler believes that it is possible that Matthew and Mark on the one hand, and Matthew and Luke on the other hand, are connected by the common use of a lost Gospel, which can best be described
as a Proto-Matthew, a document of which our canonical Matthew is a fairly faithful “second edition”.” (pp. 97-98)


Abstract: "According to Butler, the priority of Mark rests, in part, on an inference that is obviously false. Lachmann himself drew a correct inference on the assumption that the Synoptic Gospels are only indirectly connected by dependence of them all on a lost document or oral tradition; namely, that the phenomena of order show that the lost document is most faithfully preserved in Mark. This conclusion was the basis of the theory of Ur-Markus as a sort of first edition of Mark and as a source for Matthew and Luke. In the course of time it was seen that Ur-Markus must have been so similar to Mark as to have been practically identical with it, and the proper step was taken of abandoning this conjectural document. But it was not noticed that by identifying Ur-Markus with Mark the terms of Lachmann’s problem were essentially altered and his inference no longer held good. In the theory of Markan priority Ur-Markus’s ghost presides over his own sepulchre.

Butler quotes Streeter, interposing his own comments: “We note, then, that in regard to (a) items of subject matter, (b) actual words used, (c) relative order of incidents, Mark is in general supported by both Matthew and Luke, and in most cases where they do not both support him they do so alternately [that is, one or the other supports him], and they practically never agree together against Mark. This is only explicable [here is the vicious inference] if they followed an authority which in content, in wording, and in arrangement was all but identical with Mark.”
This mistake, although not actually made by Lachmann, was apparently fathered upon him and has been repeated in modern times by Stanton, Abbott, Wellhausen, Burkitt, Hawkins, Streeter, Rawlinson, Narborough, Redlich, and others. In fact, Butler maintains, once the theory of Ur-Markus is rejected, all that can be argued is that Mark is necessarily the connecting-link between Matthew and Luke in the Triple Tradition, but not necessarily the source of more than one of them. The data simply do not support a more precise determination of the relationship among the synoptic gospels.

Butler does concede that Mark’s use of phrases likely to cause offense and his roughness of style and grammar and use of Aramaic words is an argument for Markan priority deserving serious attention."


Abstract: "Recent and influential proposals (Richard Bauckham; James Durin) have emphasized the role of memory in the composition of the Gospels. Despite the diversity and sophistication of these proposals, they have led to a devaluation of source and redaction analysis among some interpreters. On the contrary, attention to Lukan redaction of Mark, particularly with respect to the sequence of pericopae, reveals both the value of source and redaction analysis and the limitations of memory-oriented accounts of Gospel origins. Lukan transposition manifests itself most clearly in four pericopae: Jesus in Nazareth (Luke 4:16-30), the woman who anoints Jesus (7:36-50), the question of eternal life (10:25-37), and the tradition of the fig tree (13:6-9). Looking at these pericopae one by one, many interpreters debate whether Luke relies on independent traditions; taken as a group, they reveal Luke's redactional and literary activity. In each instance (a) Luke neatly excises the pericope from its location in Mark's sequence, (b) Luke changes fundamental dynamics of the pericope, and (c) Luke's
redactional activity favors widely accepted Lukan emphases. Memory-oriented interpretations will undervalue Luke’s emphases in these instances."


"Proponents of the Griesbach hypothesis have often appealed to a tradition handed down by Clement of Alexandria in support of their position that Mark used Matthew and Luke. Written early in his career in the now lost *Hypotyposeis*, Clement’s information has been preserved for us by Eusebius of Caesarea..." [follow the citation of Eusebius of Caesarea, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 6.14.5-7] (p. 118)

(…)

"Although leading source critics have disputed the value of this information, Clement’s statement, (...) is widely understood to mean that Matthew and Luke, which include genealogies, were written first, i.e. before Mark and John. Under this interpretation, Clement’s statement raises perplexing questions that have not been satisfactorily resolved. For example, Clement’s order stands isolated in apparent contradiction with the chronological order Matthew–Mark–Luke–John given by virtually every other patristic witness. In fact, Clement’s order was unsupported until the ninth century." (p. 119)

(…)

"Clement’s statement [*] has puzzled commentators over the years because it has been uniformly interpreted in chronological terms, but its difficulties evaporate when προγεγραμμέναι is understood as a reference to the open publication of Matthew and Luke. In terms of its textual and historical contexts, therefore, the best interpretation of Clement’s statement is that the gospels with the genealogies were written before the public, as gospels for all Christians. This interpretation makes better sense of the aetiology of Mark that immediately follows and
explains the patristic unanimity of the chronological order for the gospels outside of Clement. For the cause of synoptic source criticism, however, Clement’s testimony can no longer be relied upon as evidence for the relative order of the gospels." (p. 125, notes omitted)

[*] He said that those of the gospels comprising the genealogies [Matthew and Luke] were ‘written before’ (προγεγράφατα) that Mark had this ‘disposition’.


"The Critical Edition of Q was an ambitious undertaking by the *International Q Project*. As a reconstruction of Q's text, it seems reasonable that they should look for analogies by textual critics in how they reconstructed the texts of the gospels based on the manuscript evidence. Some of the techniques they adopted from the textual critics seem appropriate to their task, for example, their analysis of the text in terms of variation units. (49) In fact, some of what the IQP did can be seen as an improvement upon the praxis of textual criticism, especially the compilation and publication of a database of scholarly opinion on each variation unit. But other aspects they adopted were less successful, and the {A} grade of 'virtual certainty' is one of them. Q is a hypothetical text whose wording is contingent on other hypotheses, including the hypothesis that the textual criticism can restore a sufficiently accurate exemplar for Matthew and Luke. Because of this contingency, it is impossible to be more confident in Q's text than that of the attested gospels and *prima facie* unlikely that even Q's doubly attested text can be as confident as that of its witnesses." (p. 60, a note omitted)

(49) Though this can be faulted since many of the variation units do not appear to be independent.
Exegetes are probably no less prone than anybody else to long for something mathematical, something clearly right or wrong, in their discipline. It is thus hardly surprising that in recent years at least two attempts have been made to examine, on a purely objective statistical basis, the disputed question of synoptic relationships. (1) It is our intention in this paper to comment briefly on these two studies and to add new figures to the discussion. (p. 59) (1) Theodore R. Rosché, The Words of Jesus and the Future of the "Q" Hypothesis, Journal of Biblical Literature 79 (1960), 210-20; A. M. Honoré, A Statistical Study of the Synoptic Problem, Novum Testamentum 10 (1968), 95-147. All pages cited below refer to these two articles.

The Problem. In an article published in the Harvard Theological Review in 1971(1) the authors suggested a method of word-counting ("agreements" among various parallel accounts) that might test certain literary relationships among the first three gospels. Two responses to it make further discussion necessary. (2) Some preliminary observations: For the purposes of this original article and the present response to its critics, we have assumed that the so-called "Two-Source Theory" best explains the synoptic problem. But the Two-Source theory presumed here is not the only option. Other perfectly competent scholars hold to a wide variety of viewpoints, which could be designated by tags such as Griesbach, proto-Mark, two editions of Matthew, Lukan priority, Luke’s use of Matthew or vice versa, multiple source theories, and even a benign (resigned?) agnosticism toward the whole issue. Still, it should be noted that the Two-Source theory is far more commonly held than any other single
view. Consequently, our method should not be considered a priori absurd, while those who hold different views have neither established those views nor seriously challenged the Two-Source theory by simply objecting to minor aspects of our study. The larger problem is enormously complex and not really under discussion here." (pp. 108-109)

(1) Charles E. Carlston and Dennis Norlin, "Once More-Statistics and Q," _HTR_ 64 (1971) 59-78. Allusions to the "original article" in this study are intended as references to this 1971 study.


"Over the last two centuries, scholars have scrutinized the Synoptic Gospels from many angles and with many different results. This is inevitable, given the vital importance of these books for Christian belief and life. In these books is narrated the life of the One in whom God has chosen especially to make himself known to human beings. They depict the events on which the significance of history and the destiny of every single individual depend: the death and resurrection of Jesus the Messiah. Issues pertaining to these books individually will be treated in the chapters devoted to each; here we address significant issues that embrace all three accounts. Specifically, we examine three questions: How did the Synoptic Gospels come into being? How should we understand the gospels as works of literature? And what do the gospels tell us about Jesus?" (p. 78)


"In surveying the history of previous scholarship in chapter 1, I showed that the Aramaic dimension of Q has never been properly treated, and is conventionally omitted. This is a remarkable fact. Most people have noticed that language is a significant part of culture, but the study of Q, like the study of Jesus in general, has proceeded as if this were not the case. I also showed in chapter 1 that the whole notion that Q was a single document written in Greek has never been satisfactorily demonstrated.

The omission of the Aramaic dimension is one significant aspect of this, since it has prevented a proper critical assessment of those passages in which the material was transmitted in Aramaic, of which Matthew and Luke used or made different translations. It is not, however, the only significant defect in scholarship. The predication of a Q community, and attempts to portray Jesus as a Cynic
philosopher are among other major problems. All these problems are related at a profound level. The omission of Aramaic is one aspect of a general failure to see the Q material within the culture in which it was produced. This general failure is behind most of the other serious problems. This failure is due to the presence of scholarly investigators in their own part of the modern world, and their strong tendency to repeat each other reflects the fact that a scholar’s membership of our vast academic bureaucracies is in some ways as important as ideological orientation." (p. 185)

"This volume incorporates a series of previously published articles, which have been extensively supplemented and in some cases very drastically revised." (p. XI)

(...) "The study of Q, the hypothetical second source used by Matthew and Luke alongside Mark, has rarely flourished as exuberantly as it does now. Monographs abound, articles jostle with one another in the scholarly journals, ever more sophisticated and nuanced proposals concerning its development arise. And yet at the same time Q is experiencing a mid-life crisis, with wounding attacks being made on its identity, indeed its existence, the intention being to kill the hypothesis stone dead. Something therefore needs to be said in its defence." (p. 1)

(...) "We shall consider in a series of test cases how well the hypothesis that Luke used Matthew works, how well the theory that all the material was created by Matthew works, and how well the Q hypothesis might explain the data. The approach will be essentially a combination of the form-critical and the redaction-critical for the
purpose of clarifying the source-critical situation. The suggestion will be that all traditions in the sample provide evidence that Luke gives us access to an earlier version than that in Matthew, and that in different ways they undermine the theory of Matthaean creativity. Some in addition provide very important evidence of the space between the theology of Q and the theology of Matthew." (p. 6)

  Abstract: "Instead of blurring the oral and the literary media in antiquity (R. Bultmann and B. Gerhardsson) or dividing them with unsatisfying principles (J.D.G. Dunn), this article follows recent scholarship on orality to explore the mechanical operation of ancient scribal memory as the oral-written interface. In so doing, I argue that the agreement of order between the Synoptic Gospels is characteristic of memory-based utilizations of written texts and does not necessarily indicate the scribes’ visual contact with those texts. It is, rather, the very high degree of verbal agreement that indicates Matthew’s frequent visual contact with Q 10–11 and 12–13 throughout the gospel, even when following Mark’s narrative sequence by memory. This approach explains the infrequent micro-conflations on the Two Document Hypothesis (2DH) with a more mechanically probable procedure, and so strengthens the argument that the 2DH is more feasible than the Two Gospel Hypothesis and the Farrer-Goulder Hypothesis."

  Edited by John M. T. Barton.

"In this volume I argue that an approach to the Greek verbal system that is based on verbal aspect theory has more explanatory power than the traditional temporal and Aktionsart approaches for answering the question, why do the Synoptic Gospels at times employ different tense-forms in recounting the same narrative event? In the light of previous research, I suggest that understanding the Greek verb as operating within a systemic network of semantic relationships, from which an author/speaker can make a subjective formal choice (whether conscious nor not) that can result in a range of discourse highlighting functions, helps to explain Synoptic tense-form differences on the basis of normal Greek usage, rather than in terms of anomaly or unexplainable irregularity, mid thus provides interpreters of the New Testament with a significant exegetical resource.

In view of the stated argument, I have three main goals: (1) to give insight into the individual tendencies of discourse structure within selected portions of the Synoptic Passion Narratives (PNs) via a comparison of verbal aspect choice, (2) to provide objective criteria for evaluating discourse prominence in Synoptic parallels, and (3) to demonstrate the overarching exegetical value of a rigorous understanding of the textual function of Greek verbal aspecL" (p. 1)


"In short, the most significant area for source analysis in the study of the Synoptic Gospels is the overarching network of issues relating to the Synoptic Problem. The associated issues with respect to a proto-Matthew, an Urmarkus, and a proto-Luke also require the use of the source-critical methodology. Yet with the practical rejection of these earlier-edition theories and the popular acceptance of the Two-Source
theory, source analysis of Matthew, Mark, and Luke has not been completely exhausted."


"This volume has as its stated objective the furthering of redactional work on the basis of the Griesbachian hypothesis. Not only does the *Brauchbarkeit* [usefulness] argument used by the advocates of the two-document hypothesis, though not a logical argument, need to be countered, but there is also need to provide standard material which can be used by the growing company of those who operate on the basis of the Griesbach paradigm, for use in the situations in which most of them earn their daily bread, namely, teaching. This need exists particularly with regard to the Gospel of Luke. A thorough study of the redactional theology of Luke is dependent, in part, upon one’s ability to distinguish between source and redaction, particularly in those parts of his gospel which are not dependent on the Gospel of Matthew. For this, a definitive list of linguistic usages of the author of the gospel, as well as a list of linguistic usages which will help delineate whether, in addition to Matthew, Luke has used another written source or sources, is needed. While linguistic controls are not the only controls needed, the relentless pursuit of theological motifs without adequate linguistic controls can lead to subjective evaluations of the redactional theology of Luke. It also can lead to the ignoring of the influences of *Nebenquelle* [secondary sources]. By linguistic usages is meant the vocabular, grammatical, and syntactical aspects of the language of the author or of a document. For various reasons, the phrase “literary characteristics” is an inappropriate word for these kinds of phenomena." (pp. 245-246)


"This is an attempt at describing some aspects of Lukan eschatology on the hypothesis that Luke* knew and used the canonical gospel of Matthew. But, it is also an attempt to delineate Lukan theology. So if the perception is right it must provide some illumination, whatever one’s own hypothesis of synoptic interrelationships.(2)

1. Since Conzelmann’s influential work,(3) it has become commonplace to suggest that Luke has replaced primitive Christian eschatology with salvation history and that his hortatory category is “suddenness” rather than imminence. There is in the gospel an emphasis on suddenness and unexpectedness. But this is seen clearly only in some parables and in Lk 17:20-37." (p. 363)

* "Luke* is used to indicate the author of the Gospel, the text being indicated by the abbreviation “Lk”; and so for the Gospel of Matthew.


There are two major reasons for this continued use of a hypothesis even when several of its major assertions have long since been proven faulty. The first, the subject of this essay, is the firm belief that in a number of places it can be shown that Matthew blatantly or clumsily altered Mark, either correcting or corrupting the sense of his source. Those cases present powerful, and as yet unshaken evidence that Mark is the earliest gospel. The second reason, more subtle and less often articulate, is the belief that one can make the best sense of the development of earliest Christianity and early Christian literature by use of the Mark-Q literary hypothesis. Since, however, this “usefulness” argument would be blatantly circular and dogmatic if it stood alone, most critics would probably agree that the crux of current belief that Mark is the earliest gospel is the evidence that Matthew has altered Mark in several instances in unmistakable ways.

As most readers know, the actual cases of clear Matthean alteration of Mark vary from scholar to scholar. Many of the claims rest firmly on the prior and unquestioned assumption that Mark is the earliest. In these cases the writers are unaware that the evidence is completely circular and so unconvincing. There are four passages, however, that are widely used as evidence for Matthew’s transparent alteration of his Marcan source. They are: the “purpose of parables” pericope in Mark 4 || Matthew 13, the story of “the death of John the Baptist” in Mark 6 || Matthew 14, the famous “Why do you call me good?”
passage in Mark 10 || Matthew 19, and the saying on “clean-unclean” in Mark 7:15 || Matthew 15:11. The evidence from these four passages, taken together, constitutes the strongest argument available for the use of Mark by Matthew. Thus today any challenge to the theory of Markan priority must be directed to this crucial material. In order to dispute the priority of Mark, evidence must be presented to show that Matthew did not alter Mark because of misunderstanding or for a deliberate theological motive. Moreover, one would need to show that the opposite is true, that is, that there are places where Mark can be shown to have altered Matthew (or Luke) through misunderstanding or out of deliberate theological bias. To my surprise, work with the passages usually cited in favor of Markan priority done in the process of redactional study of Matthew appears to show that the evidence in these reverses in just this way."


article provides a more precise account of their contributions, as well as the relationship between the two figures. It argues that Ammonius, who was likely the teacher of Origen, composed the first gospel synopsis by placing similar passages in parallel columns. He gave this work the title Diatessaron-Gospel, referring thereby to the four columns in which his text was laid out. This pioneering piece of scholarship drew upon a long tradition of Alexandrian textual scholarship and likely served as the inspiration for Origen’s more famous Hexapla. A little over a century later, Eusebius of Caesarea picked up where Ammonius left off and attempted to accomplish the same goal, albeit using a different and improved method. Using the textual parallels presented in the Diatessaron-Gospel as his ‘raw data’, Eusebius converted these textual units into numbers which he then collated in ten tables, or ‘canons’, standing at the beginning of a gospel book. The resulting cross-reference system, consisting of the Canon Tables as well as sectional enumeration throughout each gospel, allowed the user to find parallels between the gospels, but in such a way that the literary integrity of each of the four was preserved. Moreover, Eusebius also exploited the potential of his invention by including theologically suggestive cross-references, thereby subtly guiding the reader of the fourfold gospel to what might be called a canonical reading of the four.”


Abstract: "It is not uncommon to read studies that either state explicitly or work under the assumption that the synoptic problem has been solved. Using the parables of the Mustard Seed and the Leaven as a test-case,
becomes clear that the problem is far from a solution. Each of the three major source hypotheses has its strengths (and weaknesses) when it attempts to account for the data generated by these two pericopae. Although this paper concludes that the Two-Document Hypothesis (2DH) deals with the data with the fewest problems, the strengths of the other hypotheses coupled with the weaknesses of the 2DH should help keep the 2DH honest.

(...) "The order of the sections is not meant to presuppose a favored hypothesis. The 2DH is presented first because for better or worse it is the most widely accepted hypothesis. Though the Griesbach hypothesis was popular before the 2DH, in its modern manifestation (2GH) it is a reaction against the 2DH, and hence follows. The Farrer-Goulder hypothesis can also be said to be a reaction against the 2DH (and possibly the 2GH as well), and so it is third." (p. 24 note 3)

- Damm, Alex. 2003. "Ornatus: An Application of Rhetoric to the Synoptic Problem." *Novum Testamentum* no. 45:338-364. Abstract: "In this essay I shall consider ancient rhetoric as a means to suggest synoptic relationships. Focusing on the stylistic virtue of *ornatus* ("adornment"), I shall examine three triple tradition sentences in which the gospel of Mark employs a word used nowhere by the gospels of Luke or Matthew. Focusing on the relationship between Mark and the other gospels, I shall ask whether it is more likely that Mark adds the word to Matthew and/or Luke on the Two-Gospel Hypothesis, or whether Matthew and/or Luke delete it from Mark on the Two-Document Hypothesis. My study leads me to two conclusions. On grounds of *ornatus*, editing on either source hypothesis is plausible. But such editing on the Two-Document Hypothesis is more plausible, since Mark's addition of each word would entail the unlikely
discovery of near-perfect or coincidentally co-ordinated literary patterns in Matthew and/or Luke."


"Thomas Longstaff argues persuasively, drawing on studies assuming both the Griesbach and the Two Source Hypotheses, that Mark should be understood as a spokesman for orthodoxy, the author of a Gospel written primarily to present to the reader the correct understanding of Jesus’ messiahship and the correct understanding of what following him entails.(1) The present study seeks to advance this argument by defining more precisely the Markan understanding of messiahship on the grounds of an intrinsic literary analysis of the gospel as a whole.(2) It will be suggested that Mark’s understanding of messiahship is compatible with a Roman provenance in that it advances the claims of Peter to be the fountainhead of the true “secret” gospel. By implication the gospel challenges the Gnostic claim of a “secret” tradition deriving from Thomas or others. Finally it will be argued that this literary understanding of Mark gives one a basis for explaining adequately why Mark could have abbreviated the available tradition that we see reflected in Matthew and Luke by omitting birth narratives, genealogy, Sermon on the Mount/Plain traditions, postresurrection appearances and much teaching material." (pp. 441-442, two notes omitted)

392, above).

- Day, Matthew. 2005. "Reading the Fossils of Faith: Thomas Henry Huxley and the Evolutionary Subtext of the Synoptic Problem." *Church History* no. 74:534-556. "In what follows, I want to examine a thicket of historical relationships and issues that the warfare model has obscured from view by unraveling the connection between evolutionary thought and biblical criticism in the nineteenth century. Specifically, my aim is to unearth the link that unites the Synoptic Problem, the workhorse of modern New Testament studies, and Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-95)?a man who is often viewed as the paradigmatic scientific warrior against religion." (p. 536) (...

"As I see it, the pressing historical question is not "Why did Huxley write about the Synoptic Problem?" but is instead "Why did Huxley believe all three Synoptic Gospels were dependent upon a single *Ur-Marcus*?". I will argue that Huxley arrived at this conclusion by viewing biblical criticism as one plank within a larger campaign for cultural and social reform - a campaign that, among other things, would make science the conceptual foundation for humanistic studies. More precisely, by extending the discourse of natural history to address religion, Huxley could regard "scientific" biblical criticism and the anthropology of religion as forms of biological inquiry. Thus, both the form and content of the *Ur-Marcus* solution to the Synoptic Problem became an opportunity for Huxley to demonstrate the methodological superiority of scientific thought and the explanatory breadth of the Darwinian hypothesis."

"For more than half a century there had been a "consensus" among the scholars not only as to the nature of the Synoptic Problem but as to its solution. As early as the nineties, students at Cambridge had been told that there was no longer a synoptic problem to solve."(1) (p. 53)

(...)

But in 1961 William R. Farmer, of Perkins School of Theology, said, "During the past ten years the situation has changed."(8)

He cites the work of Butler in England (1951), Parker in America (1953), Vaganay in France (1954), and Ludlum in America (1958), all of whom opposed the view that our Mark could have been used as a source by our Matthew. Upon investigation. Farmer rejects the hypothesis that these writers were but serving some ecclesiastical or traditional cause. And the major thrust of his paper is to present the question whether, in the light of serious research, the priority of Mark can still be assumed as an assured result of nineteenth century criticism.

Since this question haunts every serious student of the Gospels, he has entitled his treatise, "A 'Skeleton in the Closet' of Gospel Research." (pp. 54-55)

(1) Foakes Jackson, *Constructive Quarterly* (June 1920), p. 326.
Studies on the Synoptic Problem

  "In a contribution to the recent Jerusalem Symposium on The Interrelations of the Gospels, Frans Neirynck makes mention of the "Augustinian hypothesis" concerning the literary relationships between the Gospels. According to Neirynck, Augustine's view of these relationships was that Mark had access to Matthew, and Luke to Mark." (...)

  "In a paper read at the Colloquium Biblicum Lovaniense of 1990, however, I have already argued that if Augustine had a "Benutzungshypothese" [usage hypothesis] at all, it can only have had the following form(3):
  Mt -> Mk -> Lk -> Jn
  The reason why Augustine should not be thought to have regarded each evangelist as dependent on all his predecessors is that he, Augustine, wrote in De consensu evangelistarum I,ii,4: "each evangelist proves to have..."
chosen to write not in ignorance of the other writer, his predecessor [in the singular!]"(4)" (pp. 2409-2410)

Augustine had no "Benutzungshypothese" at all. The so-called "Augustinian hypothesis" does not reflect Augustine’s views on the origin and interrelations of the Gospels. It is a recent invention, possibly not older than the sixteenth Century(22)" (p. 2417).


(4) AUGUSTINUS, De consensu evangelistarum, ed F. WEIHRICH (CSEL, 43), Vienna/Leipzig, Tempsky and Freytag, 1904, p 4, I,ii,4 "non tamen unusquisque eorum velut altenus praecedentis [singular!] ignarus voluisse scnbere reppentur".

22. So far as I know the first author to ascribe the "Augustinian hypothesis" concerning the relationships between the Gospels to Augustine was M. CHEMNITZ,Harmonia evangelica, 1593; Frankfurt-Hamburg, 1652, "Prolegomena", cap. l, p. 3: "Et manifestius hoc inde colligitur, cum, juxta Epiphanii et Augustini sententiam, inter evangelistas illi, qui post alios scripserunt, priorum scripta et viderint et legerint". For other sixteenth-century authors who held the so-called "Augustinian hypothesis" without ascribing it explicitly to Augustine, see H.J. DE JONGE, The Loss of Faith (n. 3 above), especially footnotes 23-27.


"The theory that the Gospel of Mark is an abridgment of Matthew and Luke has become known mainly through the work of the eighteenth-century biblical scholar Johann Jakob Griesbach. The question we want to deal with here is whether Griesbach came to this hypothesis
under the influence of the investigations of other scholars or independently." (p. 134)

(...) 
"However, Griesbach was not the first to argue that Mark had used both Matthew and Luke. At least three authors had defended the same view before him: Henry Owen, Anton Friedrich Büsching and Friedrich Andreas Stroth. Henry Owen's Observations on the Four Gospels appeared in 1764. Owen assumed Matthew had been the first to write his Gospel, Luke being the second; and that Mark had made an epitome of both Matthew and Luke." (p. 135, note omitted)

(...) 
"The second work in which we find the thesis brought forward that Mark is a compendium of Matthew and Luke, is the harmony of the Gospels composed by Anton Friedrich Büsching and published by him in 1766 under the title *Die vier Evangelien mit ihren eigenen Worten zusammengesetzt*. Büsching's view, however, differed from that of Owen and Griesbach on one important point: he held that Luke, not Matthew, was the earliest Gospel." (p. 136)

(...) 
"The third scholar to defend the view that Mark is a compendium of Matthew and Luke, was the anonymous author of an article which appeared in 1781 in the periodical *Repertorium* edited by J.G. Eichhorn. The author is generally thought to be Friedrich Andreas Stroth. His essay is entitled *Von Interpolationen im Evangelium Matthäi*. In it Stroth argues that a number of passages in the Gospel of Matthew do not belong to the original text of the evangelist, but are later additions." (p. 137)

Sacred Texts, edited by O'Flaherty, Wendy Doniger, 121-137. Berkeley: Graduate Theological Union.


"The hypothetical source Q receives much attention in N.T. research today. A quick examination of the current bibliography of D.M. Scholer clearly demonstrates this fact.(1)

The first task of Q research is to make a reliable reconstruction of Q. It is such a reconstruction, reliable done, which acts as a basis for what one can assert about other aspects of Q, such as its literary unity and macro-structure, its literary genre and theology, its (poetic) formal features, the tradition- and composition history of Q and its place in the history of Early Christianity. One cannot, of course, detach this primordial task of reconstruction from the other tasks: there is a certain reciprocity between all these aspects.

Elements of the task of reconstruction may be seen in the work of A.D. Jacobson. He distinguishes two different but complementary aspects: "Two reconstructive procedures are necessary: (a) reconstruction of the original wording of each saying or group of sayings, and (b) reconstruction of the original sequence of the material. It is not possible to do either in isolation from the other, but, as in many large tasks, some division of labor is inevitable". (2)

(1) One can find the basic bibliography in F. Neirynck & F. Van Segbroeck, "Q Bibliography", in J. Delobel (ed.), Logia. Les paroles de Jésus--The Sayings of Jesus (BETL, 59), Leuven, 1982, pp. 561-586; it was continued


"This book is an attempt to address part of a difficult problem in New Testament studies that, owing to certain advances in our understanding of the relevant issues, has recently got much worse. The problem can be adequately stated in three sentences:

1. Some first-century Christians remembered and transmitted oral traditions about Jesus.
2. The Synoptic Evangelists made some use of some of these traditions in the composition of their Gospels.
3. We don't know very much about these traditions or how the Synoptic Evangelists used them.

New Testament scholars have long been aware of this problem and of the crucial importance of its solution. The Synoptic Gospels contain the earliest and most detailed accounts of the life and ministry of Jesus of Nazareth now extant. To be able to accurately assess the data contained in these texts concerning Jesus, the primitive church, the Synoptic Evangelists, and the Synoptics themselves, we need to know something about the sources consulted in process of their composition. And since the Synoptic Evangelists were undoubtedly familiar with orally transmitted Jesus traditions, we need to know the extent to which their Gospels were derived from or influenced by those traditions. Unfortunately, we have very little
unambiguous evidence to indicate the precise character of any part of the first-century oral Jesus tradition, or to illuminate the editorial policies of the Synoptic Evangelists with respect to it." (pp. 1-2)


———. 2004. "Disagreements of Each Evangelist with the Minor Close Agreements of the Other Two." *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* no. 80:445-469. Abstract: "Whilst the “Q” hypothesis is largely accepted in continental European research, it continues to be disputed in English language debate. Perhaps Mk conflated Mt and Lk (Griesbach – Farmer); or Lk conflated Mk and Mt (Farrer – Goulder). Largely unattended to in these debates, however, are the very frequent though not entirely consistent refusals of the imagined third author to copy his sources when they agree verbatim or very closely, while happy to copy precisely one or the other in the same immediate context. Some sixty instances are discussed. Where other ancient authors explain their preference for agreement in their sources, these writers have to be imagined refusing just that, and going to considerable pains to avoid it. Mk and Q as the sources for Mt and Lk remains by far the more plausible hypothesis."


contexts is agreed by sceptics to be possible, if not really plausible. Can 'possibility' or 'plausibility' be quantified? Perhaps our judgement between hypotheses is inescapably subjective. However, if some proposed reconstruction can be shown to be impossible, then any that are merely possible surely hold the field, alone or 'complausible' with others. One evangelist writing third (whether Mark, Luke, or recently, from Alan Garrow, Matthew) turns out willing to paraphrase or often copy verbatim – or all but – single matter from the other two, while assiduously avoiding forty or so extensive sequences of the verbatim agreed witness of the other two. Only the hypothesis of Matthew and Luke independently using Mark and 'Q' (2DH) avoids such an arguably impossible reconstruction.


The Two-Gospel Hypothesis, formerly known as the Griesbach Hypothesis, proposes a comprehensive solution to the SYNOPTIC PROBLEM. It was first given this new title by Bernard Orchard (1982: vii; 1983: xii) to emphasize the central argument that the gospel of Mark was originally composed by joining together elements of the two earlier gospels, Matthew and Luke. The name is intended to distinguish this approach from the Two-Source (or Document) Hypothesis (hereafter 2SH), in that it does not postulate a hypothetical "lost document" such as "Q" plus Mark (or a second hypothetical "lost document" such as UrMark or DeuteroMark) as a source of Matthew and Luke. See TWO-SOURCE HYPOTHESIS.

The Two-Gospel Hypothesis (hereafter 2GH) contends that the gospel of Matthew was written first in the service of the Palestinian Jewish Christian proclamation of the messiahship of the recently crucified Jesus of Nazareth. It proposes that the gospel of Luke + Acts was written second for use in the Pauline mission to the gentiles, using Matthew as the main source. It proposes that the gospel of Mark was written third as a selective combination of Matthew and Luke, as an attempt to reconcile the Jewish and gentile branches in the early Church. It proposes that the gospel of John was written fourth, revealing an extensive awareness of the other
Gospels but consisting mostly of a separate stream of the Jesus tradition." (p. 671)


"Why Another History of the Synoptic Problem?

Given the hundreds of handbooks introducing the New Testament and Bible study guides being used around the world, as well as the scores of commentaries on the Gospels and the dozen or so histories of New Testament scholarship, why should I feel impelled to add another lengthy study of this subject, especially since there is such unanimity regarding the solution to the Synoptic Problem, namely, the almost universal acceptance of the Two Source Hypothesis? What more could be said that hasn't been already, more than once? My account will differ from all others in four important ways:

* Most accounts do not tell the whole story; they begin around 1800 instead of at the beginning. As a result, they privilege the most recent form of the Synoptic Problem, treating it as if it were somehow self-evident. Thus, they do not notice that there are earlier forms of the Synoptic Problem, and, by comparison with them, they do not notice how destructive to traditional Christianity the modern form is. This skewed situation is instead regarded as morally and politically neutral and objective, when precisely the opposite is the case.
* No history of source criticism correlates the four basic components of the full Synoptic Problem to each other or explains their intrinsic interrelationships. This history will show how the Synoptic Problem has always involved much more than just the question of how the Gospels were composed and what sources were used. The complete Synoptic Problem has always also involved the question of which Gospels to consider (the question of canon), which text of the normative Gospels to use (text
criticism), and how to interpret the Bible as a whole and the Gospels in particular (hermeneutics). The full Synoptic Problem, strictly speaking, always includes these four components.

• This history is unique in that it discusses the history of each of these four components as they arise within each of the major Forms of the Synoptic Problem.
• No history of the Synoptic Problem has tried to indicate the cultural, political, economic, and technological presuppositions undergirding and shaping the debate in every historical period. Instead, most biblical scholars naively believe that their discipline is free of such mundane concerns, as if their biblical research had no economic agenda and did not serve fundamental political objectives. It will be the task of this history to make these political and economic aspects clear for each of the major Forms of the Synoptic Problem." (pp. 2-3)

Abstract: "The literary mindset (‘default setting’) of modern Western culture prevents those trained in that culture from recognizing that oral cultures operate differently. The classic solution to the Synoptic problem, and the chief alternatives, have envisaged the relationships between the Gospel traditions in almost exclusively literary terms. But the earliest phase of
transmission of the Jesus tradition was without doubt predominantly by word of mouth. And recent studies of oral cultures provide several characteristic features of oral tradition. Much of the Synoptic tradition, even in its present form, reflects in particular the combination of stability and flexibility so characteristic of the performances of oral tradition. Re-envisioning the early transmission of the Jesus tradition therefore requires us to recognize that the literary paradigm (including a clearly delineated Q document) is too restrictive in the range of possible explanations it offers for the diverse/divergent character of Synoptic parallels. Variation in detail may simply attest the character of oral performance rather than constituting evidence of literary redaction."


• Dyer, Charles H. 1981. "Do the Synoptics Depend on Each Other?" Bibliotheca sacra no. 138:230-245. "What is the literary relationship between the Synoptic Gospels? How does one explain the many similarities of content and wording within the Gospel accounts while at the same time accounting for the numerous differences between the individual records? This article examines the theories which have been proposed in an attempt to arrive at an acceptable solution to the question of literary dependence in the Synoptic Gospels." (p. 230)


It is a commonplace of Form-critical studies that as the Gospel tradition developed, proper names were added to the material. The ’proofs’ for this usually include such examples as the identification of the high priest’s servant as Malchus only in the developed tradition of the Fourth Gospel. The criterion that the earliest tradition was largely without names is usually used by writers on the synoptic problem often to support Markan priority, it being stressed that Matthew makes many aspects of Mark’s material more precise and detailed. (1)" (p. 148)

"In this paper I have dealt only with the appearance or absence of proper names. In assessing the order of the gospels one needs obviously to consider many other features, for example, Hawkins’ conclusions about language(2) must be tested against Butler’s(3) and both tested against the developments in Koine on the one hand and against the evangelists’ own style and idiosyncrasies of grammar on the other. Similarly, the author’s own theological position will need to be tested against the developments of theological thought elsewhere in the New Testament. Stringent use of a redaction-critical approach to the gospels not only enables the reader to assess the relative priority of the synoptic gospels as complete units, but can also be harnessed to test the relative antiquity of individual pericopes in the gospels; but the main contribution it can make to New Testament studies is less in assessing antiquity of tradition than explaining the theological position of the Gospel writers. And it is this which seems the more worthwhile pursuit." (p. 152)

(1) e.g., The Gospel According to St Matthew by W. C. Allen (I.C.C.) (1907), xxiv f.
(2) J. C. Hawkins, Horae Synopticae, 2nd ed. (1909).
(3) B. C. Butler, The Originality of St Matthew (1951).


In all three synoptic gospels, the Beelzebul Controversy (Mt. 12.22-37 // Mk 3.20-30 // Lk. 11.14-23) takes the form of a sorcery accusation. It also provides a textbook example of where, exceptionally, it is Matthew rather than Mark that constitutes the 'middle term' among the three synoptics. On the Two-Document hypothesis (henceforth 2DH) this is explained as a Mark-Q overlap, meaning that versions of this pericope appeared in both Mark and Q, and that Matthew combined the two (while Luke, in this case, broadly followed Q alone). On the Griesbach hypothesis (henceforth GH) the data are explained on the basis that Luke and Mark each adapted Matthew (there would be little need to argue for Mark's conflation of Matthew and Luke in this case). Supporters of the Farrer hypothesis (henceforth FH) would instead argue that here Matthew adapted Mark and Luke adapted Matthew." (p. 16, notes omitted)

"The present essay has had the following limited aim: to determine whether the Synoptic parallel Mt. 12.22-37 //Mk3.20-30//Lk. 11.14-23 is more plausibly explained on the Two-Document hypothesis (2DH) or on the Farrer Hypothesis (FH) - that is, whether, assuming Marcan priority, the major agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark in the Beelzebul Controversy are more plausibly explained as a Mark-Q overlap or an instance where Matthew has reworked Mark and Luke has reworked Matthew. To achieve this, the Matthaean and Lucan versions of the Beelzebul Controversy have been examined in some detail." (p.42)
In his *Ecclesiastical History*, Eusebius reports that Clement of Alexandria in his work *Hypotyposeis* had transmitted a tradition preserved by "the ancient presbyters" about the order of the Gospels.[*]

Current scholarship routinely uses this text for claiming that Clement of Alexandria not only accepted the fourfold Gospel canon but also held that Matthew and Luke were composed before Mark and John. The purpose of this article is to propose a new interpretation of this text by carefully distinguishing among the three levels on which this passage must be analyzed: the understanding of Eusebius, that of Clement, and that of the "ancient presbyters."

While the actual order of the composition of the four Gospels is undoubtedly an important issue, here I do not want to enter into that question as such, nor do I think that this article should be considered as support for any of the theories espoused in the current debate. In fact, I attempt to show that the presbyters quoted by Clement of Alexandria did not provide information about the chronological order of the four canonical Gospels and thus the passage neither favors nor contradicts any of the modern theories concerning that question." (pp. 261-262, note omitted)

[*] Book 6.14.5

Norris, Frederick W. and Thompson, James W., 92-106. Leiden: Brill.

"Papias is our earliest known author who tells us explicitly of two gospels coexisting in the Church, Matthew and Mark. The fragments of Papias which have survived do not speak of the parallel or combined use of these two gospels but reveal the problem caused by the plurality of the gospels as it was perceived at the beginning of the second century. The thesis of this article is threefold. First, it intends to show that Papias transmits information coming from a significant earlier source.

Second, it demonstrates that this source, when speaking of Mark, is reflecting views closely similar to those contained in the prologue of Luke. Third, it demonstrates that, in the fragments of Papias, Mark is judged by the same criteria which Luke held and that these reflect a gospel model developed in the early church under the influence of Matthew's gospel. The importance of this investigation consists in unveiling the thought pattern which brought together the Synoptic Gospels into one single gospel canon." (p. 92)

• Farmer, William R. 1962. "Notes on a Literary and Form-Critical Analysis of Some of the Synoptic Material Peculiar to Luke." New Testament Studies no. 8:301-316. Extract: "We may begin our analysis of the synoptic tradition peculiar to Luke with a study of one of its most important component parts, namely that preserved in the fifteenth chapter. The whole of this chapter constitutes a single literary unit, whose beginning and end are well defined and whose internal structure, while not uniform, is perfectly self-consistent. The introduction to this literary unit points to the ‘grumbling’ of the Pharisees and Scribes in response to Jesus' behaviour of receiving and eating with those tax collectors and sinners who had come to hear him. This response of the Pharisees and Scribes occasions a threefold response from Jesus, namely a threefold insistence upon the single point that it is right to accept the repentance of sinners and to rejoice
with them, since their repentance is accepted by God who himself in heaven rejoices over their return."

Contents: I. The Essential Developments in the Pre-Holtzmann Period 1; II. The Holtzmannian Synthesis 36; III. The English Endorsement and Modification of the Two-Document Hypothesis 48; IV. An Analysis of Streeter’s Contribution to the Two-Document Hypothesis 118; V. Other Factor Contributing to the Twentieth-Century Consensus 178; VI. A New Introduction to the Problem 199; VII. Notes for a History of the Redaction of Synoptic Tradition in Mark 233; Appendix A 284; Appendix B 287; Index 294-308.

"A history of the Synoptic Problem is a history of the basic ideas which have influenced men’s thinking about this problem. These ideas are limited in number and can be presented in such a way as to provide the reader with a firm grasp of the essentials of the problem and its history. He who would attempt to go beyond this, and attempt to review all the work that has ever been done on this problem, faces an almost limitless task." (p. 3)

(...)"

"Prior to the publication of Lessing' views in 1784 [•], other developments had taken place, the importance of which it is essential to grasp. We have already mentioned the emergence of a new type of Gospel harmony, specifically the famous “Synopsis” of Griesbach. While Griesbach printed some passages of John, he included the entire texts of only Matthew, Mark, and Luke. Therefore, these three Gospels, which were featured in his “Synopsis,” came to be known as the “Synoptic” Gospels. In the beginning of this work, which in its successive editions was to become a handbook for subsequent scientific investigators, Griesbach confessed to “the heresy” of doubting the possibility of harmonizing even
the closely related but conflicting chronologies of Matthew, Mark, and Luke. In other words, Griesbach’s harmony, if a harmony at all, was a harmony to end harmonization. Henceforth, those who followed in his footsteps would no longer seek to reconcile the conflicting chronologies of the Gospels, but rather would seek to understand the relationships between the Gospels in terms of their direct literary dependence, or in terms of their indirect literary dependence through the mutual use of earlier hypothetical sources.

It is important to recognize the fact that all previous authors of Gospel harmonies had been wrestling with the problem created by chronological differences between Gospels believed to have been written by authoritative witnesses who would not deliberately have differed from one another without good cause. The frank and shocking admission of Griesbach that he confessed to the “heresy” of doubting that this problem could be solved paved the way for widespread theological interest in Lessing’s solution. For with Lessing’s hypothesis, scholars were provided with an explanation of the reasons why the canonical Evangelists, who frequently agreed verbatim, sometimes differed from one another. Because on this hypothesis each Evangelist could be thought of as following faithfully an apostolic model preserved in the particular modified form of the original Nazarene Gospel available to him.” (pp. 5-6)


In his recent book on the synoptic problem, after having presented the results of his extensive and detailed philological analysis of the seven most important arguments that have been used to support Marcan priority, Hans-Herbert Stoldt turned to the larger and very speculative historical and sociological question of the ideological background of the Marcan hypothesis. Because of the importance of the issues involved, and because of their complexity, it is necessary to clarify the larger significance of Stoldt's over-all argument, and explore the perimeters within which Stoldt's original contribution to our understanding of the ideological background of the Marcan hypothesis can best be evaluated. The purpose of this note is not to settle any of the issues involved, but rather to orient readers to the current discussion of Stoldt's book in such a way that his discoveries about the importance of the reaction to David Friedrich Strauss' Leben Jesu for understanding the history of the synoptic problem are neither over-emphasized nor unfairly discounted. (p. 1)
the Marcan hypothesis one begins an analysis of this tradition by considering the text preserved in Mark 16:1-8. But on the Griesbach hypothesis the Gospels were written in the order of Matthew, Luke and Mark. On this hypothesis, therefore, the synoptic texts can best be understood when considered in that order. The strict parallel in Matthew to Mark 16:1-8 is Matthew 28:1-10. It is especially important to study Matthew 28:1-10 within the context of the continuous narrative of which it is a part. The thread of this narrative can be conveniently picked up at 27:50 where "Jesus ... gave up his spirit." For with these words the account of the events leading up to the death of Jesus are brought to an end, and what follows narrates the events that occurred after Jesus' death." (p. 7)

Table of Contents:
Introduction
William R. Farmer: Introductio 1;
PART ONE
The Patristic Evidence
PART TWO
Further evidence for the Posteriority of Mark and for the Early Character of Matthean Tradition in Relation to Luke and Mark

PART THREE
New Methodological Approaches

PART FOUR
Papers Assuming the “Two-Gospel” (Owen-Griesbach) Hypothesis

PART FIVE
Papers Exploring a Paradigm Shift in Gospel Studies

Appendix

Index: Modern autors: 525; "Fathers" of the Church 532-533.


In 1987 the late Professor Bo Reicke of Basel University published his study of 'Synoptic Theories Advanced during the Consolidation of Germany, 1830-1870', in which he traced the history of the idea of Markan primacy from Strauss to Holtzmann. In passing, Reicke noted that the appointment in 1874 of Holtzmann to the prestigious chair of New Testament at the reconstituted University of Strasbourg gave this young scholar's career (and thus the Markan Hypothesis) an important boost. (2) Stoldt had analyzed Holtzmann's influential work published in 1863 in his 1977 work, and had demonstrated its critical untenability. This had been done independently as early as 1866 by Hajo Meijboom, eight full years before Holtzmann's appointment to the chair at Strasbourg. (3) Thus it is an unsolved question in the social history of biblical studies how and why this important appointment was made. (4)
This leads me to focus on the decade in which this happened—1870-1880, the era of the *Kulturkampf*—in order to see whether it is possible to discover how and why what was still only a very popular 'scientific' hypothesis in 1870 was eventually transformed into what Bo Reicke designates as a *theologumenon*. It should be said in advance that this bit of social history cannot settle the vexing question of whether Mark was or was not the earliest Gospel. That question can only be settled on the basis of historical and literary evidence. This bit of social history can, however, help explain what might be called the sociology of Markan primacy. (pp. 16-17)


(4) The correspondence between Bismarck and Ledderhose, who represented the University in the appointment process, focuses on Holtzmann's church politics.


edited by Thomas, Robert L., 111-125. Grand Rapids (MI): Kregel

  Abstract: "Modern historical criticism has systematically ignored the writings of the early church fathers regarding their viewpoints on the Gospels. This article examines pertinent writings of several significant early fathers (Papias, Tertullian, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Eusebius, and Augustine) regarding any information that they can impart regarding the chronological order of the Gospels. Their writings reveal that the unanimous and unquestioned consensus of the early church was that Matthew was the first gospel written. They also reveal that, while they considered John as written last, Luke was predominately considered second and Mark third (although admittedly Mark, at times, appears in second place). Since the church fathers lived much closer to the time of the composition of the gospels and were scholars in their own right, their testimony must be given serious consideration in any hypothesis regarding chronological order. Such early testimony stands in direct contradiction to the predominant contention of source criticism that concludes for the Two- or Four-Document Hypothesis (i.e. priority of Mark and Q), especially since the latter is not a product of objective historical analysis but a late-blooming conjecture spawned by Enlightenment ideologies."

  Abstract: "Second Corinthians 10:5 and Colossians 2:8 warn believers to examine their thought life carefully to guard against being taken prisoner by philosophical presuppositions that are hostile to the Bible. One can either take thoughts captive or have their thought life
taken captive to the detriment of their spiritual lives. One place in particular where conservative evangelicals have been taken captive is in the historical-critical discipline of source criticism. The predominant view of the early church was that the Gospels were four independent witnesses to the life of Christ. Starting around the A.D. 1600-1700s, there occurred a philosophical and ideological shift in thinking about the origin of the Gospels, particularly in relationship to Synoptic Gospels. Due to the rise of Rationalism, Deism, Skepticism, the Enlightenment, and Romanticism (to name a few), the Independence approach was rejected and two qualitatively different approaches in explaining the Gospels resulted: the Two-Gospel hypothesis and Two-Source hypothesis. A careful investigation reveals that both approaches stemmed from the same errancy roots as modern unorthodox views of inspiration. Because of the history and philosophy behind source criticism, when evangelicals adopt either approach in their interpretation of the Gospels, they automatically tap into these errancy roots that inevitably lead to deprecating the historicity of the Gospels."


"That there is an interrelationship between textual criticism and the Synoptic Problem is the presupposition of most Synoptic studies. Nonetheless the specific nature of that relationship, especially as it affects the
finding of solutions, is seldom spelled out, and, it would seem, is frequently neglected. This present paper is an attempt, partially at least, to fill up that lacuna. As far as I know, the last comprehensive study which took both disciplines (textual and Synoptic criticism) seriously as being interrelated in arriving at solutions was B. H. Streeter's monumental *The Four Gospels* (1924). The first two large sections of his book were entitled 'The Manuscript Tradition' and 'The Synoptic Problem'. I may be pardoned for borrowing this *Gattung* for my paper. In part I, some suggestions are offered as to what 'modern textual criticism' means, by overviewing some recent work on method. Since I am part of the debate in this area, I can scarcely be expected to achieve objectivity! But I do hope I have been fair to all, and have touched on the essential issues. In part II, I offer some general observations on the chief area of interrelationship, the problem of harmonization/disharmonization. The illustrations in this section are basically concerned with the resolution of textual questions." (p. 154)

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of the main studies in English from 1964 (Fit - Gou)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

Abstract: "This essay addresses two questions: (1) Is Q a narrative?, and (2) Is Q a narrative gospel? Both questions receive an affirmative answer as Q has all the essential characteristics of a narrative, including an identifiable plot, and all the essential elements of a gospel. The author of Q develops the plot of Q in a series of dialogues and speeches. The five dialogues in Q provide a symbolic presentation of the transformation Jesus undergoes in the crucifixion and resurrection and arrange of reactions to this transformation. The speeches of Q unfold the four dimensions of the revelation contained in the transformation: (1) The disclosure of Jesus as the end-time savior and judge, (2) The revelation of a new way of living through absolute faith in God to the exclusion of any concern for the Self, (3) The revelation of a new radical ethic of love, and (4) The disclosure of a new understanding of community as a radical religious and economic democracy."


During the period from the 1960s until the 1990s it is fair to say that the major rival alternative to the widely accepted two-source theory was the Griesbach hypothesis, or perhaps more correctly the neo-Griesbach hypothesis. In no small part, due to the indefatigable stream of publications and presentations from W.R. Farmer and his energetic band of supporters, the neo-Griesbach hypothesis gained a prominence which was probably disproportionate to its numerical support. The basic tenet of this theory was that the Gospel of Mark was the last of the three synoptic gospels to be composed, and that it was the result of the conflation of the Matthean and Iukan accounts. In the contemporary period support for this theory appears to have quite literally ‘died out’. With the deaths of the major proponents of this theory of synoptic relationships, and the failure of this hypothesis to have attracted new defenders, there appears to be few if any advocates for this solution. Moreover, no significant publications in support of the neo-Griesbach hypothesis have appeared during the last couple of decades.

This demise of the neo-Griesbach hypothesis has not, however, resulted in an upsurge of support for the two-source theory. The decrease in support for Farmer’s ideas has coincided with a notable increase in support for the Farrer hypothesis (FH), or, as some prefer, the Mark without Q theory (MwQ). The primary figure associated with this synoptic solution, Austin Farrer, presented his major statement in defence of the basic claims of the theory prior to Farmer’s work on the neo-Griesbach
hypothesis. Its two basic tenets are the defence of Markan priority, and in place of the Q hypothesis the claim that Luke made direct use of the Gospel of Matthew as a source for the material that is shared uniquely by Matthew and Luke (the so-called double tradition material). Farrer’s work attracted some limited support in the period from the 1950s to the 1980s. However, growth in support became more widespread from the 1990s onwards, to the extent that it might now be correctly seen as the current major rival proposal to the two-source theory, which still remains the most widely accepted and preferred solution to the synoptic problem. In this discussion, the development and emergence of the Farrer hypothesis will be traced from its antecedents to the current form of this synoptic solution theory. An attempt will also be made to account for this rise in popularity of the variant forms of this hypothesis, and an assessment will be made of its impact on synoptic gospels scholarship and possible future trajectories in the discussion surrounding the Farrer hypothesis." (pp. 86-87)

(1) Perhaps Farmer’s most influential publication on the topic was Farmer, *Synoptic Problem*.

  Table of Contents: Preface VII; David R. Catchpole: Christopher M. Tuckett: An Appreciation XIII; Publications XIX; John S. Kloppenborg: Introduction 1; PART I
  Christopher M. Tuckett: The Current State of the Synoptic Problem 9; John S. Kloppenborg: Synopses and the Synoptic Problem 51; Andrew Gregory: What Is Literary Dependence? 87; Peter M. Head: Textual Criticism and the Synoptic Problem 115; PART II
PART III
Robert A. Derrenbacker, Jr.: The “External and Psychological Conditions under Which the Synoptic Gospels Were Written”: Ancient Compositional Practices and the Synoptic Problem 435; Alan Kirk: Memory, Scribal Media, and the Synoptic Problem 459; Alex Damm: Ancient Rhetoric and the Synoptic Problem 483; Dennis R. MacDonald: The Synoptic Problem and Literary Mimesis: The Case of the Frothing Demoniac 509; F. Gerald Downing: Writers’ Use or Abuse of Written Sources 523;
PART IV
PART V


of the argument in his commentary on Matthew that some minor agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark represent subsidiary influence of Matthew on Luke's use of his primary sources, Mark and Q. F. Neirynck has already engaged in a lively exchange with Gundry concerning the minor agreements in the Great Commandment pericope (Lk 10,25-28). The purpose of this note is to respond to Gundry's continued defense of Matthean influence on Lk 9,22, with special attention to his rejoinders to the brief article on which Neirynck and I collaborated.

- ——. 2003. "A Note on the Lamp Saying, Mk 4,21 and Q 11,33." Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 79:423-430. Abstract: "Mk 4,21, the saying on the lamp, has a direct Lucan parallel in Lk 8,16; a variant form appears in Lk 11,33 parallel Mt 5,15, which is considered a Q-version of the saying. Among other Mark–Q overlaps, H.T. Fleddermann proposes that here Mark uses and redacts Q for his text1. In this note, we will present Fleddermann's argument and show why he has not demonstrated his position, concluding that it is more probable that the lamp saying in Mk 4,21 is independent from Q 11,33."
- ——. 2004. "What Is Hidden Will Be Revealed. A Note on the Independence of Mk 4,22 and Q 12,2." Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 80:439-444. Abstract: "This note first provides an overview of the presentation of H.T. Fleddermann's proposal (Mark and Q, BETL 122, Leuven, 1995, esp. pp. 81-84) that the saying in Mk 4,22, concerning "what is hidden will be revealed", is Mark's redaction of Q 12,2. The note then critiques his methodology as insufficient for establishing Mark's dependence on Q 12,2 (this note follows the author's similar treatment of the Lamp Saying, Mk 4,21
and Q 11,33, in ETL 79 [2003] 423-430). First, Fleddermann's proposal requires that Mark take the saying of Q 12,2 out of its own logical context and attach it somewhat uncomfortably to the saying on the lamp in Mk 4,21. More specifically, the proposed Marcan redaction of Q 12,2 results in three hapax legomena in one verse, which is highly improbable. The article thus demonstrates that the independence of Mk 4,22 and Q 12,2 is a better understanding of these respective forms of the saying.

- ———. 2006. ""To One Who Has...": Mk 4,25 (Mt 25,29; Lk 19,26). A Note on the Independence of Mk 4,25 from Q 19,26 and on the Sayings Cluster of Mk 4,21-25." Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses no. 82:165-173.
- Fuller, Reginald H. 1978. "Baur Versus Hilgenfeld: A Forgotten Chapter in the Debate on the Synoptic Problem." New Testament Studies no. 24:355-370. "William R. Farmer's history of the debate on the Synoptic Problem contains the following footnote: Baur answered Hilgenfeld in his Das Markusevangelium, Tübingen, 1851, and the two carried on the debate for years in the Theologische Jahrbücher. This debate is worthy of thorough analysis and evaluation.(1) When I was invited to read a paper at this year's meeting at Tübingen with the understanding that the paper should deal if possible with some aspect of the work of the Tübingen school of the mid-nineteenth century, this seemed to be an appropriate occasion to take up Professor Farmer's challenge." (p. 355) (...
"What can we learn of value for the discussion of the relations between the gospels today? First, it confirms the point made by E. P. Sanders(5) that most of the arguments for the priority of one gospel over another are reversible.

To that I would add, that the direction in which you take them depends largely if not entirely on your Blick - the view you have already adopted on the relations between the gospels. There is however one non-reversible criterion which emerges from this debate. It appeared in Hilgenfeld's argument that the dependence of one gospel upon another is demonstrated when Tendenz material from the earlier gospel survives in the later. If Luke's Tendenz shows up in Mark and if Mark does not share that Tendenz, it would be a clear sign of Mark's dependence on Luke. Today we would substitute the concept of 'redaction' for Tendenz. But even this criterion has to be applied with caution, otherwise the argument becomes circular. A gospel's redaction must be determined without recourse to a synoptic theory already presupposed.(1a) That calls into question much of the redactional study that has been done in recent years on Matthew and on Luke. It is indeed ironic that the Tendenzkritik, for which the Tübingen school has been so notorious, at least in the English-speaking world, should have led them to contribute a criterion of permanent value to the discussion of the relation between the gospels today." (pp. 369-370)

(5) E. P. Sanders, The Tendencies of the Synoptic Tradition (SNTS Monograph 9; Cambridge, 1969)
(1a) This is not meant to exclude a comparison of the parallels in the other gospels, a procedure necessary to expose what is unique to and characteristic of the gospel which is being studied.

  An Examination of a New Paradigm.

  Abstract: "Matthew and Luke sometimes write versions of Marcan pericopae in which they make initial changes, only to lapse into the thought or wording of the original. Clear examples are Matt 14.1-12 II Mark 6.14-29 (Death of John); Matt 8.1-411 Mark 1.40-5 (Leper); Matt 12.46-5011 Mark 3.31-5 (Mother and Brothers); Luke 8.4-1511 Mark 4.1-20 (Sower); Luke 5.17-2611 Mark 2.1-12 (Paralytic) and Luke 9.10-1711 Mark 6.30-44 (Five Thousand), all of which make good sense on the theory of Marcan Priority. 'Fatigue' may also suggest a solution to the problem of double tradition material: Luke 9.1-6 (cf. Matt 10.5-15, Mission Charge) and Luke 19.11-2711 Matt 25.14-30 (Talents) both make good sense on the theory of Luke's use of Matthew."


"It is a fact seldom acknowledged that the double tradition material in Matthew and Luke shows a
remarkably high degree of verbatim agreement. It is a fact still more rarely acknowledged that the high verbatim agreement makes best sense if Luke is copying from Matthew. The issue is surprisingly straightforward, and yet it is almost always missed in discussions of the Synoptic Problem. Where two documents show very close agreement in wording in parallel passages, the best explanation is that one is copying directly from the other, not that both are copying from a hypothetical third document. Where two documents are copying from a third, we should not expect to see the kind of high verbatim agreement that we often see in the double tradition. The evidence suggests that Luke had direct contact with Matthew, and this entails dispensing with Q." (p. 82)


Contents: List of tables VIII; N. T. Wright: Foreword IX; Abbreviations XIII; Nicholas Perrin: Introduction:


Conclusion
In sum, with the help of the ancient rhetorical tradition, I have demonstrated that Luke's narrative is indeed orderly, just as he claims. This proves true on a macro scale insomuch as Luke arranges his material sequentially according to the topics listed in the *progymnasmata*. On a micro scale, I have also shown that if Luke did indeed use Matthew as a source for his SOP [Sermon of the Plain], such redaction would have made sense on ancient rhetorical grounds. His rearrangements and omissions of Matthaean material would be justified in light of his larger concerns for clarity, brevity, and plausibility.

What implications does this study have for source criticism of the gospels? Perhaps one of the strongest criticisms launched against the FH has been aimed at Luke's order.
"The above clarification of the rhetorical principles on which Luke ordered his narrative suggests that there is less need to invoke Q to account for Luke's sequence. This study, of course, does not prove that Luke used Matthew, but it does make the FH that much more probable. While there are still problems to be solved regarding the sources of the Synoptics and their relationship to one another, this study has done at least two things: (1) it has removed a significant obstacle for proponents of the FH by showing Luke's order is justifiable on rhetorical grounds, and (2) it suggests that rhetorical analysis may be a profitable way forward in source-critical studies of the gospels." (pp. 80-81, a note omitted)

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of the main studies in English from 1964 (Gre - Klo)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

- Griesbach, Johann Jakob. 1978. "A demonstration that Mark was written after Matthew and Luke." In J. J. Griesbach: Synoptic and Text-Critical Studies, 1776-


Abstract: "The assumption that a productive and vital Aramaic tradition gave rise to early Christianity has haunted critical New Testament scholarship since its inception some 200 years ago. The traditional image of Christianity's birth in the Aramaic-speaking milieu of Palestine, together with the idea of the church's gradual expansion into the Hellenistic world, has made scholarship search unabatingly for Q's Aramaic ancestors. Fanciful translation hypotheses, prompted by Q's Semitisms and its LXXal style, are coupled in the literature with speculations about the transformation of Q's early apocalyptic outlook on history into a manual of sapiential instructions intended to shape Mediterranean life and culture. A closer comparison of the arguments advanced in support of or in opposition to this assumption reveals its problematic nature. Studies of the evolution of Q from a compilation of sayings into a
Sayings Gospel have opened new vistas from within the document itself. Q's portrait of Jesus as Sophia's most trusted envoy, along with the literary devices employed by the Q redactors to flesh out their vision of Jesus, suggests strongly that at each stage of its evolution the document was at home, in language and in thought, in the Hellenistic milieu of Galilee and Syria.

- Hägerland, Tobias. 2019. "Editorial Fatigue and the Existence of Q." *New Testament Studies*:190-206. Abstract: "This article challenges Mark Goodacre's contention that the distribution of editorial fatigue in Matthew and Luke points not only to Markan priority but also to Luke’s dependence on Matthew. Goodacre's argument is criticised through questioning the assumptions that Matthew's handling of Q would have been analogous to his handling of Mark and to Luke's handling of Q, as well as the claim that no instances of editorial fatigue can be detected in Matthew’s handling of the double tradition. The conclusion is that the argument from editorial fatigue cannot be used to establish that the existence of Q is improbable."


Contents: List of Contributors IX; Preface X; Permissions XII; Abbreviations XIII;

Catherine Sider Hamilton: Introduction: Francis Watson's *Gospel Writing* and *The Fourfold Gospel*: engaging a "New Paradigm"

Part I. Critical assessments of *Gospel Writing* and *The Fourfold Gospel*


Part II. Gospel writing and Gospel sources

Chapter 3. Richard A. Burridge: Ancient biography and the development of the canonical collection 63; Chapter 4. Mark Goodacre: What does Thomas have to do with Q? The afterlife of a sayings Gospel 81;

Chapter 5. Jens Schroter: Gospels in the First and Second century and the origin of the "Fourfold Gospel": a critical appraisal of Francis Watson's *Gospel Writing* 90;

Part III. *Gospel Writing* and *The Fourfold Gospel*

"The passion narrative has been and continues to be one of the most studied sections of the Gospel of Luke. The problem is that many differences exist between the Lukan account and the passion in Mk, encompassing at times the absence of some material and the addition of other material as well as the difference in the order of various accounts. Our purpose is to reexamine the use of the Markan material in Lk. In recent years the discussion has once more focused on the question of Luke’s sources as part of ongoing source-critical and redaction-critical research. The issue of Luke’s use of a special source (or sources) for his passion narrative has again generated much scholarly debate. Consequently, some believe that the discussion has arrived at an impasse. Led by proponents of the new literary criticism, a number of exegetes now prescind from source-critical investigation, and even from any supposition concerning sources. Although the Lukan passion narrative has been the focus of much analysis, no adequate history has sketched the contours of the debate. Our goal is not only to present a recent history, but to trace the discussion to its beginnings. We have generally followed a combination of a chronological and systematic order alternating between proponents and opponents of the theory of a special source or sources. It has also been our intention to report dependence of scholars upon one another. The survey, covering roughly the period from the 1880’s to 1997, is divided into two major sections. The first
details the development from P. Feine through the 1960’s. The second period begins with the work of G. Schneider and continues up through 1997. In the treatment of each scholar’s position, insofar as it is possible, we review their underlying Synoptic theory, their source theory as applied to the passion in general, then the trial of Pilate, and finally any contributions regarding the trial before Herod. Three appendices are provided: 1) Special LQ vocabulary and constructions according to J. Weiss, 2) Lukan priority theories, and 3) the Gospel of Peter and its relation to the Herod pericope." (pp. XI-XII, note omitted)

  "Considerable mystery enfolds Marcion of Sinope, the notorious second century heresiarch, since none of the documents he bequeathed to history survive directly." (p. 213) 

(...)
"One topic generated particularly heated debate, that of the relation between the Gospel of Luke and the Gospel of Marcion. Sparked by Johann Salomo Semler in 1783, the controversy raged until 1921, when Adolf von Harnack’s magisterial monograph reaffirmed the traditional position that Marcion excised portions from Luke.(2) Though the alternative thesis cropped up only sporadically during the 20th century, a small contingent of scholars have recently reopened the question, including the recent learned essay of Matthias Klinghardt “Markion vs. Lukas: Plädoyer für die Wiederaufnahme eines alten Falles.”(5)" (pp. 213-214, a note omitted) (...)

"Though Klinghardt considers the historically broad assent to Harnack’s later, critically grounded reaffirmation of the position to have been prematurely dismissive (485), he has not yet overturned Harnack’s case. The cumulative weight of internal evidence and considerations of dating corroborate the external testimony to Lukan priority over Marcion’s Gospel, though whether the document which Marcion edited is identical with the canonical Third Gospel remains a viable question." (p. 232)

(2) A. von Harnack, Marcion: Das Evangelium vom fremden Gott: Eine Monographie zur Geschichte der Grundlegung der katholischen Kirche (TU 15), Leipzig 1921.


• Horman, John. 2011. *A Common Written Greek Source for Mark & Thomas*. Waterloo (On): Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion. "This book uncovers an early collection of sayings, called N, that are ascribed to Jesus and are similar to those found in the Gospel of Thomas and in Q, a document believed to be a common source, with Mark, for Matthew and Luke. In the process, the book sheds light on the literary methods of Mark and Thomas. A literary comparison of the texts of the sayings of Jesus that
appear in both Mark and Thomas shows that each adapted an earlier collection for his own purpose. Neither Mark nor Thomas consistently gives the original or earliest form of the shared sayings; hence, Horman states, each used and adapted an earlier source. Close verbal parallels between the versions in Mark and Thomas show that the source was written in Greek. Horman's conclusion is that this common source is N. This proposal is new, and has implications for life of Jesus research. Previous research on sayings attributed to Jesus has treated Thomas in one of two ways: either as an independent stream of Jesus sayings written without knowledge of the New Testament Gospels or as a later piece of pseudo-Scripture that uses the New Testament as source. This book rejects both views.


The editors of JHJS have pulled together an ideal set of respondents to Q in Matthew: Robert Derrenbacker and Sarah Rollens, fellow alums of the University of Toronto program and representatives of the so-called ‘Toronto School’ of Q scholarship, Rafael Rodríguez, Synoptic source-critical agnostic and fellowtraveler in the world of ancient media, and Mark Goodacre, genial champion of the Farrar-Goulder
hypothesis (fgh). I am grateful for the investment of time evident in their responses. While their expressions of appreciation for the work are welcome, naturally what is of most interest are the points they raise in critique. That this is a journal dedicated to historical Jesus research also raises the question of why the editors have seen fit to devote an issue to the Synoptic Problem debate. We will therefore conclude with reflections on the significance of the memory factor in the transmission of the Jesus tradition, as this becomes visible in Synoptic source relations, for historical Jesus enquiry."


"A grasp of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century scholarship on the Synoptic Problem is indispensable for putting our own debates in perspective. Though good surveys of this fascinating and pioneering period are available, (1) as yet untried angle is a media analysis - what role particular concepts of memory, oral tradition, and the written medium played in nineteenth-century synoptic scholarship, and just as importantly, what was at stake when critics invoked media factors in their histories of the synoptic tradition and gospel writing. In this exploratory probe we will focus on Heinrich Julius Holtzmann and Paul Wernle, two of the most consequential critics of that era. In particular, we will look at how they deployed memory, oral tradition, and written sources in their quest for a pre-dogma Jesus." (p. 53)


Abstract: "The most recent debate of the Synoptic Problem resulted in a dead-lock: The best-established solutions, the Two-Source-Hypothesis and the Farrer-Goodacre-Theory, are burdened with a number of apparent weaknesses. On the other hand, the arguments raised against these theories are cogent. An alternative possibility, that avoids the problems created by either of them, is the inclusion of the gospel used by Marcion. This gospel is not a redaction of Luke, but rather precedes Matthew and Luke and, therefore, belongs into the maze of the synoptic interrelations. The resulting model avoids the weaknesses of the previous theories and provides compelling and obvious solutions to the notoriously difficult problems."

"In order to assess the importance of the Marcionite Gospel for the New Testament we must determine the editorial relation between this gospel and Luke: this is the basic problem for everybody dealing with the Marcionite Gospel, no matter whether for literary, historical or theological reasons. As I have argued in some detail elsewhere, I strongly believe that the direction of the editorial process linking the two texts runs from the Marcionite Gospel to Luke.(1) Only under this basic assumption does the full impact of the Marcionite Gospel become visible: with regard to the emergence of the gospel tradition, the understanding of the New Testament and its textual history, and many other – hitherto unanswered – questions.(2)" (p. 318)

(2) These problems precede and outweigh even a critical
reconstruction of the text of the Marcionite Gospel:
significant parts of the heresiologists’ testimony,
particularly the numerous contradictory attestations, will
be evaluated according to the direction of the editorial
process.

- Kloppenborg, John S. 1986. "The Formation of Q and
Antique Instructional Genres." *Journal of Biblical
Literature* no. 105:443-462.
- ———. 1987. "Symbolic Eschatology and the
Apocalypticism of Q." *The Harvard Theological Review*
no. 80:287-306.
& Christian Beginnings: In Honor of James M.
Robinson*, edited by Goehring, James E., Sanders, Jack
T. and Hedrick, Charles W., 35-48. Sonoma: Polebridge
Press.
- ———. 1990. "City and Wasteland: Narrative World and
the Beginning of the Sayings Gospel (Q)." *Semeia* no.
52:145-160.
Neirynck. Volume II*, edited by van Segbroeck, Frans,
Tuckett, Christopher M., van Belle, Gilbert and
Verheyden, Joseph, 93-120. Leuven: Leuven University
Press / Peeters.
Reprinted in: S. Kloppenborg, *Synoptic Problems:
Collected Essays*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014, pp. 11-
37.
Contents: Acknowledgments V; Preface VII; John S.
Kloppenborg: Introduction 1; 1. Rudolf Bultmann: : What
the Saying Source Reveals about the Early Church 23; 2.
Helmut Koester: The Synoptic Sayings Source and the
Gospel of Thomas 35; 3. James M. Robinson: Jewish
Wisdom Literature and the Gattung, LOGOI SOPHON 51;
4. Dieter Luhrmann: Q in the History of Early


  Abstract: "H.J. Holtzmann's Die synoptischen Evangelien (1863) is not only regarded as having established Markan priority and the basic contours of the Two Source hypothesis; it also offered a sketch of the life of Jesus based on a Mark-like source that represents a starting point for the so-called 'Liberal Lives of Jesus' which prevailed from 1863 until the early 1900s. Holtzmann's 'Life' portrayed Jesus as an exemplary personality, and posited psychological development in seven stages in the career of Jesus. This essay discusses the intellectual context leading to Holtzmann's book and then offers an annotated English translation of Holtzmann's 'Life of Jesus'. This is Part 1 of a two-part essay."
  Contents: Preface VII; Abbreviations XIII; Introduction 1; Part I: SYNOPTIC PROBLEMS 9
  Part II:THE SAYINGS GOSPEL Q 155
Sayings Gospel Q and the Quest for the Historical Jesus 366;
Part III: MARK 407
Part IV: PARABLES 513
18. Jesus and the Parables of Jesus in Q 515; 19. The Parable of the Prodigal Son and Deeds of Gift 556; 20. Pastoralism, Papyri and the Parable of the Shepherd 577; 21. The Representation of Violence in the Synoptic Parables 600;
Bibliography 631; Index of Modern Authors 697.

Abstract: "Recent analyses of the Gospel of Thomas by Mark Goodacre and Simon Gathercole make only a partial and, in several instances, unconvincing case for Thomas’s knowledge of the Synoptic Gospels. Other neglected data suggests that some portions of Thomas are substantially autonomous. This calls for a more complex understanding of the composition of Thomas, one that recognizes its construction as a ‘school text’ or ‘anthology’, drawing on multiple and parallel streams of the Jesus tradition."

References

"It is an honour to be able to respond to the nine essays in this collection, some offering arguments that advance the case for the Farrer or Mark without-Q hypothesis, and others that raise issues with the positing of Q as a component of the Two Document hypothesis. In this response I will treat the essays that advance the FH first (Eve, Gorman, Abakuks, Peterson, Landry, Poirier), and then the remaining three essays (Carlson, Olson, Goodacre). Although Poirier's essay is entitled to suggest that it deals primarily with Q, it is in fact an analysis of Delbert Burkett's critique of the FH, and a defence of some of the key features of the FH, rather than simply a treatment of Burkett's view of Q." (p. 226)


"The question posed in this chapter is not how Catholic scholars at the turn of the last century came to embrace the two-document hypothesis (2DH) - that is, the specific arguments that were made, although that too is important but what seems to have been at stake in them
doing so. The matter is complicated by the fact that, as in
the case of many treatments of the Synoptic Problem, the
decision is often framed as simply a matter of historical
or literary probability or even as "objective" scholarship;
there is often very little reflection on what might be at
stake, both conceptually and theologically, in a particular
synoptic hypothesis.
I hasten to add that this chapter does not take the view
that synoptic hypotheses are embraced (or rejected)
merely because they have or lack some perceived
theological utility; that would be to misread the history of
scholarship and this possibility was expressly rejected by
scholars such as Marie-Joseph Lagrange and Friedrich
Maier. Nevertheless, irrespective of the particular
historical and literary grounds upon which a particular
hypothesis is founded, there are theoretical "costs" and
"advantages" entailed in that hypothesis. My interest is
not in personal motivations, data for which is in almost
all cases lacking, but rather in the larger theoretical or
conceptual interests that may have been served by one or
other synoptic hypothesis.(1)" (p. 165)
(1) See Christopher M. Tuckett, "The Griesbach
Hypothesis in the 19th Century," *JSNT* 3 (1979), 29-60
for an analogous exploration.

  *Theological and Theoretical Issues in the Synoptic
  Contents: Preface VI; Notes on Contributors VII; 1.
  Christopher Tuckett: Theological Issues at Stake in Early-
  Twentieth-Century Research on the Synoptic Problem 1;
  Harmony: Loss or Gain? 19; 3. Francis Watson: The
  Archaeology of the Q Hypothesis: The Case of H. J.
  Holtzmann; 4. Alan Kirk: Memory, Tradition, and
  Synoptic Sources: The Quest of Holtzmann and Wernle
  for a Pre-Dogma Jesus; 5. Markus Tiwald: Die Suche
  nach dem „Urevangelium" als Frage nach der
  Authentizitat der Jesustiberlieferung 71; 6. Paul Foster:

- ———. 2000. Excavating Q: The History and Setting of the Sayings Gospel. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. "This book explores two sets of issues crucial to the study of early Christianity: first, the basic methodological issues bearing on the identification and reconstruction of one of the earliest documents of the Jesus movement, and second, how so seemingly abstract and hypothetical a project has belonged and continues to belong to the history of discourse on early Christianity and what importance it has in that discourse. In short, it is a book on how one talks about Q, and why it matters.

The motivations for this book are several. First, I have been thinking and writing about Q for two decades and have watched it transformed from a documentary source of rather limited interest into a major point of debate in matters of the delineation of the early Jesus movement and in the quest of the historical Jesus. With much work already accomplished, this seems a mod juncture at which to review and evaluate what has been done.
Second, for the last several years I have also conducted a doctoral seminar on the Synoptic Problem, inviting students to examine seriously, sympathetically, and critically a variety of solutions to the Synoptic Problem—not only the two Document hypothesis (2DH), but the Two Gospel (Griesbach) hypothesis (2GH), the complex hypotheses of Vaganay, Boismard, and Rolland, The solution of the so-called Jerusalem school, and the Farrer-Goulder hypothesis. Part of my concern has been to ensure that graduate students appreciate both the strengths and weaknesses of various Synoptic solutions, and that they understand the difference between well and poorly constructed hypotheses." (From the Preface, IX)

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of the main studies in English from 1964 (Kni - Mey)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

  
  Abstract: "Michael Goulder’s analysis of the predominant understanding of the relationship between the synoptic gospels is assessed in terms of the philosophy of science, and more nuanced criteria for assessing the rationality of synoptic study are developed, especially in relation to historical plausibility. A new hypothesis is proposed, which has claims to greater historical plausibility than the two-source hypothesis. While Luke is still seen as being based on Mark and Q, it is argued that these two documents were not a source for Matthew, but were derived from an early version of its text and used initially for didactic purposes. The advantages of this hypothesis are urged, especially in relation to Mark’s ‘missing ending’.


  Posthumously edited by Henry Chadwick.

  Posthumously edited by Henry Chadwick.


  Translated by Howard C. Kee.


Part I. Mark and Q

Harry T. Fleddermann: Mark's Use of Q: The Beelzebul Controversy and the Cross Saying 17; Jens Schröter: The Son of Man as the Representative of God's Kingdom: On the Interpretation of Jesus in Mark and Q 34;

Part II. The Historical Jesus in New Research

Michael Labahn: Introduction 70;

A. Recent Trends in the Historical and Sociological Portrait of Jesus


B. Theological and Hermeneutical Investigations into the Proclamation of Jesus

Marius Reiser: Eschatology in the Proclamation of Jesus 216; Peter Balla: What Did Jesus Think about his
"Conclusion

The final dating technique that is applicable to the gospel of Luke is consideration of the constellation of ideas found in the text and their consonance or dissonance with a particular historical context. Many of the scholars who argue for a late date for Luke do so on the basis of this criterion, claiming that (a) Luke's ideas clearly reflect a later stage in the development of Christianity than Mark and Matthew, and (b) that the texts whose ideas are most similar to Luke's were all written in the second century. What is more interesting is the fact that even those scholars who argue for an early date often admit that Luke's thought fits better in a second-century context than a first-century one."

(...)  
"The fact is that the gospel of Luke (and Acts) display(s) almost unmistakable signs of having been written after 115 CE. Luke reflects knowledge of all the texts one would expect him to be familiar with if he wrote the gospel this late: Mark, Matthew, John, Josephus, and Paul. The terminus a quo for Luke cannot be earlier than"
about 100 CE. But no other author quotes from Luke until Marcion or Justin. Hence the *terminus ad quem* for Luke lies somewhere between 125 and 160 CE." (pp. 189-190)


"The year 1774 is usually marked as an important year for New Testament scholarship. It was the year Johann Jakob Griesbach published his gospel synopsis, a presentation of the texts of the first three gospels in columns side by side. The work was meant as the first portion of an edition of the New Testament. The synopsis was reissued in his edition of the whole New Testament, which appeared in 1776. The importance of Griesbach's synopsis was not that it was a synopsis. In the early modern period, apart from a host of gospel harmonies, quite a number of gospel synopses had been published. Well-known examples are the synopses published by Calvin in 1555 and Jean Le Clerc in 1699. But Griesbach's publication of 1774 had one striking new feature: no attempt was made to reconstruct the life of Jesus.

(...)
Understandably, several experts on the history of the Synoptic Question have supposed that Griesbach's synopsis was also the point of departure from which he developed his solution of the synoptic problem, in his case the Two Gospel Hypothesis. It is true that no other synopsis before his time had ever been meant for such a purpose.

(...)
In this chapter, I would like to address two questions. The first is: Was the decline of the gospel harmony after the publication of Griesbach's synopsis a loss or a gain? This entails the issue of how the genre of the old-fashioned
harmony related historically to the new genre of the "unharmonized" synopsis.

My second question is: How clear-cut exactly was the "paradigm shift" in synoptic studies that was brought about by Griesbach’s synopsis? Or, to rephrase this question more strongly: Can we speak at all of a turning point or paradigm shift with regard to Griesbach’s synopsis?" (pp. 19-20, note omitted)


"What is called the “modern” and the “critical” study of the gospels began in earnest about 170 years ago. Through a series of fortunate circumstances the writer has sometimes been led—sometimes impelled—to examine in detail for himself nearly the entire course of development of “critical” or “scientific” gospel study. A thirteen years’ investigation of this little known field yields a very different impression of it than the books and the popularizers give us. Real acquaintance with such
work leads also to a markedly different evaluation of it than the current one. The results of such study would normally find embodiment in monographs, and be put on a library shelf to collect dust. But in the present case the results have an unusual practical value for the Church and for its ministers. We will say no more of this, but will allow the reader to judge of this matter for himself.


Abstract: "Is Matthew, our first canonical Gospel, a genuine and authentic production of an apostle? The answer to this question is at stake in the debate on the validity of the Mark-hypothesis. The question of Matthew’s authenticity is tied to the question whether it was known and used by Mark, or Mark was used by its writer. It is therefore of importance to decide whether Mark came first, as the Mark-hypothesis holds, or whether Matthew was written first.

The writer of “More Light on the Synoptics” (Christianity Today, March 2 issue) tries to prove the Mark-hypothesis. He claims that Mark was written first and was used and adapted by the writer of our Matthew. His attempted proof of the priority of Mark is the most important part of his article. Therefore we will consider it first. We meet here a kind of argument often given for the Mark-theory. We are firmly convinced that it is not, and indeed in the nature of the case can never become, a valid proof. After pulling the attempted proof to the ground four distinct times by four separate handles, we will explain why, in our opinion, no one should accept the same article’s special pleading for Matthew’s genuineness and authenticity. And lastly, we have a point to clarify. Some readers of Christianity Today concluded that the present writer argued (“New Light on the Synoptic
Gospels”) for totally independent origination of our first three Gospels. But this was not so.

the social history of its tradents can be reconstructed. The movement that comes into view is markedly different from the kerygmatic congregation that scholars have customarily imagined as the first social formation of Christianity. Since the traditional picture of "the earliest Christian community" is largely dependent upon a conflation of Pauline texts and the Gospel of Mark, scholars are now forced to consider the relation of Q to Mark and Paul. This essay takes up one of these challenges by focusing upon the relation of Q to Mark. It argues for the priority of Jesus movements like that reflected in Q and explains the Markan divergences from Q in terms of Mark's own plan for his gospel. Finally, the implications for a reconstruction of Christian origins are sketched and some consequences for New Testament studies in general are drawn."


by copying Mark. But occasionally the others agree against Mark. These agreements are slight, but they could suggest that Mark was not the only source. Authors who contest the 2ST frequently cite these minor agreements as evidence against that theory. An attempt is made here to identify the most weighty cases. Forty were found. These are explained as independent reactions by Matthew and Luke to the Markan text, so that the 2ST is safe from objection. In addition, rival source theories are positively discouraged.

A translation with introduction and notes of Geschiedenis en critiek der Marcushypothese (History and Critique of the Marcan Hypothesis), translated and edited by John J. Kiwiet.

"The synoptic problem has vehemently disturbed the minds of biblical scholars ever since the controversial publication of Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet by David Friedrich Strauss in 1835-1836 (ET The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, 1846). The author compared the reaction to his book to “a wailing of terrified women after hearing the sound of a gunshot in their vicinity.” Even deep into the American frontier, revival preachers for more than a century afterward would blast the supposed demonic attack of higher criticism. Strauss not only questioned the historical data of the New Testament, but its theological content as well. The Gospel, he contended, did not give the message of Jesus in the first place, but rather the historical interpretations of the authors.

Crucial to this confrontation was the “two-document hypothesis,” also called the “Marcan hypothesis.” The opponents of the Tübingen School, which followed Strauss, saw in this hypothesis a valid argument for the historicity of the data presented by the synoptic gospels. They interpreted a statement by Papias(2) as a reference to two historic documents, namely an earlier form of Mark and a Logia (“Sayings”) document, with which the later hypothetical Quelle (“Source”) or Q-document is sometimes identified. Thus the Marcan hypothesis claimed to defend the historical reliability of the New Testament. This interpretation of history clashed with that of the Tübingen school, whose adherents attempted to discover the historical tendencies of the gospel writers, a view later described as “Tendency Criticism”.

Over against a documentary history came a doctrinal history, which reflected the situation during the decades following the cross and the resurrection. The Hegelian dialectic provided a convenient pattern for this history, as
Professor Bo Reicke has described? The Jewish original Gospel of Matthew was counteracted by the Hellenistic Gospel of Luke, which Mark—as the new catholic gospel—then synthesized.

Conservative scholars welcomed Marcan priority, while liberal theologians, valuing the ethical norms of the Sermon on the Mount, claimed traditional Matthean priority. The debate was fanned by the sociopolitical tensions of early mid-nineteenth-century Germany. Conservative forces wanted to maintain and extend the Prussian establishment, while liberal forces hoped to achieve a more democratic pattern of government and society. Originally the center of the debate was the newly established University of Berlin, founded by the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm III in order to revamp the German spirit by establishing a bulwark against the rising revolutionary tide of the French Revolution. Two of the leading protagonists were Georg F. W. Hegel and Friedrich E. D. Schleiermacher. (pp. XIII-XIV)

(1) See below, Hajo U. Meijboom, "History and Critique of the Marcan Hypothesis," 11.
(2) See below, Meijboom, "History and Critique," 17, cf. 67ff.


"The central purpose of this essay is to examine the external evidence for the priority of Matthew; and as the main evidence of this type is arguably, though not I suspect demonstrably, to be found in the fragments of Papias largely preserved in Eusebius, something must be said about the reliability as distinct from the exact import of the evidence he provides. It has become the fashion to decry Papias himself and consequently the evidence which comes from him by means of an argument that can be reduced to syllogistic form somewhat as follows.

(i) All the available external evidence for the independence and priority of Matthew is derived from
Papias.
(ii) But Papias was a 'pinhead, as well as a 'bottle neck'.
(For this minor Eusebius's words at Historia Ecclesiastica 3.39.13 are taken as conclusive evidence.)
(iii) Therefore we can afford to disregard all the external evidence in favour of Matthaean priority." (p. 187)
(...)
"I have implied or more than implied in the above argument that not all that Eusebius has to say on the subject of Papias need be taken at its face value. Valuable though he is as an historian, he is also a propagandist. In his efforts to portray the empire as God's work on earth and as reaching its culmination he could not afford to treat favourably those writers or writings which told a different story. Hence the silence on the Montanist writings of Tertullian and the apocalyptic strain in Hippolytus. Hence the fondness for the spiritualizing versions of the gospel to be had in Origen and Dionysius. Hence too the hostility to Papias. My conclusion is that to accept the superior dismissal by Eusebius of Papias as σψόδρα σμικρός ών τον νούν is to adopt a less than serious attitude to the historiographical problems that H.E. 3.39.12-17 raise." (p. 195)

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of the main studies in English from 1964 (Mic - Pat)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

  Abstract: "The study of the Synoptic Problem continues with a wide range of hypotheses proposed to explain the relationship of Mark, Matthew and Luke to the early Jesus tradition, and to each other. This article reviews recent developments in synoptic studies highlighting the recognition of the ongoing role of the oral tradition, the ways in which scribal compositional practices in the first century have been used to test the major hypotheses, and
the methodological constraints that accompany research in this area.


• ———. 1982. "Recent Developments in the Study of Q." In Logia. Les paroles de Jésus = The Sayings of Jesus:
  409-464.
  281-292.
  Press / Peeters.
  Contents: Collected Essays 1966-1981
  I. The Four Gospels
  1. La rédaction Matthéenne et la structure du premier évangile [1967]
  2. La matière marcienne dans l'évangile de Luc [1973]
  3. Duplicate Expressions in the Gospel of Mark [1971]
  4. L'epanalepsis et la critique littéraire. Á propos de l'évangile de Jean [1980]
  II. The Empty Tomb Stories
  5. ANATEΙΛΑΝΤΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΗΑΙΟΥ. Mc 16,2 (1978)
  9. Le recit du tombeau vide dans l'évangile de Luc (Lc 24.1-12) [1976]
11. The Uncorrected Historic Present in Lk xxiv.12 [1972]
12. The 'Other disciple' in Jn 18,15-16 [1975]
14. ΠΑΡΑΚΥΨΑΣ ΒΑΕΠΕΙ. Lc 24,12 et Jn 20,5 [1977]
15. ΑΠΙΘΛΘΕΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΕΑΥΤΟΝ. Lc 24.12 et Jn 20.10 (1978)
16. ElΣ ΤΑ ΙΔΙΑ: Jn 19,27b (et 16.32) [1979]
17. La traduction d'un verset johannique: Jn 19,27b [1981]

III. The Gospel of Mark
22. Le discours anti-apocalyptique de Mc 13 [1969]
23. Deux nouveaux commentaires sur Marc [1981]
24. The Redactional Text of Mark [1981]

IV. Matthew and Luke
34. Mc 9,33-50 en de overlevering van de Jezuswoorden (E.T. Concilium) [1966]
35. De Jezuswoorden over echtscheiding [1972]
V. The Text of the Gospels
38. The New Nestle-Aland: The Text of Mark in N²6 [1979]
39. L’édiction du texte de Q. A propos de A. POLAG, Fragmenta Q [1979]
40. L’édiction des Elzevier et le Textus Receptus du Nouveau Testament [1980]
41. Note on the Codex Bezae in the Textual Apparatus of the Synopsis [1976]
42. La Concordance de Franciscus Lucas Brugensis (1617) [1979]

Abstract: "In M.D. Goulder's opinion, the minor agreements of Mt 16,21 and Lk 9,22 against Mk 8,31 indicate Matthean influence on Luke. He does not question Matthew's redaction of Mark's text, so here, too, the focus shall be on Luke's changes."


  1. The Minor Agreements and the Two-Source Theory [1991]
  2. Note on Lk 9,22:: A Response to M.D. Goulder [1989]
S. The Matthew-Luke Agreements in Mt 14,13-14 / Lk 9,10-11 (par. Mk 6.30-34): A Reponse to M.-È Boismard ([1984])
6. ΤΙΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΗΟ ΠΑΙΣΑΣ ΣΕ: Mt 26,68 / Lk 22,64 (diff. Mk 14.65) [1987]
II. Matthew and Luke
7. ΑΠΟ ΤΟΤΕ ΗΡΞΑΣΩΝ and the Structure of Matthew [1988]
10. Actes 10,36-43 et l'Évangile [1984]
11. Actes 10,36a TON ΑΟΓΟΝ ΟΝ [1984]
12. Le texte des Actes des Apôtres et les caractéristiques stylistiques lucaniennes [1985]
III. Mark and the Synoptic Problem
14. Les expressions doubles chez Marc et le problème synoptique [1983]
15. L'arrière-fond sémitique des évangiles synoptiques: Réponse à P. Rolland [1984]
16. Marc 6,14-16 et par. [1989]
17. ΚΑΙ ΕΛΕΓΟΝ en Mc 6114 [1989]
19. Mark and His Commentators: Mk 1,1-8,26 [1989]
22. Greeven's Text of the Synoptic Gospels [1982]
IV. The Sayings of Jesus
24. Recent Developments in the Study of Q [1982]
25. A Synopsis of Q [1988]
26. Q_{Mt} and Q_{Lk} and the Reconstruction of Q [1990]
27. Mt 12,25a / Lc 11,17a et la rédaction des évangiles [1986]
28. The Eschatological Discourse [1990]
29. Paul and the Sayings of Jesus [1986]

V. The Fourth Gospel
31. John 21 [1990]
32. The Anonymous Disciple in John 1 [1990]
34. John 4,46-54: Signs Source and/or Synoptic Gospels [1984]
35. Note sur Jn 21,14 [1988]

VL The Apocryphal Gospels
38. The Apocryphal Gospels and the Gospel of Mark [1989]
39. Papyrus Egenon 2 and the Healing of the Leper [985]
40. Le lexique de Bauer-Aland [1988]


Abstract: "In a recently published essay I studied the minor agreements used by some scholars for expanding Q to triple-tradition passages. I examined Q 3,2-4; 3,21-22; 6,12-16; 10,25-28; 12,1b; 17,2; 17,31 as possible candidates for inclusion in Q and had to conclude that "in none of them the Matthew-Luke agreements against Mark seem to provide conclusive evidence". One of these passages, the pericope of the Great Commandment, was studied again, and more extensively, with regard to the alternative theory of Luke’s use of Matthew. It is to this last essay that R.H. Gundry now responds with a Rejoinder."


371-398.


The purpose of this historical-critical study is to evaluate the various ways that critics have appealed to the phenomenon of order in attempting to resolve the synoptic problem. But what is “the phenomenon of order”? It refers neither to the historical order of events in the life of Jesus of Nazareth nor to the chronological order in which the gospels were written, but to a literary feature related to the narrative structures of the gospels. Within the context of gospel source criticism, “the phenomenon of order” denotes the pattern of agreement and disagreement between the first three gospels with respect to narrative sequence or to the order in which pericopes are arranged. As such, this particular phenomenon must be distinguished from similar patterns of convergence and divergence in the order of words, phrases, clauses, or even subsections within pericopes.
triple tradition”), together with material shared between Matthew and Mark and between Mark and Luke. Sometimes designated “the Marcan tradition,” this appellation stems from the view that the Gospel of Mark, or a document similar to Mark’s Gospel, was a principal source for Matthew’s and Luke’s Gospels. No prejudice should be read into my decision to exclude an analysis of the significance of similarity and dissimilarity in the sequential arrangement of material common only to Matthew’s and Luke’s Gospels.” (pp. 3-4)

(...) "The following historical and analytical survey is divided into three sections. Section I explores the fons et origo of arguments from order for each of these two views: Mark’s dependence on Matthew’s and Luke’s Gospels or Matthew’s and Luke’s dependence on Mark’s Gospel. The first to argue for a particular source theory on the basis of the phenomenon of order was Johann Jakob Griesbach (1745-1812), who also set source criticism of the gospels on a scientific foundation by constructing a tool designed to facilitate critical comparison of the first three gospels. He called his tool a “synopsis” because it presented the texts of Matthew, Mark, and Luke in parallel columns so they could be viewed simultaneously. Consequently, the first three gospels have since been referred to collectively as “the synoptic gospels”.” (p. 7)

(...) "Section II traces the development of two distinct arguments from order for Marcan priority in English-speaking synoptic criticism between the publication of F. H. Woods’s influential study, “The Origin and Mutual Relation of the Synoptic Gospels,” and the release of B. H. Streeter’s epochal book on The Four Gospels." (p. 7, two notes omitted)

(...) "Section III examines major turning points in synoptic criticism since the publication in 1951 of B. C. Butler’s The Originality of St Matthew, which forced a number of
critics to reassess B. H. Streeter’s “fundamental solution.” The developmental thread in this section is, first, Butler’s demonstration that Streeter’s argument from order for Marcan priority was not so much an argument as a fallacious inference; second, Farmer’s resuscitation of Griesbach’s hypothesis as the theory that allegedly provides the most tenable explanation of the various literary phenomena in the synoptic gospels, particularly the phenomenon of order; and third, Tuckett’s defense of a particular type of argument from order in the wake of Butler’s and Farmer’s criticisms of the use of an inconclusive argument for Marcan priority."(p. 9)

(11) In the first instance, “the phenomenon of order” simply refers to the sequential arrangement of pericopes in any one gospel, but it is the pattern of agreement and disagreement between the different arrangements of pericopes in all three gospels that is significant for determining their interrelationships.


Part I. Luke Rewriting

Part II. Rewriting of Testament Themes and Passages

Part III. Rewriting Gospel Themes and Passages

Part IV. Luke Rewriting Roman Authorities
Martin Friis: Paul in the Presence of Power: Depictions of Social Interactions in Acts and in the Hellenistic
Historians 251; Stefan Nordgaard: Luke's Readers and Josephus: Paul and Agrippa II as a Test Case 266; Index of References 280; Index of Authors 295-299.


"In the literature on the Lord's Prayer one frequently finds the claim that there are no credible reasons for Luke to have rejected the material he must have omitted if he knew the longer version of the prayer. I do not doubt that many of those accustomed to thinking of Luke's prayer as earlier and more original will not find the reasons for omission proposed here to be fully
convincing. Deductions about what an author might or might not have done are never absolutely conclusive but always involve a contest of plausibility among various options. The question, though, is whether more convincing reasons can be given for the other side. There seems to be a working assumption among many scholars that we should assume as a default position that Luke copied out everything in his source for the Lord's Prayer unless it can be demonstrated that Luke necessarily would have omitted it. We would have a great deal of difficulty explaining Luke's omissions from Mark in the Sower, or Gethsemane, or Jairus' Daughter, if this standard were applied consistently. It ought to be incumbent on those asserting that Luke would have retained the unparalleled material from the Lord's Prayer had he known it to produce reasons that are equally or more convincing than the ones given here for their omission. I do not think this has been done." (p. 118)


• Orchard, Bernard, and Longstaff, Thomas R. W., eds. 1978. J. J. Griesbach: Synoptic and Text-Critical Studies, 1776-1976. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Contents: Portrait of J. J. Griesbach page vi; Copy of Colloquium announcement vii; List of participants and selected observers ix; Preface xi; Abbreviations xvi; 1 William R. Farmer: The genesis of the Colloquium 1; 2 Gerhard Delling: Johann Jakob Griesbach: his life, work and times 5; 3 Heinrich Greeven: The Gospel synopsis from 1776 to the present day 22; 4 Bo Reicke: Griesbach's answer to the Synoptic Question 50; 5 J. J. Griesbach: Commentatio qua Marci Evangelium totum e Matthaei et Lucae commentariis deceptum esse monstratur (Introduction by Bo Reicke) 68; 6. Bernard Orchard: A demonstration that Mark was written after Matthew and Luke (A translation of J. J. Griesbach's Commentatio) 103; 7 G. D. Kilpatrick: Griesbach and the development of text criticism 136; 8 Gordon D. Fee: Modern text criticism and the Synoptic Problem 154; 9 Thomas R. W. Longstaff: At the Colloquium's conclusion 170; Frans
Neirynck and F. Van Segbroeck: 10 The Griesbach Hypothesis: a bibliography 176; Notes 182; Appendix: Additional entries to the Bibliography 219; Index 220-224.


"This study is the first attempt to coordinate, within the compass of a single volume, the three separate lines of argument necessary to solve the Synoptic Problem, namely the historical and patristic evidence, the internal critical evidence for mutual literary dependence, and the “scenario” necessary to show how the tensions between the first and the second lines of argument can be satisfactorily resolved. It is the work of two scholar priests. Harold Riley, an Anglican, and Bernard Orchard, a Benedictine monk, and forms a further link in a series of studies of the Synoptic Problem, initialed by John Chapman. Christopher Butler, and later developed by William R. Farmer. David L. Dungan H. H. Stoldt. T. R. W. Longstaff, and many others who have over the past fifty years helped to expose the weaknesses of the various Markan-Priority hypotheses, and have now built up a strong case for the contrary hypothesis known as the Two-Gospel Hypothesis, a recent development of the old Griesbach Hypothesis. (...)"

Part one does not attempt to deal with the usual flaws in the argument for Markan Priority, for these have been
adequately dealt with by other writers. Instead, Riley works out an original argument in which he shows how the thematic order of Matthew cannot be derived from Mark, nor can that of Luke; and he is then able to show that Mark is in fact derived mostly from our Matthew and our Luke. His section concludes with a refutation of G. M. Styler’s "key-passages" in favor of Markan Priority.

In part two the historical testimonies are approached scientifically, that is to say, in chronological order according to the dates of the documents in which the evidence has come down to us. Thus the vital Papias testimony is dealt with only when the discussion reaches the fourth century witnesses. In the course of this part the following points become clear: (1) that the evidence for the apostolic origin of the Gospels is in reality both consistent and cogent, despite the two or three minor discrepancies, for which adequate explanations are available; (2) that the late appearance (in mid-second century) of the first direct written attestation of the authorship of the Gospels is in itself no argument for disregarding its value; and (3) that the "John the Presbyter" legend is a fabrication of Eusebius on the basis of a single comment of Dionysius of Alexandria. Thus the conclusions of part two support those of part one.

Part three, however, will probably be the principal object of critical concern, and understandably, in view of the revolutionary yet conservative nature of the thesis proposed. For here there is a great problem, since scholarly integrity requires that a serious effort be made to see if the data of the patristic tradition, now shown to be compatible with the critical evidence, actually slot into the historical development of the Primitive Church as portrayed in the Acts of the Apostles. In fact they do, and part three shows that it makes excellent sense, historically speaking, for our Greek Matthew to be the first gospel and for our Luke to be the second, with Mark chronologically in the third place. In fact, if Acts was written and completed before Paul’s release from his
Roman confinement, it makes good sense to see Matthew as composed for the primitive Jewish Christian Church described in Acts 1-12. and Luke to have been written for Paul’s converts of Acts 13-28. In other words, each Gospel reflects a well-defined stage in the development of the Church, seen against the background of the struggle between the Circumcision and the Non-Circumcision parties. Peter and Paul being the two key figures."

(Foreword, X)


"The late, great Burton Scott Easton was once heard to say that his idea of heaven was a group of competent scholars, sitting about a table through eternity, discussing the synoptic problem. I hope we may infer, not that it will take eternity to solve the problem, rather, that something very like heaven are occasions such as the one that brought forth the present essay. At its 1979 meeting, the SBL [Society of Biblical Literature] Group on the Relationships of the Gospels held a panel discussion. The topics were (a) my old book, The Gospel Before Mark, and (b) a statement from me that had appeared in Seminar Papers Vol. 1. The assignment for the latter was to indicate where my own thinking about the synoptic problem had changed in the past quarter-century and, every whit as important, where it had not. The present article has been revised in the light of comments from the panelists and from the JBL editorial board." (p. 389, notes omitted)


- ———. 2014. "Twice More—Thomas and the Synoptics: A Reply to Simon Gathercole, The Composition of the Gospel of Thomas, and Mark Goodacre, Thomas and the Gospels." Journal for the Study of the New Testament no. 36:251-261. Abstract: "Whereas the recent studies by Mark Goodacre and Simon Gathercole focus on sayings in the Gospel of Thomas which have close Synoptic parallels, this review article highlights the historical and theological questions raised by a late rather than early Thomas. Furthermore, the review argues that too much credit is given to scanty or ambiguous evidence for Synoptic dependence (Gathercole), and that several cases of verbatim agreement between Thomas and the Synoptic Gospels (Goodacre) are brief, formulaic
sayings which might in fact indicate familiarity with Q. Drawing on the modern analogy of how jokes circulate, ‘diagnostic shards’ (Goodacre) of shared words and phrases do not necessarily brand the author of Thomas as a plagiarist, but point in all likelihood to the author’s reliance on common oral tradition. Thomas also draws on numerous other, Synoptic-like traditions that are clearly independent of the canonical Gospels."
Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of the main studies in English from 1964 (Pea - Row)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem


"I first became aware that studies by members of the so-called Strasbourg school might have importance for understanding the history of a paradigm shift that took place in Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century when I read an early version of an English translation of a Dutch doctoral dissertation. The paradigm shift to which I refer was the shift from the Griesbach explanation of gospel origins to the theory of Markan Priority. The dissertation was that by Hajo Uden Meijboom entitled *History and Criticism of the Markan Hypothesis* which was defended at Groningen, in the Netherlands, on Thursday, 27 September 1866, at noon. The English translation was being prepared already in the early 1980s by John J. Kiwiet of the Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary in Forth Worth, Texas, It was published by Mercer University Press in 1993, after more than ten years of work.

I have chosen to begin this paper with an overview of Meijboom's dissertation and then to move to a closer examination of one chapter within it, namely, Meijboom's analysis of the development of the Markan Hypothesis in France. The central section of my paper consists of a series of biographical sketches of Timothee Colani (1824-1888), Eduard Reuss (1804-1891), Edmond Scherer (1815-1889), Albert Reville (1826-1906) and Michel Nicolas (1810-1886), all members of the Strasbourg school." (pp. 5051, notes omitted)
Also by the early 1980s, many of us had rejected the name “Griesbach” as a label for our hypothesis and had come to call our source theory “the Two Gospel hypothesis” for several reasons. First, it brought the name of our theory into an intended contrast and tension with the dominant view among experts at that time, the Two Document or Two Source hypothesis (the priority of the two documents/sources, Mark and “Q,” followed by the mutual, but independent, use of these sources by Matthew and Luke).” (Preface, XII)

"In the conclusion to our volume, Beyond the Q Impasse: Luke’s Use of Matthew, we stated that we had provided a plausible account of the composition of Luke on the assumption that canonical Matthew was his main source.
As far as we knew, it was an entirely new contribution to the field of Lukan Studies. Such an analysis of Luke was never attempted by Griesbach or any of his followers in the nineteenth century. In the conclusion, we stated that our next step would be to provide a pericope-by-pericope compositional analysis of the Gospel of Mark showing that a plausible account could be given of it, assuming that it was written after and on the basis of Matthew and Luke. After some forty years of painstaking research, going back beyond William R. Farmer’s ground-breaking book, *The Synoptic Problem: A Critical Analysis*, and after several preliminary attempts, we now present *One Gospel from Two: Mark’s Use of Matthew and Luke*, the necessary complement to Beyond the Q Impasse, to our peers and colleagues for their consideration and critical response.

In the following detailed compositional analysis, we do not posit the existence of lost versions of Mark (such as UrMarkus. Secret Mark or Deutero Markus), or lost recensions either of Luke (e.g., ProtoLuke) or of Matthew (Aramaic Matthew) to help make sense out of the text of Mark. The number of such hypothetical sources continues to grow in the scholarly literature on the Synoptic Problem for one fundamental reason: to defend the idea that Mark was written first. That task, however, in our view, is unnecessary. As we seek to demonstrate in this volume, Mark’s secondary character vis-à-vis Matthew and Luke can be demonstrated at many different levels and in many different ways."

(Introduction, XV)


"The present study is offered primarily to illustrate the exegetical results made available by holding to Marcan priority along with Luke's knowledge of both Mark and Matthew. I shall suggest that adopting this as one's working model for exegesis affords a more plausible account of Luke's decision to compose, as a companion piece to his protos logos surveying Jesus' life and ministry, a deuteros logos covering the ministry and travels of the disciples through the succeeding generation, tracing the progress of the word of God from
Jesus' first Jewish followers in Judea through Samaria to Gentile lands and peoples, toward the ends of the earth (Acts 1.1-2, 8).(3)" (p. 141)
(3) 'Luke' is used here for the author of the third gospel and Acts, but nothing crucial to the argument depends on his traditional identification as the missionary associate of Paul, nor on a first-century date of composition for Luke or Acts.


Abstract: "The synoptic problem is an important and visible subfield within NT studies, yet, for some reason, almost every NT introduction written in the past forty or so years has passed on a defective understanding of that subfield. Two problems in particular plague these NT introductions: (1) their discussions of the synoptic problem tend to rely on a logical argument disproven almost sixty years ago, and (2) they tend to misrepresent the current state of the question by marginalizing the Farrer hypothesis, which today is the Two-Source Theory’s leading competitor."


"Delbert Burkett's second volume of *Rethinking the Gospel Sources* (2009) opens with one of the most robust defenses of Q yet to address the Farrer hypothesis ( = FH). Burkett understands that the existence of Q depends in some measure on the unlikelihood that Luke used Matthew. He notes that not only does the FH hold to Luke's use of Matthew, but so also do the Three-Document hypothesis (of Gundry et al.), the Augustinian hypothesis, and the Griesbach hypothesis. He seems to think that, as far as Q goes, a critique of any one of these theories might suffice, and he settles on the FH, perhaps due to its recent successes. His critique of the FH is hard-hitting on some points, and his understanding of the main source-critical issues is on all points exceptional." (p. 191)

(…)

"Thus the reader is made to think that, when Farrerians are said to begin from a deficit, it is as though they failed to qualify for the front row of the racing formation - that is, that they have to begin the race several rows back - while the 2DH and the 'Burkett' hypothesis somehow get to begin at the front of the pack. This in fact misrepresents the macro perspective with which one must judge the main advantages of one source theory over another. Farrerians accept the challenge of explaining how Luke worked with Matthew, because they find it easier and more believable than explaining how, on the 2DH, the minor agreements arose. Proponents of the 2DH, on the other hand, are convinced that the opposite is the case. Progress is best made, of course, by those who appreciate the straitening aspects of their own source theories as fully as they recognize them in an opposing view." (pp. 224-225)

"The reigning source theory in synoptic studies is the Two-Document hypothesis (= 2DH), which consists of two main tenets: (1) Matthew and Luke both used Mark as a source, and (2) they did so independently, which necessitates the postulation of an otherwise unattested source, which scholars call 'Q'. The present book features original essays written from the perspective of a competing source theory - the Farrer hypothesis (= FH) - which agrees with tenet (1) of the 2DH, but which holds, in place of (2), that Luke knew Matthew's gospel (obviating the need for Q). " (p. 1, note omitted)

 (...) 

 "The PH has an easier time in 2015 than it did in (say) 1975. Why is this the case? It would be difficult to name a point at which the PH became (as it now is) the 2DH's leading challenger, and it would be even more difficult to account for all the reasons for this development. 

 (...) 

 There are at least four such developments: (1) increased awareness of the evangelists as writers and reshapers of tradition rather than as strict (scissors-and-paste) compilers, (2) wider acceptance of the view that Luke wrote in response to other gospel writers, (3) increased awareness of Luke's literary ability, and (4) wider acceptance of a late date for Luke. These points, of course, do not tell the whole story, particularly as the PH's newfound respect is also owed in large part to the efforts of some of its more able defenders. Nevertheless, it appears that scholarship in general has become much more accepting of the PH's major facilitating adjuncts - viz. the ideas that help it make sense within the reality of the NT world - and that this is at least partly responsible for the PH's recent fortunes." (p. 2, two notes omitted)

 - Poirier, John C., and Peterson, Jeffrey, eds. 2015. *Marcan Priority Without Q: Explorations in the Farrer*


"Brooke Foss Westcott (1825–1901), one of the so-called Cambridge triumvirate along with J.B. Lightfoot (1828–1889) and F.J.A. Hort (1828–1892), was a truly outstanding New Testament scholar of the nineteenth century, certainly in Britain." (p. 326)

(...)  
"One of the least well known of Westcott’s works began as an essay that he wrote when he was twenty-five years old,
entitled “On the Alleged Historical Contradictions of the Gospels.” (5) This prize-winning essay (one of several prizes Westcott won on the basis of his academic prowess) was expanded into his first book, The Elements of the Gospel Harmony, (6) and then further expanded and subsequently titled An Introduction to the Study of the Gospels, which went through eight editions. (7) This is the volume with which I am concerned here. I wish to return to Westcott’s theory of the origins of the Gospels, examine the response to his work in recent scholarship, and then propose some explanations for this response.” (p. 327)


Price, Ron. 2001. "A Three Source Theory for the Synoptic Problem." *Journal of Biblical Studies* no. 1:1-9. Abstract: "This paper posits that Luke used three written sources: Mark's gospel, an early sayings source and subsidiarily, Matthew's gospel. Evidence is provided for Luke's knowledge of Matthew's gospel, and for the incongruity of Q as normally delineated. Some of the pericopae usually assigned to Q are shown to have typical Matthean features and so to be unlikely to have originated in the sayings source. Instead it is suggested that Luke derived these pericopae directly from Matthew's gospel. This Three Source Theory is shown to combine the best features of the Farrer-Goulder Theory and the prevailing Two Source Theory."

Ra, Yoseop. 2016. *Q, the First Writing about Jesus*. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock.

"Johann Jakob Griesbach (1745-1812) was active in Halle when he published his epoch-making Synopsis of 1774 which appeared separately in 1776. This instrument enabled him to apply himself to an exhaustive study of the literary relationships among the Gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke.
He later moved to Jena, and in 1783 gave scholars of Germany a hint of his Synoptic Theory.(1) In 1789-90 this was fully elaborated and published under the title of Commentatio(2) in 1794 the study was republished with supplements.(3) Similar theories had been put forward in Great Britain by Henry Owen in 1764 and in Germany by Anton Friedrich Büsching in 1766; but Griesbach mentioned neither of these.(4)" (p. 50)
(1) J. J. Griesbach, Fontes unde evangelistae suas de resurrectione Domini narrationes hauserint: Paschatos solemnia... (Jena, 1783); reprinted in J. J. Griesbach, Opuscula academica, ed. J. Ph. Gabler, vol. II (Jena, 1825), pp. 241-56 (quotations below are from this edition).
(2) Idem, Commentatio qua Marci evangelium totum e Matthaei et Lucae commentariis decerptum esse monstratur (Jena, 1789-90).


- ———. 1987. "From Strauss to Holtzmann and Meijboom: Synoptic Theories Advanced during the Consolidation of Germany, 1830-70." *Novum Testamentum* no. 29:1-21. Abstract: "The discussion of the synoptic problem, which had been promoted by Griesbach's publication of a Greek synopsis in A.D. 1774, was largely intensified among German Protestants during the years 1830-70. It was a period of academic liberalism, historical positivism, national enthusiasm, and political consolidation. During these years German theologians produced critical and challenging studies of the synoptic question with an enormous assiduity. Their contributions gained wide importance for later generations occupied with the synoptic Gospels, and the circumstances under which the German discussion took place is therefore of interest."


"By way of conclusion, let me draw two inferences from this little study that point the way for biblical scholarship of the next century: First, the flood of new source material from early Christianity that has emerged over
the last half century not only provides its own new information about early Christianity, but also provides material for understanding better the traditional source material, the New Testament itself. A scribal error in Matthew and Luke, because it was already in Q, has corrupted the text of one of the oldest small sayings collections in the New Testament, containing material that has usually rightly been ascribed to Jesus himself. Now a noncanonical gospel fragment of the early third century and an erased text of Matt 6:28 from the fourth century produce the text as it was prior to the scribal error, and containing other traits of primitiveness. The canon has always been seen as the official norm for the noncanonical material, but in this case it is the noncanonical material that corrects the very wording of the canon itself and may well be nearer to what Jesus actually said.

Second, already as early as Q, a spiritualizing trend away from the basic necessities of life was creeping into the Jesus tradition in such a way that food and clothing were held to be less important to God than the soul and body they nourish. What Jesus himself had probably wanted to say was to trust God precisely for the physical necessities of life, such as food and clothing. That may not have sounded religious enough for the early church or for much spirituality even today. Yet since God acts through people, what Jesus would seem to have said amounts in our time to a call for social responsibility that, though uncomfortable for much of the established church, may point the direction for the survival of a relevant Christianity in the century to come." (p. 74)

---


  Synopsis including the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, Mark and Thomas with English, German, and French Translations of Q and Thomas. 

  Contents: Preface: 3; Acknowledgements: 4; Q Texts in Matthean Order 5; Divergences for the Lukan Sequence 9; James M. Robinson: Introduction 11; Sigla 73; The text of Q in Greek and English 75; John S. Kloppenborg: Concordance: Introduction 153; Concordance 156; Recommended Reading 175.


  Abstract: "This article examines mutually exclusive reconstructions of the community “behind” Q. It argues
this state of affairs is a product of the implicit assumptions about religion that each reconstruction takes for granted. Rather than dismissing theoretical reflection on the category of religion as irrelevant for their work, it is time for Q scholars to recognize that presuppositions about “religion” fundamentally shapes their understanding of the text’s representative potential."


"In Q in Matthew: Ancient Media, Memory, and Early Scribal Transmissions of the Jesus Tradition, Alan Kirk presents the culmination of a long-held interest in the Synoptic Problem with a nearly as long-held interest in the role of memory in the transmission of the Jesus tradition and the production of the earliest texts. This book is a welcome intervention into synoptic studies, for it brings fresh attention to ancient media practices, the production and conditions of writing, and the influence of memory. Understanding ancient media practices (and the mountain of scholarship that informs the topic) is no easy task, and to be honest, biblical scholars have been known to ignore methodologies other than philology and history. Therefore, the careful attention to these neglected topics in Q in Matthew is an invaluable contribution to the field." (p. 169)


Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of the main studies in English from 1964 (San - Tri)

Studies on the Synoptic Problem

  Contents: Introductory VII;
  I. William Sanday:
  The Conditions under which the Gospels were written, in their bearing upon some difficulties of the Synoptic Problem 3;
  II. John C. Hawkins:
  Three Limitations to St. Luke's Use of St. Mark's Gospel: 29
  1. The Disuse of the Marcan Source in St. Luke ix. 51-xviii. 14
  2. The Great Omission by St. Luke of the Matter contained in St. Mark vi. 45-viii. 16
  III. Probabilities as to the so-called Double Tradition of St. Matthew and St. Luke 95;
  B. H. Streeter:
  IV. On the Original Order of Q 140
V. St. Mark's Knowledge and Use of Q 165
VI. The Original Extext of Q 185
VII. The Literary Evolution of the Gospels 209
VIII. On the Trial of Our Lord before Herod: A Suggestion 228
[See also Appendix, p. 425]
W. C. Allen:
IX. The Book of Sayings used by the Editor of the First Gospel 235
X. The Aramaic Background of the Gospels 287
J. Vernon Bartlet:
XI. The Sources of Luke's Gospel 314
W. E. Addis:
XII. The Criticism of the Hexateuch compared with that of the Synoptic Gospels 367
N. P. Williams:
XIII. A Recent Theory of the Origin of St. Mark's Gospel 388
Appendix (B. H. Streeter)
Synoptic Criticism and the Eschatological Problem 425
Index 437-456.


  "In a recent critical note in this journal, Lou Silberman suggested that Johannes Weiss in his use of the siglum Q in NT studies was influenced by the use which Wellhausen had made of the same sign in OT study, viz., for "[der] Kern der Grundschrift."' This note offers further considerations on the use of this sign in both OT and NT areas of biblical scholarship." (p. 609)

  (...) "Quelle was abbreviated in print by Weiss in 1890, and it stuck, no doubt, because it replaced the current Greek abbreviation Λ for λόγια(13) The young theologians at Gottingen now used with enthusiasm "Q" as a German abbreviation in NT study, after OT study in the person of Wellhausen had tried, albeit temporarily, to use it as a Latin abbreviation." (pp. 610-611, a note omitted)


"To sum up, in the late seventeenth century, the question of the foundations of Christian faith is reformulated in the context of the theology of Enlightenment. It now appears as the hermeneutical problem whether or to what extent historical testimonies from the early period of Christianity can serve as a reliable basis also for later times. In this context, the Synoptic Problem appears for the first time. As especially Lessing's thesis of an original version of the Gospel of Matthew in Hebrew language shows, an important aspect of that problem was the question of the oldest sources for the activity and fate of the earthly Jesus. Griesbach's rejection of a Gospel harmony and his remark about the possible historical unreliability of all of accounts of all the Gospels points to the literary dimension of the Synoptic Problem, which eventually leads to the interpretation of the Gospels as individual writings.

The Synoptic Problem is therefore discussed from the beginning in a framework determined by literary and historical dimensions. Consequently, in one respect the debate is aimed at a solution of the literary relationship between the Synoptic gospels.

In this regard, the Synoptic Problem touches upon questions such as the existence of Q or Luke's use of Mark
and Matthew as an alternative to the two-source hypothesis. The historical dimension of the Synoptic Problem is concerned with the oldest and most reliable sources for the activity and fate of Jesus. In this respect, it is part of the wider discussion about sources for a historical reconstruction of the activity and fate of Jesus. From a current perspective, however, the Synoptic Problem has to take into account the wider horizon of the early Jesus tradition in its literary and historical dimensions. I will return to this aspect below." (p. 141)


  
  Abstract: "Most scholars acknowledge Matthew’s debt to Mark in the composition of his own Gospel, and they are fully aware of his extensive redaction and expansion of this major source. Yet few scholars pose what is an obvious question that arises from these points: What was Matthew’s intention for Mark once he had composed and circulated his own revised and enlarged account of Jesus’ mission? Did he intend to supplement Mark, in which case he wished his readers to continue to consult Mark as well as his own narrative, or was it his intention to replace the earlier Gospel? It is argued in this study that the evidence suggests that Matthew viewed Mark as seriously flawed, and that he wrote his own Gospel to replace the inadequate Marcan account."

  

  
  Abstract: "Most recent studies of Q are built on the assumption that Q is not much more extensive than the double tradition, a questionable assumption given that
Mark is much more extensive than the components of Mark that are found in both Matthew and Luke and that Matthew’s selective rather than consecutive approach to Q may have caused him to leave out many verses of Q. This article considers three similitudes unique to Luke that begin with the phrase τίς ἐξ ὑμῶν (Lk. 11.5-8; 14.28-33; 17.7-10) as well as one that is paralleled in Matthew but has been omitted from the Critical Edition (Lk. 14.5 par. Mt. 12.11-12) and argues that all four of these passages are from Q. The criteria of Vassiliadis and Kloppenborg for finding Q passages in Lukan Sondergut are used, with particular emphasis on Kloppenborg’s ‘stylistic coherence’.


Abstract: "In their studies of Matthew and the Sayings Gospel Q, Ulrich Luz and James M. Robinson agree in proposing that the Matthean community was, sociohistorically as well as theologically, the direct descendent of the Q community, although they differ considerably as to the compositional procedures of the author (hereafter simply “Matthew”) in his use of Q (2). This paper will present brief synopses of the approaches of Luz and Robinson to Matthew’s use of Q and evaluate them in light of Matthew’s use of the latter parts of Q in the composition of the Apocalyptic Discourse (Matthew 24–25). The paper will also explore insights from Matthew’s redeployment of Q’s eschatological materials and use them, where possible, to assess the arguments of Luz and Robinson in favour of a possible sociohistorical
connection between the communities behind the texts of Q and Matthew."


Abstract: "Recent studies proposing that Marcion’s Gospel represents, or provides access to, an edition of Luke earlier than its canonical form have obvious implications for Synoptic Problem scholarship. This article examines the place of the Double Tradition material (i.e., Q material) in the work of Joseph Tyson, Jason BeDuhn, and Matthias Klinghardt, with detailed analyses of the so-called Minor Agreements and the problematic attestation of Double Tradition material in Marcion’s Gospel. Finally, a moderate suggestion
concerning the place of Marcion’s Gospel in the web of Synoptic relationships will be tentatively proposed."

Works cited
"To be sure, any proposal to include Marcion’s Gospel as a factor in the Synoptic Problem will be beset with problems, although this could never be an option for anyone who believes, as Irenaeus, Tertullian, and many others since them have claimed, that Marcion’s Gospel (hereafter, MLk) is the direct descendent of Canonical Luke (hereafter, CLk), an abridged Luke, the product of Marcion’s own editorial ("mutilating") hand.(1)"

(…)
"The essay has four parts. The first part assesses briefly the three recent reconstructions of MLk by Jason BeDuhn, Matthias Klinghardt, and Dieter Roth.(8) The second section revisits the question whether CLk or MLk is the earlier form of Luke, with observations concerning five different arguments in favor of MLk being prior to (though not necessarily the direct source of) CLk. The third section addresses the proposal of Matthias Klinghardt and Markus Vinzent that MLk is “the oldest gospel,” the Urquelle, with special attention to the question of the relative priority of Mark and MLk.(9) A
close reading of Mark 16:1–8 and Luke 24:1–12 will test Klinghardt’s Arbeitshypothese (“working hypothesis”) of Markan dependence on MLk(10). The fourth and final section deals briefly with the question of the limits of Q in a scenario in which, as BeDuhn and others propose, MLk is seen as a kind of relic of an early edition of Luke, in which Mark and Q were already combined.” (p. 131)

(1) Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.27.2; Tertullian, Adv. Marc. 4.2.4; Epiphanius, Pan. 42.9.1–2. In this essay, “MLk” is meant to refer to the recension of Luke associated with Marcion (but not to a particular contemporary reconstruction), and “CLk” either to the recension of Luke known to the heresiologists, and/or established by textual criticism today (=Nestle-Aland 28).


(9) See Markus Vinzent, Marcion and the Dating of the Synoptic Gospels (Studia Patristica Supplements 2; Leuven: Peeters, 2014); Klinghardt, Das älteste Evangelium (n. 8).

(10) Klinghardt, Das älteste Evangelium (n. 8), 1:195: “Als Arbeitshypothese ist daher davon auszugehen, dass Mk die erste Bearbeitung dieses mutmaßlich ältesten Evangeliums darstellt” (emphasis original).

———. 2020. "“No Weapon but That of Analysis”: Issues at Stake in the Rise and Reception of the Two-Document Hypothesis." In Theological and Theoretical Issues in the Synoptic Problem, edited by Kloppenborg, John S. and Verheyden, Joseph, 113-135. New York: Bloomsbury. "The focus of this chapter, then, is the matter of stakes, theological and otherwise, in the rise and reception of the 2DH in nineteenth-century scholarship. Rather than attempting to sketch these issues out in broad outline,
this chapter will focus on four figures of note, namely: Christian Hermann Weisse, Heinrich Julius Holtzmann, Arthur Wright, and William Sanday. While the others scarcely need an introduction, Wright probably does. Admittedly, he was not a major influence in Synoptic scholarship in Britain, but his caution, moderation, and piety in proposing what is essentially an oral catechesis variant of the 2DH are worth considering. The discussion treats Wright before Sanday because a definitive statement from the latter on the Synoptic Problem was quite a long time in coming—a matter worth considering in its own right.

(6) In treating the two German innovators of the 2DH with two figures from English scholarship, one from Cambridge and one from Oxford, I follow the rough schema of Farmer, who sees the history of the Synoptic Problem unfolding in two corresponding phases (Farmer, Synoptic Problem [n. 4], 47).


"Q was assumed without discussion. In 1951 B. C. BUTLER launched the first modern full-scale attack on Marcan priority, but his attempt to revive Augustine's solution of the synoptic problem did not attract many followers and it was not influential on Matthean scholarship. In 1964 W. R. FARMER revived the GRIESBACH hypothesis and he has continued to champion it vigorously. On this view, Matthew's gospel was the first to be written, Luke used Matthew, and Mark used both Matthew and Luke. If the GRIESBACH hypothesis (or a modern modification of it) were to be accepted, many of the conclusions accepted by most Matthean specialists would be falsified, for they rest on the presupposition that Matthew used two sources, Mark and Q, as well as oral tradition not found elsewhere in the gospels. Hence it is not surprising to find that the origin and relationship of the three synoptic gospels has been debated fiercely in recent years." (p. 1899)

(...) "Three British scholars, A. M. FARRER (1954), H. B. GREEN (1975) and M. D. GOULDER (1974) have acknowledged that there are sound reasons for concluding that Matthew's main source is Mark, but have challenged the existence of Q. FARRER argued that the Q hypothesis wholly depends on the incredibility of Luke's having read Matthew's book. "It needs no refutation except the demonstration that its alternative is possible." (p. 62) Once rid of Q, FARRER believed, we are rid of a progeny of nameless chimaeras, and free to let St. Matthew write as he is moved. Most scholars have conceded that while FARRER'S account of Luke's use and redaction of Matthew is ingenious, it is implausible." (,,,)
"GOULDER has taken up and adapted FARRER'S emphasis on Matthew's creative freedom. He claims that Matthew has expanded Mark (his only source, apart from a small handful of oral traditions) by means of midrash. Matthew's gospel is, quite simply, a very free midrashic exposition and expansion of Mark. Why did Matthew want to write in this way? GOULDER' s answer is novel, to say the least: Matthew’s gospel was developed liturgically and was intended to be used liturgically; its order is liturgically significant, for the author has taken the Jewish Festal Year and its pattern of lections as his base. With a wave of the lectionary wand, Q is consigned to oblivion." (pp. 1901-1902)


"The present work does not approach a critical analysis of the whole problem of the Gospels, but for the time being examines only its most highly controversial and therefore most essential feature, the synoptic problem." (p. 2)

"Until now it has been generally accepted that there were, in all, six different possibilities of utilization, calculated according to the law of permutation theory. But that hardly exhausts all of the potential combinations of the three Gospels: of these, there are not six, but over thirty (see below, p.144ff). It can be said that almost all of the theoretical relationships have been represented experimentally, or have at least put in an appearance, during the course of research. However, only two of them have received the concentrated attention of scholarly discussion, and thus taken on true historical importance; the Griesbach hypothesis, and the Marcan hypothesis. Both of these theories proceed from the assumption that the key to the solution of the synoptic problem must lie in the Gospel of Mark. Without a doubt, the Gospel of Mark occupies a central position, and its relationship to the first and third Gospels is different from the relationship
between those two. One may also reverse the situation and say: each of these two Gospels has for its very own a special relationship to Mark which cannot be compared with the one that relates it to the other. Both hypotheses, therefore, start from the same alternative: Either Matthew and Luke are dependent on Mark, or Mark is dependent on them. In a chronological sense this would mean that the Gospel of Mark is either the first or the last of the synoptic Gospels. Griesbach’s hypothesis asserts the latter, and the Marcan hypothesis the former." (pp. 4-5)

(...) "One looks in vain among the founders of the Marcan hypothesis for such a preparatory balancing of the pros and cons of their theory of sources. Rather, one has the impression that they rush too quickly into the thick of the fray, and that their gaze is overwhelmingly turned toward questions of detail in the synoptic gospels in order to consider these questions from the perspective of the Marcan hypothesis and to bring them into harmony with it whenever necessary. But only if these parts were fitted together to form an unbroken chain of evidence without excluding any unsolved questions could it be said that the Marcan hypothesis had been proved, at all events from this point of view.

Therefore, in the following chapters we shall submit this source-theory to a severe ordeal by fire. In doing so it is of decisive importance to examine this fundamental question from its very beginning, that \$s, from the laying of its foundation by its originators. But for what reason? Is it not possible to object and say that all of this is “old hat”—old research results that have gathered dust for more than a hundred years? Have not these results again and again been scrutinized and confirmed by competent researchers? It does not seem to be necessary to repeat the whole process; for some time these conclusions have belonged to the “assured results of scholarship,” and they have stood forth like a rock of Gibraltar.
But let us assume that this “assured result of scholarship” was false. Then it must have been, or at least could have been, false from the very beginning. Then it would be of decisive importance to examine it as it comes to birth and to discover its peccatum originale. This is what we shall undertake in the following chapters." (pp. 22-23)

"The purpose of this work is to discover how, throughout their history, evangelical Christians have approached the
Synoptic Problem (SP)-the classic puzzle in NT criticism-and engage with recent scholarly discussion among evangelicals about solutions to the SP. This study addresses five crucial questions. First, for how long have those with evangelical convictions sought to explain the similarities and differences between the synoptic gospels by appealing to the evangelists' sources? Second, as they considered these sources and the evangelists' use of them, how were views of inspiration held by those evangelicals affected and explained? Third, how have evangelical solutions to the SP evolved as biblical criticism has developed over the centuries? Fourth, how have evangelicals advocated their preferred solutions to the SP and characterized those solutions different from their own? Fifth, how has ecclesiology factored into evangelical discussions of the SP?" (p. XII)

Abstract: "This article examines early Protestant discussion of the historic puzzle in New Testament study known as the Synoptic Problem, which deals with the potential literary relationship between the Gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke. The subject was addressed by John Calvin, pioneer Reformer, and by the early Lutheran Martin Chemnitz. Calvin made a puissant contribution by constructing the first three-column Gospel harmony. Chemnitz contributed nascent redaction-critical assessments of Matthew’s use of Mark. Thus, far from simply being a concern to post-Enlightenment critics (as is often assumed), interest in the Gospel sources was present from the earliest days of the Reformation."


"The priority of Mk and the hypothesis of Q have been widely accepted in the present century, and are conveniently denoted by the name ‘The Two-document Hypothesis’, although it should be noted that the documents may well have been many more than two. The classical statement and defence was made by B. H. Streeter,(1) who attempted to reconstruct Q as a unitary document, but restricted it more narrowly than previous scholars. He gave the labels ‘M’ and ‘L’ to the material peculiar to Matt. and Lk., or (to be more precise) to the sources from which he took most of their peculiar material to be derived. Here again it may be noted that some scholars have been cautious in accepting the unity of the M or L material, and that since this material appears in only one gospel any reconstruction of its alleged source is even more speculative than the reconstruction of a Q.

It was not necessary to maintain that Mk’s version must at every point be older than Matt.’s parallel version, since it was possible to say that anything in Matt. which in fact seemed more original than Mk could have been derived from Q. Further, there had been lingering doubts about the existence of Q. But it came as a shock when in 1951 Dom B. C. Butler published his book *The Originality of St Matthew*, attacking the Q-hypothesis and the priority of Mk at the same time. In a minutely detailed study he subjected both hypotheses to a severe criticism, and argued strongly for the priority of Matt.

Mk, he argued, was dependent on Matt.; Lk. was dependent on _Mk for the material which the two had in common, and on Matt. for the Q-material. Once the Q-hypothesis is abandoned, the priority of Matt., he claimed, quickly follows‘ from the existence of those
passages in which Matt.’s text seems clearly more original than Mk’s, or in some other way superior to it.
In spite of much close and careful reasoning, and the existence of at any rate some passages which tell in favour of Butler’s conclusion, scholars have not abandoned the usual belief in the priority of Mk.
In this Excursus it will not be possible to examine all Butler’s arguments and instances one by one. (2) But an attempt will be made to show that the belief in the priority of Mk is in fact securely grounded, and to make clear the principal arguments on either side, on which the decision must turn." (pp. 223-224)
(1) *The Four Gospels* (1924.).
(2) Nor to consider the various articles that have appeared subsequently.


  Contents: Contributors 7; Robert L. Thomas: Introduction 8;
  Robert L. Thomas: Conclusion: The Evidence Summarized 337;
  Author Index 389; Scripture Index 393; Subject Index 398-406.


Toda, Satoshi. 2012. "The reasons why the synoptic problem should be reconsidered once again."

"We are often told that in writing the seven letters of the so-called Middle Recension Ignatius of Antioch, bishop and martyr, showed knowledge of Matthew’s Gospel. (1) His epistles, it has been claimed, provide therefore a *terminus ante quem* for that Gospel’s creation and/or supportive evidence in favour of its Syrian provenance. (2) Although such statements are made, the question of literary relationship has been relatively little studied, and this paper will draw attention to the findings of a small number of scholars which has considered seriously Ignatius’s alleged dependence on Matthew’s Gospel. To facilitate comparison for readers, it will include a table of the parallels between the Gospel and the letters most frequently adduced as well as comments concerning some of those factors which render the approach to a Gospel from the second century difficult and worth undertaking. For although no consensus of scholarly opinion has emerged regarding Ignatius’s usage, the few studies cited in this paper provide tempting glimpses of insights yet to be gained.

They suggest that our knowledge of the Synoptic Problem, of the form, date and provenance of individual Synoptic sources and of the use of Gospel traditions in Christian communities may be furthered by means of an approach to the Gospels from the second century." (p. 59)

(1) Written to Ephesus, Magnesia, Tralles, Rome, Philadelphia, Smyrna and to Polycarp.

Synoptic Problem: Bibliography of the main studies in English from 1964 (A - Bro)

Bibliographies on the Synoptic problem

  
  "This bibliography includes the major works (books and reviews; articles in journals and collected essays; dissertations; unpublished material) not only with reference to the synoptic problem, but with reference to the wider question of the sources of and interrelationships among the synoptic gospels. A number of works are included which, while not dealing with the issues directly, are relevant and have been cited in the literature. Many of the books in the bibliography themselves contain excellent bibliographies. The most important of these have the notation “Includes bibl. ” This bibliography is divided into three sections: (1) Author/title index; (2) date of publication/writing index (author and entry number listed); and (3) keyword index with entry numbers." (p. XV)

  
"The number of studies devoted to the Synoptic Problem is immense and no longer controllable. The following works are among the most important. For those who wish to delve further into the Synoptic Problem, the bibliography of Longstaff (see #142) is exhaustive through 1988. Besides the industry of individual scholars poring painstakingly over the data of the texts themselves, scholars of the Synoptic Problem have frequently sponsored international conferences where heated debate and constructive progress held the day. Fortunately, many of the conferences have had their papers published. A virtual history of the debate can be traced by studying such volumes. Let it be observed that one's solution to the Synoptic Problem has a decided impact on one's perception of early Christian history and the nature of the theology of each Evangelist (see Farmer, #120)." (p. 37)

References

**Studies on the Synoptic Problem**

  Summary: "In New Testament studies, the synoptic problem is concerned with the relationships between the gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke. A careful specification in probabilistic terms is set up of what is known as the triple-link model, and, as a special case, the double-link model. Counts of the numbers of verbal agreements between the gospels are examined to investigate which of the possible triple-link models appears to give the best fit to the data."
"Honoré (1968) in a pioneering paper carried out a statistical analysis of the synoptic problem, a well-known branch of New Testament studies, in which hypotheses about the relationships between the gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke are investigated. A good introduction to the various theories that have been proposed for the relationships between the synoptic gospels is given by Goodacre (2001). Honoré (1968) is particularly useful in that it provides a comprehensive listing of the data that were used in the analysis and a detailed account of the mathematical and statistical reasoning. However, from the point of view of a statistician, one of the challenges of Honoré (1968) is that his terminology tends not to conform to what is accepted usage in statistical theory."

(p. 49)

Summary: "In an earlier paper a careful specification in probabilistic terms was set up of Honoré’s triple-link model. In the present paper, a modification of Honoré’s model is proposed. As previously, counts of the numbers of verbal agreements between the gospels are examined to investigate which of the possible triple-link models appears to give the best fit to the data, but now using the modified version of the model and additional sets of data."

Summary: "Assuming Markan priority, we investigate the relationship between the words in Mark that are retained unchanged by Matthew and those that are retained unchanged by Luke. This is done by mapping the sequence of words in Mark into binary time series that represent the retention or non-retention of the individual words, and then carrying out a variety of logistic regression analyses."
In Chapter 2, we build upon the triple-link model introduced by Honoré (1968), broadly following the development in Abakuks (2006a, b, 2007), but with some changes. In Chapter 3, the bivariate binary time series obtained from the highlighted text of Mark in Farmer's *Synopticon* is introduced, and much of the rest of the book is concerned with the analysis of such binary time series. In Chapter 3 itself, following the treatment in Abakuks (2012), under the assumption of Markan priority, i.e., that Mark was the first of the synoptic gospels to be written, the time series is analyzed using logistic regression methods in order to investigate Matthew's and Luke's use of Mark and, in particular, to test whether Matthew and Luke were statistically independent in their verbal agreements with Mark. From Chapter 4 onwards, hidden Markov models are used to analyze the series. Chapter 4 is a theoretical interlude in which the theory of hidden Markov models for binary data is presented, with some associated R code in Appendix A at the end of the book. In Chapter 5, hidden Markov models are used to investigate Matthew's and Luke's use of Mark. In Chapter 6, a different bivariate binary time series, which uses Matthew as the base text instead of Mark, is analysed in order to investigate the verbal agreements of Mark and Luke with Matthew. After the statistical analysis in earlier chapters of the binary data extracted from the gospel texts, in Chapter 7 we turn to some examples of the incomparably richer material of the texts themselves in Greek, to be able to exhibit the verbal agreements word by word, and in English translation, to make the texts accessible to a wider readership. Parallel passages from the synoptic gospels, which emerge from the results of the statistical analysis as particularly significant for the synoptic problem, are presented for detailed examination.
We focus especially on passages that, from the statistical analysis, appear likely to provide the strongest evidence that, under the assumption of Markan priority, Matthew and Luke were not independent in their use of Mark. This leads to the discussion of specific issues concerning the relationships between parallel sections of text and the responses of New Testament scholars who defend different synoptic hypotheses. Finally, in Chapter 8 we summarize the conclusions that may be drawn from our analysis and suggest directions for further research.

To put things in the broader context of New Testament studies, much of the material in this book could be regarded as falling within the scope of what is known as source criticism, which seeks to identify the sources used by the gospel authors. Some of the discussion in Chapter 7 touches on aspects of redaction criticism, which deals with the way in which the gospel authors edited and adapted their sources to fit in with their own theological standpoint.

These and other aspects of biblical criticism are surveyed in Tuckett (1987)."

(24) An introductory sketch of this approach is given in Abakuks (2015).


"1. Introduction
The statistical approach to the synoptic problem to be described in this study follows a tradition of statistical analysis of verbal agreements comprehensively reviewed in a recent article by John Poirier.(1) In particular, it builds on aspects of a seminal paper by A. M. Honoré.(2) Earlier analysis by the present author(3) put some of Honoré’s work on the so-called triple-link model on a more rigorous mathematical footing.

Using the symbols A, B, and C to refer to any permutation of the synoptic gospels, it is supposed in the triple-link
model that, (...) Gospels B and C both use Gospel A and that Gospel C also uses Gospel B as a source. To summarise very briefly the results of this earlier work, it was found that the triple-link model appeared to give a good fit to the data, with the best fit provided by the two cases of the model where Luke was the last of the gospels to be written: A = Mark, B = Matthew, C = Luke, and A = Matthew, B = Mark, C = Luke, respectively." (p. 119)


  Appendix I: A complete table of the corrections in Greek , pp. 307-324; Appendix II: Oral tradition , pp. 325-330.

"The object of this book is to demonstrate that Mark contains a tradition from which Matthew and Luke borrowed, and to discuss the corrections of Mark jointly adopted by Matthew and Luke." (Preface, VII).

(....)

"A comparison of the Synoptists will show that Matthew and Luke, where Mark is altogether wanting, often agree very closely indeed, as, for example, in this passage of the Sermon on the Mount: " No one (Lk. servant) can be bond-servant to two lords ; for either he will hate the one and love the other or hold fast to one and despise the
other. Ye cannot serve God and Mammon."

In the whole of the Triple Tradition there is perhaps no instance of such close agreement as in this and in other passages common to Matthew and Luke and wanting in Mark. But these passages are best considered by themselves. Almost all of them contain sayings, not doings, of Christ, and they have (many of them) peculiarities of style and subject-matter which render it desirable to consider them separately, as constituting a distinct document from the Triple Tradition. Theoretically, it may be urged that this has no more right to be treated as a distinct document than any other doubly-attested tradition, e.g. the similarities common to Mark and Matthew alone, or to Mark and Luke alone. But in practice this collection of Matthew -Luke passages is so much more important than any other " double traditions " in the Synoptists that we shall find it convenient, for brevity, to call it the Double Tradition, and to discuss it in a separate volume, without, of course, allowing this convenient title to commit us to any conclusions about the authorship of this or that passage in the collection." (p. 48)

(1) Mt. vi. 24, Lk. xvi. 13.


"If the 'Q source' ever existed, it must have been one of the pillars of theology of early Christianity. In such a case, why was this pillar so underdeveloped theologically, especially in comparison to the Pauline ideas? Why did 'Q' completely disappear as a literary entity soon after the composition of the gospels of Matthew and Luke? Shall we believe that Christianity is based on sand of an unknown, lost, theologically problematic document?
It is therefore evident that the solution to the synoptic problem has fundamental importance for interpretation of the Synoptic Gospels and of the early Christian tradition as a whole. Every solution to the synoptic problem offers not only a more or less satisfactory explanation of the literary similarities and differences among the gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke. It either gives or presupposes also an answer to a more general question, whether the Synoptic Gospels and other New Testament writings were based on one internally coherent gospel tradition or on numerous disparate, partially overlapping traditions and literary sources. Consequently, every solution to the synoptic problem not only explains the origin of the so-called triple, double, and single traditions in the Synoptic Gospels but also gives an explicit or implicit answer to the more fundamental literary-hermeneutic question, in what sense we may call them 'traditions' at all. Were they channels of more or less faithful oral transmission of some preliterary material or rather ways of literary-rhetorical formulation and reformulation of some particular theological ideas? Accordingly, shall we understand the synoptic 'traditions' as having (similarly to other scriptural traditions) mainly a historical-informative or rather an intertextual-performative nature?

The quest for the correct solution to the synoptic problem is therefore by no means a purely technical issue. Every solution to the synoptic problem to a considerable degree conditions understanding not only of the history of early Christianity but also of the literary character of the New Testament writings and consequently of adequate ways of their overall interpretation." (pp. 17-18)

Syllabus: "The principles of criticism whether applied to the Old or New Testament are identical. But the subject-matter in each case is very different. The date of Moses most uncertain, but he must have lived at least several centuries before any record of his life, which has reached us, came into being. Contrast with this the proximity of St. Mark's Gospel and of Q to the events which they attest.

The present position of criticism of the Hexateuch. The uncritical conservatism of MoUer and Orr. New views on the early date of Monolatry. Eerdmans' rejection of critical principles accepted ever since Astruc published his book on the composition of Genesis in 1751. Sir W. M. Ramsay's protest against the claim of Hexateuch critics to determine in the minutest details the extent of the several documents. The misleading nature of the parallel which he draws.

The minute severance of documents in the Hexateuch justified by an examination of the story of the Flood as given in Genesis. General sketch of the documents in the Hexateuch and their characteristics.

Both Hexateuch and Gospels of composite origin. Similar composite origin can be proved in case of Chronicles, I Esdras, and may be illustrated from the Saxon Chronicle. Doublets the best clue to diversity of documents. Doublets in Synoptic Gospels, Psalms, and Proverbs.

The compiler of the Hexateuch had no documents near to the time of Moses, and he makes his latest document the framework in which he sets and to which he adapts all his earlier material. The Synoptic Evangelists, on the contrary, base their narratives on Mark, their earliest document for the life of Christ. Matthew and Luke also build on Q, which may belong to the Apostolic age. But a peculiar difficulty arises in the Gospels from the fact that there must have been an Aramaic background."

The gospels differ considerably from each other. The question this raises is pressing for genre criticism: what gives the gospels themselves any generic affinity with each other, let alone generic identity with Hellenistic biography? Can we really speak of the gospels as belonging to one genre? Under the *sui generis* solution this problem is nonexistent, for the gospels, being *Kleïnliteratur*, are in a category by themselves, separate from any extant examples of Hellenistic *Hochliteratur*, and generically united with each other in their own genre gospel on the basis of their kerygmatic content. But if the gospels are not simply gospels alone, being instead, generically speaking, literary works, perhaps biographies, which incidentally have gospel subject matter, then their differences do create the problem of what comprises their generic unity. Current discussion on this question must discern some factor that gives the gospels their common genre other than the gospels’ subject matter, if the gospels can successfully be regarded as Hellenistic biographies.

The purpose of this paper is to suggest that such a factor is discernible, in the case of the synoptic gospels, in the historical source-copier relationship that exists among Matthew, Mark, and Luke-Acts. This proposal explores the ramifications of one of Shuler’s [*] observations about genre, that it must be a dynamic concept, allowing for the influence of one work on those that follow, so that the works in question can be different because they stand in relation to one another, each author reacting to the preceding authors’ work, while at the same time the works belong to a single genre. Perhaps the synoptic gospels’ historical interrelationships can make intelligible the differences among these works without infringing on their generic unity, thus opening the way for a new biographical consensus view on the question of the genre of the synoptic gospels based on contemporary
scholarship. We shall see how such a consensus might look after first considering in detail the historical relationships existing among Matthew, Mark, and Luke-Acts." (pp. 485-486, notes omitted)


"The first three Gospels are written in Greek. Was that their original language, and are they based on Greek sources? Apart from the question of the language of the first Gospel writings, did Christ speak in Aramaic or in Greek?
The case of St. Luke is the easiest and may be taken first. It is written in Greek, and is largely based on Greek sources. That is to say, the compiler had before him a Greek Gospel practically identical with our St. Mark. He has also a good many sayings which are also found in St. Matthew. Whatever St. Matthew may have done, St. Luke no doubt drew them from a Greek source or sources. The rest of the Gospel of St. Luke was probably also based on Greek sources. The first two chapters, which are strongly marked by Hebraisms (not Aramaisms), have often been thought to be translation work of a Hebrew original. But it is equally possible that they were purposely written in the style of the Greek version of the Old Testament. St. Luke's language, generally speaking, in the Gospel is tinged with Hebraisms, but these need not anywhere be signs of translation work. Conscious imitation of the Septuagint will quite adequately account for them.
The case of the Second Gospel is rather different. This too is extant in Greek, and in the judgement of most modern writers that was the original language. The Greek of the Gospel is coloured by Aramaisms (not Hebraisms).
So long ago as 1902 I ventured to suggest that the only adequate explanation of this foreign element is that the Gospel is a translation of an Aramaic original. (1) Recently this opinion has received the weighty corroboration of the judgement of Wellhausen. It is not sufficient to say that the writer may have been an Aramaic-speaking Jew who was not very adequately equipped with a knowledge of Greek, and that he was writing in Greek matter which had come to him orally in Aramaic. The evidence rather suggests, as Wellhausen points out, a translator of an Aramaic document who sometimes misinterprets by translating too literally.

On the original language of the First Gospel much has been written, but the investigations of the last century of criticism seem to have proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Gospel was written in Greek, and is based at least in part upon Greek sources. Like St. Luke, the author had before him a Gospel practically identical with our St. Mark. And he also has a good many sayings which in substance are also found in the Third Gospel." (pp. 292-293)

(1) Expository Times, xiii. 328 fl.


"The criticism of the Synoptic Gospels seems to have reached this point. It is very generally agreed that Matthew and Luke have edited and enlarged the Second Gospel. The points still debated in this connexion are details. The main fact is, as it would seem, undeniable. There is further a very widely held belief that Matthew and Luke had also before them a second source, consisting mainly of discourses; and for some years attempts have been made to reconstruct this. It was at one time usual to call this alleged discourse source the Logia, but as that term seemed to beg disputable questions connected with a statement of
Papias about the Logia written by Matthew, recent writers have preferred to adopt for it a colourless symbol Q (= Quelle).
Harnack (2) has recently set himself to the reconstruction of Q, and as his results are likely to be widely accepted, it is the purpose of this chapter to offer some criticism of both his methods and his results by way of introducing a reconstruction of a discourse source which was used by the editor of the First Gospel." (p. 235)
(2) The Sayings of Jesus (Crown Theological Library, 1908).

"Therefore, most scholars embrace a two-source or a four-source approach, and such is warranted by the evidence. A glaring weakness, though, with all approaches to the Synoptic problem is that none of them does anything with the Gospel of John. If John represents an independent Jesus tradition with different perspectives from the beginning, though theologically developed, might it require consideration alongside the other Gospels? This would call for a new theory; we might call it a Bi-Optic Hypothesis.
A Bi-Optic Hypothesis—Bringing John into the Mix
The Gospel of John alone argues that the primary source for its material was an eyewitness, the beloved disciple, who leaned against the breast of Jesus at the Last Supper and whose “testimony is true” (John 21:23-24). The question is whether such is a knowing opinion or simply a rhetorical claim with no basis in knowledge—therefore a false assertion. Of course, John is so different from the Synoptics that it makes it easier for interpreters to ascribe John’s story of Jesus to theological factors rather than historical ones, thereby expunging it from canons of historical memory about Jesus and his ministry. And yet, this is a simplistic and facile way out of the problem, as John’s final compiler claims the opposite, and John also
includes apparent historical tradition that is not in the Synoptics.
The de-historicization of John appeals to some historical-critical scholars, as it is much easier to deal with the Synoptics’ literary and historical issues without John in the mix. But is this a robust approach or a timid one? Ascribing John’s origin to theology rather than history has also come to be preferred by some traditionalist scholars because if John were judged historically correct where it differed from the other Gospels, this would create new problems for interpreting the canonical Gospels. Therefore, critical and traditional scholars have settled for a more manageable compromise, differing from the early church, claiming that John is not historical but is theological only; three against one, John is the lone Gospel out. However, if Matthew and Luke built upon Mark, it is not a three-to-one majority; it is a factor of John and Mark—two Gospels having individuated perspectives, perhaps from day one—deserving to be analyzed critically as the Bi-Optic Gospels." (Part I: The Gospels and Jesus; Excursus I: A Bi-Optic Hypothesis - A Theory of Gospel Relations, pp. 102-126)

  "While we presuppose the validity of the 2DH and Q’s written character, in what follows we shall engage the feasibility of Q’s reconstruction and the attainability of the document’s wording. The former has recently been dismissed by a number of scholars who have pointed out the inferiority of the reconstructed Mark(4) to the canonical version of the gospel, while Q’s wording has come under renewed scrutiny. This will be followed by arguments in support of the autonomy of Didaché 1:3b–
2:1 and portions of the *Gospel of Thomas*, both contested subjects in recent academic discussion. Some of the observations included in the treatment of these matters will cover familiar terrain. However, their configuration is designed to highlight the problematic nature of a number of current claims and to lay the methodological foundation for the present investigation as well as for a fresh treatment of the Sayings Source and related documents." (p. 2, note 5 omitted)

(4) Viz., Mark’s gospel as reconstructed from its reception by Matthew and Luke.

———. 2020. "The “Reconstructed Mark” and the Reconstruction of Q: A Valid Analogy?” *Biblical Theology Bulletin: Journal of Bible and Culture* no. 50:83-91. Abstract: "Described as a “thought experiment” by a number of scholars, Mark’s Gospel as reconstructed exclusively from its reception by Matthew and Luke has been repeatedly advanced as a challenge to the reconstruction of Q in recent decades. This essay analyzes the “Reconstructed Mark” argument, finding it to form a poorly calibrated analogy for the Q document. It will be shown that Matthew and Luke treat Q, which is a sayings collection, differently from the sayings of Jesus in Mark’s Gospel, which are already valued by them more highly than Mark’s narrative. Further arguments in support of the feasibility of Q’s reconstruction and the attainability of its text will also be provided."

———. 2020. "A Source-critical Analysis of the Lord’s Prayer: Multiple Autonomous Recensions or Q?" *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* no. 96:661-679. Abstract: "Although in the New Testament the Lord’s Prayer is extant only in Matthew and Luke, scholars who work with the Two-Document hypothesis frequently maintain the Prayer’s proliferation apart from the Q source, in a liturgical tradition potentially also responsible for the *Didache* ’s recension and for the Prayer’s echoes in Mark’s gospel. This essay analyzes the data supporting the above hypothesis, reopening the question of the Prayer’s exclusive transmission through
Q. Some observations are included concerning the alternative solution offered by the Farrer-Goulder hypothesis.

Abstract: "The level of scepticism met by the concept of macro-chiasm in ancient literature is noticeably lower today than two decades ago, with sizable agreement coalescing around certain examples. One such example is found in the synoptic double-tradition material as it is preserved in Luke’s Gospel, which provides the methodological foundation for the reconstruction of the hypothetical synoptic source document Q. This article explores the study of the macro-chiasm identified in Luke (Q) 3.7–7.35 and its implications for the synoptic problem. It also addresses the methodological considerations advanced by S. E. Porter and J. T. Reed in their NTS article two decades ago, meeting a certain stipulation placed by them upon subsequent scholarship."

Abstract: "Argyle notes that there are a number of editorial agreements between Matthew and Luke that are best explained not by their use of a common source (Mark), but by the fact that one of them was acquainted with the work of the other. The evidence at the beginning of Matthew 5 suggests unmistakably that Luke followed Matthew. 
Argyle examines a number of passages to show how Luke has dealt with material from Matthew and argues that the differences between Matthew and Luke are no obstacle to the belief that Luke uses Matthew’s gospel, a belief for
which the very many agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark afford sufficient warrant.
After examining in detail several passages in the Triple Tradition, Argyle concludes on the basis of the evidence that the view that Luke knew and used Matthew’s gospel is not only a possible one, but is very probable."


"Arguably, the synoptic problem has been intimately related to the quest for the historical Jesus from its inception. The recognition that the gospels are not perfect renditions of “what actually happened” is what raises the question of their sources of information and the reasons for their agreements or disagreements; and at the same time, what makes pressing the issue of how much of what they relate is reliable" (p. 371)

(...) "To conclude inconclusively, then, one’s solution to the synoptic problem does have important consequences for how one approaches individual texts, and even for what one may reasonably infer about the overall development of the traditions about Jesus – consequences that are not always admitted by advocates of that solution. There may also be affinities between one’s solution and one’s reconstruction of the historical Jesus, something we see when a 2DH advocate produces a Q-like Jesus, or a FH advocates produces a Mark-like Jesus, or a 2GH advocate produces a Matthew-like Jesus. At the same time, however, both in theory and in practice, no necessary relationship emerges between one’s synoptic source theory and one’s portrait of Jesus: similar
portraits of Jesus are held by adherents of different synoptic source theories, while very different reconstructions of Jesus may be offered by adherents of the same solutions to the synoptic problem. The critical questions that must be answered before one can address the vexed matter of the historical Jesus are less those of the literary relationship among the extant gospels than historical questions about the nature and transmission of the tradition." (pp. 429-430)

"The bulk of this article, therefore, is devoted to attempting a rather less idealized characterization of Q's literary development and social history than has been customary. It is not of especially great concern to me that the people responsible for Q be identified specifically and precisely with the exact office of village scribe (κωμογραμματέως, sometimes translated as “village clerk”), or whether they “should perhaps be estimated a few notches higher.”(30) Caviling about just how high or low on the spectrum of literate administrators these people should be does not much affect the basic reading of Q’s rhetoric or situation (though it might have some impact on the details), and in any case misses the point, which is to situate Q and its literary development in a genuinely historical context, that is, one that is specific, concrete, material, and also has the potential to be truly explanatory.(31) So long as Q and its traditions are recognized as the literary product of a bureaucratic-scribal milieu rather than an incidentally transcribed residue of indigenizing village prophets or the self-promotion of destitute peasant itinerants, this will suffice." (pp. 15-16, some notes omitted)

(31) In what follows I am taking it for granted that Q is the product of a Galilean environment and that it dates to before the war of 66–70 CE.

Contents: Preface VII;
H. Koester: An Intellectual Biography of James M. Robinson XIII;
James M. Robinson: Curriculum Vitae XXIII; James M. Robinson: Bibliography XXV;
Founder and Fashion
Topos and Topics
Indexes; Abbreviations 325; Index of Biblical References 329; Index of Other Ancient Writings 341.
Abstract: "Recent studies of ancient compositional practices and the Synoptic Problem have validated the Two-Source hypothesis and challenged the “Augustinian,” Farrer–Goulder, and Griesbach hypotheses. These studies conclude that, according to the Two-Source hypothesis, subsequent evangelists would have adhered to the Greco-Roman conventions of working with one source at a time and not working backward through a text. The present essay adduces counterexamples such as the Greek Minor Prophets Scroll from Nahal Ḥever, which predates the Gospels, and Tatian’s Diatessaron, which postdates the Gospels. Upon further examination, simultaneously accessing multiple sources and reordering those sources were established compositional practices in the first century. Moreover, every solution to the Synoptic Problem necessitates such scribal conventions. Therefore, the lesser extent of these ancient compositional practices does not privilege the Two-Source hypothesis over its rivals."

Abstract: "Barrett questions the theory that the material we have called Q was all derived from one written document; rather it was derived from a number of non-Markan sources that were used by Matthew and Luke. Barrett’s investigation is directed toward two issues. (1) The degree of agreement not only in words but also in traditional background (Sitz im Leben) between Matthew and Luke when they are reporting sayings of the same purport. Barrett finds, in this regard, that in some of the Q passages the agreement is so close that there is no reason to doubt they were drawn from a common
source or sources, but in other passages the agreement is much less close. He concludes that the part of the material where agreement is closest may be satisfactorily explained as derived from a single common Greek source, but that the remainder cannot be explained without recourse to some parallel version. Barrett maintains that it is simpler to suppose that Matthew and Luke in collecting their material used traditions that were similar but not identical than that they each had identical copies of one source, which in the case of one of them was contaminated with a parallel version.

(2) If Matthew and Luke are both using the same continuous source, we should expect them to show in their use of it the same agreements in order that, in general, they show when both are following Mark. Barrett finds, in this regard, that the argument that the order of the Q sections in Matthew and Luke indicates that they were drawn from a common document, breaks down. The common order of much of the Q material in Matthew and Luke is afforded rather by the outline of Mark. In conclusion, Barrett argues that behind Q we should probably see a wider editorial research and a greater number of sources than have commonly been allowed for."


I. Yet Luke used a second written source besides Mark, and our problem is to define its character.
(i) The test of style points to the Jewish-Christian or Hellenistic nature of Luke's special source (S).
(ii) Characteristic ideas confirm this, e.g. the notion of 'fulfilment', Messiah, etc.
Analysis of certain sections in this light:—The Epileptic Boy (ix. 37-43*); Peter's Confession; the non-use of Mk vi. 45-viii. 26; the Feeding of the 5,000 (ix. 10b-17); and especially the Mission of the Twelve.

Hence the basal Apostolic tradition (Q), implied even by Mark, was used by Luke in an independent form (QL) already embedded in his 'special source' (S); while Q itself included the 'Logia'. This seen in the Great Sermon, the Message of the Baptist and Jesus' response, and the Parable of the Sower.

The question whether one 'special source' will explain all Luke's non-Marcan matter, to be answered in the affirmative: e.g. for the Sermon at Nazareth, the incident at Nain, etc.

These results apply also to the Passion story, on the view that this also stood in Q as far back as we can trace it: detailed proof. Further, it is there even clearer than elsewhere that the continuous twofold special material in Luke (S + QL), apart from Mark, lay before the Evangelist already unified in an order fixed by the witness of a single authoritative informant.

Traces of independent historical witness peculiar to Luke's narrative, both before the Passion (xviii. 15-xxi. 38) and after (ch. xxiv).

Luke's 'Great Insertion' (ix. 51-xviii. 14) best explained on the above theory: The 'Peraean' Ministry; the Mission of the Seventy (special relation of Luke's informant to their circle); the Lucan Parables, their setting and special features.


II. Objections met.

Professor Stanton's kindred view.

Merits of the theory. Diagram.

Abstract: "The past two centuries have witnessed a wide spectrum of solutions for the Synoptic Problem. Even though quite far from a consensus, the problem tends to incorporate new domains from ongoing connected research: the relevance of the Gospel of Thomas, the Synoptic authors’ use of the Old Testament or recent studies on communication media in antiquity. This article surveys a number of issues presented in the papers of the Oxford Conference on the Synoptic Problem, held in May 2008, ranging from challenging past and present solutions of the Synoptic Problem from different perspectives to new directions of research on this topic."

redaction criticism, which depends upon the adoption of a certain understanding of synoptic relationships in order to identify sources that lie behind our Gospels. Yet an examination of the major proposals regarding the Synoptic problem reveals that none of these offers the level of reliability necessary for the reconstruction of sources that is the presupposition for redaction criticism. This consideration leads to the conclusion that approaches to Gospel interpretation that require no reliance upon specific source theories are called for."


"How did the textual similarities and differences between Matthew and Mark and Matthew and Luke develop? The answer to this question has to be well founded. A mere description of the New Testament evidence is not enough. The synoptic data raise a number of preliminary questions, but in themselves they do not provide a reliable answer. In order to solve the Synoptic Problem on the basis of a broader foundation it is necessary to compare the New Testament synoptic data (part 1) to the relationship that exists between other parallel texts from antiquity, especially from rabbinic tradition (part II ), and to relevant results from experimental psychology and oral poetry research (part III). Most Gospels scholars have not paid much attention to these analogies to the Synoptic Problem. But of those scholars who took these analogies into account only a minority argued for a simple literary dependence between the New Testament Gospels. Most of them integrated, to varying degrees, an oral factor into their solution to the Synoptic Problem. I would like to develop their approach a step further. One of my results is that neither the selection of material nor its order is adequate criterion for distinguishing between literary and orally related parallel texts. The
verbal agreements and disagreements are much more relevant.
But it has turned out to be essential to look not only at the number of verbal agreements (1) but also at their dispersion (2), and at the higher figures in the poetic sections (3), in the words of Jesus (4) and in the Old Testament quotations (5) as well as at the Minor Agreements (6)." (pp. 1-2)

"The Synoptic Problem deals with the interrelationship of the Synoptic Gospels (Matthew, Mark, Luke) and addresses a foundational question: What is the best explanation for the textual similarities and differences between Matthew, Mark, and Luke? Based on the Synoptic evidence, this question can be split into a number of subquestions, which can be formulated on the basis of the most commonly accepted solution, the two-source hypothesis (...).
1. The Synoptic Evidence
2. The Proposed Explanations
3. Insights from Cognitive Psychology
4. Conclusion" (p. 911)

"2.8. Conclusion. Irrespective of the many different opinions about chronological order and the mutual relationships among the Synoptic Gospels, there exists a broad variety of views about the relative amount of literary dependence and oral tradition involved in the composition of the Gospels. The explanation of the Synoptic evidence in terms of a more or less exclusively literary dependence is widespread (cf. Wilke; Farmer; Goulder; Burkett) but contested. A second approach combines literary dependence with the influence of oral tradition and/or human memory and appears in two variants. Some parts of the Synoptic parallels are explained by literary dependence, while other parallel
sections are explained as the result of oral tradition (Dunn; Mournet). Alternatively, one ascribes the Synoptic parallels to a concurrence of literary dependence and human memory activity (Goodacre). Third, a clear alternative to the theory of literary dependence is the oral-tradition hypothesis originally put forward by Westcott (Reicke; Baum)." (p. 918)

- Beare, Francis W. 1964. *The Earliest Records of Jesus: A Companion to the Synopsis of the First Three Gospels by Albert Huck*. Oxford: Blackwell. "This book is intended in the first instance for the use of students in theological colleges and kindred institutions who have in their hands the well-known edition of the Synoptic Gospels arranged in parallel columns, first prepared by Albert Huck. This *Synopsis of the First Three Gospels* is now available in an English edition prepared by Professor F. L. Cross, which is based upon the ninth German edition of Huck, revised by Hans Lietzmann, with the same Greek text, but with prolegomena, section-headings and sub-titles given in English. Students also have at their disposal the same text in the English of the American Revised Standard Version, edited by Burton H. Throckmorton, Jr. (and edition, 1957). (...) These notes are intended to serve as a companion to the Huck *Synopsis*. They are not meant to offer anything like a commentary on the first three Gospels. Their purpose is rather to lead the student into an understanding of the nature of the materials with which he has to deal, and of the motives and methods of the Evangelists. Exegesis and exposition are therefore subordinated to the discussion of the problems raised by criticism." (from the Foreword)

"Conclusion s. Even if it seems to be the case that, in terms of a relative chronology, Matthew follows Mark rather than vice versa, in terms of an absolute dating, Matthew provides no unique or even more precise indications for a *terminus post quem* in comparison to Mark. This observation can be interpreted twofold: First, in regard to the *post quem*-dating, Mark and Matthew need to be treated equally. And because we could not find a further (112) or later date than 70 C. E. in the history of the first century C. E. that could function as a *terminus post quem* for dating Mark and Matthew, we need to conclude that both Gospels were written either before or after 70 C. E. Secondly, what can be said for the literary intention of the Markan Gospel is also relevant for Matthew: Both Gospels obviously refuse a precise dating. This does not mean, however, that we are discharged from dating Mark and Matthew. To the contrary, a precise dating of Mark and Matthew could shed light on central issues of Markan and Matthean exegesis: for instance, we could precisely formulate the extent of the authors’ agreement in creating the ‘level of narration,’ how much they reveal of the ‘level of reference,’ and the extent to which each narrator affects the Gospel narrative and makes himself visible. In terms of a relative chronology, Matthew might be the later Gospel. The manner in which Matthew succeeds Mark also indicates how Matthew values his writing in relation to the Markan ‘Vorlage,’ namely, as a competitive completion of Mark rather than as a totally new-conceptualization." (p. 143, a note omitted)

(112) The only exception might be 44 C. E. (cf. Mark 10:35 ff.par. Matt 20:20 ff.).


Table of Contents: Preface V; Eve-Marie Becker and Anders Runesson: Introduction: Studying Mark and
Matthew in Comparative Perspective 1;
1. History of Research
2. Reconstructing the Artifacts: Text-Critical and Linguistic Aspects of the Study of Mark and Matthew;
Barbara Aland: Was heißt Abschreiben? Neue Entwicklungen in der Textkritik und ihre Konsequenzen für die Überlieferungsgeschichte der frühesten christlichen Verkündigung 55; Tommy Wasserman: The Implications of Textual Criticism for Understanding the 'Original Text' 77; Stanley E. Porter: Matthew and Mark: The Contribution of Recent Linguistic Thought 97;
3. Date and Genre
Eve-Marie Becker: Dating Mark and Matthew as Ancient Literature 123; David E. Aune: Genre Theory and the Genre-Function of Mark and Matthew 145;
4. Socio-Religious Location
Sean Freyne: Matthew and Mark: The Jewish Contexts 145; Morten Hørning Jensen: Conflicting Calls? Family and Discipleship in Mark & Matthew in the Light of First-Century Galilean Village Life 205; Linden Youngquist: Matthew, Mark and Q 233; Wayne Baxter: Matthew, Mark, and the Shepherd Metaphor: Similarities, Differences, and Implication 263s;
5. Conflict and Violence
6. Building Community Using Text
"The study of Mark and Matthew in comparative perspective has a long history, but mainly insofar as we attempt to solve the Synoptic Problem, and, to a certain degree, to untangle the relationship of these Gospels through redaction-historical analyses. However, ever since the theory of Markan priority became firmly established in the first half of the 19th century, such redaction-historical work has focused on understanding Matthew rather than Mark when they are compared. To be sure, many studies, especially commentaries of either Mark or Matthew, make observations related to the other Gospel as they interpret specific passages or reconstruct certain events; nevertheless, most often the result of studying Mark and Matthew is that one Gospel stands in the shadow of the other." (p. 1) (...)

"In this volume, the purpose of comparing Mark and Matthew is to shed light on the earliest history of gospel literature, i.e., the earliest history of Jesus-traditions that were transformed into a more or less coherent Jesus-story that was not only repeated and imitated, but also modified and redefined. Within this comparative approach, the most challenging and deceivingly simple question arises: What is it that makes Mark’s Gospel a Markan Gospel, and Matthew’s Gospel a Matthean Gospel?\"
For the Aarhus conference, and thus for this volume, we decided to focus on investigating the first Gospels in their first-century C. E. settings." (pp. 2-3)


In conversation with Markus Vinzent.
"In this contribution, however, I [E.-M- Becker] have to limit my thoughts about the Marcionite Gospel, and I will restrict myself to examining some of the critical reflections and ideas concerning Marcion and the Dating of the Synoptic Gospels raised in your 2014 monograph. [*] The following remarks should therefore be seen as critical responses to the discourse opened up – or, better, renewed – by you and your suggestion that we view Marcion as the creator of ‘the new literary genre of the “Gospel”’.(26) As indicated already, my remarks are motivated by – what I would call – a New Testament scholar’s view on Marcion’s general place in 2nd century CE Christianity and – more particularly – Marcion’s interaction with the gospel traditions and writings.

Firstly, I will outline my general approach to Marcion and 2nd century literary history – an approach derived from my perspective on New Testament exegesis and its specific interest in literature that succeeds – what might best be called – the ‘New Testament’ period of formative literature. This will help to illuminate more in detail my disciplinary perspective and heuristic presuppositions when investigating and interpreting who Marcion was and which role he really played in Christian literary history in the 2nd century CE.

Secondly, I will comment on some of your arguments that present Marcion as the founder of the gospel genre. Finally, I will suggest how to approach the question of dating the Synoptic Gospels, and, more specifically, the Markan Gospel, which I consider to be the earliest gospel
narrative with a prototype like status in the history of early Christian literature." (pp. 12-13)


(26) M. Vinzent, Marcion (2014), 277. As Dieter Roth claims, this discourse can only be renewed to the extent that it was initiated by scholars such as Baur and Ritschl in the 1840s and 1850s. See D.T. Roth, ‘Marcion’s Gospel and Luke: The History of Research in Current Debate’, *Journal of Biblical Literature* 127 (2008), 513-27.

  Contents: Arthur J. Bellinzoni, Jr.: Preface IX; Arthur J. Bellinzoni, Jr.: Introduction 1;
  THE CASE FOR THE PRIORITY OF MARK 21
  THE CASE AGAINST THE PRIORITY OF MARK 95
  THE CASE FOR THE Q HYPOTHESIS 219

--- 1985. "Introduction." In The Two-Source Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal, edited by Bellinzoni Jr., Arthur J., 1-19. Macon: Mercer University Press. "Basically, the purpose of this collection of essays is to afford to the reader easy access to the literature that is most critical to an understanding of the question of synoptic relationship, or more particularly to an understanding of the two-source hypothesis. Specifically, the volume is divided into two main sections: the first dealing with the question of the priority of the Gospel of Mark, and the second dealing with the question of the hypothetical source “Q.” In each principal section we have tried to assemble those essays which argue most strongly, most forcefully, most convincingly the case for and the case against Markan Priority and Q. Some of the arguments are repeated in more than one essay, but each essay makes a special contribution to the question of synoptic relationships."
Effectively, the volume should be read as a whole, although it may serve some readers simply as a convenient source for the individual essays being consulted. Each main section is viewed as a unit; together the several essays within the section argue the case for or the case against Markan priority or the use of Q. The effect of the case made by each section must weighed as the reader tries to judge whether the two-source hypothesis deserves to continue to serve as the basic model for contemporary gospel research." (pp. 12-13) (...)

"This volume does not represent a single point of view. It has no particular model that it seeks to promote. It has no axe to grind other than to offer the strongest arguments possible on both sides of the issues, to give a hearing to alternative solutions to the synoptic problem, and to encourage further research in the area. This volume has no pretense of being exhaustive, but these essays and their bibliographical references are important resources for any scholar interested in synoptic studies." (p. 14)


"The relationship between the Sermon on the Mount, Matt. 5: 3-7: 27 (henceforth abbreviated: SM), and Q is far more intricate than a superficial view of a synopsis of the New Testament gospels would suggest. James Robinson pointed to the problem years ago in a footnote, when he said: •The cohesion of the collection suggests that the Sermon on the Mount (or Plain) is derived from an oral or written collection of its own, and did not first come into being in the context of Q ... The end seems to be the conclusion of a collection, and this is not simply because of the occurrence there of the term logoi (1) This way of stating the matter, however, leaves room for several options. Since two texts are involved, the SM and the Sermon on the Plain, Luke 6: 20b-49 (henceforth: SP), the question is whether we are dealing
with one sermon or two. Which of them is derived from a
previous collection? Since that previous collection is said
to be oral and thus different from the written Q, how
many collections are we to assume? What relationship
exists between the presumed oral source and the written
Q?" (p. 249)
(1) James M. Robinson and Helmut Koester, Trajectories
Through Early Christianit y

  Early Church Wrote the Story of Jesus . Grand Rapids,
  MI: Eerdmans.
  Chapter 4: The Literary Genetics of the Gospels: The
  Synoptic Problem and Johannine Question 221;
  Excursus: Patristic Quotations on the Order of the
  Gospels 281-298.

"Conclusion: In sum, I believe in a literary relationship
between the Gospels, because oral tradition does not
account for the strong verbal and structural
correspondences that we find in the Gospels and because
proto-Gospel theories are speculative and lack solid
evidence. I believe in Marcan priority, because it explains
why Mark is the middle term between Luke and Matthew
and why Mark’s roughness in language is smoothed over
by the other two Evangelists. I believe in Q because,
despite its potential misgivings, it allows us to hold
together a literary connection between Matthew and Luke
that is indirect enough to explain their varied order and
divergent utilization of the double tradition. I believe that
Luke used Matthew because it accounts for the minor
agreements and erases the anomaly of the so-called Q-
Mark overlaps." (p. 187)

  Stein's The Synoptic Problem and Markan "Errors"."
  Filología neotestamentaria no. 1:95-101.

- Black, David Alan, and Beck, David R., eds. 2001.
  Rethinking the Synoptic Problem . Grand Rapids (MI):
  Baker Academic.

Black, Steve D. 2010. "One Really Striking Minor Agreement: ΤΙΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ Ο ΠΑΙΣΑΣ ΣΕ in Matthew 26:68 and Luke 22:64." Novum Testamentum no. 52:313-333. Abstract: "It is asserted that Matt 26:68|Luke 22:64([Mark 14:65]) is the most difficult of the minor agreements. Some advocates of the two-source theory have addressed this minor agreement by trying to make sense of the narrative as we have it, and others by making sense of the text as we have it (arguing for textual corruption or lost recensions). While some of these arguments are reasonable, in the final analysis they are not satisfying. Although we might remain persuaded that the two-source theory best integrates the data relating to the synoptic problem, this minor agreement reminds us that the synoptic problem is still a problem."


Bloomberg, Craig. 2001. "The Synoptic Problem: Where We Stand at the Beginning of a New Century." In Rethinking the Synoptic Problem, edited by Black, David Alan and Beck, David R., 17-40. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker. "... I limit this survey to what has traditionally come under the rubric of the “Synoptic problem”—the question of the written sources of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, and the literary interrelationship of these three Gospels. The most recent history of the Synoptic problem, by David Dungan, casts its net far more widely, covering issues of textual criticism, canonization, and hermeneutics as well, demonstrating the interrelatedness of each of these three issues with source-critical questions.(5) It is a fascinating
study that I highly commend, but I cannot hope in this short time to do anything as wide-ranging. With this introduction, let us turn to the major solutions to the Synoptic problem. I discuss them in what I perceive to be a decreasing order of probability, which also roughly corresponds to a decreasing order of how commonly each is held. Obviously, not all of us agree that these two sequences match each other. Also I focus on the most recent and important work in each area, because the literature is voluminous and others have well documented earlier developments. (6)" (p. 18) (5) David L. Dungan, A History of the Synoptic Problem: The Canon, the Text, the Composition and the Interpretation of the Gospels, ABRL (New York and London: Doubleday, 1999). (6) In addition to Dungan, History, and the previous historical surveys cited therein, see esp. the thorough bibliography by T. R. W. Longstaff and P. A. Thomas, The Synoptic Problem: A Bibliography, 1716–1988, NGS 4 (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1988).


"In this opening section I treat how arguments against Q are made by those who do not believe the source ever existed as well as explain the rationale for arguing for the source’s existence. In sum, those who hold to Matthean priority reject Q’s existence largely on the basis of the external evidence of church tradition, which argued that Matthew was the first Gospel composed. In their view, there is no need to posit the existence of this hypothetical source. It is necessary to evaluate this church tradition surrounding Matthew’s origin. Only then does it become clear that one should also consider issues tied to internal evidence, such as the order of units and their wording, as well as evidence for or against Luke’s use of Matthew. (1) If Matthew is not the first Gospel written or there is evidence that Luke did not use Matthew, then the
rationale for the existence of a source like Q becomes plausible."
(p. 41)
(1) For reasons of space, I cannot go over the full debate that argues internally for Matthean priority, including the important argument made from agreements between Matthew and Luke against Mark. I will only try to make the positive case for the possibility of Q. A complete treatment would require that one deal with this argument in some detail. In fact, this essay in general focuses only on “macro” arguments of larger structures between the Gospels. The issues raised by “micro” arguments of details within are also important, but are so varied as to be difficult to pursue in a summarizing essay. For a full argument to be present, however, both macro and micro arguments need consideration.

- Boismard, Marie-Émile. 1979. "The Two-Source Theory at an Impasse." New Testament Studies no. 26:1-17. "To summarize the conclusions resulting from the analyses in this article:
  1. Mark blends two parallel accounts, taken from two distinct sources, which we could call Document A and Document B.
  2. One must distinguish between two successive states of Matthew; we call them Matt. I and Matt. II. Matt. I does not depend on Mark, but on one of Mark's sources, Document A. Matt. II complements the Matt. I account by copying ad litteram a section from Mark.(32)
  3. Luke, here, depends fundamentally on Matt. I and not on Mark. He complements the former by using Mark: this shows up most if one thinks of the account which immediately precedes the pericope we have analysed.
  4. In this article we have not studied John's text. It would be possible to show that John 6. 1-2 depends either on Matt. I or, more probably, on Matt. I's source, Document A, as we have acknowledged in our Commentary on John's Gospel.(33)
A synoptic theory that wishes to account for all the literary facts contained in the Gospels should include, at
the minimum, the synoptic relations which we have just mentioned. The Two-Source theory is much too simple to answer such a requirement; the same can be said about Griesbach's theory, though it has the advantage of recognizing an influence of Matthew on Luke. The reader might refer to the rather complex synoptic theory we presented, which takes into account the literary facts analysed here. (34"

(32) All the conclusions in this second paragraph can be found in Michel Hubaut's study, La Parabole des vigneronnus homicides (Cahiers de la Revue Biblique, 16; Paris, 1976); see the outline on page 128.

33) M.-E. Boismard and A. Lamouille, L’Évangile de Jean (Synopse des quatre évangiles en français, tome III; Paris, 1977), 179.


"To account for the complexity of the Synoptic Problem, the Two-Source Hypothesis in its purest form can best be summarized in the following three propositions: (a) in the sections common to the three Synoptics (the Triple Tradition), Matthew and Luke depend on Mark; (b) in the sections common only to Matthew and Luke (the Double Tradition), these two gospels depend on a second source, designated by the letter "Q" (for the German Quelle = "source", which was made up almost exclusively of logia ("sayings"); c) Matthew and Luke are independent of one another. Scholars also concur that Matthew and Luke had available to them their own particular sources for those sections which are unique to themselves. This hypothesis —widely held today, though with important qualifications —was only worked out in successive stages." (p. 679)


Abstract: "Biadby’s purpose is to suggest a rough-and-ready method of judging Austin Farrer’s hypothesis in “On Dispensing with Q” that Luke had available and used as the basis of his gospel both Mark and Matthew. Bradby maintains that Farrer’s thesis can fairly be judged by reference to a small number of key-passages from the Triple Tradition in which Matthew’s text is fuller than Mark’s. In these instances, if Farrer is right, we should surely find some instances in which Luke has reproduced material from Matthew which neither Matthew nor Luke could have gotten from Mark, because it is not paralleled in Mark.

Bradby considers four sets of passages from the Triple Tradition:
1. the walk through the cornfields and its sequel
2. the parable of the sower
3. the charge to the apostles
4. Peter’s confession at Caesarea Philippi.
Bradby concludes that Farrer’s thesis cannot be “proved” or “disproved.” But in the four instances examined, if Farrer’s thesis is correct, then Luke has consistently spurned the latter and fuller version in Matthew in favor of the earlier and shorter version in Mark. Bradby prefers to fall back on the theory of the priority of Mark and the use of Mark and Q by both Matthew and Luke.

  "The fact is that no evangelical solution to the synoptic problem is going to be found through Marcan priority. Scholars like Farmer and Griesbach have presented the elements of an answer. It is up to modern evangelicals to take that answer-Matthean priority-and adapt it to a conservative view of Scripture. Such an option requires three things: (1) a clear theological commitment to inerrancy, (2) an elevation of patristic tradition and resources, and (3) a reasonable and constructive use of form criticism. Relative to the latter, we seem to have two choices: either opt for Matthean priority and a reasonable exercise of form criticism, or accept Marcan priority and suffer the consequences of a more severe redaction criticism." (p. 121)

  "Six years ago, in 2004, Andreas Lindemann published his report on Markan research from 1992 till 2000.(1) His essay is valuable for many reasons, not least because it helps us to follow certain tendencies in Markan research2 Rather than structuring the current report according to categories such as volumes of essays, monographs, specific topics, expositions of particular passages, and commentaries, as Lindemann did, I shall focus this
review on the literature that has been published in monograph form since 2000. When necessary, the preceding discussion will be briefly summarized. Sometimes the question is not only what was published, but rather what questions have not been addressed. It is not possible to give due credit to new commentaries, nor is it commendable to pay attention to the volumes of collected essays on Mark or monographs confined to specific episodes or single passages of the Gospel." (p. 13, some notes omitted)


- Broadhead, Edwin K. 1997. "On the (Mis)definition of Q." *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* no. 68:3-12. Abstract: "Important developments in the study of the Sayings Tradition (Q) and growing awareness of this issue beyond critical circles demand renewed attention to how the Sayings Tradition is defined and to the terminology by which it is described. Definitions based upon where this tradition is found or how it was used are no longer adequate. Future descriptions must be based upon the fundamental identity of this tradition and upon its role in the development of early Christianity. Furthermore, it is time to rethink the terminology by which we refer to the collection of Jesus’ sayings. The relevance of the designation 'Q' is questionable, and the propriety of speaking of a Sayings Gospel is debatable. In light of these problems, new terminology is proposed, and a more descriptive definition of the Sayings Tradition is offered."


Mark(1). As proposed here - in a way which differs from the proposal of M.-E. Boismard(2) - there are essentially three arguments for Proto-Luke:
(1) Distinctive dependence on the LXX. Within Luke-Acts is a stream of texts which has a distinctive dependence on the LXX. This does not prove former separateness, merely distinctiveness. The texts: Lk 1,1-4,22a(3) (except 3,7-9; 4,1-13); 7,1-8,3; 9,51-10,20; 16,1-9.19-31; 17,11-18,8; 19,1-10; chaps. 22-24 (except 22,31-65): Acts 1.1-15.35.
(2) Distinctive unity, especially unity of structure (eight diptychs).
The above texts have a unique unity: unity of content and, above all, of structure - a precise structure of eight diptychs. Such unity argues not only for distinctiveness but also for former separateness. (Separateness need not mean two authors. Both editions probably come from one person - Luke the evangelist).
(3) Subsequent verification: the hypothesis solves problems. Once Proto-Luke is so identified (as in the above texts), problems about gospel origins and relationships, including aspects of Mark and Q. come closer to resolution." (p. 627)
(3) Not 4,30 or 427 as indicated in some of the present authors earlier publications.
"Within Matthew 5 and 11,25-30 lies a group of sayings that constitutes a distinct synthesis of Deuteronomy, and, to a lesser degree, of Sirach.
The sayings are three-part: Five Beatitudes (Matt 5,5-9); Five Antitheses (plus prologue and sequel) (partly scattered, within Matt 5,17-48); A Wisdom Cry/Song/Hymn (Matt 11,25-30). The relationship of these Matthean sayings to the OT is complex, but it is precise and verifiable.

The purpose of this paper is to indicate that this short arrangement of sayings constituted the original logia which underlie many NT writings.

This hypothesis, when combined with a specific form of the theory of Proto-Luke(1) makes the prevailing notion of Q unnecessary." (p. 729)


The above texts have a unique unity: unity of content and, above all, of structure - a precise structure of eight diptychs. Such eight-fold unity argues not only for distinctiveness but also for former separateness. (Separateness need not mean two authors. Both editions probably come from one person - Luke the Evangelist),


"The purpose of this work is to outline the literary development of several of the New Testament writings and, while doing so, to unravel the Synoptic Problem—the well known puzzle about the relationship between the first three gospels (‘the Synoptics’).

'Outline' is the key word. The New Testament is like a vast complex tapestry, and one volume cannot try to unravel all the levels of textual weaving. This work does indeed look closely at some levels of some texts, but the volume has already become bulky, and for several reasons it is appropriate, necessary even, to keep a focus on leading threads and to provide just an outline. This then is the goal: an outline that hopefully can be tested and developed by others.

The work has four parts:
I. General Introduction: Ancient Writing and its Context (Chapters 1-9)
II. The Overall Picture: Initial Evidence (Chapters 10-26)
III. Proto-Luke as Septuagint-Based (Argument 1): Supporting Evidence (Chapters 27-54)
IV. Appendices: Further, Exploratory Aspects of New Testament Intertextuality (Appendices I-8)" (Preface, p. XX)
Verses 1-3 and 16–22 contain statements that imply various and even contrary relationships to Jewish authorities sanctioned by reference to sayings of Jesus. What relationship did Matthew advocate for his readers? Not only are Matt 23.1-3, 16-22 unique in the Synoptics specifically and in the NT generally, but a large portion of Matt 23 is unparalleled in the Synoptics. Sayings similar to those found in Matt 23 also occur in Matt 5.17–6.18 and Matt 10. These sayings, like those in Matt 23, are also unparalleled and suggest the possibility of various relationships between Matthew’s community and Judaism. Unparalleled sayings are also found in Matt 5.5, 7–10, 14–16; 7.6, 15 16a, 11.28–30; 12.34–37; 16.17–19, 18.16–19; 19.10-12." (pp. 11-12)

"Chapters 2, 3, and 4 will isolate the M sayings in Matt 5.17–6.18; 10, 23, respectively. Each chapter will be organized according to thought units made apparent by literary shifts in the text. Within each section of the text, first a translation will be given, followed by an identification of four types of material, always in the same order: (a) verses with parallels in Mark; (b) verses with parallels in Luke; (c) verses likely to come from Matthew; (d) verses with a strong possibility of containing an M saying. Chapter 5 will accumulate the results from these chapters, describe the material, and establish probable life settings for the sayings or groups of sayings. Use of the preliminary results from Chapter 5 will be an aid in Chapter 6 in recovering other M sayings
that may occur throughout the Gospel.” Whereas the un paralleled material in Matt 5.17–6.18; 10; 23 occurs in contexts where the use of parallels, style, vocabulary, and content can be employed with relative ease, there are other un paralleled sayings in Matthew in contexts where those criteria are more difficult to utilize. These additional M sayings will also be described and assigned life settings. Chapter 7 will relate the results of the analysis to a hypothesis that suggests a reconstruction of the history of the community and accounts for the tradition(s) recovered." (p. 22)


"fundamental datum of the Synoptic problem is that Luke in its "Markan materials" (primarily Luke 4 31-44, 5 12-6 19, 8 4-9 50, 18 15-43, 19 28-22 23, 22 31-24 11) has only minor agreements with Matthew against Mark, either in matter or order.' Mark then must be some kind of connecting link between Matthew and Luke; the usual solution, which I take to be correct, is that both Matthew and Luke knew some form of Mark. What form of Mark they knew I hope here to define more precisely." (p. 215) (...)

"We are thus led to the proposal that there existed in the first century a revised version or versions of Mark, which accounts for many textual variants in our MSS of Mark, for many divergences from Mark in Matthew and Luke, and particularly for the bulk of the agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark; and that to this recension the best witness is the "Caesarean."

We have already considered the importance of this suggestion for the Synoptic problem; I add just a word about what it would mean for textual history, and then leave it to the mercy of more competent hands. If the suggestion is right, Mark’s Greek was very rough, scribes corrected it very early, and already in the first century we could talk about a "vulgate text" of Greek
Mark. Only Alexandria, most particularly in codex B, preserved with any consistency the forms of the original; although indeed a series of Aramaisms, in Mark as elsewhere, have been preserved only in D. (30). Both d the Old Syriac will then come from good local texts with a moderate contamination of "vulgate" readings; the Byzantine text will represent a different contamination of vulgate readings into a local text, which, further revised, happened to win the day. The "Caesarean" witnesses, which it is becoming harder and harder to localize geographically, will then simply be direct descendants of the "first century vulgate" which to varying degrees have escaped assimilation to the Byzantine text.

(1) I.e., Luke (unlike Matt) after 4 16 does not give "Q-materials" in the context of their Markan parallels. The only exception is Luke 9 3-5, where the agreements with Matt 10 7-14 against Mark 6 6-11 are echoes or transfers from the (Q) mission-discourse Luke 10 1-12.


"It is doubted, even by believers in the existence of the Q document, that Mark can have known it. Streeter's earlier view(1) was that "Mark wrote to supplement Q," which explained why Mark, "while apparently familiar with Q ... uses it so little and usually with abbreviation."

Afterwards Streeter(2) rejected this view, and his second thoughts have usually been taken as decisive; e.g., by Taylor, on the grounds that "the existence of parallel versions of sayings in the great Churches of primitive Christianity is highly probable."(3) That is, the question, "Did Mark know Q?"(4) tends to be answered a priori, on the basis of our general opinion how the sayings of Jesus circulated. I here suggest, on the contrary, that the
relations between Mark and Q are concrete evidence how those sayings circulated." (p. 29)

"It is usually assumed that Matthew did not know Luke, nor Luke Matthew.(1) The non-Marcan (',Q,') materials common to Matthew and Luke, then, ultimately go back to a common source or sources, oral or written, much of which anyway had reached a fixed Greek form. Attempts have been made to split up the source of the Q-materials into two documents,(2) into one-sheet 'tracts',(3) and into individual floating sayings.(4) I here assume that the great bulk of the Q-materials have as their ultimate common source a single Greek document 'Q,' (while holding open the possibility that behind Matthew—but probably not Luke—there lies also independent knowledge of Aramaic originals for some sayings). The basic evidence is the considerable series of Q-materials given in the same order by Matthew and Luke." (p. 27)
A further stage in Gospel development is required to explain the interrelationship of the first three Gospels, called “Synoptic” because they can be reviewed side by side (syn-optically). These Gospels have so much in common that in the third stage described above there must have been some dependence of one or two on the other or on a common written source. Although much scholarly attention and even passion has been devoted to this problem, most readers of the NT find the issue complex, irrelevant to their interests, and boring—a fact that causes me to be succinct in my treatment. Ample bibliography will be given; but beginners are warned that the subject tends to generate complexity, and they may want to settle for the most common conclusions that I have italicized below (pp. 114, 115, 122).

Statistics and terminology: Mark has 661 verses (vv.); Matt has 1,068, and Luke has 1,149. Eighty percent of Mark’s vv. are reproduced in Matt and 65 percent in Luke.(18) The Marcan material found in both the other two is called the “Triple Tradition.” The approximate 220–235 vv. (in whole or in part) of nonMarcan material that Matt and Luke have in common is called the “Double Tradition.” In both instances so much of the
order in which that common material is presented, and so much of the wording in which it is phrased are the same that dependence at the written rather than simply at the oral level has to be posited. Let me simply list some proposals offered to explain these statistics, including for each the main argument(s) pro and con. Finally I shall draw out corollaries from the most commonly accepted solution." (p. 127, a note omitted)


Studies on Synopsis, Concordances, Harmonies of the Gospels

Bibliography


"The plan of the Synopsis in detail can be seen directly from using it, and therefore only a few observations need to be made here.

The headings in several languages will facilitate the use of the Synopsis beyond the area where German is understood. The Latin and English texts do not represent simply a wooden translation from the German, but provide headings for the respective sections in accord with usage current among those who use Latin and English (at the same time account is taken of the advantages of assimilation whenever possible). The chapter and verse references for the leading texts (which, in their succession, form the consecutive text of the Gospels) are printed in medium bold-face type.
References at the beginning and at the end of these sections, so far as they are not given in their original order, indicate clearly the connection between them. In addition to these leading texts there will be found primary and secondary parallels. The primary parallels are printed in normal type and can be recognized by the fact that their chapter and verse references are not printed in medium bold-face type; the secondary parallels are immediately recognizable by being in smaller print. In each case both kinds of parallels are supplied with references by number and page to the place where they are printed as leading texts. A critical apparatus is provided not only for each principal passage but for the principal parallels also, for an investigation of mutual relationships requires the consultation of textual variants. The subject apparatus for each section supplies references within the text as well as parallels from the Old and New Testament which will serve to illustrate the text. In other words, here is a concise commentary which will direct the user to further material, and thus in academic instruction teacher and student alike will no doubt be spared much trouble both in dictating and in writing down information." (from the Preface to the First Edition)

———, ed. 1996. Synopsis of the Four Gospels. Greek-English Edition of the Synopsis Quattuor Evangeliorum. Stuttgart: German Bible Society. First edition 1972; 15th edition 1987. Numerous copies of the comprehensive edition of the Synopsis Quattuor Evangeliorum are in international circulation, as is shown by the publication of six editions in just over six years. It is therefore unnecessary to say anything further about it here, except to justify the publication of this Greek-English edition. A short description of its structure will accomplish this: The Greek part of this diglot edition agrees exactly with the comprehensive edition in its structure, arrangement of parallel texts, and critical apparatus. The last has even been enlarged by the addition of newly discovered papyri and uncialss. Omitted are the appendices (the Gospel of Thomas and the witnesses of the early Church Fathers
concerning the origin of the Gospels) and the additions to the individual pericopes from the apocryphal Gospels and the Church Fathers. A number of less important secondary parallels has been dispensed with. Their texts, previously given in small print, have been replaced by references. In this way, the Greek part has been made clearer and more concise.

The decisive reasons for these modifications were that the user of the Greek-English Synopsis is chiefly interested in the texts of the Gospels and much less in the witnesses of the early Church and in noncanonical supplementary material. He frequently wants to use primarily the English part and is only concerned to be able to compare the translation at certain points with the original text. This is now possible for him to do in a completely systematic manner. For this reason, the English part consists of the text of the Revised Standard Version. In addition the critical apparatus lists all variant readings occurring in the Authorized Version, the American and English Revised Versions, and the Catholic Edition of the Revised Standard Version insofar as they are of any relevance (cf. the Introduction to the English part, p. XI). The user therefore not only has before him at all times several different possible translations of the Greek text and can choose between them, but he also has a concise survey of the development of official and semi-official Bible translations in the English language. The Revised Standard Version has been chosen as the basic text since it enjoys such general approval. Not only is it the translation most widely used at present but it is also a comparatively literal translation of the Greek text." (From the Preface to the First edition)

"The second edition of the Synopsis of the Four Gospels in 1975 was characterized by a change of texts: the Greek text was adapted to the 26th edition of Nestle-Aland, Novum Testamentum graece, and the 3rd edition of the United Bible Societies’ Greek New Testament, and the English text was conformed to the second edition of the Revised Standard Version. In the present sixth edition the earlier apparatus, which is now dated, has been replaced by the apparatus familiar to the reader from the
26th edition of Nestle-Aland, increasing the usefulness of the Synopsis. For this edition the corrected apparatus of the 4th printing was reviewed once again." (From the Preface to the Sixth edition)


"The present concordance was produced because, in addition to the users of the "Complete Concordance to the Greek New Testament on the Basis of All Modern Critical Text Editions and the Textus Receptus" (ed. Κ. Aland, 2 vols. Berlin/New York, 1983) there are larger groups of students and parish pastors who are interested in owning an overview of the words in the New Testament which is as far as possible complete. Thus the limited selection in Schmoller is insufficient for them. On the other hand, they believe they do not necessarily need the complete tradition of the text as offered by the "Complete Concordance." In the latter the readings of all the critical editions from Tischendorf to the present (and the Textus Receptus) are given under each entry. The present concordance, however, only employs the text of Nestle-Aland26 (in its contents identical with the Greek New Testament3) as its basis. In the "Complete Concordance" the occurrences of all words in the New Testament are offered with a full text.

(...)

Schmoller's concordance only offers a limited selection. Those of Bruder and Moulton are 100 years old and are based on an antiquated text. Thus we believe the present concordance fills a real gap and - within the limits described - presents a welcome tool for the exegesis of the
New Testament." (From the Preface by K. Aland, H. Werner)


"The Preface and Introduction which my father wrote for the original edition of his Diagram was concerned principally with pragmatic questions. He introduced the organization and use of the Diagram and furnished the practical explanations necessary for the use of it by the reader; and along with this he provided a minimal statement of the critical theories implied, such as the existence of the document Q and the use of the symbols M and L for the material peculiar to Matthew and Luke respectively." (p. 1)

(...) 

"The advantage of the Diagram as a mode of presentation is that it displays very clearly and on one visual plane six things that are highly essential: (a) the relative lengths of a passage as between Gospels (e.g. where Mark has a passage that is also in Matthew and/ or Luke, the Marc an version is commonly longer); this is displayed because the Diagram is to the scale of 32 verses to one inch; (b) the extent of material which is found in Mark and also in one or both of the other two Gospels; this is indicated by red; (c) the existence of material which is peculiar to one of the three Gospels; this is indicated by white in Matthew, by yellow in Luke, and by green for the small amount of material peculiar to Mark; (d) the existence of material which is common to Matthew and Luke but absent from Mark; this is indicated by blue; (e) differences in order as between Mark and the other two Gospels, or between Matthew and Luke; these are indicated by lines drawn between one column and another; (f) passages in Mark which are
absent from either Matthew or Luke are indicated with a heavy black block at the appropriate side. All this can be quickly seen by the student of the Bible without having to look up references or turn over pages." (p. 4)


"Le premier volume de cette Synopse mettait « sous les yeux des lecteurs les textes confrontés des quatre évangiles » de façon à « souligner leurs différences et leurs ressemblances » (vol. I, p. VII). Ce deuxième volume en est un commentaire, section par section, dont le but est d’aider le lecteur à scruter les textes évangéliques afin de « mieux comprendre leurs parentés littéraires, la genèse de leur rédaction, leurs emprunts mutuels et leurs sources » (ibid.). C’est, en un mot, la « préhistoire » de nos évangiles actuels qu’il s’agit de reconstituer. Depuis longtemps, les commentateurs ont essayé de trouver une théorie qui puisse rendre compte de toutes les données littéraires de ce qu’on a l’habitude d’appeler le « problème synoptique»; il faut bien avouer que pas une n’a réussi à s’imposer. Même la théorie des « Deux Sources », qui a pourtant connu un succès certain et, encore maintenant, est tenue pour un « dogme » indiscutable par beaucoup de commentateurs, surtout en Allemagne, se trouve soumise à de virulentes attaques venant d’horizons divers. Le fait même que le problème synoptique continue à susciter études et polémiques est un indice qu’il se pose en termes complexes ; s’il est possible de lui trouver une solution (ce qui n’est pas certain), cette solution ne peut être que complexe. Dans cette Introduction, nous voudrions exposer les grandes
lignes d’une théorie que nous avons élaborée en étudiant toutes les péricopes évangéliques; nous donnerons ensuite une justification de cette théorie en renvoyant de façon systématique au commentaire de la Synopse."
(Tome II, p 15)

"En présentant le tome II de la Synopse des Quatre Évangiles en français, nous écrivions : «Ce volume a pour but de proposer une explication de la genèse littéraire des quatre évangiles ; il donne donc le primat aux analyses littéraires. La valeur théologique des textes n'est cependant pas négligée, dans la mesure où elle interfère avec leur évolution littéraire. Malgré tout, on ne trouvera pas, dans les notes, un commentaire détaillé et complet de chaque péricope évangélique. Pour cette raison, nous avons renoncé à rédiger des notes sur les sections johanniques qui n'ont pas de parallèle dans les Synoptiques... Le problème littéraire posé par les textes johanniques pourra faire l'objet d'un volume ultérieur » (p. 7). Ce projet s'est réalisé. Ce tome III de la Synopse, qui paraît sous le titre : L'évangile de Jean, se situe dans la même perspective que le tome II. Il s'en distingue toutefois sur deux points. D'une part, les analyses de vocabulaire et de style y sont beaucoup plus poussées. D'autre part, les développements et les synthèses théologiques ont souvent une ampleur plus considérable que les analyses littéraires. Pour faciliter l'accès de ce volume aux personnes qui sont peu familiarisées avec le travail exégétique, nous avons, dans chaque note, groupé en deux parties distinctes les analyses littéraires et les développements théologiques ; ceux qui ne voudraient pas se lancer dès l'abord dans le dédale d'analyses souvent subtiles pourront commencer par lire la dernière partie de chaque note où nous donnons le sens des récits ou des discours de Jésus à leurs divers niveaux rédactionnels. Il reste qu'analyses littéraires et développements théologiques sont étroitement liés, à tel point que, souvent, les premières ne trouveront leur achèvement qu'à la lecture des seconds. En général, les discours sont d'un abord plus difficile que les récits. Pour se familiariser avec la méthode que nous avons suivie, nous suggérons au Lecteur de se laisser guider par la
Samaritaine, personnage, au reste, peu farouche {note § 81}." (Tome III, p. 7)


"From the 16th century until the time of Griesbach, no less than 24 synopses of the Gospels and works of a synopsis-like structure appeared. The new genre of the synopsis rose up in the 16th century beside the much older and more popular genre of the harmony. In the harmonies of the Gospels, the texts of the four Gospels were integrated into one continuous text so that a single flowing overview of the works of Jesus was achieved. At this point, the harmonies become irrelevant for our study due to the fact that the Gospels as individual writings are completely lost in the harmonies. Moreover, the harmony prevents the reader from confronting the problem of the discrepancies and the similarities between the Gospels, a problem which motivates and encourages the reader to further investigate the formation of the Gospels.

Because of these factors, the harmonies have played no significant role in the development of the historical and literary criticism of the Gospels.

From the very beginning, two works have had a profound influence upon the way synopses were arranged: 1)
Augustine's treatise *De consensu evangelistarum*, which appeared around the year 400; and 2) the *Harmonia evangelica* published by the German Lutheran Andreas Osiander in the year 1537." (pp. 600-601, notes omitted)


(...)

Understandably, several experts on the history of the Synoptic Question have supposed that Griesbach's synopsis was also the point of departure from which he developed his solution of the synoptic problem, in his case the Two Gospel Hypothesis. It is true that no other synopsis before his time had ever been meant for such a purpose.

(...)

"In my dissertation of 1993 on the history of the gospel synopsis from Calvin to Griesbach, I also took Griesbach's synopsis as a turning point in the history of synoptic studies. However, I have come to wonder if this view does not need to be qualified.

The influence of Griesbach's theory on the synoptic discussion at the end of the eighteenth century turned out to be marginal: the Two Gospel Hypothesis disappeared and surfaced only in 1825 when Heinrich Saunier adopted it.(7) In particular, the question has to be reconsidered whether there was indeed a direct link between Griesbach's synopsis and his solution of the Synoptic Problem in the form of the Two Gospel Hypothesis.

In this chapter, I would like to address two questions. The first is: Was the decline of the gospel harmony after the
publication of Griesbach's synopsis a loss or a gain? This entails the issue of how the genre of the old-fashioned harmony related historically to the new genre of the "unharmonized" synopsis.

My second question is: How clear-cut exactly was the "paradigm shift" in synoptic studies that was brought about by Griesbach's synopsis? Or, to rephrase this question more strongly: Can we speak at all of a turning point or paradigm shift with regard to Griesbach's synopsis?" (p. 20)


"The main object of textual criticism is to establish as accurately as possible a text approximating to the original words of the original authors.

As far as the text of the synoptic gospels is concerned, one of the main problems in establishing the text is the amount of cross-fertilization in the MSS whenever the gospels are in parallel. Scribes were prone
to assimilate the gospel they were copying to a parallel text in another gospel." (p. 231)

(...)

"The principles which were applied to some of the variants in Mark seem therefore not to have been consistently acknowledged in other variants. This observation ought to make us cautious in using the UBS3 text or of our accepting uncritically the explanatory notes in Metzger’s Commentary. Our concentrating here on the UBS3 text is significant, because the 9th edition of Aland’s Synopsis (= Syn9) (3) has a text substantially the same as UBS3 (which also agrees with Nestle–Aland in the forthcoming 26th edition of that text) whereas the 8th edition of Aland’s Synopsis was based on Nestle–Aland25 (= N–A25). The majority of scholars who will work on the synoptic problem in the future are likely to base their work on the text of Syn9. It is important therefore to see how far that text is reliable and in particular to what extent assimilated readings have been allowed to appear as the text rather than as part of the marginal apparatus." (p. 232)


"Serious study of the synoptic problem can be undertaken only with the aid of a Greek synopsis. At the present time three such synopses are readily available:(1) Aland’s *Synopsis Quattuor Evangeliorum*, the 13th edition of Huck extensively revised by H. Greeven and the recently published text by B. Orchard. In this article these
synopses are referred to as follows: Aland as Syn when all editions are intended, otherwise as Syn$^A=1–8$ or Syn$^B=9–12$ to differentiate between the two major editions of the text, the earlier of which has a text comparable with the twenty-fifth edition of Nestle-Aland Novum Testamentum Graece (= N-A$^{25}$)

and the later a text comparable with N-A$^{26}$; Greeven’s revision as H-G; and Orchard’s text as Orchard.

Syn and H-G print the parallel columns of the synoptic gospels in the sequence Matthew, Mark, Luke. Orchard, whose text was produced in order to assist those scholars who feel such a sequence prejudicial against the neo-Griesbach theory, prints the parallels in the sequence Matthew, Luke, Mark. It is my task in this article not to discuss these three editions as aids to a particular attempted solution to the synoptic problem but to examine the texts and apparatuses with special reference to H-G and Orchard but with comparisons with Syn also.(2) What is immediately striking is that each of the three has a different text despite the claim of one of them (Syn$^B$ p. xi) to be the ‘Standard Text’ of the future."

(p. 557)

(1) R.J. Swanson ‘s Horizontal Line Synopsis of the Gospels the Greek edition of which at present covers only Matthew and its parallels has been discounted from this article, so too has W.R. Farmer ‘s Synopticon dismissed by H.F.D. Sparks in his review in Journal of Theological Studies 1971 as of use only in conjunction with a conventional synopsis. Farmer’s exercise cannot be considered a new synopsis in its own right.


van Segbroeck, F., Tuckett, C. M., van Belle, G. and Verheyden, J., 337-357. Leuven: Peeters. Reprinted in: J. K. Elliott, *New Testament Textual Criticism: The Application of Thoroughgoing Principles*, Leiden: Brill 2010, pp. 431-458. "I have attempted on several occasions (2) to preach that decisions about the Synoptic Problem ought not to be made on the basis of the text in any one Synopsis but that one should make use of the alternative readings to be found in the critical apparatus and that one should not imbue the editor of any one printed text with an omniscience that enabled him to produce a definitive version of the text. In reality I recognise that such preaching generally falls on deaf ears. Most writers on the Synoptic Problem still base their discussions on one printed text and with scarcely an acknowledgement that the apparatus is of help. However, one notable exception among scholars of the Synoptic Problem is Professor Neirynck, and that is why this present study is offered in grateful tribute to an indefatigable contributor to and critic of the international synoptic debate. Neirynck is all too well aware of the differences in printed synopses and the effect these can have on aspects of the Synoptic Problem: he is also alert to the textual variants." (p. 338)


"In the Neirynck Festschrift(1) I listed under several categories differences between the Greek text printed in the synopses of Aland(2) (= Syn) and Greeven(3) (= HG) and with cross-references to the synopses of Orchard(4) and Boismard-Lamouille(5) (= BL) in order to demonstrate the effect editorial text-critical decisions could have on an investigation into, or on statistics relevant to, the resolution of the Synoptic Problem. In that article I tried to present mere lists without commentary. In the present article I shall endeavour to make the dry presentation of lists into a practical exposition of how these texts (on which most exegetes will base their conclusion about the Synoptic Problem) can lead the unsuspecting along differing paths. For my examples below I shall use samples that reveal different aspects of literary interrelationship. We are concerned here only with those variants that are the cause of differences in the printed editions." (p. 51)


(2) K. Aland, Synopsis Quattuor Evangeliorum (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 131985).


"This Synopticon is designed to supplement existing aids to Gospel studies. It stands in a tradition which began with the earliest systematic attempts to compare the work of one evangelist with that of another. Ammonius of Alexandria constructed an aid to Gospel studies which made it possible to compare passages in Mark, Luke and John with their parallels in Matthew. This was accomplished by copying the relevant portions of the other Gospels alongside the full text of Matthew. Eusebius noted that this procedure often destroyed the sequence of the material in Mark, Luke and John. He also complained that it presented only those parts of these Gospels which had parallels in Matthew. In order to facilitate the study of similar passages in all four of the Gospels, and to preserve the sequential arrangement which each evangelist gave to his material, Eusebius developed a cross reference system which was widely accepted and remains useful today.

The basic format for most modern synopses was established by J. J. Griesbach in 1776 with the publication of his *Synopsis Evangeliorum Matthaei Marci et Lucae una cum iis Johannis pericopis*. . . . Most subsequent synopses have varied only in their use of John and in the degree to which relevant citations and parallels from apocryphal and patristic literature are included."

(Introduction, p. VII)


"Griesbach's synopsis and its significance for Gospel research can be properly judged only when it is seen in
the total context in which it belongs: namely that Christianity has never fully satisfied itself or been quite at ease with the fact that what it knows of its Master has been handed down to it in four books which - unanimous as their witness is - do differ from one another in numerous details. Whatever theological motives may underlie this, the Church has never, or at least never for long, wanted to accept the four Gospels simply as they are. The replacement, connected with the beginnings of the Syrian Church, of the four Gospels by Tatian's Diatessaron is no doubt the most violent attempt up to now, and so one not repeated, to cut the Gordian Knot. But also the Eusebian Canons cautiously try to put some order into the Gospels' mixture of agreement, divergence and contradiction. The problem, here only sketched out, is discussed at length by Augustine. In his De consensu evangelistarum he shows that the Gospels present a clear and complete picture of the persons and things about which they narrate, and that the occasional contradictions are either no contradictions at all, are insignificant, or serve the purpose of clarification. His harmonizing is sometimes forced and can hardly prove acceptable to a critical reader, but he has no intention of turning the four Gospels into a single work, behind which the four Evangelists would have to retire. So the early Church already took in hand a theme of Biblical scholarship that was afterwards always with it, obviously not without being variously illuminated by the historical currents of the human spirit and of theology. The ways in which this theme is expressed are diverse. The trend of the scribes, more or less observable everywhere, to harmonize the text of the canonical Gospels (mostly with Matthew) belongs to it, as does a broad stream of harmonizing Gospel interpretation which is handed down in the exegetical tradition."

(pp. 22-23, a note omitted)

Second edition, revised and supplemented. (First edition 1898).

"The origin, mode of composition, and mutual relations of the three Synoptic Gospels form so obscure and so complex a subject of inquiry that it has come to be generally known as the 'Synoptic Problem'. Among the many modern attempts to deal with it, this volume has a limited and merely preparatory purpose, which I have tried to indicate upon its title-page. It is called by the plural name 'Horae Synopticae', because, while it is the outcome of a good many hours spent in examination of the Synoptic Gospels and in tabulation of the results thus obtained, those results are presented separately and almost independently in the successive sections of the book, no attempt being made to combine them as foundations or supports of any system or theory. And the sub-title is 'Contributions to the study' - rather than to the solution - 'of the Synoptic Problem', because I have only been trying to help in that preliminary process of collecting and sifting materials which must be carried much further than it has yet been before we can be ready for the solution of the Problem - or, as I would rather express it, of such parts of it as are not now insoluble." (Preface to the First Edition, p. V)


"At the beginning of each entry a chart with the New Testament word statistics gives information about the distribution of the key word in the whole New Testament."

(...) 

"The synoptic statistics give in three lines (Mt, Mk, Lk) a classified statistical overview of the number of occurrences of the key word in the Synoptic Gospels. A
chart containing a three-digit statistical code classifies the synoptic situation in several columns.

The first digit stands for Matthew, the second for Mark, the third for Luke."

(...)

"The term “triple tradition” refers to all verses of the Gospel of Mark as well as to those verses of the Gospels of Matthew and Luke that have a parallel in Mark.

If the Synoptic Concordance speaks of the “triple tradition”, there is always a Markan verse at issue. In the statistical code the second digit is either “1” or “2”. On the two-document hypothesis one can speak of the Markan tradition.

The term “double tradition” refers to all verses of the Gospel of Matthew with a parallel in Luke, but not in Mark, and to all verses of the Gospel of Luke with a parallel in Matthew, but not in Mark.

If the Synoptic Concordance speaks of the “double tradition”, a Markan verse is not at issue. In the statistical code the second digit is “0”. On the two-document hypothesis one can speak of the Q tradition.

The term “Sondergut” refers to all verses in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke that have no parallels in the other two Synoptic Gospels." (p. 8)

  German title: *Synopse der drei ersten Evangelien, mit Beigabe der johannischen Parallelstellen*. 


"Since Griesbach’s time, it is safe to say that every study of the synoptic problem has relied on the tool of the synopsis. The modern three- or four-gospel synopsis in a complex tool, displaying not only the texts of the gospels for comparison, but often including an *apparatus criticus* with text-critical data, and other apparatus with indications of citations of or allusions to the Hebrew Bible (rarely an actual display of the text in Hebrew and Greek), parallel texts drawn from the Pauline epistles, patristic writers, and extracanonical gospels (rarely, however, displayed in parallel with the synoptic texts), section titles, and a *conspectus locorum*.

Not all of these features of the synopsis are oriented to the same task: some assist in the close verbal comparison of the texts of the Synoptics; others facilitate seeing the role of harmonization in the textual tradition of the gospels; others allow the user to see the variations in gospel texts as they are variously performed in the Synoptics, patristic writers and extracanonical gospels; and still other features are designed to display the varying degrees of indebtedness that gospel texts have to the Hebrew Bible.(8)

The modern synopsis, then, has multiple functions, with the inevitable result that not all synopses are equally suited to every task.(9) My interest in this paper is not to offer a general survey of synopses and to comment on their advantages and disadvantages for a variety of
critical operations, but instead to focus on the issue, raised by Bernard Orchard, David Dungan, and others, as to whether synopses are in principle ‘neutral’ in regard to synoptic source theories." (p. 53, a note omitted)


(9) See the survey by J.K. Elliott (*Which is the Best Synopsis?*, in Expository Times 102 [1991] 200-204) who agrees that the choice of synopsis depends on one’s purpose, but nonetheless suggests that, if pressed to recommend one synopsis, he would recommend Huck-Greeven.

Abstract: "Zeba Crook’s Parallel Gospels, mainly for use by undergraduates and students who lack Greek, takes the genre of the Gospel synopsis in innovative and helpful directions. Crook’s addition of texts of the “Sayings Gospel Q” and the Gospel of Thomas enhance the utility of his synopsis; Crook’s innovative and controversial English translation is designed to maximize the user’s ability to see small differences and critical similarities; and his display and alignment of parallels lets the user see what other many synopses obscure."

"The Complete Gospels offers its readers several distinctive features.

First, it is the premier publication of the Scholars Version translation of the gospels, and represents the efforts of a group of independent scholars to capture the meaning of the original documents in living American English and in a text that is entirely free of ecclesiastical control.

The Complete Gospels is also the first publication to include both the canonical gospels and their principal
extracanonical counterparts under one cover. Within this anthology can be found:

- the lost *Q Gospel*, in a reconstructed text that is the fruit of years of critical scholarly work. The Q Gospel is a crucial literary source for the Gospels of Matthew and Luke.

- the first publication for the general reader of the *Signs Gospel*, which many believe underlies the canonical *Gospel of John*, and is thus older than the Fourth Gospel.

- the first publication for the general reader of the fragmentary *Gospel of the Savior*, which was discovered in the 1990s, as well as the *Gospel of Judas*, which came to light in 2006.

- the first publication of the miscellaneous collection we call “Orphan Sayings and Stories”—anecdotes and sayings that never found a firm place in the manuscript tradition of any particular gospel, but which nevertheless survived as notes in one or more manuscripts." (p. 3)

Treatments of the harmonized gospel tradition usually follow one of two paths. Either they focus on only Tatian and his Dialessaron, or they deal with only a single pericope or witness.

Both of these norms will be transgressed in this study, for it seeks to offer an overview - a tour d’horizon, if you will - of a literary genre: gospel harmonies.

Tatian will, of course, loom large in this scheme, but our survey will not be limited to him and his Diatessaron. Rather, we will take bird’s eye view of gospel harmonies, commencing with their pre-Tatianic origins in the writings of Justin Martyr (who died sometime between 163 and 167 CE), and continuing down through the late Middle Ages. We will conclude with the Chemnitz-Leyser-Gerhard harmony, published in 1652. Compiled by three generations of Germans, this harmony was not, however, the only one circulating in the seventeenth century, for at the same time the library of the English diarist Samuel Pepys (1633-1703) contained a Middle English manuscript (now in the library of Magdalene College, Cambridge, catalogued as MS Pepys 2698, and known to scholarship as the ‘Pepysian Harmony’) which is today...
recognized as the sole surviving witness in English to Tatian’s Diatessaron(1)." (p. 71)


"The purpose of this edition of the Synoptic Gospels is to provide an objective tool for New Testament study and research that has hitherto not been available." (p. IX) (...)

"It is intended that this new *Gospel Synopsis* should give an insight into the subtle and complex nature of the variation between early New Testament manuscripts. It becomes readily apparent that the type of variation found among the three Synoptic Gospels, which is something of a minefield in itself (or ‘a maze’ to take up Goodacre’s term), also exists among the manuscripts. This fact compounds, of course, the difficulty for synoptic studies. But to adopt the easy solution of disregarding the complexity is to work with an illusion and to risk producing misleading results.

In the first instance, the *Gospel Synopsis* serves directly as a means to compare Codex Bezae with Codex Vaticanus, and to establish the nature of their relationship as well as their distinctive features. This is potentially of great importance for textual studies for, apart from the insight given into the two manuscripts, it will allow more precise notions of editorial and scribal activity, in particular with regard to harmonisation, to be formulated.

The value for synoptic studies, on the other hand, is that it offers a tool for examining with a higher degree of accuracy than has been possible with the current Greek editions the interrelatedness of the Gospel texts. By shining light on the amount and the nature of textual variation that existed in the early centuries, it disturbs the false sense of security often present in synoptic studies
and reveals how the issues of the order of the Gospel writings, the relationships among them and their connection with other traditions and sources are even more intricate than is usually envisaged. In setting out the three Gospels in turn, the aim has been to facilitate the study of the different forms and the connections between them.

Of particular value for synoptists is that the entire text of the manuscripts in continuous form is made available, so enabling a complete reading of any given passage of each of the Gospels, where the significance of variant readings is enhanced as they are seen working together within their context." (p. XVII)


"When Otto Schmoller produced his "Ταμιεύον τῆς καινῆς διαθήκης εγχειριδιον oder, Handkoncordanz zum griechischen Neuen Testament" in 1869, it filled a real need in the market. The fact that his work has been reprinted up to the present demonstrates that the need for a pocket concordance continues unabated. But since 1938, when Alfred Schmoller adapted his father's work in the seventh edition to the 15th/16th edition of Erwin Nestle's *Novum Testamentum Graece*, "Schmoller" has not been compared with modern editions. In view of the progress made in New Testament textual criticism this situation requires urgent attention.

The German Bible Society resolved therefore to adapt "Schmoller" to the text of Nestle-Aland²⁶ and GNT³. The Greek vocabulary presented no problem, but the notes on the vocabulary of the Septuagint and the Latin Vulgate
which Alfred Schmoller had added in the seventh edition of the concordance raised a question. Would it be worth the expense of correcting this supplemental information against modern critical editions, especially when despite their acknowledged significance they are no substitute for the use of Septuagint and Vulgate concordances?

In view of the fact that today’s reader is primarily if not exclusively concerned with the Greek text, it was decided to adapt only the Greek text and to let the notes on the Septuagint and Vulgate texts remain unchanged. This would require a resetting of only the lines requiring changes in the Greek text. The data for the text of the Septuagint and the Vulgate, therefore, do not reflect the state of modern critical editions, although the notes on the text of the Vulgate in particular continue to serve as a valuable resource for persons interested in the history of the Latin text of the Bible." (From the Introduction)

Bibliographies on Biblical Studies

Questions of Biblical Criticism

- Hebrew Bible Textual Criticism
- History of the Hebrew Bible Critical Research
- New Testament Textual Criticism
- History of New Testament Critical Research

Hebrew Bible

(Under construction)

New Testament

The Synoptic Gospels

The Synoptic Problem
The Synoptic Problem

The Gospel of Matthew
The Gospel of Mark
The Gospel of Luke

The Pauline Epistles

1 Thessalonians, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, Philippians, Philemon, Galatians, Romans

Early Developments of Christianity

The Acts of the Apostles

Deutero-Pauline Epistles

2 Thessalonians, Colossians, Ephesians

Pastoral Epistles

1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus
The Epistle to the Hebrews
The Catholic Epistles: James, 1 Peter, 2 Peter, Judas

The Johannine Literature

The Gospel of John
The Epistles: 1, 2, 3 John

The Christian Apocalyptic

The Book of Revelation
The Canon of the New Testament

The Formation of the Canon
The New Testament Apocrypha
on the Apocryphal Literature
General Studies on the Apocryphal Literature

New Testament Apocrypha

Apocryphal Gospels
Apocryphal Acts
Apocryphal Letters
Apocryphal Apocalypses
Bibliography on the Literature of Early Christianity (I-II centuries)

Apostolic Fathers

Clement of Rome (fl. c. 95)
Ignatius of Antioch (fl. c. 100-115)
Polycarp of Smyrna (69-155)
Didache (100-150)
The Epistle of Barnabas (130-131)
Papias of Hierapolis (c. 60-130)
Quadratus of Athens (d. 129)
Papias of Hierapolis (c. 60-130)
Epistle to Diognetus (130? - late 2nd century?)
The Shepherd of Hermas (90-150)
Justin Martyr (c. 100-165)
Aristide of Athens, Apology (c. 120-138)
Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215)
Tertullian (155-c. 220)
Melito of Sardis (d. 180)
Irenaeus (early 2nd century – died c. 202)
Athenagoras of Athens (c. 133-c.190)
Theophilus of Antioch (d. 183-185)
Hippolitus of Rome (170-235)
The Bauer Thesis: The Origins of Orthodoxy and Heresy

Dissent in the First Century

Simon Magus
Ebionism
Nicolaism

Heresies of the Second Century
Christian Gnosticism
Sethianism
Marcionism
Montanism
Ebionites
Nazarenes
Elchasaites
Bibliography on the Religious Literature of the Early Judaism

(Under construction)
Bibliography on the Philosophy and Phenomenology of Religion

Fundamental Questions

The Definition of 'Religion'

The Sacred

Monotheism and Polytheism

History of the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God
General Introduction

General Works on the History of the Ontological Argument

The Medieval Period from Anselm of Canterbury to Duns Scotus

The Modern Period from Suárez to Frege

The Contemporary Period from Barth to the Present Time

A Selection of Primary Texts
"Philosophers who address the questions of what it is for an individual to exist, or what it is for an individual to be actual, often do so with reference to the fallacy they have uncovered in the classical Ontological Argument for God's existence. Indeed, the Ontological Argument is useful as a vehicle by which this and other issues in ontology and the philosophy of logic may be introduced and sharpened."


"Higher-type classical logic is intensional logic with the intensional features removed, so this is a good place to start. Ontological arguments, Gödel's in particular, are natural examples of intensional logic at work, so this is a good place to finish." (page XI)

"There are many directions from which people have tried to prove the existence of God. There have been arguments based on design: a complex universe must have a designer. There have been attempts to show that the existence of an ethical sense implies the existence of God. There have been arguments based on causality: trace chain of effect and cause backward
and one must reach a fist cause. Ontological arguments seek to establish the existence of God based on pure logic: the principles of reasoning require that God be part of ones ontology." (p. 133)


"Of all the arguments for the existence of God, the one which Anselm first formulated is the most refined and the least capable of a finally satisfactory statement. It draws its strength from an ambiguity, which appears to be an ambiguity in language, but is more deeply an ambiguity in human experience. If God exists, there must be a level of experience at which it is impossible to think of God as not existing. But at what level can this impossibility be made to appear? Must the demonstration await the experience of the Beatific Vision? Or can it, at the very opposite extreme, be made out at the level of linguistic-logical analysis? Whether valid or not, the first three chapters of the *Proslogion* were the first piece of writing in which this problem was raised and a solution proposed which will probably never be finally buried. It may be agreed that Descartes put it better, because more simply and with fewer philosophical presuppositions. He had the advantage, which Anselm lacked, of inheriting, if only to reject, a long philosophical tradition. The Augustinian and grammatical background of Anselm's thought, which made it possible for him to formulate the argument, also burdened it with limitations. But these pages of Anselm must be placed among the most deeply interesting pieces of reasoning ever written. The early chapters of the *Proslogion*, in which the argument was first expressed, will never be read without excitement, nor thought about without appearing to be more cogent than they are. For the most extraordinary thing about the argument is that it loses nothing of its power, its freshness, or even in a curious way its persuasiveness, by being refuted. The *Proslogion* may not set forth a valid argument for belief in God, and even if it were valid it is doubtful whether it would ever persuade an unbeliever; but in its subtlety, and in a
certain unsubstantial, ethereal quality which antagonizes men of robust common sense, it perfectly reflects the quality and mystery of Anselm's personality." (pp. 74-75).


"The ontological argument for the existence of God has fascinated philosophers ever since it was formulated by St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109). It is doubtful, I think, that any person was ever brought to a belief in God by this argument, and unlikely that it has played the sort of role in strengthening and confirming religious belief that, for example, the teleological argument has played. To the unsophisticated, Anselm's argument is (at first sight at least) remarkably unconvincing, if not downright irritating, it smacks too much of word magic. And yet almost every major philosopher from the time of Anselm to the present has had his say about it; the last few years have seen a remarkable flurry of interest in it. What accounts for this fascination? Not, I think, the religious significance of the argument, although no doubt that can be underrated. The cause is perhaps twofold. First, the ontological argument offers an enormous return on a pretty slim investment - a definition, and a perplexing but not altogether implausible premise connecting existence and 'greatness,' yield the theistic conclusion. Second, although the argument certainly looks at first sight as if it ought to be unsound, it is profoundly difficult to say what exactly is wrong with it. Indeed, it is doubtful that any philosopher has given a really convincing and thorough refutation of the ontological argument. Too often philosophers merely remark that Kant refuted the argument by showing that existence is not a predicate and that 'one cannot build bridges from the conceptual realm to the real world.' But it is very doubtful that Kant specified a sense of 'is a predicate' such that, in that sense, it is clear both that existence is not a predicate and that Anselm's argument requires that it be one. Nor are the mere
claims that no existential propositions are necessary or the above comment about bridge building impressive as refutations of Anselm - after all, he claims to have an argument for the necessity of at least one existential proposition. So one must either show just where his argument goes wrong, or else produce a solid argument for the claim that no existential (in the appropriate sense) propositions can be necessary-and this, I think, no one has succeeded in doing."


"PROSLOGION 2-4 consists of four pages. Barth's book about them ["Fides Quaerens Intellectum" (1931)] has 165 pages. All the books and essays written about them in the last eight hundred years would fill libraries. It is a legitimate question to ask, What is it, in these four pages, that makes them so potent a challenge to the best minds of humanity? What is the spell they cast over the reader so that occupation with them becomes a passionate enterprise? These pages do not seem to have the completeness and remoteness of a classic; rather, they seem to call on the reader personally to do something about them. They arouse in him an intellectual passion -- either for or against them -- which makes him feel that the core of his own thinking is being touched. On the one hand, they seem so concise that nothing can be added, on the other, so loose that everything still has to be done. But what? The reader feels puzzled, teased, imposed upon. He feels called to take a personal part in a herculean intellectual struggle.

The reason for this spell -- which was already felt in Anselm's life time -- cannot be solely Anselm's subject matter, for this has treated by many before and after with less than intriguing effects. It must be, to a large degree, his method. But what can there be so exciting about a logical demonstration?"
"No logician wishes to deny that in ordinary speech sentences such as 'tame tigers exist' can be used with perfect propriety. Some of them may be false, but it is not for the logician to determine which are and which are not. If, however, we assume that grammatical form is a sure guide to logical structure, we may be tempted to say that in these sentences the word 'existence' stands for a predicate, where 'predicate' has a logical sense distinct from its grammatical sense. That some philosophers have taken the word 'existence' to stand for a predicate in the logical sense, i.e., for an attribute, may be seen from their use of the ontological argument to prove the existence of God.

Descartes' exposition of the argument is clearer than most others. He starts from the position, supposed to be already established, that we can know some propositions, e.g., simple theorems of mathematics, to be necessarily true. It does not matter for our purposes whether he thinks that his necessary propositions are analytic or synthetic, although we may remark in passing that the language in which he refers to them suggests that they are analytic. He wishes to say that the proposition that God exists can be proved in the same way as that in which a necessary proposition of mathematics is proved.(...) [His] argument is based on the assumption that 'God exists' is a proposition of the same sort as a theorem of geometry. Descartes writes as though both propositions predicated something of a subject, the one being about 'God,' the other about 'the triangle.' If he did not assume this, he would not say that they can be proved in the same fashion. Gassendi was the first, I think, to criticize the argument on the ground that existence is not a property of God or of anything else. (...) No doubt Descartes and those who agree with him would say, if questioned, that they wished to make a distinction between existence and qualities such as redness. But refinements of the theory of existence as a predicate only introduce fresh difficulties. The theory is unacceptable."
"It is much harder than one might first suspect to see what is wrong - if anything - with the ontological argument, in some of its variants at least. By way of criticism, it is often said that the argument fails because 'existence is not a predicate'. However, there are senses - and what is more, senses other than the purely grammatical one - in which existence clearly is a predicate. It is sometimes said that existence is not the kind of property that can be included in the essence of anything; but the reasons for saying so are far from clear, and the notion of essence is a notorious mess in the best of circumstances. One might suspect that something goes wrong with the logic of definite descriptions in the modal contexts involved in the argument; but I shall try to reconstruct some of the most important aspects of the ontological argument in terms having little to do with ordinary modalities and nothing whatsoever with definite descriptions. In fact, the independence of the essential features of the ontological argument from the theory of definite descriptions ought to be clear enough without much detailed argument. If what we are trying to do is to establish that there exists a unique being 'than which nothing greater can be conceived' - in short, a unique supremely perfect Being - surely the great difficulty is to show that there exists at least one such being, whereas we can face the problem of uniqueness with relative calm.

Furthermore, it has been complained that the notion 'being greater than anything else that can be conceived of' and the notion of supreme perfection are unclear. More than that, it is sometimes suggested that they are systematically ambiguous - that they make no sense until it has been specified in what respect greatness or perfection is to be measured. Certainly, greater evil or more perfect vice cannot be what is meant - but
even if there be no such things as these, what precisely is meant? Yet a straightforward answer to this question is forthcoming. What is at stake is surely greatness or perfection with respect to existence. It does not take a neo-Platonist to agree that the greatest or most supreme being intended in the argument is certainly one whose powers of existing are maximal or whose mode of being is, as existence qua existence goes, supremely perfect."


"Modal reasoning can be replaced by non-modal, ordinary reasoning about possible things. Given an obscure modal argument, we can translate it into a non-modal argument - or into several non-modal arguments, if the given argument was ambiguous. Once we have a nonmodal argument, we have clear standards of validity; and once we have non-modal translations of the premises, we can understand them well enough to judge whether they are credible. Foremost among our modal headaches is Anselm's ontological argument. How does it fare under the translation treatment I have prescribed? It turns out to have two principal non-modal translations. One is valid; the other has credible premises; the difference between the two is subtle. No wonder the argument has never been decisively refuted; no wonder it has never convinced the infidel. (pp. 10-11).

CONCLUSION. Of the alternative non-modal translations of our ontological argument, the best are the arguments from 3A and 3B. The premises of the argument from 3B enjoy some credibility, but the argument is invalid. The argument from 3A is valid, but 3A derives its credibility entirely from the illusion that because our world alone is actual, therefore our world is radically different from all other worlds - special in a way that makes it a fitting place of greatest greatness. But once we recognize the indexical
nature of actuality, the illusion is broken and the credibility of 3A evaporates. It is true of any world, at that world but not elsewhere, that that world alone is actual. The world an ontological arguer calls actual is special only in that the ontological arguer resides there - and it is no great distinction for a world to harbor an ontological arguer. Think of an ontological arguer in some dismally mediocre world - there are such ontological arguers - arguing that his world alone is actual, hence special, hence a fitting place of greatest greatness, hence a world wherein something exists than which no greater can be conceived to exist. He is wrong to argue thus. So are we." (p. 20)


"In the preface to his Proslogion Anselm audaciously claims discovery of 'a single formula which needs no other to prove itself but itself alone, and which by itself suffices to establish that God truly is, and that he is the greatest good needing no other, and that which everything needs if it is to be and be well, and whatever else we believe about divine being' (93.6-10). Anselm published his argument in 1077 or 1078. The dispute immediately kindled was bright but brief; and after Anselm's death his argument lay fallow for some hundred years. Then, in the thirteenth century, it was widely debated, and widely accepted, (...) until it received the authoritative disapproval of St Thomas Aquinas.

In the Seventeenth century Descartes discovered and vigorously defended an argument for the existence of God which was plainly similar to and allegedly identical with Anselm's argument. Controversy over the Cartesian argument culminated with Kant; in a section 'On the Impossibility of an Ontological Argument for the Existence of God' in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant performed for Descartes the service Aquinas had rendered Anselm. Incidentally he gave the
argument a title, imposing, universally adopted, and wholly opaque.
After Kant's assault the argument again languished - for the Hegelian claim to have revived it is specious (...). In recent years, however, philosophers and theologians have again looked with favour, or at least attention, on the Ontological Argument. In this renaissance of interest a new version of the argument has been brought to birth; Norman Malcolm and Charles Hartshorne, its independent obstetricians, both maintain that the new version, unlike the old, does provide a proof of the existence of God."


"This argument has excited enormous controversy. Nearly every great philosopher from Anselm's time to ours had his say about it: Aquinas rejected it, John Duns Scotus 'coloured' (modified) it a bit and accepted it. René Descartes and Nicolas Malebranche accepted it; Leibniz accepted a version of it; Kant rejected it (and delivered what many have thought the final quietus to it); Arthur Schopenhauer thought it at best a charming joke; and many contemporary philosophers seem to think it as a joke all right, but at all a charming joke."


"Gödel showed his *1970 [Ontological Proof] to Dana Scott, and discussed it with him, in February 1970. Gödel was very concerned about his health at that time, feared that his death was near, and evidently wished to insure that this proof would not perish with him. Later in 1970, however, he apparently told Oskar Morgenstern that though he was 'satisfied' with the proof, he hesitated to publish it, for fear it would be thought "that he actually believes in God, whereas he is only engaged in a logical
investigation (that is, in showing that such a proof with classical assumptions [completeness, etc.], correspondingly axiomatized, is possible)." Scott made notes on the proof and presented a version of the argument to his seminar on logical entailment at Princeton University in the fall of 1970. Through this presentation and the recollections and notes of those who attended the seminar, Gödel's ontological proof has become fairly widely known. Discussion of the proof, thus far, has been based largely on Scott's version of it (Dana Scott 'Gödel's ontological proof' in: Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.) 'On being and saying: essays for Richard Cartwright' - Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press 1987), which differs somewhat in form from Gödel's own memorandum. The latter is published here - though not for the first time; like Scott's version, it was published as an appendix to John Howard Sobel 'Gödel's ontological proof' in: J. J. Thomson cit. pages 256-7.

Gödel had devised his ontological proof some time before 1970. Other, presumably earlier, versions of it have been found among his papers. A sheet of paper headed "Ontological Proof" (in German), and dated, in Gödel's own hand, 'ca. 1941', contains some but not all of the ideas of the proof. Extensive preparatory material is contained in the philosophical notebook 'Phil XIV'. The first page of this notebook bears a notation indicating that it was written during the period 'Ca. July 1946-May 1955". The last page of the notebook contains the note 'Asbury Park 1954 p. 100 ff.', which presumably applies to the pages (103-109) pertaining to the ontological proof. Other documents, including letters, indicate that Gödel intended to leave Princeton for the shore 9 August 1954, was vacationing in Asbury Park on 25 August 1954, and was probably back in Princeton by 3 October 1954. We may reasonably assume, then, that the notebook pages on the ontological proof were written in the late summer and early fall of 1954 and were completed at any rate by May 1955. Relevant excerpts from the notebook, and two of the (presumably earlier) loose sheets headed 'Ontological Proof', including the

"1. SOME HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS.
As far as I know, there has been no exhaustive historical study of ontological arguments, even for relatively narrow historical periods. In particular, I found the pre-Cartesian discussion of ontological arguments very hard to investigate. An accessible book of translations, commentary, and analysis would be very useful.

1.1 HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS.
Gilson (1955) [History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages] contains much information about the status of ontological arguments - versions of the arguments of St. Anselm - in the Middle Ages. Unfortunately, there is no subject index to this book, so the information is not easily accessed. As we have seen, Thomists rejected ontological arguments; but other philosophers of a more rationalistic bent - for example, Scotists - accepted them. Consequently, there were lively debates about ontological arguments during the golden age of Scholasticism. However, the victory of Occamist nominalism seems to have led to a widespread rejection of those arguments by the end of the fourteenth century. Among those who discussed St. Anselm’s argument, there are the following:

That no historical study of ontological arguments exists, is not exact (see the bibliography at the bottom of this page).

**HISTORICAL STUDIES**

In French: Chatillon (1959).
In Spanish: Ceñal (1970).
Daniels (1909) contains "an invaluable collection of medieval Latin texts referring to the Argument, with a penetrating analysis of them as indications that the author accepted or rejected Anselm's Proof, and a careful discussion of the philosophical beliefs which determined this acceptance or rejection" Hartshorne (1965) p. 306.

"The reception of the Argument in the Twelfth and thirteenth centuries was almost as odd as what happened in its inventor's own lifetime or in the modern period. (In this section I am heavily indebted - and deeply grateful - to P. A. Daniels 1909). In the twelfth century the Proof was simply ignored, so far as our records go. Three conclusions have been drawn from this: all accepted the Proof, all rejected it, they were unacquainted with it. Daniels shows
that the last is the most reasonable. In the next three centuries things were dramatically different. Fifteen authors refer to the Proof, of whom the following ten accept it: William of Auxerre, Richard Fishacre, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, Matthew of Aquasparta, Johannes Peckham, Nicolaus of Cusa, [this is a lapsus: Daniels (1909) speaks of Nicolaus Occam] Aegidius of Rome, William of Ware, and Duns Scotus. Of these at least four, Alexander, Bonaventura, Nicolaus, and Scotus seem to have some appreciation of Proslogion III and of the true Anselmian Principle; the rest seem to be thinking largely or exclusively of Proslogion II. Albertus Magnus, Peter of Tarentaise, and Henry of Ghent take no position on the Proof; of these, only the first seems to have read past Proslogion II. St. Thomas and his disciple Richard of Middleton reject the Proof; Richard cites only Proslogion II, while Thomas refers (in five different writings) sometimes to this and sometimes to the following chapter; however, where he is explicitly rejecting the Proof (in the two Summas) he mentions only Proslogion II; and where he does mention the other chapter he, in my opinion, misconceives the relationship of the two.

We have then fifteen medieval judges, of whom at most five show that they have the Principle clearly and centrally in mind; one or two others exhibit some conception of it, and the rest, little or none. Of the five having the Principle (as Anselm did) clearly and centrally in mind, four accept the Proof, and the fifth takes no stand. Of the other ten, those who seem not to grasp the centrality of Proslogion III, six accept, two reject, and two give no verdict. Thus even where the Proof was taken at its weakest, still six found it convincing and but two rejected it; and where it was taken at its strongest, four out of five accepted and none rejected it. This seems to show the power of the Proof even when incompletely grasped, and its much greater power when fully grasped. It also shows the blighting influence of Gaunilo’s inability to read beyond Chapter II. Unfortunately, the example of Thomas has in the end outweighed in prestige all the others put together.
Bonaventura's cogent rebuttal of Gaunilo's 'island' analogy has been passed over as though it had never happened, while the objections of Thomas have been treasured."


**A SELECTION OF PRIMARY AUTHORS, WITH ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHIES**

*Legenda:* P = Pro (accept the proof); C = Contra (rejected the proof); I = indifferent (take no position on the proof); ca. = circa; fl = flourished; d. died.

References are to the most important works where ontological argument is discussed.

**The Medieval Period from Anselm to Scotus**

- P Anselm of Canterbury [Anselmus Cantuariensis, Doctor Angelicus]
- C Gaunilo of Marmoutiers [Gaunilo, monachus]
- P William of Auxerre [Guillelmi Altissiodorensis]
- P Alexander of Hales [Alexander Halensis, Doctor Irrefragabilis]
- P Richard Fishacre [Richardus Flamesburensis]
- C Richard Rufus of Cornwall [Richaruds Rufus Cornubiensis]
P Bonaventure of Bagnorea [Bonaventurae, Johannes Fidanza, Doctor Seraphicus]

I Albert the Great [Albertus Magnus, Doctor Universalis]

C Thomas Aquinas [Thomae Aquinatis, Doctor Angelicus]

I Peter of Tarentaise [Petrus a Tarentasia, Pope Innocent V]

P John Peckham [Johannis Packham, Doctor Ingeniosus]

I Henry of Ghent [Henrici de Gandavo, Doctor Solemnis]

P Nicolaus of Ockham [Nicolaus de Ockham]

P Matthew of Aquasparta [Matthaei ab Aquasparta]

P Giles of Rome [Aegidius Romanus, Egidio Colonna]

C Richard of Middletown [Richardus of Mediavilla]

P William of Ware [Gulielmi Guarae]

P John Duns Scotus [Johannes Duns Scotus, Doctor Subtilis]

**The Modern Era from Suárez to Frege**

P Francisco Suárez

P René Descartes

C Pierre Gassendi

P Henry More

P Ralph Cudworth

P Baruch Spinoza
P Nicolas Malebranche
P Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
P François Fénelon
P Samuel Clarke
P Christian Wolff
C David Hume
P Alexander Baumgarten
C Immanuel Kant
P Moses Mendelssohn
P Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
P Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling
C Ludwig Feuerbach
P Robert Flint
P Franz Brentano
C Gottlob Frege

The Contemporary Debate

P Heinrich Scholz
P Karl Barth
P Robin George Collingwood
P Charles Hartshorne
C John Niemeyer Findlay
P Kurt Gödel
P Norman Malcolm
P Jan Berg
C John Howard Sobel
P Alvin Plantinga
C David Kellogg Lewis
P Robert Maydole
C Graham Oppy
P Alexander Pruss
Selected Bibliography on the History of the Ontological Argument. General Works

General Histories of the Ontological Argument

  
  See Chapter III. *The Ontological Argument* pp. 107-170.


  Contents: Preface 9; List of Abbreviations 11; Introduction: an episode in the history of an argument 15; Chapter One: Proof and perception: the contest of the *Argumentum Cartesianum* 41; Chapter Two: Refutations of atheism: ontological arguments in English philosophy, 1652-1705 79; Chapter Three: Being and intuition: Malebranche's appropriation of the Argument 101; Chapter Four: An adequate conception: the argument in Spinoza's philosophy 121; Chapter Five: Ontological Arguments in Leibniz and the German Enlightenment 141; Chapter Six: Kant's systematic critique of the Ontological Argument 167; Chapter Seven: Hegel's reconstruction of the Argument 197; Glossary of terms,
arguments, and positions 231; Bibliography 235; Index 249-253.

"This book provides a philosophical analysis of the several debates concerning the "ontological argument" from the middle of the seventeenth to the beginning of nineteenth century. My aim in writing it was twofold. First, I wished to provide a detailed and comprehensive account of the history of these debates, which I perceived to be lacking in the scholarly literature. Second, I wanted also to pursue a more philosophically interesting question concerning the apparent unassailability of ontological arguments. In pursuit of this latter problem, the driving question that my account addresses is "why has this argument, or kind of argument, been such a constant in otherwise diverse philosophical contexts and periods?"

As familiar as the ontological argument is, there have been no book-length studies in English about the historical development of the arguments of Anselm, Descartes, etc. A vast collection of articles and chapter-length treatments of the history of these arguments does exist, however; and in composing this work I have benefited from the labors of numerous scholars. Particularly helpful was the work of Bernardino Bonansea, Charles Hartshorne, Asnat Avshalom, and Oded Balabon. Even more influential were the many monograph-length studies that have long appeared in other Western languages, especially in German and French. In conducting the necessary research I accrued an enormous debt to the authors of these texts. I thus owe my sincere gratitude to Wolfgang Röd, Louis Girard, and Jan Rohls. My greatest debt in this regard, however, is to Dieter Henrich. My work is little more than an extended argument with him." (From the Preface)


Contents: Preface; Introduction: Arguments, texts and contexts; Anselm and tradition; Encountering God within: Anselm's argument among the early Franciscans in Paris; Other ways to God: Anselm, the early Dominicans and the friars in Oxford; Bonaventure and the Franciscan community; Thomas Aquinas and the Dominican community; Contested traditions; Conclusion; Bibliography; Index.

"This book examines key questions about the relationship of rationality to its contexts by tracing the early history of the so-called 'ontological' argument. The book follows Anselm's *Proslogion* from its origins in the private, devotional context of an eleventh-century monastery to its reception in the public and adversarial contexts of the friars' schools in the thirteenth century. Using unpublished manuscript evidence from the Dominican and Franciscan schools at Oxford, Paris and Bologna in the thirteenth century, Matthews argues that the debate over Anselm's argument embodied the broader religious differences between the Franciscan and Dominican communities. By comparing the most famous figures of the period with their lesser-known contemporaries, Matthews argues that the Friars thought as communities and developed as traditions as they developed their arguments."


Inhaltsverzeichins. A. Texte.
I. Anselm von Canterbury 3; II. Richard Fishacre 21; III. Wilhelm von Auxerre 25; IV. Alexander von Hales 28; V. Albert der Grosse 36; VI. Bonaventura 38; VII. Johannes Peckham 41; VIII. Matthaeus von Aquasparta 51; IX. Thomas von Aquino 64; X. Peter of Tarentaise 68; XI. Ägidius von Rom 72; XII. Heinrich von Gent 79; XIII. Nicolaus Occam 82; XIV. Richard von Middleton 84; XV. Wilhelm von Ware 89; XVI. Johannes Duns Scotus 105; B. Untersuchungen.
I. Vorfragen.
1. Die Bedeutung des Schweigens gewisser Scholastiker mit Bezug auf Anselms Argument 111; 2. Der scholastische Lehrbetrieb und das gegenwärtige Problem 115;
II. Das Ergebnis der Texte.
III. Die Voraussetzungen, welche für die Annahme von Anselms Argument in Frage kommen 131.
1. Die angeborene Gottesidee bei S. Bonaventura und seiner Schule 132; 2. Das primum cognitum bei den Anhängern des Gottesbeweises des Proslogion 143; 3. Der Satz "non ens non potest esse objectum intellectus" in seiner Beziehung zum Gottesbeweis des Proslogion 154; Anhang.

  Traduzione italiana di Sonia Carboncini: La prova ontologica dell'esistenza di Dio. La sua problematica e la sua storia nell'età moderna, Napoli, Prisma, 1983.
GENERAL AND INTRODUCTORY STUDIES ON THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

  Contents: General Editor's Preface VII; Author's Preface VIII; 1. The Arguments 1; 2. Necessary Existence 29; 3. Existence and Predication 39; 4. 'God' 67; Appendix A: Chronology of Anselm's Life 87; Appendix B: Anselm's *Reductio* 88; References 91-98.

"The Ontological Argument has been debated for eight centuries, and never more energetically than in the last decade. The present essay is less concerned to break new ground than to harrow land already ploughed. Thus Chapter 1 expounds, perhaps rather more particularly than is customary, some of the chief versions of the Ontological Argument; while Chapters 2-3 attempt to appraise and then to outflank the two main manoeuvres which opponents of the Argument have essayed. Finally, Chapter 4 outlines and advocates a more elementary plan of attack.

My goal has been to state, as plainly as I can, what the Ontological Argument is, and what is and is not most wrong with it. But I have tried to keep in mind a secondary objective, and to provide some intimation of a few of the wider philosophical issues which the Argument
raises. For even those philosophers who are sceptical of
the merits of the Argument itself must allow that it has
inspired and stimulated some considerable work in
philosophical logic, and that it still offers a pointed
introduction to a number of peculiarly recalcitrant
problems.
The literature on the Ontological Argument is of daunting
magnitude, and it swells almost daily: I am acutely
conscious of broad lacunae in my reading, especially of
the more theologically inclined matter. Nevertheless, my
debts to the published thoughts of others are frequent
and heavy; I have tried to acknowledge the most
important in the text." (P. VIII)

- Bastit, Michel. 2016. Le principe du monde. Le Dieu du
Table des matières : Introduction : À la recherche du
principe 7; Chapitre 1: Des traditions religieuses à la
philosophie 13; Chapitre 2: Persuasion et démonstration
29; Chapitre 3: De la pensée à la pensée ou de la pensée à
l'existence ? 47; Chapitre 4: Commencement et fin 63;
Chapitre 5: Le concert des sciences 85; Chapitre 6: Survie
des substances dans l'espace-temps 107; Chapitre 7: Les
mouvements des corps mobiles 135; Chapitre 8: Le temps
des mouvements 147; Chapitre 9: Limites et unicité du
monde 157; Chapitre 10: Les causes 171; Chapitre 11: La
Cause Première 199; Chapitre 12: Éléments principaux de
théologie naturelle 217; Conclusion 237; Bibliographie
243-258.
"Cet ouvrage est un livre de philosophie première, et
particulièrement de théologie naturelle. Il a pour objet
l'établissement de l'existence d'un principe premier de la
réalité qui pourra peut-être par la suite être identifié avec
Dieu, puis l'exploration de quelques-uns des attributs de
cet principe. Sa démarche ne relève pas de croyances
religieuses, mais de la pure rationalité philosophique. Il
relève de la métaphysique en sa partie ultime, mais d'une
métaphysique appuyée sur une physique. Il pourra
arriver au cours de la réflexion de croiser des problèmes
et des thèmes qui relèvent aussi des croyances religieuses. Ces points de contact, à l’exception de l’étude de la portée philosophique des croyances religieuses qui forme une partie importante du chapitre premier, seront signalés, mais ils doivent être considérés comme accidentels par rapport à la démarche et seront donc traités marginalement." (p. 7)

"La recherche scientifique d’un principe n’est pas exclusive de l’adhésion de foi à ce principe. Inversement la foi peut susciter le désir de démontrer ce que l’on croit ou une partie de ce que l’on croit. C’est une attitude de ce genre qui est à l’origine de la démonstration dite par la preuve ontologique due à Anselme de Cantorbéry et à un grand nombre de ses successeurs, comme aujourd’hui par exemple Plantinga. Le mérite de ces démarches est sans aucun doute leur recherche de scientificité et rigueur attestée d’ailleurs par un certain nombre de formalisations possibles, toujours chez Plantinga qui fait appel au système modal S₅, ou chez Gödel qui a été préoccupé par une élaboration rigoureuse de la preuve pendant une longue partie de sa carrière.

Il est probable que l’idée de la preuve ontologique procède en partie de la vanité et de l’impossibilité de concevoir une démonstration à partir d’un principe situé au-delà du premier principe. Il vient facilement à l’idée devant l’impossibilité radicale de posséder un principe au-delà du premier principe pour le démontrer, de recourir à une sorte de dédoublement du premier principe dont une partie sert de principe à l’autre. La preuve ontologique repose sur un mécanisme de ce genre : une partie du principe, son essence, sert à démontrer son existence." (p. 47)

Le Chapitre 3 contient une discussion détaillée des argument de Anselme de Cantorbéry, Kurt Gödel et Alvin Plantinga (pp. 47-62).


  "This chapter gives a very compressed history of the ontological argument from Anselm to Kant, and discusses briefly a modern, modal version of the argument. It is argued that Anselm's and Descartes's versions of the argument are flawed, and that one cannot know the main premise of the modal argument -- 'It is possible for there to be a perfect being (a being that has all perfections essentially)’ -- to be true otherwise than by knowing, on some ground independent of the modal argument, that a perfect being actually exists."

  "This chapter gives a very compressed history of the ontological argument from Anselm to Kant, and discusses
briefly a modern, modal version of the argument. It is argued that Anselm's and Descartes's versions of the argument are flawed, and that one cannot know the main premise of the modal argument -- 'It is possible for there to be a perfect being (a being that has all perfections essentially)' -- to be true otherwise than by knowing, on some ground independent of the modal argument, that a perfect being actually exists."


• Leftow, Brian. 2005. "The Ontological Argument." In *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion*, edited by Wainwright, William J., 80-116. New York: Oxford University Press. "I analyze and evaluate ontological arguments and objections to them in Anselm, Gaunilo, Descartes, his immediate objectors, Leibniz, Kant and Brouwer. Anselm comes off rather better than he is often portrayed, Kant rather worse; Descartes (I argue) is as bad as you've heard."

"Presenting an account of Anselm's Proslogion argument, its background and its subsequent history in later thought is more than an exercise in intellectual archaeology. Work still needs to be done to understand what Anselm was trying to achieve and how he was trying to achieve it, Anselm's argument presents an important paradigm for the history or ideas, since it has been treated directly or indirectly by so many different thinkers in subsequent centuries, and it provides a direct challenge to the way philosophy has been done over those centuries. That Anselm has been consistently misunderstood and misrepresented is a central thesis of this book. It is only by returning to and reading Anselm's text that we can hope to establish what he was trying to say and understand how he was trying to say it. Anselm's argument has fascinated and continues to fascinate philosophers and theologians, to such an extent that it is no longer possible in a single work to review exhaustively the history of its reception. Thus, the account of the reception in this book is selective, particularly in Chapter 8 where I limit myself in the main to its reception amongst modern English speaking philosophers. It is these philosophers who have been particularly concerned with the logical form, validity and soundness of Anselm's argument, and to whom it is necessary to respond, if one wishes to discover whether Anselm still has something of philosophical interest to say to us in the Proslogion. There has been a natural tendency amongst modern thinkers to adhere, wittingly or unwittingly, to a Whig view of history, to see the history of ideas as the steady progress of enlightened thought over benighted ignorance. The past is a bad or at best confused place, in which people concerned themselves 'with a lot of outdated foolishness', such as questions about the existence of God, which we now correctly consider to be irrelevant. (1) It is my hope that the study of Anselm's
argument and its subsequent reception will help to counter such views, not because everything in the past was good, but because some things were, and it may just be that some of those good things are what 'we' now consider outdated and irrelevant.

Anselm's argument is frequently identified with later ontological arguments. It is one of my tasks in this work to show how that has happened, and that Anselm's argument has to be addressed in its specificity, that 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' is the irreplaceable middle term of Anselm's argument, which for Anselm functions as the 'natural or proper word' for God. This is not simple a question of scholarship, but also of philosophy, for in my view the latter is aided by the former.

In this book I seek to create and 'audit trail' which stretches from (I) a prehistory of the text (Chapter 2) to (ii) the manuscript tradition and a translation which seeks to remain faithful to Anselm's Latin text (Chapter 3), presenting the Latin and English texts in parallel to (iii) a commentary on the text (Chapter 4) to (iv) an exposition of the debate that immediately followed its 'publication' (Chapter 5) to (v) a review and evaluation of the historical ongoing reception of the Proslogion (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). It concludes with an assessment of the significance of Anselm's argument." (pp. 1-2)


  Chapter 3. Ontological Arguments: (a) Descartes's Proof and Kant's Criticism 41; (b)Anselm's Ontological Proof and Gaunilo's Reply 49; (c) Plantinga's Ontological Proof 55-63.
Within the past two decades or so there has been a gradual renewal of interest in metaphysics in general and in the theistic arguments in particular. This is the most comprehensive bibliography ever done on this argument for God's existence, with over 330 items listed. The article is divided into the following categories:

I. General histories of the argument; II. The argument in Anselm; III. The argument in the Middle Ages after Anselm; IV: The argument from Descartes to Kant; V: The Hegelian and Idealist use of the argument; VI. The argument in Continental philosophy; VII: The argument in British and American philosophy; VIII. The logic of "exists"; IX. The concept of necessary being; X: Additions as a result of additional research.

The objection which appears to bedevil modal "as well as" non-modal versions of the ontological argument is that no modality of 'real' (i.e., denotational) existence can be contained in any concept whatever, and, consequently, that 'God exists' cannot constitute a conceptual truth. I attempt to establish the rationality of maintaining that whether or not this is so is irrelevant to the integrity of the modal version of the ontological argument, since the falsity of the 'containment-objection' is not a necessary condition of its being a conceptual truth that God exists. In sum, I show that it is perfectly rational to believe "both" that 'God exists' constitutes a truth-of-meaning
and that no modality of existence can be "contained" in the concept of God."


"Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz held that there are "necessary beings" whose existence is necessitated by the very concept; Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein denied this. Whether or not necessary beings exist cannot have a contingent answer: this is the article's elementary premise. And this, together with the law of the excluded middle, tells us that either existence or non-existence must be derivable from the concept of necessary beings; nonexistence, if the concept is self-contradictory, and existence if the concept is not self-contradictory. Also, if there is a positive ontological argument concerning necessary beings, this could be constructed by either of the following strategies: [a] by arguing that the expression, "necessary beings do not exist," is self-contradictory -- the classical strategy of Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz; or [b] by claiming the coherence of necessary beings, based on the fact that necessary beings either exist out of necessity or are absent out of necessity. This is the view of Hartshorne, Malcolm, and Plantinga, utilized in their respective attempts to prove God's existence. Steinitz argues that their ontological arguments are unsatisfactory, but that if we apply the Hartshorne-Malcolm-Plantinga basic strategy to the sheer concept of necessary beings -- rather than to more complicated concepts, such as God or a most perfect being or an unsurpassable greatness -- this helps to avoid some of the difficulties. Swinburne, van Inwagen and others argue convincingly that one can find a conclusive argument for the coherence of any concept of any kind whatsoever. Yet, replacing the concept of God with that of necessary beings can help defend the possibility of an
ontological argument, resulting in an inconclusive yet reasonable justification for its coherence."


Contents: Acknowledgements 5; Authors of Contributed Papers 7;
Part I. Introduction
1. Mirosław Szatkowski: Guided Tour of the Book: Ontological Proofs Today 19
Part II. Interpretation of Old Ontological Proofs. God’s Attributes
Part III. New Ontological Proofs
Part IV. Semantics for Ontological Proofs
Part V. Ontological Proofs and Kinds of Necessity
Part VI. Ontological Proofs and Formal Ontology
Part VII. Debate Maydole-Oppy
Author Index 511; Subject Index 515-520.

Selected Bibliography on the History of the Ontological Argument from Anselm of Canterbury to Duns Scotus

Legenda: P = Pro (accept the proof); C = Contra (rejected the proof); I = indifferent (take no position on the proof); ca. = circa; fl = flourished; d. died.

References are to the most important works where ontological argument is discussed.

- P Anselm of Canterbury [Anselmus Cantuariensis, Doctor Angelicus]
- C Gaunilo of Marmoutiers [Gaunilo, monachus]
- P William of Auxerre [Guillelmi Altissiodorensis]
- P Alexander of Hales [Alexander Halensis, Doctor Irrefragabilis]
- P Richard Fishacre [Richardus Flamesburensis]
- C Richard Rufus of Cornwall [Richaruds Rufus Cornubiensis]
- P Bonaventure of Bagnorea [Bonaventurae, Johannes Fidanza, Doctor Seraphicus]
- I Albert the Great [Albertus Magnus, Doctor Universalis]
Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109)

Texts and translations


Written in 1077-1078.
Critical edition of Latin text in the first volume of: *Sancti Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia ad fides codicum recensuit Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, OSB* - 6 voll. (1938-1961); reprinted in two volumes, Stuttgart (Bad Cannstatt) Friedrich Frommann Verlag 1968 with an introduction by Schmitt drawing together his articles on Anselm.

*Proslogion* vol. I pp. 93-122.


Reply to Gaunilo written in 1078.


Translated by Jasper Hopkins


Translated by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson.

*Proslogion* pp. 88-112.


Translated, with introduction, by Thomas Williams.
"In this essay I offer a formal analysis of Anselm's arguments for the existence of God in the Proslogion and in his reply to Gaunilo. I do not attempt to show here that the arguments are compelling, or that they are not. What I try to do is discover in each argument, so far as possible, a valid logical form, to exhibit the relations of the arguments to each other, and to show how they depend on certain doctrines in logic or the philosophy of logic. Anselm's arguments are far from dead, and in this paper I hope to provide a logical map, so to speak, of some ground that is still very much fought over.
The first two sections of the paper are concerned with the most famous of Anselm's arguments, the argument of Chapter 2 of the Proslogion. In Section I, I formulate a version of the argument in modern logical symbolism, and state the assumptions about existence and predication on which the argument seems to me to depend. Gaunilo's criticism of Anselm was directed very largely against the ontological presuppositions of the Proslogion 2 argument; and in Section II I try to show how Gaunilo's famous "lost island" counterexample proves that the assumptions stated in Section I must be modified, if not rejected. In his reply to Gaunilo Anselm introduced two new arguments for the existence of God, which do not depend on assumptions about predication. I discuss one of these arguments in Section III; it seems to me to be at least a better argument than the argument of Proslogion 2. Analysis of this argument from the reply to Gaunilo leads to the conclusion that the crucial question about logically necessary divine existence is whether it is possible. Section IV is devoted to an analysis of Anselm's argument in the third chapter of the Proslogion and its relation to the other arguments."


"In Proslogion IV, Anselm addresses the peculiar referring power of the expression "God". In the light of the idea of determinates and determinables (used by W.E. Johnson and others) one can read what Anselm says here, supplemented perhaps by De Grammatico, as making a case for the belief that "God" refers not to a thing in the world but to the highest member of the system of determinates and determinables, and that this hierarchy is essential to meaning. The highest order determinable can plausibly be identified with God. Denying that God exists, therefore, is denying the possibility of meaningfulness."


"The ontological argument of Saint Anselm has attracted a great deal of attention. There has been considerable discussion of whether the argument begs the question, by assuming the existence of God in the premises of the argument. But, although the theological, Augustinian context of Anselm's argument has been dealt with, and although the argument has been extensively treated in modern logical terms, little attention has been paid to how the argument fares in terms of traditional logic. In this article I shall analyze the argument of Proslogion 2 in traditional terms. I shall then argue that to a great extent the debate between Anselm and Gaunilon can be viewed as depending on attitudes toward the Aristotelian syllogistic.1 In short, the standard for the validity and
soundness of arguments in medieval philosophy was the syllogistic. It was apparently assumed that all terms used in the syllogistic have existential import. So Anselm's argument is suspect in that it employs a term, 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived,' which cannot be assumed to have existential import. I then shall offer a solution of this difficulty. I shall argue that the success of the argument of *Proslogion* 2 depends on the modal character of 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived.' That modal character suggests that the argument of *Proslogion* 2 is modal as well. I shall show that there are grounds in theology and in the Aristotelian modal syllogistic for rejecting the existential import assumption, and shall suggest that Anselm does not make such an assumption, at least in the ontological argument. Rather, despite its assertoric appearance, the argument in *Proslogion* 2 is modal.


"Examination of Anselm's Proslogion shows that he carefully distinguishes 'greater' from 'better' or 'more perfect'. He says that God 'most truly exists', that he exists 'in the highest degree'; the Neo-platonist metaphysical framework suggested by this is confirmed by examining Anselm's Augustinian background, and the *Monologion*. 'Greatness' is an ontological concept. This
both makes good sense of Anselm's argument, and justifies his refutation of the 'Lost Island' objection: it is nonsense to say of any island, or dollar, that it is ontologically superior to another, or to anything else."


"The paper aims to show that parody-based critiques of Anselm's ontological argument fail to do damage because there is a crucial disanalogy between 'God' and for example, Gaunilean 'Islands'. the basis of the disanalogy is God's alleged uniqueness in terms of necessary existence. It is this rather than the structure of Anselm's argument which constitutes the real problem in attempting to assert that there is a God."


"This paper treats a question which first arose in these *Proceedings*: Can Anselm's ontological argument be inverted so as to yield parallel proofs for the existence (or nonexistence) of a least (or worst) conceivable being? Such "devil parodies" strike some commentators as innocuous curiosities, or redundant challenges which are no more troubling than other parodies found in the literature (e.g., Gaunilo's Island). I take issue with both of these allegations; devil parodies, I argue, have the potential to pose substantive, and novel, challenges to Anselm's ontological argument."


"The principal arguments considered are in some ways similar to those offered in Anselm's *Proslogium*, Chapters II and III. In addition, two quick' versions of the ontological argument are examined. Finally, I worry a bit about the ineffable One. The general line of attack is similar to a procedure employed by David Lewis in discussing *Proslogium II*. My approach to *Proslogium III* is based upon the idea that the appropriate modal logic for these matters is much weaker than the standard S5. The hope is that this alternative perspective reveals features worthy of notice."


———. 1988. ""Nul N'a Plus Grand Amour Que De Donner Sa Vie Pour Ses Amis (Jn 15,13)". *La Signification*


  "This paper examines interpretations of the doctrine that "exists" is not a predicate (existence is not a property). None, it is concluded, is both true and a refutation of st Anselm's "ontological" argument for the existence of God."


Unpublished Dissertation (University of Graz).


"The author argues that Anselm's proof of God in the *Proslogion* is the first and so far the last example of an entirely new philosophical method which is neither categorial not analytic but axiomatic and synthetic: the method of mathematics validly applied to the highest possible subject of human thought. With particular reference to Karl Barth's 1958 study, *Fides quaerens intellectum*, he first reconstructs Anselm's theological program. He then discusses Anselm's notions of rationality and proof and presents his axiomatic concept of the name of God. Finally, the author examines the argument between Anselm and Gaunilon step by step."


"The article aims at elucidating the argumentation in Anselm's *Proslogion* by relating some aspects of it to the early medieval theory of argument. The focus of the analysis is on the "single argument" (*unum argumentum*), the discovery of which Anselm announces in the Preface to the *Proslogion*. Part 1 of the article offers a preliminary description of the single argument by describing the *reductio ad absurdum* technique based on the notion "that than which a greater cannot be thought". Part 2 discusses the ideas about arguments and argumentation that Boethius presents in Book One of his *In Ciceronis Topica*. Part 3 draws attention to some early medieval sources (Abelard, Lanfranc, Anselm) that are witness to the importance of the Boethian ideas in Anselm's time. Finally, Part 4 argues that Anselm looked at his single argument in the Boethian framework and that the term "that than which a greater cannot be thought" should be identified as his single argument."


The article presents a formalization of Anselm's so-called 'ontological arguments' from Proslogion. The main idea of our research is to stay to the original text as close as is possible. We show, against some common opinions, that (i) the logic necessary for the formalization must be neither a purely sentential modal calculus, nor just non-modal first-order logic, but a modal first-order theory; (ii) such logic cannot contain logical axiom A right arrow implies that A is possible; (iii) none of Anselm's reasoning requires the assumptions that God is a consistent object or that existence of God is possible; (iv) no such thing as the so-called Anselm's principle is involved in any of the proofs; (v) Anselm's claims (that God exists in reality and that God necessarily exists in reality) can be obtained independently, hence, there is no need for presenting them in an opposite order than Anselm did.


In cooperation with Eduardo Brinacesco, Walter Fröhlich, Helmut Kohleberger, Frederick Van Flaten,
Coloman Viola.
Contains 3,784 references up to 1996.
Contents: I. Text and editions 12 (items 1-441); II. Alphabetical Table 33 (items 442-3784); III. Systematic Table 158-201.
Introduction: "With this International Bibliography of Anselm of Canterbury we intend to lay out a comprehensive list of works and sources of Anselm of Canterbury as well as the relevant research literature. The systematic presentation takes into consideration the time period from the first manuscripts until 1996. The bibliography includes all together three thousand, seven hundred, and eighty four individual citations.
Part I: For a manual of this kind, not only a presentation of secondary literature, but also a presentation of texts, manuscripts, omnia opera, editions, and translations, ordered according to the most important languages, should be useful. This latter collection is presented in the first part of the bibliography, entitled 'Texts and Editions'. We have undertaken no new studies of sources and manuscripts, but have taken the references of F. S. Schmitt's Omnia Opera and F. S. Schmitt's and R. Southern's Memorial, and have reprinted the most important bibliographical information.
Part II: The 'Alphabetical Table' presents alphabetically all the relevant secondary literature in detail. This second section is the heart of the bibliography. It serves as the foundation for Part III. The systematic presentation of the literature extends to the year 1996. The final references were to the contributions in the collection of D. E. Luscombe and G. R. Evans, Aosta, Bec, and Canterbury. Papers in Commemoration of the Nine-hundreth Anniversary of Anselm's Enthronement as Archbishop, 25 September 1093 (1996). After that, particular titles appear only sporadically.
Part III: The 'Systematic Table' is conceived as an aid for research into the works of Anselm of Canterbury. In a systematic reference word table, developed especially for
this purpose, relevant research contributions are presented in short form. It should be possible quickly to find citations in the 'Alphabetical Table' through the presentation of references of Author (Year) in the 'Systematic Table'."


"Anselm's Ontological Argument is an *ad hominem* argument against the Foole, part of which is a *reductio ad absurdum*, designed to prove the existence of God. The actual argument offered by St. Anselm has seventeen premisses; the heart of the argument is a careful distinction among intentional objects—and the Ontological Argument *cannot* be formalized by modal logic. It is not a modal argument at all, but rather relies on certain intuitive principles of intentional logic, which Anselm applies throughout the *Proslogion*. The Ontological Argument is valid, if one accepts these principles; insofar as an *ad hominem* argument may be sound, it is sound as well. It is not a demonstration, for the key premiss granted by the Foole is highly implausible. Those who agree with the Foole, however, may justifiably assert God's existence.

These claims only apply to Anselm's *actual* argument, not to other Ontological Arguments, no matter how distinguished the pedigree, no matter how careful the formalization. Other Ontological Arguments only interest me insofar as they shed light on, or claim to accurately represent, Anselm's Ontological Argument. Other Ontological Arguments must be judged on their own merits. Anselm's actual argument, unlike most versions, is an exercise in intentional logic, a fact that has eluded commentators from the time of Gaunilon. That Ontological Argument is the subject of this article, and henceforth I shall call it *the* Ontological Argument."


"This paper provides replies to the objections Tony Roark presented (Roark, T. 2003. 'Conceptual closure in Anselm's proof', History and Philosophy of Logic 24) to my reconstruction of Anselm's famous argument in the Proslogion (Klima, G. 2000. 'Saint Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding', in G. Holmström-Hintikka, Medieval Philosophy and Modern Times, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 69-87). The replies argue that Roark's objections actually strengthen the general conclusion of my original paper concerning the different attitudes one can take toward Anselm's argument, depending on whether one refers to that than which nothing greater can be thought 'constitutively' or 'parasitically'. In agreement with Roark, however, at the end of the paper I also indicate some of the broader implications of this distinction worthy of further exploration."


In the over nine hundred years since Saint Anselm wrote the Proslogion steadfast disagreement over what he meant, and sometimes over what he said, functions as an unbroken principle of interpretation among its readers and commentators alike. How to explain this phenomenon has proven equally controversial. However, two explanations of the long embattled history of the Proslogion are feasible. One is that access to the complete Proslogion was impossible for many of Anselm's successors, including such renowned reviewers of the work as Aquinas, Scotus, and the noted modern critic of the ontological argument, Immanuel Kant. A second, applying more to recent times, appears to be a failure to exercise due regard for the language of the work. (1) This is further evidenced by a tendency to concentrate only on part of the Proslogion, principally chapters two-four.

(1) Two recent discussions of the Proslogion deserve notice in this regard. Professor G. R. Evans, Anselm and Talking about God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), devotes more time to talking about the interpretation a large tradition has placed upon the Proslogion argument than to an analysis of the argument's language as such. See, especially, chapters two and three, pp. 39-75. On the other hand, Professor Gregory Schufreider's study, "The Identity of Anselm's Argument," The Modern Schoolman,
LIV (1977), pp. 345-61, breaks genuinely new ground in its search for the argument in Anselm's Proslogion instead of a new search for confirmation of an old rendition. In arguing that Saint Anselm has a single argument in the Proslogion Schufreider provides a careful analysis of Anselm's use of "vere esse" in chapter eleven's heading and chapter three's text (pp. 349-52); of "absolute" in chapters twenty-two and twenty-eight of the Monologion (pp. 353-58) and the modal quality of the Proslogion's "vere esse" (p. 360). The conclusion Schufreider reaches reinforces the argument of this paper from a different perspective.

  "I offer a defence of the ontological argument. I argue for the principle that if $F$ is a necessarily exemplified concept and $G$ is not, then $F$s are a greater kind of thing than $G$s. This principle is defended on the basis of two other principles concerning such attitudes as total reliance, which it is appropriate to take to $F$s if $f$ is a necessarily exemplified concept."


  "I present a semi-formal analysis of St. Anselm's version of the ontological argument from Proslogion II, with two purposes in mind. First, I show that some contemporary analyses of the argument, in terms of the apparatus of modal logic, neglect the conceptual framework within which Anselm worked. I then display three ingredients of that framework: the distinction between beings 'in intellectu' and beings 'in re', the distinction between one's conceiving of a thing and one's conceiving it to exist, and
the doctrine that existence is a property of things. Second, I argue that even if Anselm is granted all three of these presuppositions, he still cannot produce a convincing argument for the existence of God."


"The contrast between the reception of Anselm's Proslogion in the work of Bonaventure and in the work of Thomas Aquinas is often held up as a classic example of their competing intellectual assumptions. Some have located the intellectual prerequisites for the acceptance or rejection of Anselm's argument in the prior acceptance of univocal or analogical accounts of being. (1) P. A. Daniels argued that the prerequisites for Bonaventure's acceptance of the argument were not his "ontological" mode of thought, or a doctrine of the innate idea of God within the soul, but in his acceptance of examplar causality. (2) Half a century later, Jean Chattillon, following Étienne Gilson, affirmed the more common view of the issue, that the acceptance or rejection of Anselm's argument among the first scholastics of the thirteenth century depended upon their allegiance to Augustinian or Aristotelian traditions. (3) Anton Pegis did the same when he insisted that recovery of the Anselmian argument in its original form involved stripping away the Aristotelian framework in terms of which the Proslogion has been read since Thomas. (4)"

(1) In general terms, the interpretation of Bonaventure as leader of an Augustinian tradition, and of Thomas as representative of Aristotelianism, can be found in the

(2) P. A. Daniels, *Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Dreizehnten Jahrhundert* (Münster, 1909), pp. 131, 156.


"In his paper *Has the Ontological Argument Been Refuted?* (Religious Studies, 29 (1993), 97-110) William F. Vallicella argues that my attempt to show that the Ontological Argument begs the question is unsuccessful. I believe he is wrong about this, but before endeavouring to
vindicate my position I must first make clear what precisely is the point at issue between us. The Ontological Argument is not a single argument, but a family of arguments. Newly devised formulations of the argument are frequently put forward by philosophers in an effort to avoid difficulties that have been pointed out in previous versions. As a consequence there is no possibility of a conclusive proof that every form of the argument embodies the same fallacy. Nevertheless, one can, I believe, prove that all the standard versions of the argument embody a certain fallacy and that, given the nature of the argument, it is therefore unlikely that the argument can be formulated in such a way as to avoid this difficulty. What I tried to show in my paper is that the six best-known versions of the argument (the non-model versions of Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz and the modal versions of Malcolm, Hartshorne and Plantinga) all beg the question and that they do so at the same point in the argument, namely when it is asserted that it is possible, that an absolutely perfect being exists. It is difficult to see how an ontological argument could be formulated without, including this claim as one of its premises, since the distinguishing badge of the argument is the inference from the possibility of an absolutely perfect being to its actuality. It must be unlikely then, if my criticism of these six versions is correct, that there is any way of formulating the argument that avoids this fallacy.


"Anselm’s Ontological Argument fails, but not for any of the various reasons commonly adduced. In particular, its failure has nothing to do with violating deep Kantian principles by treating 'exists' as a predicate or making reference to 'Meinongian' entities. Its one fatal flaw, so far from being metaphysically deep, is in fact logically shallow, deriving from a subtle scope ambiguity in
Anselm's key phrase. If we avoid this ambiguity, and the indeterminacy of reference to which it gives rise, then his argument is blocked even if his supposed Meinongian extravagances are permitted. Moreover it is blocked in a way which is straightforward and compelling (by contrast with the Kantian objections), and which generalizes easily to other versions of the Ontological Argument. A significant moral follows. Fear of Anselm's argument has been hugely influential in motivating ontological fastidiousness and widespread reluctance to countenance talk of potentially non-existing entities. But if this paper is correct, then the Ontological Argument cannot properly provide any such motivation. Some of the most influential contributions to ontology, from Kant to Russell and beyond, rest on a mistake."


"The kernel of Anselm's famous argument in chapter II of his Proslogion consists of a few lines. Thousands of pages have been written about them, but nevertheless they have resisted final clarification, though the literature about them still grows. Most of what has allegedly been written about Anselm's argument is concerned more with phantasies than with Anselm's original text. In fact most authors take Anselm's argument as an excuse for doing quite different things and developing their own ideas. Anselm's brilliant text does not deserve such a treatment. Accordingly I will focus on Anselm's own words and will display the ingenuity of his argument as well as where it fails."


"I argue contrary to Stephen Makin's "The Ontological Argument" (Philosophy 63, No. 243) that one can't show that necessary being is a meaningful concept by the use of modal notions involving the exemplification of concepts. For conceptual coherence provides, at best, a necessary condition for necessary exemplification, not a sufficient one. What then could there possibly be about a concept beyond its coherence that would necessitate its exemplification. I suspect there is none."


"This study is a reexamination of the Proslogion, aiming, in the light of the interpretations of K. Barth, E. Gilson and especially H. Bouillard, to determine the nature of its argument for God as a rational construction. St. Anselm believes that the believing reason is both believing in itself and rationally visible to an unbeliever. The argument in chapters 2-4 is not from thought to existence, but from God as designated by and in things to
God as posited in his transcendence. There is no reason for thinking that the so-called ontological argument originates in the *Proslogion.*


  "Although 'exists' has the superficial appearance of a predicate in the *Proslogion*, Anselm does not rely on the premise that 'exists' is a logical predicate (or that existing is a property) in the ontological proof. Anselm argues that God exists not only as a mental object (*in intellectu*) but also exists in extramental reality (*in re*). Whether 'exists' is a predicate is irrelevant to this inference. It follows that many putative refutations of the argument fail."


  "In Anselm's ontological argument, the phrase 'to exist (only) in the understanding' needs explanation; so also does the claim that something which exists only in the understanding, and so does not exist, is less great than something that does exist. What this means is that, if it were to exist, it would be less great than the other. But it could not then be less great than itself. So Anselm's argument collapses."

"Gyula Klima maintains that Anselm's ontological argument is best understood in terms of a theory of reference that was made fully explicit only by later medievals. I accept the interpretative claim but offer here two objections to the argument so interpreted. The first points up a certain ambiguity in Klima's formulation of the argument, the correction of which requires a substantive revision of the argument's conclusion. The second exploits the notion of semantic closure introduced by Tarski. Klima offers the atheist an 'out' by drawing a distinction between constitutive and parasitic reference. I argue that using Klima's preferred description ('the thought object than which no thought object can be thought to be greater') to refer constitutively to God results in conceptual closure, a condition analogous to semantic closure that renders the instant conceptual scheme inconsistent and subject to paradox. Although the proof ultimately fails, Klima's development of the notions of constitutive and parasitic reference has important and far-reaching implications."


"In recent discussions on Anselm's ontological argument, the assumption is made, that Anselm holds "existence" to be a first order predicate. However, there is no explicit statement in Anselm's texts that confirms this interpretation. In Thomas Aquinas and his predecessors, the logic of subject and predicate is applied on Anselm's argument."
Anselm himself has no logic of "existence". The exact meaning and function of the expression "existence" is, therefore, to be investigated by an interpretation of its actual use in the argument itself. I propose, that Anselm views existence to be an event, and that the term "maius" can best be interpreted as a relation between different kinds of events.


  "The article presents an analysis of Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God, based on Transparent Intensional Logic. Section I consists of general considerations on denotation and existence. In section II, two fallacies flawing Descartes's proof are exposed. Anselm's argument is reconstructed and assessed in section III, it is found logically sound, but doubt is cast on one of its premises."


  "Suppose we say that a deductive argument is probative just in case it is (i) valid in point of logical form, (ii) possesses true premises, and (iii) is free of informal fallacy. We can then say that an argument is normatively persuasive for a person if and only if it is both probative and has premises that can be accepted, without any breach of epistemic propriety, by the person in question. If the premises of a probative argument would be
accepted by any reasonable person, I will call such an argument demonstrative.
Now it seems that a reasonable position to take with respect to the Ontological Argument for the existence of God (hereafter, OA) is that none of its versions is demonstrative, though some of the versions are normatively persuasive. If so, the OA in at least one version is a 'good' argument although not a successful piece of natural theology'. To show that the OA is 'bad' in all versions one would have to show, for each version, either that it is not probative, by showing that it is either invalid, or possessed of one or more false premises, or guilty of informal fallacy, or such that its premises are more rationally rejected than accepted by the person who considers the argument. To show a version 'bad', then, it does not suffice to show that it fails to establish its conclusion in some incontrovertible manner. Precious few philosophical arguments get the length of that.

(Notes omitted).


Gaunilo of Marmoutiers (fl. XI century)

Texts and translations


  Written in 1078.

Studies


  "Gaunilo's "Lost Island" argument is his most famous objection to Anselm's ontological proof, and Anselm is known to provide quite an unsatisfactory response to it. So someone sympathetic to Anselm might ask: is there something that Anselm is not saying, some point he has perhaps made elsewhere and he might be implicitly appealing to which would give substance to his disappointing statement? I believe there is, and this paper provides my answer."

"The received view is that Gaunilo's attempted refutation of Anselm's ontological argument fails. But those who believe this do not agree as to why it fails. The aim of this essay is to show that "whether" the attempted refutation succeeds depends crucially on how one formulates the so-called greatmaking principle on which Anselm's argument rests. This principle has largely been ignored by contemporary philosophers, who have chosen to focus on other aspects of the argument. I sketch two analyses of metaphysical greatness and suggest that on one of them, which Anselm may have held, his argument avoids Gaunilo's criticism."


"Gaunilo, monk of Marmoutier, is known almost exclusively for his attempted refutation of Anselm's ontological argument around 1079. Indeed, both his counterexample about the alleged island which is more excellent than all others and Anselm's rebuttal thereof have nowadays become standard items for courses in medieval philosophy. Over the past decade or so, which has witnessed a revival of interest in the ontological argument, Gaunilo has been either lauded for his brilliancy or disparaged for his mediocrity. Thus, R. W. Southern judges that, "in words which are as trenchant as, and in some details strikingly similar to, those of Kant", Gaunilo pointed out the main difficulty in accepting Anselm's argument. (1) By contrast, the most Charles Hartshorne can say on Gaunilo's behalf is that he is "a clever, but essentially commonplace mind". (2) Those who praise Gaunilo tend to do so because he "wisely" discerned the illegitimacy of inferring a factual
statement from an a priori description. Those who speak
derogatorily of his achievement tend to side with
Anselm's two criticisms: (I) that he misunderstood the
phrase *aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest* - replacing
it by *maius omnibus* - and (II) that his definition of
"understanding" is inconsistent with his having
maintained that what is unreal can be understood. (3)
Now, if Gaunilo did commit himself to two blatantly
inconsistent statements within a few lines of each other,
as the second criticism maintains, then to call him a
clever mind would itself be an overstatement.
In this paper I want to clear up several misinterpretations
both within and about the debate between Anselm and
Gaunilo. At the same time, I want to articulate the
reformulations of the ontological argument as they occur
in *Reply to Gaunilo* 1. I shall not take up the issue of
whether or not any of these reformulations presents a
sound argument for the existence of God, though in my
judgment none does. Nor shall I worry about the
respective degrees of brilliancy attributable to our two
opponents, though on the present interpretation Gaunilo
will fare better than Hartshorne supposes but not as well
as Southern fancies." (pp. 25-26)
(1) *The Life of St Anselm* by Eadmer, ed., introd., and
trans. by R. W. Southern (New York: Thomas Nelson and
Sons, 1962), 31 n.
(2) Charles Hartshorne, *Anselm's Discovery: A Re-
examination of the Ontological Proof for God's Existence*
(La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1965), 20. See also p. 151.
(3) Hartshorne complains that Gaunilo, and others like
him, neglected the principle of Proslogion 3 that *to exist
without conceivable alternative of not existing is better
than to exist with such alternative*. Anselm's Discovery,
88 (verbatim).

- Imbrisevic, Miroslav. 2007. "Gaunilo's Cogito
"Gaunilo presents Anselm with a dilemma in section 7 of his *Responsio*: I know most certainly that I exist. But if I cannot think my non-existence at the same time, then Anselm's claim in *Proslogion* 3 (that my inability to think God's non-existence, while knowing most certainly that He exists, is a unique property of God) would be false. If I can do so, however, then I should also be able to know most certainly that God exists and, at the same time, think his non-existence. I will show that Anselm's response to Gaunilo's attack is not adequate because it does not address the issue of certainty, which is at the heart of Gaunilo's objection."


"The existence of major disagreement between Saint Anselm and Gaunilo concerning reason's ability (unaided by faith) to attain any knowledge of God's hence is easily recognized by reading their famous exchanges. What has received minimal notice is the extent of this disagreement and its significance for interpreting Anselm's argument in the *Proslogion*. This study will seek to establish to what extent knowledge of God's existence is / is not attainable and what said knowledge includes according to these two thinkers. The method for conducting this endeavor will be to examine the kinds, range, and origins of human knowledge of existence as variously held and disputed by Anselm and Gaunilo. Such a survey should help to place this aspect of the two protagonists' thought in sharper relief. Moreover, expanding the parameters of our consideration of Anselm's argument in this fashion will free us from the, for many, enslaving fascination of Anselm's logic in *Proslogion* II-IV and allow a clearer insight into the metaphysics at work in these three"
chapters and the work as a whole. Additionally, such freedom of inquiry will permit a due recognition of chapter one's role in posing the problematic according to Anselm. Finally, the metaphysical notions stated obliquely in *Proslogion* II-IV, and especially in III, will be better heard by examining their elaboration in later chapters of *Proslogion* and the subsequent exchanges between Anselm and Gaunilo. It is necessary, then, to turn to the originals to see if, indeed, such insights are forthcoming.

**William of Auxerre (ca. 1140-1231)**
Texts

  
  Written ca. 1215-1229.
  Prologue 15-23;


Studies


**Alexander of Hales (1185-1245)**
Texts


  Written after 1245.
  Studio et cura PP. Collegii s. Bonaventurae ad fidem codicum edita (reprinted 1979)
  The *Summa Alexandri*, attributed to Alexander, is a compilation put together by his students after his death.
  Daniels (1909) pp. 28-35): *Pars I Quaestio III. De essentialitate divinae Substantie Membrum. I, II et III.*

Studies


  Vol. I.

**Richard Fishacre (ca. 1205-1248)**

Written ca. 1240, this work, the first Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard written at Oxford, is unpublished; a critical edition is in preparation. Daniels (1909) pp. 21-24: Liber I, Distinctio III.


Studies


Richard Rufus of Cornwall (fl. 1231-1256)
• Richard, Rufus of Cornwall. 1250. Sententia Oxoniensis I-Ii.


Studies


"Publishes substantial excerpts from Rufus' Oxford theology lectures and brief excerpts from Assisi 138. Shows that Rufus anticipated both Thomas' criticism of Anselm's Proslogion proof for God's existence and Scotus' modal proof for the existence of God." Rega Wood - The Richard Rufus of Cornwall Project.


"In previous articles, Fr. Gedeon gàl and I have shown that after rejecting Anselm's argument in its original form, Rufus, like John Duns Scotus, and like the modern American analytical philosopher, Norman Malcolm, proposed another ontological argument in its place. To oversimplify: either as a gloss on Anselm or as a substitute for his argument, they claimed that God's existence, or rather the existence of a *per se* being, could be inferred by *modus tollens*: a per se being is necessary if possible, a variety of arguments show that a per se being is possible, therefore a per se being is necessary. (3) Here, I want to look at Rufus' criticism and very briefly at another proposed substitute argument for God's existence." p. 88


In Appendix (pp. 99-102) is given the Latin text of Rufus (*Sententia Oxoniensis 1.2, B62.2ora-va*).
Dei.

  Translated with an introduction by George Boas.

  Works of Saint Bonaventure Vol. III.
  Introduction and translation by Zachary Hayes (reprinted 2000).

  Written in 1254-1255.
  Sancti Bonaventurae Opuscola theologica (Opera V/1) - Latin text and Italian translation.

  Written in 1259.
  Latin text and English translation by Zachary Hayes;
  introduction and commentary by Philotheus Boehner.

Studies


"For St Bonaventure the self-evident truth of God's existence can be shown forth by 'intellectual exercises' like that of St Anselm. Such exercises are not simple-minded transits from the ideal to the real order. Rather they are based upon a sophisticated metaphysics. They involve the experience of common intelligibility. With Plato, they accept the 'really real' character of that intelligibility. Implicitly, they also accept a plurality and a one-way hierarchy of intelligibles leading up to a 'First'. Turning then precisely upon the unprincipiated nature of this 'First', they spread before us its absolute necessity both in reality and for thought."


"The formula (if God is God, God exists) is the shortest summary of the ontological argument. The article tries to demonstrate that this argument, as interpreted by Bonaventure, in no way is guilty of the logical mistakes with which one reproaches it. It proceeds not from a subjective idea or concept but from an intrinsically necessary and supremely intelligible divine nature and therefore applies to no other being but to the divine being. Bonaventure's basic thesis is that the inner truth (necessity) of the divine nature imposes itself on the mind and contains objectively the real existence of God. Only someone who does not understand this inner necessary truth can deny God's existence."

**Albert the Great (ca. 1200-1280)**

**Texts and translations**

  
  Written ca. 1270-1280
  
  Edidit Dionysius Siedler, collaborantibus Wilhelmo Kübel et Henrico Georgio Vogels.
  
  Daniels (1909) pp. 36-37: *Pars I. Tractatus III, Quaestio XVII; Tractatus IV, Quaestio XIX, Membrum II.*

**Studies**
Thomas Aquinas (1225/6-1274)

Texts and translations

  Written ca. 1257-1273.
  Texts selected by Daniels (1909) pp. 64-67:
  1) *In librum Boethii de Trinitate Expositio*: Quaestio I Articulus III: Utrum Deus sit primum quad a mente cognoscitur.
  2) *Sententiarum Liber I Distinctio III Quaestio I Articulus II Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum.
  3) *Summa Contra Gentiles Liber I Capitulo X et Capitulo XI.
  4) *De Veritate* Queastio X Articulus XII. Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum menti humnae sicut prima principia demonstrationis quae non possunt cogitari non esse.
  5) *Summa Theologica* Pars I. Quaestio II Articulus I. Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum.

  Written ca. 1266-1273.
  S. Thomae Aquinatis doctoris angelici *Summa theologiae*, cura et studio Petri Caramello, cum textu ex recensione leonina.
The article discusses inadequacies in Aquinas' criticism of Anselm's ontological argument. Aquinas is commonly credited with criticizing Anselm by distinguishing two kinds of self-evidence, a distinction which for the purpose of criticizing Anselm, is not very helpful, and instead of an effective rebuttal of Anselm, Aquinas provides mostly a mere denial that his argument is cogent. The article attempts to show how Anselm's ontological argument can be defeated.


Peter of Tarentaise (1225-1276)
Texts

- Peter, of Tarentaise. 1259. *Innocentii Quinti in Iv Libros Sententiarum Commentaria*.
  
  Written ca 1259.  
  The last printed edition is that of Toulouse: Vol. I. (1652); Vol. II (1649); Vol. III. (1652); Vol. IV. (1651).  

Studies

**John Peckham (ca. 1230-1292)**

Texts

- John, Peckham. 1260. *Commentariius in Iv Libros Sententiarum*.
  

Studies

**Henry of Ghent (ca. 1217-1293)**
Texts and translations


Studies


St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent represent three medieval philosophical traditions in proving the existence of God, namely, the Platonic, the Aristotelian and the Avicennian. Platonic hierarchy and participation, leading to a supreme term, govern the proof of God in St. Bonaventure and St. Anselm. St. Thomas, beginning with data in nature (e.g. motion), reaches God as the cause of these data before reaching him as he is in his own absoluteness. St. Thomas' argumentation and method are Aristotelian. The proofs of God in St. Anselm (specifically, in the Proslogion), in St. Bonaventure and in St. Thomas are all empirical and "a posteriori". but the proof of God in Henry of Ghent, Avicennian in origin, is "a priori" and seeks to reach God in his unity as the necessary being. Henry's proof is the model and perhaps the origin of the ontological argument.

Nicolaus of Ockham (fl. XII century)
Texts

  Unpublished manuscript (ca. 1260-1270) - Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze Conv. G5, 858.
  Daniels (1909) pp. 82-83: *Sententiarum Libro I Distinctio III. Quaestio II. Quaeritur secundo an Deum esse sit per se notum.*

Studies

Matthew of Aquasparta (ca. 1240-1302)

Texts

- Matthew, of Acquasparta. 1280. Commentarius in Primum, Secondum Et Quartum Librum Sententiarum.
  Written ca. 1271-1280; unpublished.

Studies

Giles of Rome (ca. 1243-1316)
Texts

- Giles, of Rome. 1492. Super Librum I Sententiarum (Reportatio).

Written ca. 1280-1290; last printed edition: Venezia (1492).


Studies

**Richard of Middletown (1249-1308)**
Richard, of Middleton. 1591. Super Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi Quaestiones Subtilissimae.

Studies

William of Ware (fl. 1290-1305)

Texts

William, of Ware. 1424. Quaestiones Super Libros Sententiarum.
Written ca. 1290-1300; available only in manuscript. Daniels (1909) pp. 89-104: Quaestio XIV. Quaeritur utrum Deus sit. Questio XXI. Quaeritur utrum Deum esse per se sit notum.

Studies

John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308)

Texts and translations

Written 1298-1299.


Written in 1308.


Written 1300-1306.
*Opera Omnia*. ("The Vatican edition") Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950-.

Studies


"Duns Scotus has substituted the notion of a "highest thinkable" for Anselm's "that than which a greater cannot be thought." For Scotus, the touchstone of "thinkability" is non-contradiction. He resumes the non-contradictory and therefore the thinkable character of God. He then shows God's existence in two steps: (1) from thinkability to essential reality, and (2) from essence to existence. The first step involves Scotus in some inconsistency and also
comes close to making man's mind the very rule of reality. The second step entails a confusion of internal possibility with total possibility, which ordinarily, beyond internal possibility, includes an external potency."


"In his "Ordinatio", Scotus disregards the constitutive function of thinking inherent to Anselm's "ratio". Scotus's representation of the argument in "Ordinatio" I d. 2 p. 1 q. 2, which lays no claim to "coloratio", eliminates this constitutive function, proving instead by means of a syllogism containing the terms "being", "non-being" and "the highest" the existence of the highest. In the "coloratio" ("Ord." I d. 2 p. 1 q. 1), then, Scotus replaces Anselm's expression "that than which nothing greater can be thought" with the concept "the highest thinkable", by which he means an infinite being. The introduction of an infinite being taken as the highest thinkable, however, destroys the structure of Anselm's argument with its innate coherence. In fact, Scotus proves the existence of the highest thinkable not by means of this argumentative structure, but instead on the basis of his own analysis of certain ontological structures. This proof has no real connection in content to Anselm's argument and does not foster its comprehension; instead, Scotus merely couches his argument in Anselm's terms, so that it is more appropriate to talk about a "coloration rationum Scoti"."


"The paper begins with a reconstruction of Scotus's argument in chapter three (3.23) of his Treatise about the first principle that there can be at most one necessary being. This argument is shown to presuppose that
'necessarily exists' is not a predicate. Scotus' argument is modified to show that he also has to accept that 'exists' is not a predicate. The remaining problem is, then, to explain how Scotus can still accept a "colored" ontological argument. This problem is met by suggesting that the nature of an existing being has more perfections than any nature of a non-existing being but that, still, existence is not one of the features - let alone anything which can be called a perfection -- making up the nature."


**GENERAL STUDIES ON THE ANCIENT PERIOD (BEFORE ANSELM OF CANTERBURY)**


  Translated by Janet Lloyd


  "The first philosopher known to use the concept of necessary existence in order to construct a proof of the existence of God was Avicenna. Avicenna's proof, it will appear, neither is, nor inevitably reduces itself to, an ontological proof. It is rather a certain kind of cosmological proof.
  The concept of necessary existence is used by Avicenna to prove the existence of God in two works, at length in the Najat, briefly and somewhat obscurely in the Isharat. The concept is also discussed fully in two other works, the Shifa and Danesh Namesh, but there Avicenna employs it only to define the nature of God, not, as far as I can see, to establish His existence."


"In this paper I offer an interpretation of the Stoic argumentum ex gradibus entium as it appears in Book II of Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*. In addition to displaying certain similarities to later formulations of the so-called "ontological argument," particularly Anselm's, I argue that the argument ex gradibus entium was a versatile feature of Stoic philosophical theology, capable of employment in relation to two distinct topics: the existence of god and the identification of god's essential nature with the world. I claim that the instance of the argument ex gradibus entium at *ND* II 18-21 is a token of this latter type, and show that there are no textual reasons precluding this interpretation. In light of the fact that the argument can be analyzed more effectively in this role, I suggest that this particular instance of the argument is best thought of as an attempt on the part of the Stoics to identify the world with god rather than as a strict proof for god's bare existence. I end with some reflections on the general type of the Stoic argument qua precursor to two of Anselm's ontological proofs. Although I think it is a mistake to call the Stoic argument "ontological" in a strict sense, it may, I suggest, have shared a similar conceptual underpinning with at least one of Anselm's famous formulations."
Aristotle produced several arguments to vindicate the \textit{futura contingenta} and to refute the conception of modalities which do not allow incidental facts. This conception was coined mainly by Diodorus Cronus and implied the view that whatever may happen, is to happen necessarily. Although Aristotle condemned this view and refuted the theology which it implies, Diodorean modalities were employed by the Scholastics (at least since Abelard, as Leibniz pointed out) to support their theology. Abelard's Diodorean formula reads: God wishes no more and no less than what He is able to do -- i.e., God's ability to do something implies necessity. In the \textit{Summa theologiae}, Thomas Aquinas employed Diodorean modalities along with this result of Abelard's. Leibniz himself confessed his debt to Diodorean modalities as well as to the work of Abelard in formulating his own ontological proof. For the Greek-speaking scholars of the Middle Ages, however, Aristotelian influences were stronger than Diodorean as regards theory building on modalities. The absence of Leibniliike modal ontological proofs in the Greek tradition seems more plausible under these circumstances.

"Ibn Sina (d.429/1037) gave a distinctive argument for the existence of God in his works. Scholars disagree on the exact structure and character of his argument (admittedly, Ibn Sina gives it in more than one form). This paper tries to determine the argument's precise shape and classify it in relation to other such proofs. It attempts this through a detailed analysis of one of the best known presentations of the proof, in Ibn Sina's *Isharat*, which is cross-checked with other versions and the commentaries. The argument is found to build on the proposition that existence occurs in the mind dichotomically, as either necessary or contingent. Ibn Sina claims that an extramental Necessary Existent follows from both modes. In the first case, it is contradictory to posit 'necessary existence' in the mind and deny it outside the mind. In the second case 'contingent existence' is such that it could not be self-explanatory. Most space in Ibn Sina's argument is taken up with showing that contingent existence, even if temporally infinite, ultimately implies necessary existence. On these grounds, it is concluded that Ibn Sina's proof must be classified as both ontological and cosmological, without paradox. It is ontological insofar as 'necessary existence' in intellect is the first basis for arguing for a Necessary Existent in re. It is, however, also cosmological insofar as most of it is taken up with arguing that contingent existents cannot stand alone and must end up in a Necessary Existent."


"An argument for the existence of gods given by the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon and reported by Sextus Empiricus appears to be an ancient version of the ontological argument. In this paper I present a new reconstruction of Diogenes' argument that differs in certain important respects from the reconstruction presented by Jacques Brunschwig. I argue that my reconstruction makes better sense of how Diogenes' argument emerged as a response to an attack on an earlier Stoic argument presented by Zeno of Citium. Diogenes' argument as reconstructed here is an example of a modal ontological argument that makes use of the concept of being of such a nature as to exist. I argue that this concept is a modal concept that is based on the Philonian definition of possibility, and thus that Diogenes' argument is a source of important evidence about the use of non-Stoic modalities in the post-Chrysippean Stoa. I conclude by arguing that the objections made against considering Diogenes' argument as ontological are unfounded and that Diogenes' argument clearly resembles modern versions of modal ontological arguments."


**GENERAL STUDIES ON THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD**


"This study is a follow-up to my previous article, *Duns Scotus and St Anselm's ontological argument*, and traces the history of the controversy about the Anselmian proof from the time when it was first proposed up to the present day. The argument found its strongest opponents in Gaunilo, Aquinas, and Kant, who objected to it on more or less the same ground but from a different perspective, while Bonaventure, Descartes, Leibniz, and Barth came to its support. Between these two opposite positions there is the view of Malcolm and Hartshorne, who see in the "ratio Anselmi" two distinct pieces of reasoning and claim that only one is valid. Koyré and Gilson view the argument within the context of the whole *Proslogion* and other Anselmian works. Each position is carefully analyzed and evaluated."


"St. Anselm's ontological argument is one of the most provocative and fascinating topics in the field of philosophy. Although the subject of endless discussion,
the argument continues to draw the attention of philosophers of different persuasions. New interpretations have superseded those of the past and new insights into the controversy have been revealed which point out, among other things, the difficulty and complexity of the issue.

It has been customary to dismiss the Anselmian argument for the existence of God on the ground that it involves a transition from the ideal to the real order, from a concept in our mind to the existence of the being so conceived. This transition, it is asserted, is never permissible, not even in the case of the greatest conceivable being, as the argument seems to imply. The fact that many great thinkers, such as Aquinas and Kant, have felt a need to refute the argument is a further proof, so it is claimed, that the ratio Anselmi has little more than a historical value. St. Anselm would have fallen victim to an illusion, and no dialectical effort could ever rescue his argument from the attacks of its critics, even though no serious scholar would subscribe today to Schopenhauer's view that the ratio Anselmi is merely a charming joke.

Yet, despite the many attacks and "refutations", the argument has a peculiar power of survival. There is a growing realization, even among those whose philosophical background is very different from St. Anselm's way of thinking, that the argument is not as simple as it first appears to be and that much of the criticism directed against it is due to a superficial knowledge of its context and the general framework of Anselm's thought. As a contemporary author points out, "If Anselm is to be refuted, it should be for what he said, taken in something like the context which he provided, and not for something someone else said he said, or a fragment of what he said, torn wholly out of context." (1) The Anselmian argument, which has been called "one of the boldest creations of man's reason and a credit not only to its inventor, but to human reason itself," (2) is not
to be treated lightly, nor are some of its later formulations. 
An objective study of the Anselmian argument in its actual context and historical development may reveal that, while undue credit has been given to certain modern and contemporary thinkers for their role in the controversy about it, the actual contribution of philosophers who long preceded them in the academic arena has often been neglected or even completely ignored. Yet it is perhaps in the writings of these forgotten masters, who both historically and intellectually are closer to the "father of scholasticism" than their later contenders, that one may find a clue to a better appreciation of the celebrated argument. 
To avoid misunderstanding, a distinction must be made at the very outset between two different issues: first, the nature and scope of the argument in the mind of its author, and second, the validity of the argument as an attempt to prove the existence of God. The first issue must be solved in terms of the argument's original text as contained in the Proslogion and set in relation to Anselm's other writings where his philosophical, and especially his epistemological, doctrines are more clearly stated. The solution of the second issue rests to a great extent on the critic's conviction as regards the possibility, ways, and means of attaining to any knowledge of a Supreme Being by unaided reason. The failure to make such a distinction has contributed to much of the confusion in appraisals of the Anselmian proof. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the essential features of the ontological argument as stated in the Proslogion and follow the history of the controversy it has generated from Anselm's first debate with his fellow-monk Gaunilo down to the present day. The presentation will be followed by a critical evaluation of the argument itself and of the argument's interpretations by succeeding philosophers and commentators." pp. 107-108


  About St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent

  "We need only look back upon the history of medieval philosophy to become immediately aware that it was not only Gaunilon who saw reason to criticise Anselm's
famous argument. I would like to examine here, in a rather sketchy manner, two medieval critiques of Anselm's argument which, to my mind, are quite unique and which, in many ways, far surpass in cogency and relevancy the common criticisms found in textbooks. The first I gather from certain remarks of William of Occam which, are not directed precisely at Anselm's argument, but which are naturally applicable to it. The second is the critique of Gregory of Rimini. Occam's critique, it will be seen, rests upon a very subtle logical point, which is somewhat unique in medieval philosophy and which anticipates views in modern symbolic logic. Occam was recognized even in his own day as somewhat of an innovator, although we have since learned that there were others of his contemporaries of even more radical stature.

The second critique I gather from Gregory of Rimini, a younger contemporary of Occam, whose thought evinces certain affinities to that of the latter. Rimini's fame among logicians of modern symbolic logic who attempt to see anticipations of later more sophisticated developments in medieval philosophy, rests upon his doctrine of the complexe significabile which seems to be a subtle anticipation of our modern notion of a proposition, or at least of the Fregean notion of the "object" of thought.

It should be remarked also, by way of introduction, that a great deal of the ideas and interpretations as well as of the scholarly references utilized in this paper came to me through discussions with my former teacher and friend of happy memory, the late, Julius R. Weinberg." pp. 55-56.
Selected Bibliography on History of the Ontological Argument from Suárez to Frege

A selection of primary authors
Legenda: P = Pro (accept the proof); C = Contra (rejected the proof); I = indifferent (take no position on the proof).
References are to the most important works where ontological argument is discussed.
- P Francisco Suárez
- P René Descartes
- C Pierre Gassendi
- P Henry More
- P Ralph Cudworth
- P Baruch Spinoza
- P Nicolas Malebranche
- P Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
- P François Fénelon
- P Samuel Clarke
- P Christian Wolff
- C David Hume
- P Alexander Baumgarten
- C Immanuel Kant
- P Moses Mendelssohn
- P Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
- P Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling
- C Ludwig Feuerbach
- P Robert Flint
- PFranz Brentano
- C Gottlob Frege

Francisco Suárez (1548-1617)
Texts and translations

  
The first edition was published in Salamanca (Spain) in 1597 (two volumes) and reprinted in the Luis Vivés edition: R. P. Francisci Suárez e societate Jesu, *Opera omnia* - in 26 volumes (1856-1861) with two additional volumes of indexes (27-28); the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* are in vols. 25-26.
  
The only complete translation is: *Disputaciones metafísicas*, edición y traducción de Sergio Rabade Romeo, Salvador Caballero Sanchez, Antonio Puigcerver Zanón, Madrid Editorial Gredos, 1960-1966 (7 vols.).

  
  XXVIII: *De divisione entis in infinitum et finitum*; XXIX: *De Primo et increato Ente, an sit*.
  
  Translated and edited with an introduction (pp. X-XXIV) by John P. Doyle.

Studies


---

**René Descartes (1596-1650)**

Texts and translations

  French translation by Charles d'Albert, duc du Luyne (1647).


  Written in 1641; See the III and V Meditations.
  *Œuvres complètes* edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, originally published 1897-1913 in 12 volumes. Vol. VII.

Studies


  A discussion of the Gouhier-Gueroult controversy on the purpose of placing the ontological argument in Descartes' Fifth Meditation.

The ontological arguments of (1) the *Fifth Meditation* and (2) the *Principles* and the Response to the Second set of Objections differ in that they have two distinct major premises. By means of a set of interlocking distinctions, I show how one might deal with the vicious circle as well as resolve the dispute between Gueroult and Gouhier on the standing of the ontological argument in the *Fifth Meditation*.


In Descartes' presentation of his a priori proof in the Fifth Meditation, there are three sorts of problems often passed over by commentators which will occupy me here. In each case, I will first present the problem as clearly as I
can and then consider some important information found in the First Set of Objections and Replies concerning a solution of the problem." p. 413.


Abstract: "In this paper, I argue that commentators have missed a significant clue given by Descartes in coming to understand his 'ontological' proof for the existence of God. In both the analytic and synthetic presentations of the proof throughout his writings, Descartes notes that the proof works 'in the same way' as a particular geometrical proof. I explore the significance of such a parallel, and conclude that Descartes could not have intended readers to think that the argument consists of some kind of intuition. I argue that for Descartes the attribute of existence is a 'second-order' attribute that is demonstrated to belong to the idea of God on the basis of 'first-order' attributes. The proof, properly understood, is in fact a demonstration. Having brought to light the geometrical parallels between the ontological and geometrical proofs, we have new evidence to resolve the 'intuition versus demonstration' controversy that has characterized much of the discussion of Descartes's ontological argument."


One might wonder what Aquinas's response would have been to Descartes' unique form of the ontological argument. He certainly would not, as Descartes seems to
think, find it compatible with his own natural theology. But how exactly would he have read it? Although one can only guess, I believe he would have read it as a failed attempt to gain a supernatural knowledge of God by the natural light of reason alone. More specifically, he would have seen it as an attempt to attain a knowledge of God that is accessible only to the elect in heaven who enjoy the beatific vision.

We have seen that Aquinas rejects the possibility of all natural knowledge which does not originate in the senses and is independent of any sense-based image. This, of course, holds true for natural knowledge of God as well. However, these conditions do not pertain to the state of beatitude. In that state, Aquinas tells us, the saints in heaven are granted an intellectual vision of the essence of God to which no created similitude is adequate. They are said to see the divine essence by an uncreated similitude which, by virtue of being uncreated, cannot be produced by the abstractive activity of the intellect upon the image. Here the intellect has a direct apprehension of its object which is not grounded in sense perception. Two features of this account should strike us as familiar; the beatific vision is an intellectual vision of the essence of God, and it is not attained by the abstraction from an image. These features are familiar because they are the very features we have found to characterize Descartes' account of clear and distinct knowledge of God. Such knowledge, Descartes claims, is of the nature of God, and as it is attained only as the mind withdraws from any presentation of the senses or the imagination, it is independent of any image.

We may also recall that for Descartes the existence of God is immediately and evidently known because in clearly and distinctly perceiving the divine nature one also perceives that existence pertains to that nature. Aquinas, because he denies that we can have such natural knowledge of the essence of God, denies that the existence of God is self-evident. Presumably, though, this
would not be the case for the saints in heaven who are not bound by dependence on the senses or reliance on images. We would expect that they, enjoying the vision of the essence of God, would have the kind of immediate and evident knowledge of the existence of God that Descartes claims for himself. And this, it turns out, is exactly what we find. Aquinas writes that "just as it is evident to us that a whole is greater than a part of itself, so to those seeing the divine essence in itself it is supremely self-evident that God exists because His essence is His being" (Summa contra Gentiles I, 11, V, 5). Once again, Descartes claims to see what Aquinas believes God has reserved only for the eyes of the beatified." pp. 448-449.


Many philosophers have claimed that Descartes' ontological proof rests on the assumption that existence is not a property and have then tried to attack that assumption by arguing that existence assertions are not subject-predicate assertions. I try to show that this kind of attack on Descartes is misguided. I distinguish a 'semantic' and an 'ontological' criterion of propertyhood. I argue that 1) Descartes' argument at most requires that existence be a property in the ontological, not the semantic, sense; and that 2) if existence assertions are not subject-predicate assertions it follows only that existence is not a property in the semantic sense."


Consider the following traditional criticism of Descartes' ontological argument. "Either Descartes' first premiss
('God is a supremely perfect being') is a categorical assertion, in which case his argument begs the question by assuming the existence of a subject of such an assertion, or it is a disguised hypothetical assertion, in which case Descartes' conclusion --' God exists' -- will also be hypothetical and so will lack existential import. Anthony Kenny has recently argued that this criticism can be avoided by construing Descartes' first premiss as a non-question-begging, but nevertheless categorical, assertion. I consider a number of different ways of so construing Descartes' initial premiss, e.g., as an assertion about a being in fiction or (following Anselm) a being in the understanding, or an assertion about a Meinongian "pure object" (Kenny's example). I argue that construing Descartes' first premiss in any of these ways does nothing to avoid the heart of the traditional criticism.


A successful ontological argument must meet Caterus's objection that the argument's conclusion lacks existential import. Caterus thought this was true of Descartes's argument because Descartes's conclusion was merely a hypothetical, or conditional, statement. However, it is easy -- by a device I call "subjectizing" the argument - to produce an ontological argument with a categorical, not hypothetical, conclusion. Anselm's arguments, as well as certain contemporary modal arguments, are "subjectized" and so appear to avoid the Caterus objection. This paper examines the nature of the subjectizing process and argues that even though it yields ontological arguments with categorical conclusions it guarantees that those conclusions still lack existential import.


• Kenny, Anthony P. 1969. "Descartes' Ontological Argument." In *Fact and Existence*, edited by Margolis, Joseph, 18-36. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Symposium with Anthony Kenny (pp. 18-36), Norman Malcolm (pp. 36-43), Terence Penelhum (pp. 43-55), comments by Bernard Williams (pp. 55-56) and Ernest Sosa (pp. 56-58) and reply by Anthony Kenny (pp. 58-62).

Can God be the efficient cause of Himself (Causa Sui)? It is well known that Descartes answers this question in the affirmative, but it is considerably less clear why. The main contention of the essay is that Descartes advances the *causa sui* doctrine because he came to think that the ontological proof of *Meditation V* required it. We argue these contentions through a close analysis of Descartes' initial articulation of *causa sui* in response to Caterus, followed by attention to the reformulation of the doctrine in response to the logical objections posed by Arnauld. Our understanding of *causa sui* as a move made within the horizon of the ontological proof not only illuminates why Descartes would have defended a doctrine as conceptually problematic as *causa sui*, but also provides an alternative to Jean-Luc Marion's view that *causa sui* constitutes a third, distinct proof for the existence of God.


I argue that Descartes intended the so-called ontological "argument" as a self-validating intuition, rather than as a formal proof. The textual evidence for this view is highly compelling, but the strongest support comes from understanding Descartes's diagnosis for why God's existence is not *immediately* self-evident to everyone and the method of analysis that he develops for making it self-evident. The larger aim of the paper is to use the
ontological argument as a case study of Descartes's non-formalist theory of deduction and his method of analysis, showing how he conceives the latter as a form of philosophical therapy."


We argue that Descartes's theistic proofs in the Meditations are much simpler and straightforward than they are traditionally taken to be. In particular, we show how the causal argument of the "Third Meditation" depends on the intuitively innocent principle that nothing comes from nothing, and not on the more controversial principle that the objective reality of an idea must have a cause with at least as much formal reality. We also demonstrate that the so-called ontological "argument" of the "Fifth Meditation" is best understood not as a formal proof but as an axiom, revealed as self-evident by analytic meditation."


Available at UMI Dissertation Express. Order number: 7002919.

Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655)
Texts and translations


  *Recherches métaphysiques, ou Doutes et instances contre la métaphysique de R. Descartes et ses réponses* (Answer to Descartes' reply to Gassendi's objections published in 1644).
  Texte établi, traduit et annoté par Bernard Rochot.


  Written in 1644.
  *Œuvres complètes* edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, originally published 1897-1913 in 12 volumes. Vol. VII.

Studies


  "In rejecting Descartes's ontological proof for the existence of God, Gassendi maintained that existence is not a property and Kant said that it is not a "real predicate". It is commonly supposed that both are making the same claim. Some have even thought that they advance essentially the same argument for that same claim. I believe none of this is correct. Gassendi and Kant offer different arguments. And they are arguing for different conclusions. These differences stem from a more fundamental one: they mean different things by existence."

**Henry More (1614-1687)**
Texts


Studies

**Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688)**

Texts

  First edition 1678.

Studies

**Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677)**

Texts and translations


First edition 1677.


Written in 1661; first edition 1854.
Critical edition with introduction and Italian translation by Filippo Mignini: *Breve trattato su Dio, l'uomo e il suo bene*.

Studies


"My chief concern in this paper is the question: in what way, if at all, did Spinoza incorporate the Ontological Proof of the Existence of God (OP) into his philosophical system? It may be proper, however, to first consider another question: what kind of proof of the existence of God is it appropriate to call 'ontological'? This cannot be gathered from Spinoza's writings for the simple reason that the term was coined more than a century after his death. It was done by Kant in his Transcendental Dialectic within his classification of the traditional arguments for the existence of God, each class to be refuted in its turn. (1)

There is enough textual evidence to show that in the refutation of the OP Kant was taking issue with an argument found in Descartes's texts, first and foremost in his Fifth Meditation. Once christened 'ontological',
however, arguments of this pattern have been traced by post-Kantian scholars to works of philosophers both preceding and succeeding Descartes. The search for the origin led eventually to St. Anselm's *Proslogion*, which has been recognized as containing the classical version of the OP. Still, Descartes's rendition remained a milestone in the history of the OP, both in view of Descartes's impact upon the whole course of modern philosophy and of the importance of the OP in the Cartesian system. This is particularly relevant to our context in view of the considerable impact of Descartes upon Spinoza's philosophy.

Under the circumstances a comparative analysis of St. Anselm's, Descartes's and Spinoza's versions of the OP will prepare the ground for dealing with my main question. In adopting this strategy I follow Harry Wolfson. (2) In my view, however, Wolfson's implementation of this method resulted in a highly objectionable conception of the OP. Let us examine Wolfson's argument to see what I have in mind."


"First, I give Spinoza's version of the ontological argument for God's existence. Then I logically reconstruct this version, showing how to avoid any first-order existence predicate, as well as any misuse of proper names and definite descriptions. Thus, I show how Spinoza may avoid objections of Kant, Frege, and Russell. However, my logical reconstruction requires the questionable premise: "every causally necessary being is logically (metaphysically) necessary". Conclusion: modal confusion is unavoidable in the ontological argument."

"Spinoza's arguments for the existence of God in proposition xi of the *Ethics* are usually characterized as ontological, and are often said, in spite of Spinoza's argumentation, essentially to report the results of a private "rational perception." I argue that Spinoza offers four interrelated arguments which resemble ontological arguments in being essentially a priori and in relying on a definition of "God," but which resemble cosmological arguments in depending on a version of the principle of sufficient reason. These arguments are valid; if sound, they would show that a sufficiently rational being could indeed "rationally perceive" the necessary existence of God."


"I argue that Spinoza's ontological argument is successful when it is understood to have two premises: (i) it is possible for God to exist, (ii) it is necessary that, if God exists, he necessarily does. The argument is valid in S5. Spinoza is in a position to establish the second premise of the argument on the basis of his definitions and axioms. The first premise was assumed to be true, but, as Leibniz noted, it must be established for the conclusion of the argument to be forthcoming. This is one of the main problems with the argument, and it requires a solution to the problem of the attributes. Certain alternate interpretations of Spinoza are then argued to be deficient on textual and logical grounds."


"It is often thought that, although Spinoza develops a bold and distinctive conception of God (the unique substance, or Natura Naturans, in which all else inheres and which possesses infinitely many attributes, including extension), the arguments that he offers which purport to prove God's existence contribute nothing new to natural theology. Rather, he is seen as just another participant in the seventeenth century revival of the ontological argument initiated by Descartes and taken up by Malebranche and Leibniz among others. That this is the case is both puzzling and unfortunate. It is puzzling because although Spinoza does offer an ontological proof for the existence of God, he also offers three other non-ontological proofs. It is unfortunate because these other non-ontological proofs are both more convincing and more interesting than his ontological proof. In this paper, I offer reconstructions and assessments of all of Spinoza's arguments and argue that Spinoza's metaphysical rationalism and his commitment to something like a Principle of Sufficient Reason are the driving force behind Spinoza's non-ontological arguments."


"Bar-On proposes to show how the ontological proof is incorporated, if at all, into Spinoza's philosophical system. Preliminary to that he wants, following Wolfson's strategy, to consider the nature of the ontological proof. Preliminary to that, in turn, he wants to show that Wolfson's claims about the ontological proofs in Anselm, Descartes, and Spinoza are "highly objectionable"."
I should like in my comments to begin by defending Wolfson. It seems to me that his claims are not "highly objectionable". They are in fact well focussed and more consistent with Bar-On's analysis than he believes them to be." p. 101

"I should like in conclusion to say something about the uses of modal logic in our understanding of proofs which have been classified as ontological. Some and perhaps much of the recent revival of interest in such proofs stems from the revived interest in modal logic and the belief that ontological arguments can be translated into modal arguments. I do not propose to go into those various efforts with respect to Anselm's and Descartes's versions, although the extent to which those efforts succeed, fail or are misapplied is itself illuminating. I should like just to mention in passing one such attempt with respect to Spinoza. In a paper "Spinoza's Ontological Argument" Charles Jarett (*) argues that if we interpret the first part of the Ethics as claiming that
(1) It is possible that God exists
(2) Necessarily (If God exists then he exists necessarily) it follows in one of the strong modal systems (with some constraints on what is known as the Barcan formula) that
(3) Necessarily God exists.
I do not propose to discuss whether such an argument can be culled from the Ethics. A strong case has been made for it. As it and many such attempts stand, it is not an ontological argument which is being presented. It does not have the requisite epistemological features. There is no conditional which takes us from what is conceived to what is known or to what exists. There is no argument to warrant the identification of conceivable with possible. Indeed, if the modal operators are taken as operators for logical, or what Kripke has lately called metaphysical possibility and necessity, then modal arguments like Jarett's, if valid, would remain valid in the absence of an epistemological subject or an idea of God altogether. Still, modal logic is not without its uses in sorting out some of
the confusions which stem from the interplay of modal and epistemic notions and in clarifying such relationships as they occur in rationalist arguments like the cogito and the ontological proofs." p. 119


"This paper attempts to characterize the "ontological proof" for the existence of God. It discusses Wolfson's analysis of the proof and argues that his characterization is not mistaken but insufficient. It is then argued that the characterization here proposed provides a good account of Anselm's and Descartes' proof, but shows that there is no "ontological proof" in Spinoza. The paper concludes by identifying a confusion between metaphysical and epistemological notions, which conflates very different arguments under the heading "ontological proof"."


"In spite of the prima facie differences between Spinoza and Heidegger, I argue that Heidegger's views in his 1929 lecture, *Was ist Metaphysik?*, are both consistent with, and supplemental to, the basic premise of Spinoza's ontological argument in Part One of his *Ethics*. According to this view, being held out into the nothing, in Heidegger's sense, is a condition without which substance can not be adequately conceived, while at the same time, being held out into the nothing does not preclude the possibility that substance, defined as an infinite being without negation, does exist."


"Spinoza's reasoning for proposition eleven of *Ethics* pivots on the sentence 'The infinite substance cannot be conceived not to exist'. This sentence figures in two inferences, for one of which its description needs to have wide -- and its negation narrow - scope, whereas for the other these scopes needs to be narrow and wide respectively. That is how Spinoza managed to persuade himself that he had demonstrated from certain premises that the infinite substance necessarily exists, though in fact this conclusion is not entailed by those premises."

**Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715)**
Texts and translations

  First edition 1674.

  First edition 1688.

Studies


  Chapter III § e): *God as Being. The Ontological Proof* pp. 143-150.

---

**Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)**

Texts and translations

- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1676. *Quod Ens Perfectissimum Sit Possibile*.

———. 1678. *Epistola Ad Hermannum Conringium De Cartesiana Demonstratione Existentiae Dei*.


———. 1697. *Animadversiones in Partem Generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum*.


———. 1700. [*De La Démonstration Cartesienne De L'existence De Dieu*].


• ———. 1714. Monadologie.


Studies


"The metaphysical core of Leibniz's philosophical theology has attracted less attention than its intrinsic interest deserves. In some ways it is also the core of his metaphysics. It is intricately connected with his logical doctrines and is the context for his fullest reflections about the nature of existence and of essence, and also
about the most general structural relationships of the properties of things. These topics are discussed in Part II of the book, in the framework of a comprehensive study of Leibniz's treatment of the ontological argument for the existence of God, which I regard as exceptionally interesting. I do not think Leibniz's or any other version of the ontological argument is likely to convince many people of the existence of God, but a related argument, which seems to me to have more persuasive force, and perhaps to be the most promising of all a priori arguments for the existence of God, is discussed in Chapter 7. One reason for the neglect of this part of Leibniz's thought is that its fullest development, in most respects, came in his early years, and many of the most important texts were quite inaccessible until the relevant volume of the Academy edition of Leibniz's works (A VI,iii) was published in 1980. I have tried to give a full account of the most important texts." pp. 4-5


"According to Leibniz, Descartes' ontological argument establishes that if God possibly exists then God exists. To complete the argument a proof that God possibly exists is required. Leibniz attempts a proof-theoretic demonstration that 'God exists' is consistent and concludes from this that 'God possibly exists is true'. In this paper I formalize Leibniz's argument in a system of modal logic. I show that a principle which Leibniz implicitly uses, 'if \( a \) is consistent then \( a \) is possibly true' is either mistaken or useless in completing the ontological argument."


"Leibniz' critical remarks on the Abbé Bucquoi's *Pensées sur l'Existence de Dieu* -- written in November 1711, (1) between the publication of his *Essais de Théodicée* (1710) (2) and his departure for the final visit to Vienna (1712) that yielded the *Monadology* and the *Principles of*
Nature and Grace (3) -- are published here, for the first time, by generous permission of the Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek, Hannover. (4) They do not revolutionize our view of Leibniz' philosophy; but they do throw a little additional light on his doubts about Descartes' version of the ontological proof of the existence of God. (5) And they provide an opportunity to recall some of the facts about the existence of the Abbé Bucquoi - one of the liveliest philosophical adventurers of Leibniz' day."

(1) Leibniz' unpublished manuscript is listed in Kurt Müller and Gisela Krönen (eds.), Leben und Werk von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Eine Chronik (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), p. 227. Dr. Gerda Utermöhlen, of the LeibnizArchiv, Hannover, made it possible for me to see and transcribe Leibniz' manuscript in September 1982

(2) Leibniz, Essais de Theodicee sur la Bonté de Dieu, la Liberté de l'Homme, et l'Origine du Mal (Amsterdam, 1710)


(4) Through the kind intercession of Dr. Gerda Utermöhlen

(5) For a good brief account of these doubts, see Robert Latta's edition of The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings (Oxford Press, 1898), pp. 274-277. For a brilliant but less sympathetic account, see Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (Cambridge, 1900), pp. 172-175

- Tortolone, Gian Michele. 1990. "La Trattazione Dell'argomento Ontologico Nel Carteggio LeibniJaquelot (1702-1704)." Filosofía no. 41:69-101

François Fénelon (1651-1715)
**Texts and translations**

  
  First edition 1713.
  
  Édition critique établie par Jean-Louis Dumas.

**Studies**

---

### Samuel Clarke (1675-1729)

**Texts**

  
  First edition 1705.
  
  Reprint: *A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and Other Writings* - Edited by Ezio Vailati.

**Studies**

---

### Christian Wolff (1679-1754)
Texts and translations

  

Studies


*David Hume (1711-1776)*
Texts

  
  First edition 1779 (on the *a priori* arguments for the existence of God, see part IX).
  
  Reprinted in: *Principal writings on religion including Dialogues concerning natural religion; The natural history of religion* - Edited with an introduction by J.C.A. Gaskin.

Studies


*Alexander Baumgarten (1714-1762)*

First edition 1740.


Translation and introduction by Gordon Treash.


First edition 1781, second edition 1787.
Reprint edited by Georg Mohr and Marcus Willaschek.


First edition 1763.
Studies


"In this article, I establish a conceptual link between Claude Buffier, a French Jesuit of the beginning of the eighteenth century, and Immanuel Kant, pertaining to the question of the refutation of the ontological argument. By using the same 'monetary' example, the two thinkers deal with the question of exteriority and conceptualization. However, there are differences in their treatment of the ontological argument. After providing a detailed analysis of the relevant points in Buffier's *Metaphysical Conversations* and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* I argue that Buffier's work truly influenced Kant, but I deny that the Konigsbergean was guilty of plagiarism. Yet, even if they are concerned with the same problem, there are obvious philosophical differences between the French partisan of common sense and the German philosopher."


"Traditional interpretations claim that Kant criticizes the ontological argument for invoking a logically flawed concept of necessary existence. They further claim that Kant produces "good" arguments supporting this criticism. This paper claims that none of Kant's
arguments support the criticism, but that he is not trying to produce such arguments anyway. His objections to the ontological argument are epistemological, not logical. He thinks that although we cannot have good reason to believe that there is a necessarily existent being, we can certainly believe or have faith that such a being exists, and hence that the concept of such a being is logically in the clear."


"Kant's arguments that existence is not a first-level property can be seen as motivated by what I call his "doctrine of isomorphism." The supposition that existence is a first-level predicate is rejected because it conflicts with this doctrine. I argue that there is no conflict provided one does not confuse "intentional" and "extensional" claims about the object of a concept. Thus Kant's arguments fail. Kant also claimed that existence "is" a "second" -level property. but his argument for that claim -- which anticipates Frege's argument for the same view -- also fails."


"Kant maintained that the cogency of the cosmological argument depends on that of the ontological, and that the appeal to experience in the former is therefore superfluous. I sketch a way of looking at both arguments which allows one to reject Kant's charges. Central to that sketch is regarding the common conclusion of both
arguments, viz., that there (necessarily) exists an "ens realissimum" (or supreme being, or God), as a necessary, but a posteriori, proposition. The cosmological arguer can thus quite coherently reject the ontological argument and also maintain that empirical, a posteriori, premisses are indispensable in any proof of a supreme being."


"Let us call the Dependency Theses (DT) the view, first stated by Kant, that certain versions of the cosmological argument depend on the ontological argument. At least two different reasons have been given for the supposed dependence. Given the DT, some of Aquinas' views about God's essence, and about our knowledge of God's existence, can seem, at least at first, to be inconsistent. I consider two different ways of defending Aquinas against this suspicion of inconsistency. On the first defense, based on a widespread understanding of his notion of necessary being', Aquinas' views fall outside the scope of the DT. The success of this defense is doubtful. There is, however, another defense to be found in Aquinas' work, one directed not to avoiding, but actually to rejecting, the DT. In this second defense, the DT is not a correct assessment even of those views that "do" fall within its scope. It success means that Aquinas had available a principled refutation of the DT some five hundred years before it was first formulated."


"Kant's refutation rests on the principle that without empirical evidence no existence can be asserted, or
proved, "a priori". But he himself provides a cogent argument, in *Kritik der reinen vernunft* A 657, B 679, why the idea of reason (which he equates with the idea of God or *ens realissimum*) must be affirmed as unreservedly objectively valid, because it is the indispensable *a priori* condition of there being any empirical evidence of the existence of anything whatsoever. And that is precisely the nub of the ontological argument."


- Hintikka, Jaakko. 1981. "Kant on Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument." *Dialectica* no. 35:128-146. Reprinted in: Simo Knuuttila and J. Hintikka (eds.) - *The logic of Being* - Dordrecht, Reidel 1986 pp. 249-268. "The ontological argument fails because of an operator order switch between (1) "necessarily there is an (existentially) perfect being" and (2) "there is a being which necessarily is (existentially) perfect". Here (1) is trivially true logically but (2) is problematic. Since Kant's criticisms were directed at the notion of existence, not at the step from (1) to (2), they are misplaced. They are also wrong, because existence can be a predicate. Moreover, Kant did not anticipate Frege's claim that "is" ("ist") is ambiguous between existence, predication, identity, and class-inclusion. To restore the ontological argument, an extra premise is needed to the effect (roughly) that it is known who the existentially perfect being is. The question is raised whether Kant could have meant the failure of this extra premise by his thesis that existence is not a "real" predicate."

Kant's rejection of speculative proofs of the existence of God, his critique of the ontological argument, and his contention that the cosmological argument is necessarily linked to the ontological argument are familiar parts of the Critique of Pure Reason. In spite of their familiarity, however, they remain inadequately understood and appreciated in several respects. First, the importance of Kant's criticism of theistic arguments to the overall argument of the first Critique is sometimes overlooked. I shall argue that a necessary condition of the success of Kant's Critical enterprise is successful refutation of the theistic proofs on grounds which do not presuppose the distinctive conclusions of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic, i.e., which do not assume the distinctive positions of Kant's Critical philosophy. Second, the sense in which Kant takes the cosmological argument to be necessarily linked to the ontological argument is often misunderstood, and Kant's success in establishing that link is overestimated. I shall argue that Kant fails to show that the success of the cosmological argument is tied to that of the ontological argument. Third, the complexity of Kant's critique of the ontological argument is often overlooked in summary invocations of the dictum that existence is not a predicate. I shall exhibit some of the dialectical complexity of that critique, and
show that, even if Kant succeeds in refuting the ontological argument, he fails to discredit constitutive employment of the notion of a highest reality (ens realissimum).

I shall conclude that Kant's critique of the theistic proofs fails to support the restrictive epistemology of the Critical philosophy, that the cosmological argument in particular emerges unscathed from Kant's attack, and that, contrary to Kant, it is the ontological argument which requires the cosmological argument as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition of its legitimacy." pp. 167-168.


**Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786)**


"In the Eighteenth century the ontological proof of the existence of God, together with the rational theology, was widely undervalued, Moses Mendelssohn endeavored to show the strength of the cosmological as well as of the ontological argument. He followed, and also renewed, the ontology of the Leibniz-Wolff-Baumgarten school. Kant, while trying to show, in his own critique, that the dogmatic metaphysics was an illusion, acknowledged nevertheless that it reached his acme in the _Morgenstunden_ of Mendelssohn. Mendelssohn was prevented by bad health from assimilating Kant's critique, but was left unmoved by the refutation of the proofs of the existence of God. He did his utmost to meet the objections of Kant. He rightly felt he was not antipodal to Kant who, though he criticized the theoretical foundations of rational theology, never gave up his faith in God.

---

**Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)**
Texts and translations

  

  
  Edited and translated, with introduction and notes, by Peter C. Hodgson.
  See *The Ontological Proof (From the 1831 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion)* pp. 187-194.

Studies


  "What is, perhaps, most remarkable in all this is the fact that Hegel's philosophical concern with and extensive treatment of God should have come in the immediate wake of Kant's apparently irrefutable invalidation of all philosophical "proofs" for the existence of God. On the
other hand, nothing gives us a clearer insight into the character of Hegel's philosophizing than his contention—thrown in the teeth of romantics and rationalists alike—that the proper task of philosophy is to think the same content of which religion affords only a representation (Vorstellung). In this connection it is significant that the form of argumentation to which he devotes the most time and accords the most respect is the so-called "ontological argument," which had been advanced by St. Anselm. According to Kant all arguments for the existence of God are ultimately reducible to the ontological argument and are thus equally invalid. According to Hegel all arguments must ultimately be reduced to the ontological argument and thus share its validity as a description of the human spirit's elevation to God. To understand this would require a complete grasp of the "System" in its entirety and, above all, a minute understanding of the Logic whose movement constitutes an extended presentation of the ontological argument. It would in addition require a most accurate understanding of Hegel's severe and sometimes almost violent critique of Kant, which is constantly cropping up in his writings -- nowhere more tellingly than in his introduction to "Subjective Logic" (Wissenschaft der Logik II 213-234). In any event -- and paradoxically enough -- whether one prefers to look upon Hegel as an atheist or a theist, there is no way of grasping the movement of his philosophizing without carefully studying his treatment of the "proofs" for the existence of God." pp. 444-445.

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling
(1775-1854)

Texts and translations

  
  First edition 1843.

  
  First edition 1834.

  
  Lectures delivered in 1831-1832, as transcribed by J. M. Wachtl and published for the first time in 1992; edited by Walter E. Ehrhardt.

Studies


This paper concerns the way in which the transition from negative to positive philosophy is executed in Schelling's critique of modern philosophy. Schelling's original insight is that the transition occurs within negative philosophy by means of a twofold experience within philosophical reflection: (1) recognizing the failure of the idealist project of the conceptual determination of Being, and (2) the reversal of the idealist conception of the relation between concepts and their objects. I argue that Schelling uses a form of the ontological argument, focusing on Anselm's formula *aliquid, quo nihil maius cogitari potest*, both in his critique of traditional formulations of the argument and to navigate the transition to positive philosophy.


*Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872)*
**Texts and translations**


  

**Studies**

**Robert Flint (1838-1910)**

**Texts**


**Franz Brentano (1838-1917)**

**Texts and translations**

  
  Aus seinem Nachlasse herausgegeben, eingeleitet und mit erläuternden Anmerkungen und Register versehen von
Alfred Kastil.


Studies


"The article is a logical analysis of Brentano's objections against St. Anselm's ontological reasoning for God's existence in the context of J. Seifert's *Gott als Gottesbeweis*. One Anselmian argument, which Brentano rejects, is seen to be valid when interpreted in free logic. The conclusion of Brentano's interpretation of a second argument is shown to be a key premise in various recent modal ontological arguments considered valid by many. Finally, the parallelism is pointed out between Anselm's *verbum* (or *vox*) plus its *extranea significatio* and *id ipsum quod res est intelligitur*, Seifert's conceptual-subjective and essential-objective aspects, and propositions and states of affairs in possible worlds semantics."

**Gottlob Frege (1848-1925)**
Texts and translations

  See § 53.


  Translated and edited, with introductory essay, by Erich H. Reck and Steve Awodey; based on the German text, edited, with introduction and annotations, by Gottfried Gabriel.

Studies

  "'God possesses all perfections; existence is a perfection; therefore, God possesses existence, i.e., God exists.' Many philosophers have claimed that: 1) Descartes' ontological proof of the existence of God rests on the assumption that existence is a first-level, or first-order, property (attribute, quality), a property of individuals such as horses or buildings or you and me. Some of these same philosophers have then gone on to argue that:
2) Existence is actually a second-level property, a property of concepts, or of properties, or even of propositional functions. (A similar claim is made by saying that the concept of existence is of second-level.)

3) Therefore, existence is not a first-level property.

4) Therefore, Descartes' argument fails.

Although I do not believe claim 1) has ever adequately been made out, I shall, for the purpose of this paper, assume it to be true. I shall also assume that the inference from claim 2) to claim 3) is valid.

To my knowledge the most elaborate defense of the idea that existence is a second-level property has been put forth by Frege. In this paper I will discuss that defense and argue that it fails."


"It is a well-known remark of Frege's that his definition of existence invalidated the ontological argument for the existence of God. That has subsequently often been taken for granted. This paper attempts to investigate, whether rightly so. For this purpose, both Frege's ontological doctrine and the ontological argument are outlined. Arguments in favor and against both are considered, and reduced to five specific questions. It is argued that whether Frege's remark was right depends on what the answers to these questions are, and that for the seemingly most plausible ones -- it was not."

GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE MODERN PERIOD


"In order to sketch a possible answer, one would have to analyze conceptually what Kant calls the "ontological argument". This analysis should proceed in three stages: (a) determining the characteristics that Kant attributes to this concept of "ontological argument"; (b) verifying whether, and how, some of the thinkers from the metaphysical tradition announce or sanction the characteristics of the "ontological argument"; (c) deciding whether or not some of its figures -- in particular, those conferred on it by Anselm and Descartes, who do not use
the qualifier "ontological" -- are exceptions to these characteristics."


Selected Bibliography on the History of the Ontological Argument from Barth to the Present Time (1931-2020)

A selection of primary authors
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heinrich Scholz</td>
<td>Pro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Barth</td>
<td>Pro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robin George Collingwood</td>
<td>Pro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Hartshorne</td>
<td>Pro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Niemeyer Findlay</td>
<td>Contra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurt Gödel</td>
<td>Pro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Malcolm</td>
<td>Pro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Berg</td>
<td>Pro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Howard Sobel</td>
<td>Contra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alvin Plantinga</td>
<td>Pro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Kellogg Lewis</td>
<td>Contra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Maydole</td>
<td>Pro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graham Oppy</td>
<td>Contra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Pruss</td>
<td>Pro</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Heinrich Scholz (1884-1956)**
Texts


Studies


"The anti-metaphysical attitude of the neo-positivist movement is notorious. It is an essential mark of what its members regarded as the scientific world view. The paper focuses on a metaphysical variation of the scientific world view as proposed by Heinrich Scholz and his Münster group, who can be regarded as a peripheral part of the movement. They used formal ontology for legitimizing the use of logical calculi. Scholz's relation to the neo-positivist movement and his contributions to logic and foundations are discussed. His heuristic background can be drawn from a set of six methodological 'articles of faith', formulated in 1942 and published here for the first time."

Karl Barth (1886-1968)
Texts and translations

  

  
  Translated by Ian W. Robertson; reprinted Pittsburgh, Pickwick Press, 1975.

Studies


**Robin George Collingwood (1889-1943)**

Texts


  The 1919 *Lectures on the Ontological Proof of the Existence of God*, Bodleian library, Collingwood dep. 2 (almost 100 pages) are unpublished.
  First edition 1940.
  Revised edition, with an introduction by Rex Martin.

  First edition 1933.
  Revised edition, with an introduction by James Connelly and Giuseppina D'Oro.

Studies


  "This paper assesses the nature of Collingwood's rehabilitation of the ontological argument through a close reading of Collingwood's private correspondence with Ryle following the publication of "An Essay on Philosophical Method." The paper asks whether Collingwood's rehabilitation of the ontological proof entails that he is committed to a form of precritical, dogmatic metaphysics, as Ryle suggests. The paper concludes that Collingwood's rehabilitation of the ontological proof is rather unorthodox and does not, contrary to what one might expect, contradict the claim that existence is not a real predicate."

  Chapter 5: *Collingwood's 'rehabilitation' of the ontological argument* -- pp. 67-78.
  "In this chapter I would like to consider a lively debate that took place between Collingwood and Ryle in the aftermath of the publication of *An Essay on Philosophical Method* (EPM), The debate was prompted by
Collingwood's reappropriation of the ontological argument in Chapter 6 of EPM where he defended what he regarded as a neglected kernel of truth in the traditional proof. Ryle launched a fierce attack on Collingwood's attempted rehabilitation of the ontological argument in the pages of *Mind*, where he accused Collingwood of ignoring crucial philosophical developments which had occurred in the last two hundred years, in particular the thesis that all existential propositions are knowable *a posteriori* and the corollary that there can be no necessary existential judgements. Collingwood newer took up Ryle's challenge publicly, but did attempt to clarify his own position in a number of private letters. (*) It was Errol Harris who replied to Ryle publicly on Collingwood's behalf, locating Collingwood's defence of the ontological argument in the tradition of Hegel's objective or speculative idealism, thereby adding further fuel to the controversy. As a result of Harris's reply on behalf of Collingwood and the private exchange with Collingwood himself Ryle responded with a further article aimed at reasserting his original position that there can be no necessary existential propositions." p. 67 (some notes omitted).

(*) The Collingwood-Ryle correspondence is deposited in the Bodleian Library in Oxford, Collingwood Department 26/3.


In this paper, I discuss the role of Anselm's ontological argument in the philosophy of R. G. Collingwood. Anselm's argument appears prominently in Collingwood's Essay on Philosophical Method (1933) and Essay on Metaphysics (1940), as well as in his early work Speculum Mentis (1924). In the proof, Collingwood finds the central expression of the priority of "faith" in the first principles of thought to reason's activities. For Collingwood, it is Anselm's proof that clearly expresses this relationship between faith and reason. The two elements of this analysis that must be understood if one is to understand Collingwood's use of the proof are what he means by "the idea of an object that shall completely satisfy the demands of reason" and the "special case of metaphysical thinking." I analyze both of these elements and conclude by showing how Anselm's proof is essential to Collingwood's historical science of mind.


Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000)

Texts


  See in particular Chapter 2: *Ten ontological or modal proofs for God's existence* pp. 28-117.


"This article examines criticisms of the ontological argument proposed by Plantinga and Alston. The conclusion is reached that the denial of existence can be contradictory if this denial implies that the ground of all possibility is itself but a mere possibility, or that an indispensable predicate -- one whose actualization or being instantiated is necessary to reality as such -- is yet dispensable. It is conceded that the argument is a proof for the divine existence only on the assumption that the idea of God is logically admissible, and not an absurdity."
It is also shown that the argument need not beg the question by assuming from the outset a subject of predication, God, but can argue rather from the predicate divine and deduce from this predicate the necessity of its instantiation in some suitable actuality."


Studies


"In this paper, I focus on Hartshorne's "de dicto" modal reconstruction of the ontological argument for God's existence. I consider "six" senses of necessity, and for all these senses, I call into question either the truth of at least one of the premises of the reconstructed argument or the truth of at least one of the axioms of modal logic itself. the main conclusion is that it is probably impossible to formalize within a "sound" modal logic any traditional or semi-traditional version of the ontological argument in such a way that it is both formally valid yet has necessarily true, "a priori" known premises. I believe that any claim to the contrary is based on acute modal confusion."


With a foreword by Charles Hartshorne.
Reply to the article published in *Erkenntnis*, 15, 1980, 301a-331.
"Professor Joel Friedman has contended that there is no univocal sense of "de dicto" necessity in terms of which the five axioms of Lewis' S5 system of modal logic and the two premises of Hartshorne's ontological argument can be known "a priori" to be true. Goodwin shows how Friedman's challenge can be met in either Carnap's or Kripke's sense of logical necessity when Hartshorne's temporal interpretation of possibility is taken into account."


"The author analyzes the validity of a certain variation of Anselm's "ontological argument", namely the modal-logical version from Charles Hartshorne. He firstly studies the origin of Hartshorne's arguments, whose starting point is an interpretation of Anselm; secondly, the modal-logical argument from Hartshorne will be presented together with its presuppositions and implications. Finally, the author proposes an evaluation of Hartshorne's approach."

"The importance of Hartshorne's use of the ontological argument of a God's existence lies not merely in his recognition of the second proof of Anselm's argument but more so in his di-polar Panentheism as in his analyses of the meaning of "necessary existence" which allows it to be significantly attributed to an entity. Nevertheless, Hartshorne's claims that the 'second proof' escapes the earlier criticisms of the ontological argument and that necessary existence implies factual existence are subject to criticism."

  
  "This paper restates and criticizes the modal version of the ontological argument given by Charles Hartshorne in *The logic of perfection*. I show that the argument is valid in modal systems as strong as Lewis' *S₅* and that it is not subject to some familiar refutations of the ontological argument. I argue that, nevertheless, the ontological argument does not prove what it sets out to, and that the value of Hartshorne's modal version of the argument is that it enables us to state with some precision why this is so."

  
  "A formal proof, paralleling the argument given by Charles Hartshorne in his reply to my "Hartshorne's modal proof," is given and discussed. His version of the ontological argument in modal logic seemed to offer a modalized ontological argument valid for a system no stronger than Lewis' *S₃*. However, a logical mistake in one of the lemmas to the main proof invalidates this aspect of the argument. (see section 8.5 of my "Logic for philosophers," Harper and Row, 1971). The main critical points of the paper were, however, independent of this proof. The conclusion of the paper is that the ontological argument is redundant if sound."

"This work traces the dimensions of two independent attempts --- those of Karl Barth and Charles Hartshorne --- to set aside the burden of the Kantian heritage in so far as it has influenced the development of contemporary philosophical-theological thinking. The focal issue throughout is the role that the Anselmian formulation of the ontological argument plays in these respective attempts. Such an issue is raised not out of an historical-critical interest in the writings of the eleventh-century saint, but because both Barth and Hartshorne have found the *Proslogion* proof for God to be a particularly propitious vantage point from which to gain a fresh perspective on their own professional preoccupations. It is interesting to note, however, that while Barth turns to a discussion of the ontological argument as a phase in the development of a methodological program which entails the *rejection* of natural theology, Hartshorne undertakes a defense of the same argument in an effort to establish an appropriate basis for the *acceptance* of natural theology. The scope of the chapters to follow has been shaped by the conviction that there is a pressing need to account for this rather disconcerting difference."


"The essay examines the syntactical, semantic and philosophical issues raised by Charles Hartshorne's formulation of the ontological argument for the existence of God and by his effort to distinguish his dipolar panentheism from supernatural theism. The essay shows how the argument is invalid, admitted by Hartshorne. It shows Hartshorne's metaphysics employs a natural language, not a modal one. It elucidates the logical structure of dipolar theism. It shows faith need not be contrary to reason though faith cannot expect reason to
prove theism. It shows that any non-dogmatic rational inquiry into theistic belief must be open and on-going."

  Chapter IV. *The ontological argument* pp. 45-57

  "The ontological argument of Charles Hartshorne serves as the speculative model for his neoclassical metaphysics. Neoclassicism requires both the necessary existence of God and his maximal relativity if its fundamental ontological principles of world, order, and beauty are to be grounded. The ontological argument proves directly the divine necessary existence and at the same time grounds indirectly the divine relativity which these fundamental principles require. The argument, therefore, is neoclassicism's speculative model in that within this model one is able to discover the structure of Charles Hartshorne's entire metaphysics."

**John Niemeyer Findlay (1903-1987)**

**Texts**

Rainer, pp. 67-71, and a rejoinder by J. N. Findlay, pp. 71-75.


"The course of philosophical development has been full of attempted proofs of the existence of God. Some of these have sought a basis in the bare necessities of thought, while others have tried to found themselves on the facts of experience. And, of these latter, some have founded themselves on very general facts, as that something exists, or that something is in motion, while others have tried to build on highly special facts, as that living beings are put together in a purposive manner, or that human beings are subject to certain improbable urges and passions, such as the zeal for righteousness, the love for useless truths and unprofitable beauties, as well as the many specifically religious needs and feelings. The general philosophical verdict is that none of these 'proofs' is truly compelling. The proofs based on the necessities of thought are universally regarded as fallacious: it is not thought possible to build bridges between mere abstractions and concrete existence. The proofs based on the general facts of existence and motion are only felt to be valid by a minority of thinkers, who seem quite powerless to communicate this sense of validity to others. And while most thinkers would accord weight to arguments resting on the special facts we have mentioned, they wouldn't think such arguments successful in ruling out a vast range of counter-possibilities. Religious people have, in fact, come to acquiesce in the total absence of any cogent proofs of the Being they believe in: they even find it positively satisfying that something so far surpassing clear conception should also surpass the possibility of demonstration. And non-religious people willingly
mitigate their rejection with a tinge of agnosticism: they don't so much deny the existence of a God, as the existence of good reasons for believing in him. We shall, however, maintain in this essay that there isn't room, in the case we are examining, for all these attitudes of tentative surmise and doubt. For we shall try to show that the Divine Existence can only be conceived, in a religiously satisfactory manner, if we also conceive it as something inescapable and necessary, whether for thought or reality. From which it follows that our modern denial of necessity or rational evidence for such an existence amounts to a demonstration that there cannot be a God."

Studies


"First published in 1948, J.N. Findlay's article, "Can God's Existence Be Disproved?" remains interesting. Findlay argues that a religious object possessing unsurpassable superiority (or God), would be one whose existence is inescapable. By "inescapable" he cannot mean "psychologically inconceivable", because then the mere fact that there are unbelievers would make atheism true. But if we interpret "inescapable" as "logically inconceivable", then God's existence is inescapable, that is, His nonexistence is logically inconceivable, only if He is a necessarily existing being. Since, according to Findlay, there are no necessarily existing beings, it follows that God does not exist. In effect, he maintains that God is by definition a necessarily existing being, but there are no such beings. However, this "ontological disproof of the existence of God" fails, because his claim that there are no necessarily existing beings is unsupported. This paper suggests the plausibility of the claim that there are necessarily existing beings without,
however, supposing that God is among them. Rather than defending theism, the paper considers what would be required to establish atheism, namely, the unintelligibility of the concept of God due to certain antinomies. The position being advocated is not, strictly speaking, atheism but, rather, conceptual skepticism, that is, skepticism with regard to the very concept. It might be described as functional atheism, inasmuch as it entails suspending all matters having to do with God until the conceptual problems are satisfactorily resolved. This recommendation is different from the one offered by the logical positivists in a bygone era, since it has nothing to do with empirical verifiability. The antinomies are to a great extent "a priori" and therefore rest on a rationalist, not an empiricist, foundation."


  "This paper attempts to present J. N. Findlay's ontological disproof of the existence of God as an extension of Hume and Kant's treatment of the ontological argument. This modal disproof is presented along side what is called the Leibnizian-Hartshornean modal proof in order to reveal the modern theistic modal paradox. In order to resolve this paradox, an interpretation of 'possibility' is presented along the lines suggested by Charles Hartshorne's justification of the premise asserting the possibility of the existence of God, that is, in terms of the other proofs."


**Kurt Gödel (1906-1978)**
Texts and translations

  

  
  Indice: Prefazione di Gabriele Lolli; La prova matematica dell'esistenza di Dio; Nota introduttiva di Robert Merrihew Adams 23; Prova ontologica di Kurt Gödel 61; Testi collegati alla prova ontologica 64; Appendici; A. Una dimostrazione divina di Piergiorgio Odifreddi; B. Logica e teofilia. Osservazioni su una dimostrazione attribuita a Gödel di Roberto Magari, con presentazione di Gabrielle Lolli 95-120.

Studies


  
  "Kurt Gödel's version of the ontological argument was shown by J. Howard Sobel to be defective, but some plausible modifications in the argument result in a version which is immune to Sobel's objection. A definition is suggested which permits the proof of some of Gödel's axioms."

"Gödel's version of the modal ontological argument for the existence of God has been criticized by J. Howard Sobel (5) and modified by C. Anthony Anderson (1). In the present paper we consider the extent to which Anderson's emendation is defeated by the type of objection first offered by the Monk Gaunilo to St. Anselm's original Ontological Argument. And we try to push the analysis of this Gödelian argument a bit further to bring it into closer agreement with the details of Gödel's own formulation. Finally, we indicate what seems to be the main weakness of this emendation of Gödel's attempted proof."


"Gödel's 1970 proof of the existence of a god-like being (i.e., a being having all the 'perfective' properties) is investigated. The proof is streamlined and reformulated within the weakest logic possible - and intuitionistic version of second-order logic with a modal operator no stronger than the system K. It is shown that even in this weak context one can derive that it is necessary that a god-like being is at least possible. Finally, the prospects for a similar proof of the existence of the Devil (or, more carefully, a being who lacks all perfective properties) is investigated. Technical reasons are given for why such a parallel proof of the existence of an evil being is not forthcoming."


"Finally, Part III is devoted to ontological proofs. Chapter 10 gives a brief history and analysis of arguments of Anselm, Descartes, and Leibniz. This is followed by a longer, still informal, presentation of the Gödel argument itself. Formal methods are applied in Chapter 11, where Gödel's proof is examined in great detail. While Gödel's argument is formally correct, some fundamental flaws are pointed out. One, noted by Sobel, is that it is too strong -- the modal system collapses. This could be seen as showing that free will is incompatible with Gödel's assumptions. Some ways out of this are explored. Another flaw is equally serious: Gödel assumes as an axiom something directly equivalent to a key conclusion of his argument. The problematic axiom is related to a principle Leibniz proposed as a way of dealing with a hole he found in an ontological proof of Descartes. Descartes, Leibniz, and Gödel (and also Anselm) all have proofs that stick at the same point: showing that the existence of God is possible.

If the Gödel argument is what you are interested in, start with Part III, and pick up earlier material as needed. Many of the uses of the formalism are relatively intuitive. Indeed, in Gödel's notes on his ontological argument, formal machinery is never discussed, yet it is possible to get a sense of what it is about anyway." (pp. XIII-XIV).


*Gödels ontologischer Beweis* pp. 354-360.


  "This article contains a presentation of Gödel's ontological proof, from both the intuitive and the formal points of view. Two other contemporary variations of it are also presented. The article discusses the philosophical and the theological criticisms of the proof. The conclusion to be drawn is that the soundness of Gödel's reasoning is an important logical result, which nevertheless demands further work of analysis. The metaphysical idea of a *positive property* (or *positive set*) for instance needs clarification."


  "Gödel's proof of the necessary existence of God is analyzed from the point of view of modal logic together with related papers by Magari and Anderson. In particular, Magari's claim on redundancy in axioms is analyzed and shown to be only true for some extension of Gödel's system (but true for Anderson's modification, as it as shown elsewhere). Completeness of the underlying modal logic is proved; and it is shown that the "ontological" proof may use only the logic KD45 (logic of belief) instead of S5 (logic of knowledge)."
Two variants of monadic fuzzy predicate logic are analyzed and compared with the full fuzzy predicate logic with respect to finite model property (properties) and arithmetical complexity of sets of tautologies, satisfiable formulas and of analogous notion restricted to finite models.


"Gödel, in a cryptic note given to Dana Scott in 1970, introduces the notion of a positive property. (Thus the formalized version uses a Third-Order constant, the predicate $P(F)$, expressing the positivity of the property $F$). The plausibility of his 'axioms' and the theological relevance of its conclusion depend on the interpretation of this notion; Gödel says that it means 'positive in the moral aesthetic sense (independently of the accidental structure of the world)', but also allows that it may mean 'pure "attribution" as opposed to "privation"'. The evidence available from his notebooks suggests that he never found an interpretation of this notion that fully satisfied him, and it is perhaps best to assume that he thought of his ontological argument not as a conclusive proof of the existence of God, but as an attempt at a reconstruction of Leibniz's argument. In any event, he laid down certain axioms concerning the notion. Any property entailed by a positive property is positive, and
the conjunction of two positive properties (the property, that is, that an individual has if and only if it has both of the given properties) is positive. Together, these amount to saying that the positive properties form a filter on the Boolean algebra of properties. (Gödel adds in a footnote that the positivity of conjunctions of positive properties holds for arbitrary numbers of conjuncts, not just for two: as we shall see, this includes infinite numbers.) Further, positivity is a non-contingent feature of a property: any property which is positive is necessarily positive, and no property which is not positive could be.

Another axiom said that, of any pair of properties consisting of a property and its negation (the property necessarily holding of all and only the individuals not possessing the first property), precisely one is positive. (Positive properties form an ultrafilter.) We are now in a position to prove our first theorem: positive properties are at least possibly instantiated, Proof: the contradictory property (self-non-identity) entails all properties, including its own negation (self-Identity), so if it were positive both properties of such a pair would be positive. (As has been noted by commentators, the proof uses only part of the strength of the latest axiom: of a pair of a property and its negation at most one is positive.)

Gödel's remaining axiom is formulated in terms of a defined notion. First define a property to be an essence of an individual if it is a property, possessed by the individual (Gödel left this clause out in (1), but this appears to have been an oversight - it is included in related manuscripts), which entails every property the individual has. The terminology is somewhat unfortunate: the notion defined is close to Leibniz's notion of the complete concept of an object, but is not at all what current philosophical usage calls an essence. 'Essence' and 'essentialism' were bad words for most analytic philosophers of the 1960s -- many found the doctrines of Kripke downright shocking -- but, with the flowering of modal metaphysics since, they have come to
have well-understood and generally agreed meanings, defined in terms of de re modal locutions. An individual x, has a property, F, essentially iff x has F and it is necessarily the case that x, provided it exists, has F. An essence of x, in this post-1970 sense, is a property which entails all and only the properties x has essentially. To avoid confusion, therefore, let us re-christen Gödel's notion: the property an individual has that entails every property it has is its character." pp. 364-365.

Notes omitted.

A novel on the ontological proof, useful as a non-technical, but reliable, introduction to Gödel's argument.


"We describe a K B Gödelian ontological system, and some other weak systems, in a fully formal way using theory of types and natural deduction, and present a completeness proof in its main and specific parts. We technically and philosophically analyze and comment on the systems (mainly with respect to the relativism of values) and include a sketch of some connected aspect of Gödel's relation to Kant."


"In his sketch of an Ontological Proof (dated February 10th 1970) Kurt Gödel introduces the concept of a positive property and proves the necessary existence of exact one being which instantiates all positive properties -- he calls it 'summun bonum'. Special emphasis in the discussion of this argument is put on the logical structure of positive property and the comparison with the concept of (pure) perfection as it is used in traditional philosophy of God for dealing with divine attributes."


"In discussing the rationality of religious belief, Franz von Kutschera (Vernunft und Glaube, 1990) criticises attempts to clarify divine attributes and to demonstrate the existence of God, including Gödel's Ontological Proof. The article argues that the criticism proposed neglects the concept of pure perfection and that the logical structure of this concept can be clarified in further developing Gödel's concept of positive property."


"The main thesis of this paper is that Gödel's ontological argument is subject to a kind of objection which has hitherto been overlooked, but which has often been levelled at other ontological arguments, viz. that it can be paralleled by apparently equally persuasive proofs of the existence of beings in which no one should wish to believe. (Compare Gaunilo's objection to St. Anselm: No one should wish to believe in the existence of an island than which no greater island can be conceived.)"

"In recent years there has been a surge of interest in Gödel's ontological proof of the existence of God. Gödel showed his proof (Gödel *1970) to Scott, and Scott made a note of the proof and presented it in his seminar at Princeton University in the fall of 1970. From then on, Gödel's proof has become widely circulated. It was finally published in Sobel 1987 as an appendix and later included in volume three of Gödel's *Collected Works*. Recent discussions of Gödel's proof mostly start from Sobel's criticisms. As is well known, the most influential criticism of Sobel is that Gödel's proof leads to a consequence unacceptable to most philosophers, i.e. that all truths are necessary truths. Anderson 1990 viewed this as the modal collapse of Gödel's assumptions, and tried to save Gödel's proof by some plausible modifications. Anderson's emendation secured many interesting responses including Oppy 1996, where a parody of the Gödelian proof reminiscent of Gaunilo's objection to Anselm's proof is presented. As one might expect, such a parody has invited friends of ontological proofs to follow in the footsteps of Anselm.

In spite of all this extensive concern, it is not certain whether there is any improvement in understanding the motivations of Gödel's ontological proof. Why was Gödel so preoccupied with completing his own ontological proof? To the best of my knowledge, no one has dealt with this basic question seriously enough to answer it. In this article, I propose to examine Gödel's ideas against a somewhat larger background in order to understand his motivation for establishing the ontological proof. I shall point out that the value of Gödel's proof is to be found in the possible role of his proof of the existence of God in his philosophy as a whole as well as in its relative merit as an ontological proof. Hopefully, my guiding question as to Gödel's motivation will turn out to be extremely fruitful by enabling us to fathom his mind regarding God and mathematics."


"The paper contains a full version of the well-known Gödel's variant of the ontological argument. It is based on the Leibniz's version of the proof, the axiom systems of Gödel 1970 and of Anderson 1990, with some weakenings. We discriminate between several types of existence; the form of existence of God we assert is, in a constructive fashion, a weaker one. Later we deal with Kant's criticism against the predicate of existence and offer several commentaries on the proof, and on topics such as perfection and existence."


"The aim of this paper is to prove strong completeness theorems for several Anderson-like variants of Gödel's theory wrt. classes of modal structures, in which: (i). 1st order terms receive only rigid extensions in the constant objectual 1st order domain; (ii). 2nd order terms receive nonrigid extensions in preselected world-relative
objectual domains of 2nd order and rigid intensions in the constant conceptual 2nd order domain."


See Chapter 3.2 *Religion and Gödel's ontological proof* pp. 111-121.

**Norman Malcolm (1911-1990)**

**Texts**


"I believe that in Anselm's Proslogion and Responsio editoris there are two different pieces of reasoning which he did not distinguish from one another, and that a good deal of light may be shed on the philosophical problem of "the ontological argument" if we do distinguish them. In Chapter 2 of the Proslogion Anselm says that we believe that God is something a greater than which cannot be conceived. (The Latin is aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit. Anselm sometimes uses the alternative expressions aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest, id quo maius cogitari nequit, aliquid quo maius cogitari non valet.) Even the fool of the Psalm who says in his heart there is no God, when he hears this very thing that Anselm says, namely, "something a greater than which cannot be conceived," understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding though he does not understand that it exists."
Studies


"Evidence is presented in support of the following theses: (1) Prior to Anselm, Ibn Sina formulated a version of the ontological argument which corresponds to Malcolm's second version of this argument. (2) An examination of Ibn Sina's formulation permits new criticism of Malcolm's version. The latter makes the unwarranted deduction that in its metaphysical use "the necessary existent" is identified with "God" in its ordinary religious use. Further, Malcolm's informal explication of "the necessary existent" in terms of "dependency on privations" contains logical confusions. Departing from the same premise as Malcolm, Ibn Sina deduces a different conclusion, identifying "the necessary existent" not with a substantial creator, but with the "source of the world's dependence," analogous to the so-called "principle of sufficient reason" used by the mystics. To clarify the alleged contentions of the argument, analytical distinctions are drawn between various metaphysical categories, e.g., "essence," "existence," and "substance"."

*Jan Berg (1928-)*
Texts


Studies


"Jan Berg has presented, in a painstaking and highly compressed paper, *St. Anselm's Ontological Argument*, dressed in the garb of a formal language, L. L is the first-order predicate calculus with identity and, particularly, with Russell's theory of descriptions. It is the task of Berg's paper to reconstruct Anselm's argument in L with an eye towards (1) preserving historical accuracy and (2) preventing the argument from begging the question. In this paper I will argue that he has not completely satisfied either objective, and further, that the reason he has not is that Russell's theory of descriptions is particularly unsuitable for Anselm's argument. I will then investigate the implications of reconstructing the argument in L, supplemented not with Russell's theory, but with some alternative theories."

**John Howard Sobel (1929 - 2010)**

Texts

"Notes in Gödel's "Nachlass" contain a sketch of a theory that culminates in a theorem that says that it is necessary that there is a being that has every positive property. I observe that in the theory a being with all positive properties would have only necessarily instantiated properties, and demonstrate that modalities collapse in the theory -- in it everything actual or true is so of logical necessity."


"This response to critics includes elaboration of ideas and arguments in Logic and Theism regarding cumulative arguments for theism, probabilities, 'fine-tuning' and many worlds, and Gödel's ontological proof, probabilities subjective and objective, and Mackiean doubts concerning the latter, are explained. There is discussion of 'dividing the evidence' in Bayesian confirmation exercises, with some of it allowed to target 'priors' of hypotheses, and there is a note on my problems with old evidence. Tentatively explored are Gödel's considered modal opinions, which may have included that every truth is necessary, and every falsehood impossible."

"Charles Hartshorne derives in a sentential modal logic, that "perfection exists" from the premises that "perfection is not impossible" and "perfection could not exist contingently." These premises are, on certain assumptions, equivalent to corollaries to which Anselm was committed of the premises of the major argument in Proslogion 2, namely, that "(S)omething-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought exists in the mind" and that "(T)hat-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought cannot exist in the mind alone," for the conclusion that "something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists both in the mind and in reality," which argument is, on a generous construction, valid in a quantificational logic for indefinite descriptions."

Studies


"Kurt Gödel left with his student Dana Scott two pages of notes in which he sketched a new version of Anselm's ontological proof of God's existence. In his most recent book (*), Howard Sobel spends the greater part of a chapter dedicating his considerable talents to an elucidation and critique of Gödel's argument, as well as to an emended version of that argument proposed by Anthony Anderson.

The ontological argument has garnered quite a bit of attention in the last fifty years. In most cases, philosophers have agreed that the argument is unsuccessful but have disagreed vigorously over where exactly the fatal flaw lies. This paper, will to some extent, follow the familiar pattern. I will argue that Gödel's argument is unsuccessful, but I hope to show that Sobel and Anderson have both misdiagnosed its failure, and, consequently, Anderson's attempted repairs are likewise unsuccessful. However, I will close with a sketch of my own proposed
repair of Gödel's argument, and I will suggest that, although the repaired argument is not by itself a successful theistic proof, it may represent a fruitful matter for future investigation."

(*) Logic and Theism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, Chapter IV.

Alvin Plantinga (1932-)

Texts


"The Ontological Argument for the existence of God has fascinated and puzzled philosophers ever since it was first formulated by St. Anselm, I suppose most philosophers have been inclined to reject the argument, although it has an illustrious line of defenders extending to the present and presently terminating in Professors Malcolm and Hartshorne. Many philosophers have tried to give general refutations of the argument-refutations designed to show that no version of it can possibly succeed-of which the most important is, perhaps, Kant's objection, with its several contemporary variations. I believe that none of these general refutations are successful; in what follows I shall support this belief by critically examining Kant's objection."


Chapter Two: The Ontological Argument (I) 26; Chapter Three: The Ontological Argument (II) 64-94.


Studies


  "The bulk of the paper is devoted to an examination of the 'interpretations' which Alvin Plantinga suggests as to what Kant was saying in his discussion of the ontological argument in the first "Critique." I conclude with an independent account of what Kant was getting at."


  "R. L. Purtill has claimed that the ontological argument that Plantinga presents in *The nature of necessity* is basically the same as that offered in Hartshorne's *The logic of perfection* and that it falls victim to the same criticisms. I argue that Plantinga's ontological argument is different enough "not" to fall victim to Purtill's criticisms. What makes Plantinga's argument different, however, also makes it vulnerable to a different criticism: the God of Plantinga's conclusion is not a being greater than which none can be conceived."


  "In this paper I shall delimit an infinite class of valid arguments I shall call ontic arguments. These arguments proceed from a premise that asserts of a set of properties that it satisfies certain conditions, to the conclusion that there exists something that exemplifies that set of properties. If the conclusion of an ontic argument can be read as asserting the existence of a Deity, then I call that
argument an ontological argument. In the present sense of this term, there are infinitely many ontological arguments, all of them valid. I shall devote special attention to one particular ontological argument, the most modest, since many of its features are shared by all other ontological arguments. I shall argue that anyone who wants to claim either that this argument is sound or that it is unsound is faced with grave difficulties. I shall take it for granted that the connection between what I call ontological arguments and traditional presentations of "the" ontological argument (there is, of course, no one argument that can be called the ontological argument) is plain. I make the following historical claim without arguing for it: Every well-known "version of the ontological argument" is either, (I) essentially the same as one of the arguments called ontological herein, or (ii) invalid or outrageously question-begging, or (iii) stated in language so confusing it is not possible to say with any confidence just what its premises are or what their relation to its conclusion is supposed to be. I should myself be inclined to place all historical "versions of the ontological argument" in category (iii), but this is a function of the way I read them: I would place many of the arguments certain contemporary philosophers claim to see in the original sources in one of the first two categories. I shall examine one contemporary argument, that presented by Alvin Plantinga in *The nature of necessity* (Chapter X) and in *God, freedom, and evil* (pp. 85-112). Plantinga's argument falls into category (I). I shall dispute Plantinga's contention that his argument can be used to show that belief in God is not contrary to reason.


"This paper is a critical overview of Alvin Plantinga's recent book entitled *The nature of necessity*. While noting the many virtues of the work, I criticise Plantinga
on a number of points, major and minor. In particular I argue that Plantinga's notion of an "essence" is lacking in content and that his formulation of the ontological argument does not advance the question much beyond the stage reached by Hartshorne's formulation of the argument and criticisms of this formulation by myself and others. Plantinga also fails to distinguish sufficiently between narrowly logical necessity and broadly logical necessity and between the direct and inverse probabilities involved in a probabilistic version of the argument from evil. I also criticise Plantinga's strategy of merely defending theistic belief as not disprovable and in that sense rational; in my view this is too modest an aim for the theistic philosopher."


"In chapter 10 of his book, *The nature of necessity*, Alvin Plantinga contends that although many versions of the ontological argument are unsound, there is at least one that is valid, and whose premises may reasonably be accepted. It is argued in this paper that Plantinga's defense of this contention is unsatisfactory, and that the version of the ontological argument which he offers is unacceptable for at least two reasons. In the first place, it involves a form of argumentation which if applied to structurally identical, and equally justified premises, leads to contradictory conclusions. Secondly, the crucial premise in Plantinga's argument can be seen to be necessarily false, given an adequate account of the truth conditions of modal statements."

**David Kellogg Lewis (1941-2001)**

Texts


"A version of Anselm's first ontological argument is symbolized in non-modal logic with explicit reference to conceivable worlds and beings that exist therein. An ambiguity appears: one symbolization yields an invalid argument with credible premises while another symbolization yields a valid argument with premises we have no good, non-circular reason to accept. The credibility of one premise of the second version turns on the nature of actuality; I propose that "actual" is an indexical term closely analogous to 'present'."

**Studies**


"David Lewis' analysis of Anselm's ontological argument shows that something is wrong with it but not, despite his claim, what is wrong with it. I offer a further analysis in the spirit of Lewis', taking account of a four-fold ambiguity in the notion of 'greater'. When the ambiguity is resolved, it turns out that on some readings the argument is valid but the premisses are not each more plausible than the conclusion. On other readings the argument is invalid but the premisses are trivially true. The argument's illusion of plausibility trades on the ambiguity."

*Robert Maydole (1941-)*

"In the first section of this paper I employ an ontological type argument to show that the mere possibility of God's existence implies, in a standard system of quantified modal logic, the actual existence of God. I also show that there is at most one God. In the second section I argue that the very idea of God is meaningful. In the third section I use a cosmological argument modeled on St Thomas' Third Way to prove that God exists. The mediate conclusion is that God exists. In the final section of the paper I discuss the plausibility of adopting the modal logic previously employed."


"The 'modal perfection argument' (MPA) for the existence of a Supreme Being is a new ontological argument that is rooted in the insights of Anselm, Leibniz and Gödel. Something is supreme if and only if nothing is possibly greater, and a perfection is a property that it is better to have than not. The premises of MPA are that supremity is a perfection, perfections entail only perfections, and the negation of a perfection is not a perfection. I do three things in this paper. First, I prove that MPA is valid by construction a formal deduction of it in second order modal logic. Second, I argue that its premises are true. Third, I defend the argument of the logic used against some likely objections."

"Robert Maydole has recently presented a sophisticated ontological argument that he calls the modal perfection argument for the existence of a Supreme Being. While this ontological argument is probably better than most of its peers, it is nonetheless open to at least one decisive objection. The purpose of this brief comment is to develop that objection. I claim that this objection indicates an important further point about the concept of entailment and its role in ontological arguments at large, the recognition of which helps to refute other conceivable ontological arguments."


"In "The Ontological Argument" (*Philosophy* 63, 1988, pp. 83-91) Stephen Makin offers a defence of what he calls 'Anselm Ontological Argument'. I am not much interested in the question whether the argument which Makin defends can properly be attributed to St. Anselm, though I suspect that there is considerable room for disagreement on this score; rather, I want to suggest that the argument which Makin offers is quite clearly invalid (and hence unsound) and I also want to suggest that it is very plausible to suppose that any version of the ontological argument is vitiated by the same fallacy in which Makin's argument is entrapped."


"In 'The Ontological Argument Defended' (1), Stephen Makin defends the following version of the ontological argument:

*Makin's Argument*

(Df) S is the concept: something than which nothing greater can be conceived.

(A) If F is, and G is not, a selectively and intrinsically necessarily exemplified concept, then, *ceteris paribus*, F's are greater than G's.

Suppose:

(B) S is not (selectively and intrinsically) necessarily exemplified.

Then:

(C) One could conceive of what is greater than S. But that is absurd. So the supposition (B) must be rejected:

(D) S is (selectively and intrinsically) necessarily exemplified. (2)
I have two criticisms to make of this argument. First, it can be paralleled to its discredit. And second, it can be shown independently that the argument fails to establish the conclusion that there actually exists a being than which none greater can be conceived. I shall argue for each of these contentions in turn.

(2) Ibid., 248. I have changed the labelling of the sentences; I shall use my own labelling of sentences throughout. Makin explains the meaning of, and the need for, the qualification that S be *selectively and intrinsically* necessarily exemplified at 250-252.


"There is now a considerable secondary literature on Gödel's ontological arguments; in particular, interested readers should consult Sobel 1987, Anderson 1990 and Adams 1995. In this note, I wish to draw attention to an objection to these arguments which has hitherto gone unnoticed. This objection does not depend upon fine details of the formulation of the arguments; I arbitrarily choose to develop the objection in connection with the formulation provided by Anderson.

In brief, the argument I shall consider may be summarized thus:

Definition 1: x is God-like iff x has as essential properties those and only those properties which are positive.

Definition 2: A is an essence of x iff for every property B, x has B necessarily iff A entails B.

Definition 3: x necessarily exists iff every essence of x is necessarily exemplified.

Axiom 1: If a property is positive, then its negation is not positive.
Axiom 2: Any property entailed by [= strictly implied by] a positive property is positive.

Axiom 3: The property of being God-like is positive.

Axiom 4: If a property is positive, then it is necessarily positive.

Axiom 5: Necessary existence is positive.

Theorem 1: If a property is positive, then it is consistent [= possibly exemplified].

Corollary 1: The property of being God-like is consistent.

Theorem 2: If something is God-like, then the property of being God-like is an essence of that thing.

Theorem 3: Necessarily, the property of being God-like is exemplified.

Given a sufficiently generous conception of properties, and granted the acceptability of the underlying modal logic, the theorems listed do follow from the axioms. (So say Gödel, Dana Scott, Sobel, Anderson, and Adams. Who am I to disagree?) Perhaps one might object to the conception of properties and/or the modal logic. But one doesn’t need to: the proof is demonstrably no good even if these things are accepted.

The problem - as with virtually all ontological arguments known to me - lies in the fact that there are parallel arguments which can be constructed, which seem no less acceptable to atheists and agnostics, but whose acceptance leads to absurd results. (1)" p. 226.

(1) In Oppy (1995, p. 225), I write: 'It may be possible to reinterpret the (Gödelian) proof in a damaging way, though I have not been able to see how to do this.' I think that my vision has now improved a little: hence the present paper.


In "Gödelian Ontological Arguments" (*Analysis* 56, 1996), I argue that Gödel's ontological argument is subject to a Gaunilo-style parody. In the present paper, I provide an emended version of the argument that avoids
objections raised by Mike Gettings in his "Gödel's Ontological Argument: A Reply to Oppy" (Analysis 59, 1999)."

  Chapter 2. Ontological arguments - pp. 49-96.

Studies


"Graham Oppy has contributed recently to the discussion of Gödel's ontological argument with an attempted refutation (Oppy 1996). Although seemingly promising, I will show here that this attempt fails to undermine Gödel's argument.

Very briefly, Gödel's argument proceeds in the following way. (1) One begins with the primitive notion of a positive property. A positive property is a 'great-making' property which entails no defect. The property of Godlikeness (G) is defined in this way: One is God-like iff one has as essential properties all and only positive properties. Given a number of axioms concerning positive properties, one can prove that a unique possible individual instantiates God-likeness, i.e. that there is (at least) one possible world inhabited by this unique God-like being. Furthermore, necessary existence is a positive property. Thus, in some possible world this unique God-like being necessarily exists, and so, in SS modal logic, this being exists in the actual world.

Oppy's strategy is the strategy which the monk Gaunilo used to try to refute Anselm's ontological argument. This strategy attempts to show that if the theist purports to have proven the existence of God, the same reasoning may be used to prove the existence of many theologically repugnant entities, e.g. demi-gods, perfect islands, etc. Oppy's particular objection is motivated in the following
way: since the theist defines God-likeness, the atheist may define a similar property, call it `God*-likeness' ('G*'). Let God*-likeness be the property one has iff one has as essential properties only and almost all of the positive properties, including necessary existence (e.g., all positive properties except omniscience, and only positive properties). Since two things are identical only if they share the same essential properties, the definition of God*-likeness ensures that the atheist's being is distinct from God. Furthermore, a God*-like being must also be necessarily existent, since necessary existence is a property entailed by God*likeness.

Oppy cannot draw the conclusion that such a being exists, however. There is a crucial disanalogy between his argument and the theist's. This disanalogy becomes evident when we look at Oppy's argument, which he presents in two formulations. These two formulations are similar, and I will show that the first is defective, and argue that the second fails for similar reasons." pp. 309-310.

(1) See Anderson 1990 for details of a strengthened formulation of Gödel's argument. This is the formulation which both Oppy and I address, although I will also consider a revision to this argument. For now, 'Gödel's argument' and 'the theist's argument' will refer to the formulation found in Anderson 1990.

**Alexander Pruss (1973-)**
Texts


  "The S5-based ontological argument assumes (1) possibly there is a maximally great being (MGB) and (2) that any MGB must be essentially such and have necessary existence, so that by S5 there is a MGB. The weakest point is (1). Samkara (788-820 AD) argued that if something is impossible, then one cannot have a seeming of it. Therefore, by modus tollens, if a mystic has a (quasi-perceptual) seeming of a MGB, then possibly there is a MGB, and hence (1) is true, and there is a MGB. A variant based on a radical dependence ontological argument is also discussed."


Studies

**GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE CONTEMPORARY PERIOD**


  Available at UMI Dissertation Express. Order number: 6913015.

Alston, William. 1960. "The Ontological Argument Revisited." *Philosophical Review* no. 69:452-474. Reprinted in: A. Plantinga (ed.) - *The ontological argument from St. Anselm to contemporary philosophers* - London, Macmillan, 1968 pp. 86-110. "The ontological argument has often been criticized on the grounds that it mistakenly supposes "exists" to be a predicate. I am going to argue (1) that the way in which this criticism is usually presented is faulty, (2) that these faults result from overlooking certain basic features of the concept of existence, and (3) that when these features are fully taken into account, new and sounder reasons can be given for denying that "exists" is a predicate and for rejecting the ontological argument. In the first section I shall present the traditional kind of criticism in what I take to be its strongest form; in the second, I shall try to show that it does not hold up; in the third I shall attempt to enrich it so as to avoid those defects. (*)" p. 452

(*) It may be helpful to relate this essay to Professor Norman Malcolm's very interesting article, "Anselm's Ontological Arguments," which recently appeared in the [Philosophical] Review (LXIX, 1960, 41-62). There Malcolm distinguishes two different arguments in Anselm's *Proslogion*. My treatment of Anselm is restricted to what Malcolm calls the first argument, and is concerned with the sort of considerations which are commonly used in rejecting it. About what Malcolm calls the second argument, I have nothing to say in this essay. My opinion is that the second argument is ultimately dependent on the first, but that is a long story."


"St Thomas rejects the ontological argument but does not deny that the concept of God entails his essence. Instead, he relies on the distinction between a proposition's being necessary and its being known "a priori", which is related to the problem of knowing God's possibility "a priori", the Achilles heel of contemporary modal arguments. Why can we not know God's possibility "a priori"? The doctrine of analogy claims that God-language is too obscure to authorize such deductions. The rejection of irreducibly analogous language leads to rationalism, which accepts the ontological argument, or to fideism/agnosticism, which reject it. Modern philosophers were in tacit agreement in ignoring the distinction between "a priority" and necessity, and on the irrelevance of analogy. Hence they oscillated between acceptance of the ontological argument, and the total rejection of significant God-talk. Recent trends are favorable to a reconsideration of both points, and to an appreciation of their adumbration in the writings of Aquinas."


"I consider modal ontological arguments of the form, 'God is possible; therefore, God actually exists', which conceive of God in terms of properties"indexed to the actual world. The use of such indexed properties can
ensure the validity of these arguments but it also transforms their possibility premises into a posteriori claims. Because of this, a typical inquirer is not going to be able to get into some desired epistemic position toward the possibility premise (e.g., knowing it, or determining that it is rationally acceptable) without first having to get into that same position toward the conclusion of the argument. Thus it is not clear for whom these arguments could establish even the rationality of their conclusions."


"Abstract. This paper presents a reconstruction of Anselm's ontological argument within the framework of Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie. It is shown that, within this framework and assuming a certain basic theological view, the argument has some force. Unlike many replies to the argument, the paper concludes undermining the theological view rather than the premise that existence is a predicate.

The ontological argument is an old piece of theological reasoning that has a long and interesting history in the course of Western philosophy. The main author of this argument was the Eleventh-century English friar Anselm of Canterbury, according to Koyré "one of the profoundest and most exalted of spirits," but Descartes' formulation (which he produced without being aware of Anselm's work) is deemed also as one of the standard presentations of the argument.

I shall devote the first part of this chapter to present Anselm's argument. I have found convenient and natural to present the ontological argument within the framework of Meinong's theory of objects, and that is why I shall devote the first section of the first part to present Meinong's doctrine. In the second and last part I will
provide a Reformed assessment of the ontological argument."


"That anyone should uphold the ontological argument as demonstrative of the existence of God is surprising, yet Professor Norman Malcolm seems perfectly serious in his recent defense of one form of it. (1) He maintains that the argument has two variants, one, which he rejects, concludes that God exists and the other, which he accepts, maintains that God has necessary existence. This acceptance is the more remarkable because Malcolm does not base his contention on any Neoplatonic identification of existence with reality and fullness of being. Granted such a metaphysics, the argument would, seem to follow, but Malcolm does not take this approach and indeed professes to have difficulty in comprehending the doctrine of negation and privation characteristic, of it (p. 59). Without such metaphysical buttressing, the argument is quite weak, but it may be well first to show that something is wrong with it before going on to consider what is wrong."


"The logic of existent and nonexistent objects provides a formal theory of reference and true predication for ordinary discourse, the semantics of ontological commitment, and logic of fiction. The intensional logic proposed in what follows offers a rigorous object theory semantics with nonstandard propositional and predicate inference machinery. The system is distinguished from previous formalizations of object theory by formal criteria for nuclear (constitutive) and extranuclear (nonconstitutive) properties, three-valued propositional semantics for predications of nuclear properties to incomplete nonexistent objects for which the objects ostensibly are undetermined, nonstandard set theory semantics with unrestricted comprehension for object theory predicate semantics (licensed by existence restrictions on abstraction equivalence), demonstrations of internal determinacy, consistency, and Henkin completeness, nonstandard deduction theorem, and consistency considerations in light of free assumption and unrestricted comprehension."


"In this paper, the authors show that there is a reading of St. Anselm's ontological argument in *Proslogium* II that is logically valid (the premises entail the conclusion). This reading takes Anselm's use of the definite description "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" seriously. Consider a first-order language and logic in which definite descriptions are genuine terms, and in which the quantified sentence "there is an x such that..." does not imply "x exists". Then, using an ordinary logic of descriptions and a connected greater-than relation, God's existence logically follows from the claims: (a) there is a conceivable thing than which nothing greater is conceivable, and (b) if x doesn't exist, something greater than x can be conceived. To deny the conclusion, one must deny one of the premises. However, the argument involves no modal inferences and, interestingly, Descartes' ontological argument can be derived from it."


"In this paper, the authors evaluate the ontological argument they developed in their 1991 paper as to soundness. They focus on Anselm's first premise, which asserts: there is a conceivable thing than which nothing greater is conceivable. After suggesting reasons why this premise is false, the authors show that there is a reading of this premise on which it is true. Such a premise can be used in a valid and sound reconstruction of the ontological argument. This argument is developed in precise detail, but the authors show that the conclusion, the formal version of which is a reading of the claim that
"God exists", doesn't quite achieve the end Anselm desired."

  "This is an examination of the ontological argument and its consistency with existential propositions. Clarification of the ontological argument is made in light of Hume, Kant, and Carnap with regard to its empirical, predicative, a priori, a posteriori and linguistic proofs and refutations. A further refinement of the presentation is the establishment of the intensional and extensional character of the ontological argument."


  "If God exists, he exists necessarily is a premise in modal versions of the ontological argument. I argue that the proposition isn't clearly entailed by theism. Appeals to intuition aren't conclusive, and alleged proofs place controversial constructions on divine attributes or employ controversial philosophical theses. The proposition is, however, plausible."

History of the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God. A Selection of Primary Sources

IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804)

The first critique of the ontological argument is formulated in the Latin Dissertation "Nova Dilucidatio" (1755).

"Proposition VI. To say that something has the ground of its existence within itself is absurd. For whatever contains within itself the ground of the existence of some thing is the cause of that thing. Suppose, therefore, that there is something which has within itself the ground of its own existence, then it will be the cause of itself. Since, however, the concept of a cause is by nature prior to the concept of that which is caused, the latter being later than the former, it would follow that the same thing would be simultaneously both earlier and later than itself, which is absurd.

COROLLARY. If anything, therefore, is said to exist absolutely necessarily, that thing does not exist because of some ground; it exists because the opposite cannot be thought at all. This impossibility of the opposite is the ground of the knowledge of
existence, but an antecedently determining ground is completely absent. It exists; and in respect of the thing in question, to have said and to have conceived this of it is sufficient.

SCHOLIUM. I find, indeed, the view repeatedly expressed in the teachings of modern philosophers [Baumgartner and Wolff] that God has the ground of His existence posited in Himself. For my part, I find myself unable to support this view. To these good men it seems, namely, somehow rather hard to deny that God, the ultimate and most complete principle both of grounds and of causes, should contain within Himself the ground of Himself. Thus they maintain that, since one may not assert that there is a ground of God which is external to Him, it follows that He contains concealed within Himself the ground of Himself. But there could scarcely be anything more remote from sound reason than this. For when, in a chain of grounds, one has arrived at the beginning, it is self-evident that one comes to a stop and that the questioning is brought to an end by the completeness of the answer. Of course, I know that appeal is made to the concept itself of God; and the claim is made that the existence of God is determined by that concept. It can, however, easily be seen that this happens ideally, not really. Form for yourself the concept of some being or other in which there is a totality of reality. It must be conceded that, given this concept, existence also has to be attributed to this being. And, accordingly, the argument proceeds as follows: if all realities, without distinction of degree, are united together in a certain being, then that being exists. But if all those realities are only conceived as united together, then the existence of that being is also only an existence in ideas. The view we are discussing ought, therefore, rather to be formulated as follows: in framing the concept of a certain Being, which we call God, we have determined that concept in such a fashion that existence is included in it. If, then, the concept which we have conceived in advance is true, then it is also true that God exists. I have said these things, indeed, for the sake of those who support the Cartesian argument." (pp. 14-15).
Kant gives a proof of the existence of God in the Proposition VII:

"There is a Being, the existence of which is prior to the very possibility both of Itself and of all things. This Being is, therefore, said to exist absolutely necessarily. This Being is called God" (cfr. pp. 15-17).

This proof was abandoned in the other writings by Kant.

Bibliography of the Sociology of Religion

The Sociology of Early Christianity

Charisma and Its Routinization in Early Christianity

Messianism

Millenarism
Bibliographia. Annotated bibliographies
Raul Corazzon || rc@ontology.co || Info

Bibliographical study guides

Study guides to Western Philosophy

- Introductory Works, Dictionaries, Encyclopedias
- Bibliography of Philosophy and Manuals of Style
- General Works on the History of Philosophy
- Formal and Descriptive Metaphysics
- Formal and Descriptive Ontology
- Philosophical Logic and Philosophy of Logic
**Philosophy Study Guide: Introductory Works, Dictionaries, Encyclopedias**

INTRODUCTORY WORKS

The purpose of the section "Study Guides to Western Philosophy" is to give both the beginner and the more experienced reader a brief guide to the introductory literature on general philosophy, Bibliography of Philosophy and Manuals of Style, history of philosophy, metaphysics, ontology, Philosophical Logic and Philosophy of Logic.

In its initial form the pages will contain a selection of introductory readings, with brief annotations on the content (for the most important books, also the index will be included); subsequently these will be expanded to include more specific essays on selected problems; in the sections for beginners, preference will be given to those books more readily available.

With the exception of the section "Philosophical Bibliographies" only works in English will be cited (for the studies in French, Italian and German, separated pages are in preparation).

If you want a first introduction to philosophy you will find useful:

"We may be standing in the water, but why try to swim? In other words, what is philosophy for? There is far too much philosophy, composed under far too wide a range of conditions, for there to be a general answer to that question. But it can certainly be said that a great deal of philosophy has been intended as (understanding the words very broadly) a means to salvation, though what we are to understand by salvation, and salvation from what, has varied as widely as the philosophies themselves. A Buddhist will tell you that the purpose of philosophy is the relief of human suffering and the attainment of 'enlightenment'; a Hindu will say something similar, if in slightly different terminology; both will speak of escape from a supposed cycle of death and rebirth in which one's moral deserts determine one's future forms. An Epicurean (if you can find one nowadays) will pooh-pooh all the stuff about rebirth, but offer you a recipe for maximizing pleasure and minimizing suffering in this your one and only life. (...)

The reader will notice that I haven't made any attempt to define philosophy, but have just implied that it is an extremely broad term covering a very wide range of intellectual activities. Some think that nothing is to be gained from trying to define it. I can sympathize with that thought, since most attempts strike me as much too restrictive, and therefore harmful rather than helpful in so far as they have any effect at all. But I will at least have a shot at saying what philosophy is; whether what I have to offer counts as a definition or not is something about which we needn't, indeed positively shouldn't, bother too much." (pp. 4-5).


Contents: Preface (2006) IX; Preface to the First Edition XIII-XX; I. Knowledge and Belief 1; II. Perception and Sensation 33; III. Doubt and Certainty 66; IV. Existence and Reality 84; V. Identity and Individuation 110; VI. Actions and Events 137; VII. Language and Truth 169; VIII. Mind and Body 203; IX. Facts and Values 240; Epilogue 262-288.

"Finally, I must say again that I have been very forcefully impressed, in preparing this account, with the way in which an unfolding problem simply drives one to explore topics that had not initially seemed so sensitively linked with one's opening concern. I have, in fact, deliberately tried to convey a clear sense of this developing linkage. I begin with an analysis of knowledge, that forces us at once to anticipate the need to admit a public world, our principal access to it, the nature of creatures capable of knowledge, and their primary way of expressing what they know. Hence, it seemed fair to proceed from a general account of knowledge (contrasted with belief) to perception (contrasted with other forms of sentience) to the boundaries of doubt and certainty regarding what we may know. In the interests of an enlarging coherence, I found myself obliged to distinguish between what is linguistically expressed and what we may convey by way of linguistic models without supposing an ability to use language (as in speaking of animal beliefs and expectations) or an actual use of language (as when beliefs are implied by one's actions); to distinguish between determining what is true (against the backdrop of a public world) and determining that there is a public world (given which, questions of truth and falsity arise); and to coordinate our analysis of perception (our
principal access to the external world) with the admission of such a world, as by the use of the critical term 'exists'. Hence, the first three chapters afford a provisional sense of closure respecting knowledge - on the condition, that is, that the essential features of the world of which, presumably, we have knowledge would be disclosed. Accordingly, the fourth and fifth chapters explore the difference between what we can talk about and what, within that range, we say exists. There, we are forced to notice a threatening gap between what we admit exists (in accord with our principal means of access to the external world) and what we judge to be the nature of whatever there is in the world (the vexed question of the nature of metaphysics); and, since whatever there is is identical with itself, we are obliged to sort out the large variety of senses in which the verb 'to be' is used (including, now, the 'is' of existence and the 'is' of reference) in order to facilitate whatever we may say about whatever exists (distinguishing, say, the 'is' of identity, of spatiotemporal continuity, of present time, of composition, and of predication).

These distinctions raise further problems, oblige us for instance to decide whether we can refer to what does not exist and why it is that we cannot always say the same thing, under given linguistic circumstances, of what is self-identical. Here, we come to see the respect in which questions of identity, particularly where discontinuity and decomposition obtain, are resolved in informal ways and the sense in which the very meaning of identity is made difficult to explicate.

Also, recognizing that the enterprise of pursuing knowledge is essentially the activity of men, chiefly by means of language, the next three chapters provide a natural sequel. There, we are drawn to examine the general nature of actions (contrasted with physical events), the nature of language (with emphasis on meaning and truth), and the nature of persons and
creatures that have minds (contrasted with physical bodies)." (from the Preface to the First Edition).


"Honer (philosophy emeritus, Mt. San Antonio College) and his co-authors provide an introduction to the basic questions of philosophy for undergraduates and lay readers. The authors have substantially updated several chapters, including their case studies, and have also added significantly to their glossary. General topics include definitions of "philosophy" and philosophical thinking. Other topics include perception and truth, epistemology, metaphysics, freedom and determinism, and philosophy's relationships with religion, ethics, aesthetics, human nature, and politics. Chapters include study and discussion questions, and online and print resources."


"Thinking Philosophically consists primarily of the lectures I used to give in my Introduction to Philosophy course - though now they are considerably expanded and polished. By putting into written form a great deal of obligatory, foundational material that I used to deliver by lecture, I have freed in-class time to engage students in
discussions of that material and to introduce them to primary sources by way of short handouts that we read, interpret, and discuss in class. I frequently present students with opposed primary source handouts on the topic of the day - for example, Aristotle versus Schopenhauer on happiness, Gorgias versus Hegel on human knowledge, Clifford versus James on the ethics of belief, Bertrand Russell versus Carl Jung on religious experience, Socrates versus Thomas Hobbes on conscience. Sometimes a single handout includes opposed ideas, such as Plato's treatment of The Ring of Gyges or the short debate between Socrates and Thrasymachus on justice. On other occasions a single handout from one point of view can be provocative and illuminating, such as Plato's Allegory of the Cave, with which I always begin my Intro course, and to which I then refer at relevant points as the course goes along. The short dialogues of Plato and some of Descartes' Meditations also work well as in-class supplements to Thinking Philosophically." (From the Preface).


"This book is an accessible stimulating gateway to the central areas of philosophy. The chapters are carefully arranged to begin with what are usually regarded as the core areas of the subject and then extend out to other important subjects of less generality, not, one should emphasise, of less importance. The prime purpose of the chapters is not to give comprehensive coverage of each subject, but rather to open the door on the subject for the reader and encourage thought about all the ideas within. Someone once said to me that studying philosophy had 'opened doors'; if this book does that, it will have succeeded." (from the Introduction).


"This is a study in the methodology of philosophical inquiry. It is, accordingly, a venture in metaphilosophy, that rather neglected and nevertheless perhaps most controversial of philosophical disciplines. The aim of the book is to expound and defend the thesis that systematization is the proper instrument of philosophical inquiry and that the effective pursuit of philosophy's mission calls for constructing a doctrinal system that answers our questions in a coherent and comprehensive way. Both of these factors - comprehensiveness and coherence - are indispensable with the adequacy of our philosophizing, since the discipline is concerned with the big picture that emerges from the harmonious coordination of the essential details. Accordingly, philosophy does not reject or otherwise conflict with the cognitive materials obtained on other fronts - science and everyday-life experience. Rather, it exploits and coordinates them. Its coherentist methodology requires it to accomplish its question resolving work with a maximum utilization of, and a minimum disruption to, the materials that our other cognitive resources provide."
Philosophy is caught up in something of a dilemma. On the one hand, its admission as a legitimate and appropriate venture in rational inquiry requires its looking to "the big picture" and striving to counteract the fragmentation that accompanies the specialization that pervades other cognitive domains. On the other hand, it does not and cannot avert division of labor. It remains committed to the quest for unity and coherence in our understanding of the nature of things. But this task is unquestionably difficult in a world where our knowledge is exploding in scope and in complexity, and this has profound implications for how we can pursue philosophy. In the end, however, the fact remains that with this difficult task, as elsewhere, we must and should endeavor to do the best we can." (pp. 1-2).


"Contemporary analytic philosophers are becoming more and more explicit about methodological issues, from the relevance of intuitions and thought experiments to talk about inference to the best philosophical explanation and the 'cost and benefits' of accepting their philosophical views. This is the first book to survey the discussion of these methods. Daly has separate chapters on common sense, analysis, thought experiments, simplicity, explanations and naturalism. While aimed at upper level undergraduates, this book can be profitably studied by graduate students and researchers in philosophy who will learn about their own perhaps unconscious methodological preferences. Case studies illustrating each method also serve as an overview of the latest trends in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology, and early analytic philosophy." Bernard Linsky, University of Alberta.


"Each of the chapters that follow is devoted to a major area of philosophical endeavour. They are their own introductions to the questions they discuss, and therefore need little supplementary introduction here. But a preliminary note about what each chapter contains will help with orientation, as follows.

Chapter 1: Epistemology. Epistemology - sometimes called 'theory of knowledge' - concerns the nature and sources of knowledge. The questions asked by epistemologists are, What is knowledge? How do we get it? Are all our means of seeking it equally good? To answer these questions we need to define knowledge if we can, examine the means we employ in seeking it, and confront sceptical challenges to our claims to have it. Each of the three parts of Chapter 1 takes up one of these tasks. The first considers the problem of giving an adequate definition. The second examines one major means to knowledge - sensory perception - and the third surveys sceptical arguments and efforts to counter them.

Chapter 2: Philosophical Logic. Philosophical logic is in many respects the workshop of philosophy, where a set of
related and highly important concepts come in for scrutiny, among them reference, truth, existence, identity, necessity, and quantification. These concepts are fundamental not just to philosophical inquiry but to thought in general. This chapter examines these concepts by focusing upon the question of reference. The first two sections look at what seem to be the most obvious examples of referring devices, names and descriptions. The third concerns a problem about existence; the fourth examines identity statements and the fifth considers the question whether, when true, such statements are 'necessarily' true. The final section examines some views about truth.

Chapter 3: Methodology. Epistemological discussions of the kind pursued in Chapter 1 concern the concept of knowledge in general. A more particular application of it concerns science, one of the major fields of knowledge acquiring endeavour. Philosophical investigation into the assumptions, claims, concepts, and methods of science raises questions of great philosophical importance. The elementary part of this inquiry, here called Methodology, focuses largely on questions about the concepts and methods used in and its problems; the concept of laws of nature; realism, instrumentalism, and under-determination of theory by evidence; confirmation and probability; and the concept of explanation.

Chapter 4: Metaphysics. All the foregoing branches of philosophy share certain problems about what ultimately exists in the universe. These problems are the province of Metaphysics. Its primary questions are, What is where, and what is its nature? These questions immediately prompt others, so many indeed - and so important - that some of them have now come to constitute branches of philosophy in their own right, for example, philosophy of mind and philosophical theology. In addressing questions about the nature of reality, the metaphysician has to examine concepts of time, free will, appearance and reality, causality, universals, substance, and a number of
others besides. Here four of these topics are considered: causation, time, universals, and substance. Note that questions about causality also come up in the chapters on Methodology and Mind, and the discussion of substance connects with the discussion of Aristotle in the chapter on Greek philosophy (see below) - thus exemplifying the interconnectedness of philosophical inquiry.

Chapter 5: The Philosophy of Mind. Questions about the nature of mind were once usually included in metaphysics, but their great importance has led to so much debate, and to such significant use of materials from the neighbouring fields of psychology and brain physiology, that the philosophy of mind is now treated separately. Chief among the points requiring discussion are the relation of mind and brain, the nature of phenomena have casual powers or are merely in some sense by-products of brain activity. The sections in this chapter take up each point in turn.

Chapter 6-9: The History of Philosophy. Because the problems of philosophy are ancient and persistent, studying the history of philosophy is an important part of a philosophical education. It is not simply, or even very largely, that this study is interesting for its own sake - although it certainly is - but rather, it is that the outstanding philosophers of the past made contributions to philosophy which we must grasp in the interests of our current work. To study the history of philosophy is to study philosophy, for almost all the great questions were formulated and explored by our predecessors. Two main periods of the history of Western thought are discussed in this volume: Greek philosophy from about 600 BC until 322 BC (the date of Aristotle's death), and Modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant (the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries AD). The Greeks initiated all of philosophy's major fields, and identified their basic questions. Two of them, Plato and Aristotle, are especially important. They and their forerunners, known as the Pre-Socratics, are the subject of Chapters 6 and 7. The
philosophers of the Modern period who have done so much to shape philosophical discussion since their day are Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant (discussed in Chapter 8) and Locke, Berkeley, and Hume (discussed in Chapter 9). They are grouped in this way because the first three are usually described as 'Rationalists' and the last three 'Empiricists' (Kant occupies a position apart), some important differences between rationalism and empiricism being at stake. But perhaps the best order in which to read them, and to read about them, is: Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant.

Chapter 10: Ethics. The supreme importance of critical reflection on the values by which we live is unquestionable. Our values are the basis of our judgements about others, and of our decisions about how to act and live. Ethics is the study of theories about moral values, and of the concepts we use in identifying and asserting them. An important distinction is required here: a theory which prescribes how we should live is called a 'first-order' or 'normative' morality. Reflective enquiry into the assumptions, concepts, and claims of such first-order moralities is often called 'metaethics'. Both are of crucial interest in the study of ethics, as this chapter shows. It discusses theories of ethics, examines some of the most important ethical concepts, and investigates aspects of 'moral psychology'.

Chapter 11: Aesthetics. Aesthetics in contemporary philosophy concentrates upon discussion of the experience of appreciating artistic and natural beauty, and investigates whether there is an underlying unity in the nature of such experience. In this chapter the three sections successively examine aesthetic experience and judgement, fundamental concepts of the philosophy of art, and theories about the nature of art." (from the Editor's Introduction).

The subjects introduced in this volume are various, and each of the chapters is independent of the others. The only unifying theme throughout is the approach: each chapter assumes that its readers have some grounding in the basics of philosophy, and (without attempting to be exhaustive: the bibliographies point the way to further study) offers an account of some of the key questions in the field under discussion. No area of philosophy is entirely free of connections to and overlaps with other areas, however, so it will be found that debate in one chapter throws light on debate in others in a variety of ways - as to which, more below.

Six chapters have as their titles 'The Philosophy of.....'. In its more advanced regions philosophy often consists in reflection on the assumptions, methods, and claims of an important area of intellectual endeavour. The 'philosophy of' chapters focus on crucial subjects: science mathematics, social science in general and psychology in particular, language, and religion.

Two chapters extend the study of Philosophy's history into periods often neglected in undergraduate study, the 'post-Aristotelian' period of later ancient philosophy, and
medieval philosophy. Each is rich in intrinsic interest, and in importance for developments in later philosophy. The high importance of political philosophy demands that it have a chapter to itself, which it gets here. I have already mentioned the chapters that respectively survey Indian philosophy and Continental philosophy; as with the others in this volume, they are intended to be prefaces to the further study invited by their bibliographies, but this is a point worth iterating in their case because of their range. The remaining two chapters discuss the work of individuals. One is devoted to a single individual, Immanuel Kant; the other introduces themes in the thought of three of the principal founders of twentieth-century analytic philosophy: Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Kant chapter surveys the work of a seminal modern thinker whose views have been influential in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics across several traditions of philosophical debate. The chapter on Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein introduces a number of the most central questions of contemporary philosophy." (from the Editor's Introduction).


"Introductory anthologies typically reflect the philosophical viewpoints of one or more senior scholars, each of whom makes editorial decisions in a variety of fields. This collection draws on the judgments of a new generation of scholars, each of whom has chosen the selections and provided introductions in one area of expertise: David Sosa (epistemology), L. A. Paul (philosophy of science), Delia Graff (metaphysics). Jesse J. Prinz (philosophy of mind), Robin Jeshion (philosophy of language), Stuart Rachels (ethics), Cynthia A. Stark (political philosophy), and Gabriela Sakamoto
While the choice of associate editors, the structure of the book, and the contents of the first section are the responsibility of the editor, the rest of the work has been done by the associate editors. These philosophers are in the vanguard of 21st-century philosophy, and the choices they have made reflect their views of the most important materials that should be mastered by 21st-century students. Those who wish to learn more about a particular philosopher or a specific philosophical issue are urged to consult the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Routledge, 1999), ed. Edward Craig. It contains detailed entries with bibliographies on every significant topic in the field. Shorter entries, but informative and reliable, are to be found in The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford and New York, 1994). ed. Simon Blackburn and The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Second Edition (Cambridge and New York. 1999), ed. Robert Audi.

- Cottingham, John, ed. 2008. Western Philosophy. An Anthology. Malden: Blackwell. Second edition (First edition 1996). "There are many ways into Philosophy, and no good reason why one particular branch of the subject should always form the chosen route. One of the objects of this book is to provide, within the compass of a single volume, a set of key introductory materials for the widest possible range of courses, covering all the main branches of the subject (or at least all those suitable for teaching at a basic undergraduate level). Fundamental issues in epistemology are dealt with in Part I ('Knowledge and Certainty'). Part II ('Being and Reality') is concerned with general metaphysics and ontology, while the philosophy of mind is covered in Part III ('Mind and Body'). The important issues of personal identity and the freedom of the will receive separate treatment in Part IV ('The Self and Freedom'). The philosophy of religion and the
philosophy of science are dealt with in Pan V ('God and Religion') and Part VI ('Science and Method') respectively. The next two parts deal with moral philosophy: Part VII ('Morality and the Good Life') tackles theoretical and systematic issues in normative ethics, while Pan VIII ('Problems in Ethics') covers a selection of key issues in applied moral philosophy. Finally, Pan IX ('Authority and the State') and Pan X ('Beauty and Art') deal respectively with political philosophy and aesthetics.

Although the first two parts of the volume are devoted to epistemology and metaphysics, traditionally considered as having a 'foundational' role in philosophy, the issues raised here are among the most demanding in the book, and there is no compelling reason why any given introductory course should have to begin with them. Each pan of the volume is intended to be self-contained, and students and teachers are invited to work on the various parts of the book in any order they see fit, or indeed to concentrate on any particular part or parts in isolation. That said, given the nature of philosophy there is inevitably a fair amount of overlap between the topics raised in various parts; where this happens footnotes are provided to draw attention to connections with relevant texts or commentary in other parts of the volume." (from the Preface, XIV-XV).


"In this anthology we have collected a variety of readings for use in a course or sequence of courses designed to introduce students to philosophy. We have based the selection on two courses we have taught numerous times at Stanford University: "God, Self, and World" and "Value and Obligation." The first is an introduction to
metaphysics and epistemology, the second to ethics. These are one-quarter courses, usually taught in sequence, with a fair number of students taking both. These courses are built around classic texts supplemented by shorter selections from the past and present. We have included in this anthology not only texts that we have found successful but also others that a survey of colleagues at Stanford and other institutions have identified as suitable. Thus, the total number of selections is larger than can be reasonably covered in even a two-quarter sequence, and instructors will want to pick those that fit their approach. We have included some footnotes from the original selections but have eliminated others. In some cases footnotes were eliminated because they could not be understood in the context of the selection; in other cases this was done simply to save space. The remaining footnotes have been renumbered." (from the Preface to the First edition).


"This book derives from thirty years of teaching in very different schools in various cities and states. It is based on the belief that philosophy is a genuinely exciting subject, accessible not only to specialists and a few gifted undergraduate majors but to everyone. Everyone is a philosopher, whether enrolled in a philosophy course or not. Most of us are concerned with the same basic problems and use the same essential arguments. The difference is that someone who has studied philosophy has the advantage of having encountered stronger and more varied arguments than might have been available otherwise. In this book, the views of the major philosophers of the past twenty-five hundred years are used to give students these various arguments."
This approach offers introductory students direct contact with substantial readings from significant works in the history of philosophy, but removes the unreasonable demand that they confront these often difficult works in full and without commentary or editing, as they would in the originals or in most anthologies. This book is not, however, a historical introduction but rather an introduction to the problems of philosophy and the various ways in which they have been answered. The history of philosophy thus serves to illuminate these problems and replies, not the other way around." (from the Preface).

**DICTIONARIES**


  Second expanded edition; the first edition was published in 1995.

  "In the first half of this century, the major philosophical dictionary published in English was James Mark Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, a multi-author work published by Peter Smith of Gloucester, Massachusetts; it appeared in 1901 in two volumes (followed by a bibliography in 1905) and was reprinted with revisions in 1925. In the second half of the century, dictionaries of philosophy in English have been much smaller than Baldwin's and either written by a single author or, occasionally, prepared by a group of writers rarely much larger than a dozen working within the confines of a small space. Few of the entries in these books are longer than 500 words; the most typical have been sketches of 150 words or less. This dictionary by contrast, is the work of an international team that includes 381 carefully selected contributors representing
the major subfields of philosophy and many philosophical traditions. It contains substantial treatments of major philosophers, many of these entries running to several thousand words. It has hundreds of entries, often of 500 to 1,000 words, on other significant thinkers, and thousands of brief definitions of philosophically important terms. In addition, it provides detailed overviews, some more than 6,000 words, of the subfields of philosophy, such as epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. It supplies numerous cross-references to help readers in comprehending philosophical ideas, in understanding the terminology of the discipline, and in appreciating philosophers themselves. There are hundreds of entries on important terms and thinkers from non-Western philosophy, for instance from the Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and Korean traditions. The dictionary also covers a number of philosophically significant thinkers and terms from fields closely related to philosophy, including computer science, economics, law, linguistics, literature, mathematics, psychology and other behavioral sciences, and religion. The Appendix defines logical symbols and identifies other special symbols used in philosophy." (from the Preface to the First Edition, XXVII-XXVIII).

"The widespread positive reception of the First Edition has been gratifying, and a number of translations are proceeding, into Chinese, Italian, Korean, Russian, and Spanish at this writing. The field of philosophy has expanded, however, and even apart from that I have become aware of several respects in which the Dictionary can better serve its readers. The result is a multitude of expansions in standing entries and the addition of some four hundred new entries. This extended coverage required sixty new authors, nearly half of them from outside North America.

The new entries range across the entire field of philosophy. We have made a special effort to increase our
coverage of Continental philosophy and of subfields where growth is exceptionally rapid, such as ethics, philosophy of mind, and political philosophy. We have also added numerous cross-references. The cross-references are an element in the volume that many readers have said they found not only valuable in enhancing their initial understanding of an entry, but also welcome as a source of intriguing connections and as an invitation to browse.

In addition to citations of many living philosophers in the Index of Names, there is now selective coverage of a number of living philosophers in separate entries. With very few exceptions, this (quite small) group includes only thinkers in their mid-sixties or older. This constraint on inclusion is in part dictated by the difficulty of providing an adequate portrait of philosophers still actively advancing their positions, and it has required omitting a number of distinguished younger philosophers still making major changes in their views. Even with much older thinkers we do presuppose that there will be no significant developments, but only a greater likelihood of discerning a rounded position that is unlikely to be abandoned.

In the difficult -- and in a sense impossible -- task of determining entries on living thinkers, advice was sought from both the Board and many other sources. We were also guided in part by the extent to which contributors to the First Edition relied on references to certain living thinkers. Given the Dictionary's overall purposes and its wide audience, which includes many readers outside philosophy, selection was weighted toward writers whom many non-philosophers may want to look up, and some weight was also given to considerations of diversity. In keeping with the overall purposes of the volume and the diversity of its readers, we have also decided not to undertake the large task of covering either living contributors to highly specialized subfields -- such as logic or computer theory or much of philosophy of
science -- or philosophers whose main contributions are to the history philosophy. There are, however, many important philosophers in these fields. A number are cited in the Index, which also lists many of the thinkers who are mentioned by one or more contributors but are not subjects of separate entries." (from the Preface to the Second Edition, XXXIII).


Second edition (First edition 1993). "The brave, large aim of this book is to bring philosophy together between two covers better than ever before. That is not a job for one man, or one woman, or a few, or a team, although it is tried often enough. So 249 of us have joined forces. The philosophy brought together includes, first of all, the work of the great philosophers. As that term is commonly used, there are perhaps twenty of them. By anyone's reckoning, this pantheon of philosophy includes Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, the blessed Hume, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. These, together with others who stand a bit less solidly in the pantheon, are the subjects of long essays in this book. Philosophy as this book conceives it, secondly, includes all of its history in the English language, a history mainly of British and American thinkers. In this history there are many figures not so monumental as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Among them, if they are not admitted to the pantheon, are John Stuart Mill, Charles Sanders Peirce, Bertrand Russell, and, if an Austrian can be counted in this particular history, Ludwig Wittgenstein. They also include Jonathan Edwards, Thomas Reid, William James, and F. H. Bradley. Thirdly, if the book cannot include all of the histories of philosophy in other languages than English, it does attend to them. It attends to more than the great leaders of the philosophies in
these languages. Thus Descartes is joined by such of his countrymen and countrywomen as Simone de Beauvoir, Henri Bergson, and Auguste Comte. Kant and Hegel are joined by J. G. Fichte, Jurgen Habermas, and Karl Jaspers. There are also general entries on each of the national philosophies, from Australian to Croat to Japanese to Russian. A fourth part of the book, not an insignificant one, consists in about 150 entries on contemporary philosophers, the largest groups being American and British. It would have been an omission to leave out contemporaries, and faint-hearted. Philosophy thrives. Its past must not be allowed to exclude its present. It is true, too, that one of these contemporaries may one day stand in the pantheon. What has now been said of four subject-matters within philosophy as the book conceives it can be said differently. These subject-matters can be regarded less in terms of individual thinkers and more in terms of ideas, arguments, theories, doctrines, world-views, schools, movements, and traditions. This contributes to another characterization of the book, more complete and at least as enlightening, perhaps more enlightening. In particular, it brings out more of the great extent to which the book is about contemporary philosophy rather than the subject's history. There are perhaps a dozen established parts of philosophy: epistemology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, political philosophy, philosophical logic, logic, the philosophy of mind, aesthetics, and so on. In the case of each of these, the book contains a long essay on its history and another on its problems as they now are, by contributors not at all new to them. In the case of each of these established parts of philosophy, more light is shed by very many additional entries -- for a start, by the aforementioned entries on the great philosophers, on their lesser companions in English-language history and other-language histories, and on contemporaries now carrying on the struggle. In the case of each of the established parts of philosophy, there are also very many
subordinate entries not about individual philosophers."
(from the Preface to the First edition).
"In one way there is little need for an entry in this book to contain cross-references to other entries. This is so since the reader can safely assume that almost every philosophical term which is used for an idea or doctrine or whatever also has an entry to itself. The same is true of almost every philosopher who is mentioned. That is not all. Entries can be counted on for very many subjects which fall under such common terms as 'beauty', 'causation', 'democracy', 'guilt', 'knowledge', 'mind', and 'time'-all such subjects which get philosophical attention. Still, it seems a good idea to provide occasional reminders of the general possibility of having more lights shed on something by turning elsewhere. And there is often a good reason for prompting or directing a reader to look elsewhere, a reason of which a reader may be unaware. So occasionally a term in an entry is preceded by an asterisk, indicating that it is the heading or the first word of the heading of another entry. For the same reason an asterisked term or terms may appear on a line at the end of an entry. In some cases the latter references are to related or opposed ideas or the like. In order not to have the book littered with asterisks, they have very rarely been put on the names of philosophers. But it is always a good idea to turn to the entries on the mentioned philosophers.
The cross-references are more intended for the browsing reader than the reader at work. For the reader at work, there is an Index and List of Entries at the back of the book. The Index and List of Entries usually gives references to more related entries than are given by cross-references in and at the end of an entry. It is also possible to look up all the entries on, say, aesthetics or American philosophy or applied ethics.
The book is alphabetized by the whole headings of entries, as distinct from the first word of a heading. Hence, for example, abandonment comes before a priori
and *a posteriori*. It is wise to look elsewhere if something seems to be missing." *(On Using the Book)*. At the end of the book there is also a useful appendix on *Logical Symbols* as well as the appendices *A Chronological Table of Philosophy* and *Maps of Philosophy*.


"Although the Dictionary covers a wide historical range and explores many subject areas, it focuses on terms and individuals at the center of current philosophical discussion. Many readers will consult the Dictionary for help in understanding individual terms and the contributions of individual philosophers, but others will explore a given philosophical issue or area by reading a range of related entries. A philosopher browsing through the text will learn much about the history and structure of Western philosophy and its sources of creative dispute. We hope that the Dictionary will be an invitation to further thought and that it will not be taken as the last word on any topic.

Entries for philosophical terms are intended to provide clear and challenging expositions that give access to major philosophical issues. Queries and objections are often included to capture the perplexity arising from philosophical questions and to encourage readers to be active and critical in their response to the Dictionary as a whole.

Many entries give the derivations from Greek, Latin, French, or German. Entries for terms state the areas of philosophy in which the terms have their main use, provide cross-references to entries on philosophers and other terms, and conclude with illustrative quotations from a classical or modern source. The reference section at the end of the book gives details of the works cited in these quotations. Biographical entries discuss the
philosophical contributions and list at least some of the major works of their subjects." (from the Preface).

- Blackburn, Simon, ed. 2008. Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. Second revised edition (First edition 1994). "It is now eleven years since the first edition of this Dictionary was published, and time moves on. When I was writing the original edition there were few comparable works to help the job of compilation and selection. In the intervening years, a great many have appeared, some of admirable weight and authority. Now, as well, the resources of the web are everywhere, and bring both a blessing and a curse: the blessing of instant access to information which, only little more than a decade ago, required ferreting out of patchy libraries and archives, but the corresponding curse of overload. A good curator, it is said, knows what to destroy, but it is hard for a dictionary writer to opt out of the arms race of adding the obscure and the marginal, the exotic and the antiquarian, when there is so little cost to doing so. My own criteria remain roughly as they did for the first edition, although I have allowed myself a fair amount of expansion where I became persuaded that the original was a little too sparse. But I have tried to keep the likely needs of the user in mind, and at least some of those needs are better met with reasonable brevity than massive prolixity. The historian Macaulay says of some unfortunate that the great weight of his learning had quite extinguished his slender faculties, but as before I have been more concerned to light up the faculties than to add to the learning. And, as before, this is my excuse for refracting so much through my own interests and judgments, rather than packaging the entries of others." (from the Preface to the Second Edition).

- Ayer, Alfred Julius, and O'Grady, Jane, eds. 1992. A Dictionary of Philosophical Quotations. Malden:
Blackwell.

"A. J. Ayer's suggestion that he should compile a dictionary of philosophical quotations was one of those ideas the excellence of which is attested by puzzlement that it has never been thought of before. In this case, however, there is some reason why, if it had been previously conceived, the idea had not been put into practice. The sort of thing readers expect from a book of quotations is a set of aphoristic utterances which trigger an immediate response of pleasure, agreement, amusement or awe, and which seem 'deep' without requiring to be sounded. But, though incidentally full of stylishness and wit, philosophical thought is not essentially aphoristic, and cannot easily be boiled down into resonant sayings. It consists mainly in intricate, often lengthy, argument, which usually invokes or assumes understanding of the philosophical positions it opposes.

The compiler of philosophical quotations is therefore in a difficult position. To reproduce too many long closely argued passages runs the risk of boring the reader; to produce only the conclusions to such arguments would be baffling and frustrating; and it is often misleading, distorting, or impossible to convey an argument in small chunks or in passages full of ellipses. Or where this can be done, there is the danger of imposing a certain homogeneity of quotability, and of replacing ponderousness with pithiness at the cost of losing philosophers' distinctiveness and style. Merely to reproduce their peripheral witticisms would not do justice to them either.

I have used a combination of these various risk-involving methods of quotation, trying to avoid the pitfalls of each. Where possible, in order to supply the necessary presupposed background to the arguments, I have selected quotations which effectively cross-refer to, and complement, one another (Reid attempting to refute Hume, Condillac appreciatively criticizing Locke). This
also, I hope, conveys a sense of philosophy as shared and cumulative dispute, rather than just the solitary musing it is often taken to be, and of how philosophers constantly both build on and demolish one another. For readers unused to philosophy there is a Glossary, in which I have aimed not merely to define the philosophical terms used in the book, but, given the limited space, to set them in the context of the disputes in which they feature, and thus make clear their significance." (from the Introduction).

**GENERAL ENCYCLOPEDIAS**


  Eight volumes, plus a supplement edited by D. M. Borchert in 1996. This edition is now superseded by the new edition published in 2005, but some articles are still of valuable interest.

  "The last and, in fact, the only previous major philosophical reference work in the English language, J. M. Baldwin’s Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy, appeared in 1901. While it was in many ways an admirable work (it numbered among its contributors men of such caliber as Charles Peirce and C. E. Moore), the scope of Baldwin’s Dictionary was quite limited. The great majority of articles were exceedingly brief, providing concise definitions of technical terms sometimes accompanied by additional information of a historical nature. Since then, especially in the light of the revolutionary developments in philosophy and related fields, the need for a truly encyclopedic presentation of philosophical theories and concepts has become increasingly acute. The present encyclopedia is intended to fill this need. It has been our aim to cover the whole of philosophy as well as many of the points of contact..."
between philosophy and other disciplines. The Encyclopedia treats Eastern and Western philosophy; it deals with ancient, medieval, and modern philosophy; and it discusses the theories of mathematicians, physicists, biologists, sociologists, psychologists, moral reformers, and religious thinkers where these have had an impact on philosophy. The Encyclopedia contains nearly 1,500 articles of ample length which can be of value to the specialist, while most of them are sufficiently explicit to be read with pleasure and profit by the intelligent nonspecialist. Some of the longer articles, such as those dealing with the history of the various fields of philosophical investigation or the work of the most influential philosophers, are in effect small books, and even the shorter articles are usually long enough to allow a reasonably comprehensive treatment of the subject under discussion. We believe that there is no philosophical concept or theory of any importance that is not identified and discussed in the Encyclopedia, although not every concept or theory has a separate article devoted to it. In apportioning the space at our disposal, we were guided by the thought that the majority of readers would derive more benefit from, a smaller number of long and integrated articles than from a multitude of shorter entries. Throughout we have aimed at presentations which are authoritative, clear, comprehensive, and interesting." (from the Introduction).


"Our strategy of building the Second Edition on the foundation of the First Edition and the Supplement requires a few additional comments. Carefully and judiciously our editorial team selected those entries from the First Edition and the *Supplement* that were so well done that they merited retention. To virtually all of these entries we added bibliographical
updates and to many of them we added substantive addenda. We prized these entries because, appearing together with the new entries, they enabled the reader to view high quality philosophizing over the course of almost a half century thereby adding a measure of historical gravitas to our project. Notwithstanding our respect for the First Edition and the Supplement, we added 450 entries on new topics, and nearly 300 completely fresh and newly authored treatments of important topics that were originally covered within the First Edition or Supplement. The presence of all of this new material is a clear indication of the vigorous and innovative philosophical activity that has occurred within the discipline since the Encyclopedia made its debut almost four decades ago. Entirely new subfields have appeared such as feminist philosophy, the philosophy of sex and love, and applied ethics. New important topics in virtually every subfield have been explored ranging from artificial intelligence to animal rights. New scholars, whose distinctive contributions to the discipline needed description in substantive personal entries, have appeared on the philosophical landscape. Among such individuals are Karl-Otto Apel, Mohammed Arkoun, Nancy Cartwright, Daniel Dennett, Fred Dretske, Ronald Dworkin, John Earman, Hassan Hanafi, Virginia Held, Julia Kristeva, Jacques Lacan, John McDowell, Ruth Millikan, Richard Montague, Thomas Nagel, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Martha Nussbaum, Derek Parfit, Hilary Putnam, Peter Singer, Gregory Vlastos, Richard Wollheim, and many, many more.

We also added updates to 90 articles, with those updates provided by their original authors. Additionally, 150 scholarly updates to existing articles have been included by means of "addenda," with each addendum compiled by an author other than the original writer, thus allowing for a fresh perspective that augments discussion of the topic at hand. Approximately 430 of the almost 1,200 classic First Edition or Supplement articles that appear in the
Second Edition have been strengthened further by the inclusion of new bibliographic citations. Classic articles from the First Edition and Supplement are clearly identifiable via specific dates in the author bylines that follow each article. Author bylines followed by "(1967)" indicate that the article originally appeared in the First Edition, while bylines followed by "(1996)" indicate first publication within the Supplement. The designation "(2005)" denotes first publication within the Second Edition.

We have modified and expanded the philosophical inclusiveness of the First Edition in several ways. Both the analytic and continental philosophical traditions are well represented in the new topics and new personal entries, as well as in the style of presentation offered by our authors.

In addition, enhanced cultural diversity is evident in the major space we have provided for topics relating to Buddhist philosophy, Chinese philosophy, Islamic philosophy, and Indian philosophy. Because of space limitations a number of First Edition entries devoted to national philosophies (such as American, British, and German) were not retained. The major figures from those countries and their contributions to philosophy have, however, been included in the Second Edition via personal and topical entries. Importantly, we have retained and expanded the entries on Japanese philosophy, Latin American philosophy, and Russian philosophy, and have added entries on African philosophy and Korean philosophy.

To preserve and enhance the detailed record of philosophical bibliographies, dictionaries, encyclopedias, and journals contained in the First Edition entries devoted exclusively to these topics, we moved these articles to the last volume of the Second Edition and increased substantially the space that had been allocated to them in the First Edition. The very large number of
new philosophical bibliographies, dictionaries, encyclopedias, and journals that have been published in a multitude of languages during the last half century testifies not only to the vitality of philosophy but also to the increasing cultural diversity on its landscape." (from the Preface to the Second Edition, pp. XII-XIII).


"Planning of the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy began against the background of a single constraint: the project was to be completable, with available means, within a reasonable time-span. The grounds for this were partly economic, but only partly. Since there was no other reason to offer a successor to the justly famous Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards for Macmillan and The Free Press, other than the fact that it had become in a number of respects out of date, it would have made little sense to replace it by a project of such proportions as to go out of date itself during the period of production. We allowed ourselves a maximum of eight years, later reduced to seven-and-a-half, from appointment of the General Editor to publication. This of course suggested advisable constraints on size. It was the firm intention that within these limits our Encyclopedia should be as inclusive as possible. The first thing to be included was full and detailed coverage of philosophy as understood by the Anglo-American academic mainstream. One commercial and one intellectual consideration made this mandatory. First, any project of this size must aim to satisfy its principal market; and second, so much of what belongs to the English-speaking philosophical mainstream belongs to it by well-established right - no encyclopedia of philosophy worthy of the name could possibly fail to cover it extensively. But here the inclusivist policy got off to a good start, for by the 1990s the mainstream itself had become a much broader river than it had been twenty or
thirty years before, when a narrowly focused jet might have been a more appropriate image. It was also far less clear where the banks were, and we were glad not to have to concern ourselves with that question. In the 1960s philosophy felt fairly sure of its business and its boundaries; in the 1990s it does not have the same confidence (though it does not lack individual confident voices), and a clear mark of this is a greater tendency to look around, historically and geographically, to see what the others are doing. An editorial policy that was unwilling to reflect the growing pluralism would be widely held to have imposed far too much of itself on the material.

The clearest beneficiary of this policy has been what is increasingly called 'world' philosophy. Chinese, Japanese and Korean, Indian and Tibetan, Jewish, Arabic and Islamic, Russian, Latin American and African philosophy have between them 400 entries. We believe that the user of the Encyclopedia can gain a thorough grounding in the philosophy of any of these regions. Someone seeking a firm foothold in Buddhist philosophy will find themselves as well served as those looking for philosophical logic. Readers with an interest in Western metaphysics are invited to pursue their interests to India. Back in Europe, but equally suspect to many mainstreamers: the devotee of later twentieth-century French thought will find their interests well catered for. In all these cases, we believe, we have provided more topics, more detail, and more bibliographical information than any previous general encyclopedia of philosophy.

It is one thing to be inclusive, another to ensure proper treatment for everything one includes. Our strategy was that Subject Editors should provide a perspective on their own area that practitioners within it could at least recognize, and preferably identify with, and therefore that they should have the space, the words and the number of entries to do so. A number of these areas are ones to which the Anglo-American mainstream has assigned little
importance. We wanted to minimize the effect of this on the coverage of the outlying areas: the periphery was not to be kept peripheral by being presented as it appears from the centre. By far the main influence on the shaping of each area was to be someone for whom that area was the centre of their academic life. This was one of our reasons for adopting the more complex editorial structure, with a layer of specialist Subject Editors taking decisions about headwords, word-counts and commissioning, though keeping in touch with a General Editor while doing so, rather than having a Chief Editor acting with the help of specialist advisers. Another reason, of course, was the thought that one makes better use of the available expertise by bringing it to bear directly, than by applying it via a less expert intermediary." (from the General Editor's Preface, VI).

• ———, ed. 1999. Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London, New York: Routledge. An abridged edition in one volume. "The Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a complete introduction to world philosophy. Its 2,000 plus entries range from the Presocratics, Ancient Egypt and early Chinese philosophy up to the present day, and across the world to include the philosophies of the West, the Arab world, India, East Asia, Latin America and Africa. Subject matter is broad ranging, from aesthetics to mathematics, from philosophy of religion to philosophy of science. Entries fall into three broad types. First, lengthy entries provide introductions to major disciplines within philosophy (epistemology, ethics, metaphysics and so on) and major time periods and regions (ancient philosophy, medieval philosophy, Indian and Tibetan philosophy and so on), defining the concepts, movements and topics and summing up the major positions and debates within each. Shorter entries, ranging from a few dozen words to several hundred, then describe more specific concepts in greater detail. Finally, biographical
entries provide information on the life, work and thought of hundreds of the world's philosophers, from household names like Plato and Confucius to others who, almost forgotten, none the less made important contributions."

(from the Introduction).


"The Shorter REP has emerged out of our experience with Concise REP, the first one-volume distillation of the original ten-volume Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy published in 1998. Concise REP appearing in 2000, was composed of the initial, introductory or summary sections of each of the 2,054 entries contained in the parent work, which it therefore matched everywhere for breadth, but hardly anywhere for depth. By virtue of its sheer range Concise REP fulfilled a need, but we have heard from users and reviewers who would evidently have preferred more depth -- and would have been willing, we must presume, to sacrifice some breadth to get it. Thinking about this valuable feedback quickly led to a different conception of a single-volume reduction of the encyclopedia that now embodied in Shorter REP. By excising much of the more recondite material we have made it possible for a considerable number of entries on the more central and sought-after topics to be included in their entirety, even though in some cases that meant as much as 15,000 words or more. The Shorter REP accordingly contains just 957 entries, but of these 119 are republished here in their full original length. and marked out by bold typeface in the headwords at the top of the page. The reader will find substantial essays on all the major figures of the Western philosophical trait likewise on all major topics and those we judged to be of most help to a student readership. Further, we have reprinted in full all the 'Signpost' entries, in which members of the original team of specialist subject editors surveyed in brief, usually in
about 2,000 words, their specialist field. There are twenty-four of these. instantly recognisable from their light-grey background: taken together they offer the reader a highly informative outline sketch of pretty much the whole of philosophy. Latin American, African, Jewish, Arabic, Russian, Indian and East-Asian thought all included. *The Shorter REP* is unashamedly 'Western' in its emphasis, being designed to suit the needs of undergraduate philosophy students and the courses they are most likely to encounter. But so far as the stringencies of a single volume allow it retains the spirit of inclusivity and comprehensiveness that was such a feature of its ten-volume ancestor. Nowhere is the 'Signpost' the only entry allotted to its area -- in every case there are at least two others.

The inclusion of so many complete entries has had another welcome effect, that of allowing us to do a little more justice to at least some of the encyclopedia's most eminent authors: Richard Rorty, Bernard Williams, Dagfinn Follesdal, Tim Scanlon. Philip Kitcher, Timothy Williamson, Onora O'Neill, Gary Gutting, Anthony Appiah, Frank Jackson, Michael Friedman, Dan Garber, Malcolm Budd, Terry Irwin and the list runs on, though I have to stop, apologetically, somewhere. Entries by all these and many others appear in their original shape, unabridged.

*The Shorter REP* is not just a selective rearrangement of the old material. Admittedly hardly anything has been rewritten specifically for *The Shorter REP*, just two very short entries in fact, but it nevertheless contains a good deal that is new when compared with the original 1998 publication. Any slight suggestion of paradox is easily dispelled: since October 2000 the *Routledge Encyclopedia* has been available on the Internet as *REP Online*, in which form it has seen additions (at present towards 100 new entries) and a number (now approaching thirty) of updates and revisions, concentrating on entries near the top of our list of user-
statistics. Some of the revised entries embody only minor changes. Perhaps the retention of a recent book or article, others differ much more from their first versions, as for *Wittgenstein* (by Jane Heal), which as well as various smaller adjustments now has a whole new section on recent interpretative controversy about Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. In one absolutely central case, of obvious prime interest to students, we have a completely rewritten replacement entry: this is *David Hume* by Don Garrett. All this new material in *REP Online* was available to us as we made our selections for *The Shorter REP* and a good deal of it is now to be found here." (from the *Introduction*, VII).

- Parkinson, George Henry Radcliffe, ed. 1988. *An Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. London: Routledge. American edition titled: *The Handbook of Western Philosophy*, New York, Macmillan, 1989. "This encyclopaedia of philosophy is intended for a very wide audience. It is intended for the general reader, who wants to know what philosophy is; for the sixth-former, who may have experienced for the first time the fascination of the problems of philosophy and who may be thinking about studying the subject at a university; and for university students of philosophy who want a general map of the various regions of philosophy that picks out the important features and relates them to each other. Finally, although this encyclopaedia is not a reference work for the specialist, it is hoped that it may be of some use to teachers of philosophy, who may find it helpful from time to time to see how their own special area of interest is related to other areas. An encyclopaedia, by its nature, should aim at being comprehensive; but comprehensiveness has to be weighed against two other factors-size (which also means expense) and intelligibility. A one-volume encyclopaedia, such as this is, could achieve a fair measure of comprehensiveness, but the material that it contained
would have to be compressed. Such an encyclopaedia
would be useful only to someone who already has some
knowledge of the subject, or who wants to pick up bits of
information—the exact title of a book, perhaps, or a date.
The present encyclopaedia, however, is meant to give its
readers some understanding of philosophy, and this
means that limits have had to be placed on its scope. It
has been decided that it should be an encyclopaedia of
contemporary philosophical thought, an account of the
current state of philosophical thinking. This does not
mean that the history of the subject will be neglected. It is
my belief that current philosophical problems have their
roots in the past, and can best be understood by tracing
them back to those roots. But there will be no discussion
of issues that belong wholly to the past.

There is another restriction on the scope of this
encyclopaedia. One of the most striking features of recent
Western philosophical thought is the existence within it
of two broad traditions, which are commonly called the
continental and the Anglo-Saxon traditions. The
continental tradition is by no means confined to the
continent of Europe, but has many adherents in America;
it descends from a method of inquiry known as
phenomenology, expounded in the first instance by
Brentano and Husserl, and developed by (among others)
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. More recently, some
continental philosophers have found inspiration in
'structuralist' methods of inquiry drawn from linguistics;
others have moved on from structuralism, though in what
direction is not wholly clear. The Anglo-Saxon tradition
goes back to the British empiricists of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries—to Locke, Berkeley and Hume—but it is not restricted to philosophers of the English-
speaking world; it has also taken root in continental
Europe, particularly in West Germany and in the
Scandinavian countries. Now, there is nothing new in the
coexistence of different philosophical traditions; what is
new and disturbing is the fact that, in the main, the
attitude of these two traditions towards one another is one of mutual incomprehension. Attempts have been made, and are being made, to end this state of affairs, but it cannot be said that they have had much success. Most of the contributors to this book are firmly within the Anglo-Saxon tradition, and it seemed to me that an attempt to deal adequately with the continental tradition would add considerably to the length and difficulty of the encyclopaedia. I have therefore decided, with regret, to omit those parts of the continental tradition that have made little or no impact on the Anglo-Saxon tradition. For similar reasons, no attempt will be made to give an account of oriental philosophy." (from the Preface, IX-X).


  "This Companion complements the *Blackwell Companions to Philosophy* series by presenting a new overview of philosophy prepared by thirty-five leading British and American philosophers. Introductory essays by John Searle and Bernard Williams, which assess the changes that have shaped the subject in recent decades, are followed by chapters exploring central problems and debates in the principal subdisciplines of philosophy and in specialized fields, chapters concerning the work of great historical figures and chapters discussing newly developing fields within philosophy. Throughout the course of its chapters, the Companion examines the views of many of the most widely influential figures of contemporary philosophy.

  Although wide-ranging, the Companion is not exhaustive, and emphasis is placed on developments in Anglo-American philosophy in the latter part of the twentieth century. A premise underlying the Companion is that major participants in philosophical debate can provide accounts of their own fields that are stimulating, accessible, stylish and authoritative."
In its primary use, the Companion is an innovative textbook for introductory courses in philosophy. Teachers can use the broad coverage to select chapters in a flexible way to support a variety of courses based on contemporary problems or the historical development of the subject. Specialist chapters can be used selectively to augment standard introductory topics or to prepare students individually for term papers or essays. Chapters include initial summaries, boxed features, cross-references, suggestions for further reading, references and discussion questions. In addition, terms are marked for a common glossary. These features and the problem-setting nature of the discussions encourage students to see the subject as a whole and to gain confidence that explorations within philosophy can lead to unexpected and rewarding insights. In this aspect, the Companion reflects the contributors' experience of small group teaching, in which arguments and perspectives are rigorously tested and in which no solution is imposed. In its secondary use, the Companion will accompany students throughout their undergraduate careers and will also serve the general reader wishing to understand the central concepts and debates within philosophy or its constituent disciplines. Students are unlikely to read the whole volume in their first year of study, but those continuing with philosophy will find their appreciation of the work deepening over time as they gain insight into the topics of the more advanced chapters. The Companion will help them to formulate questions and to see connections between what they have already studied and new terrain. In its final use, the Companion bears a special relationship to the *Blackwell Companions to Philosophy* series. Many readers will wish to read the integrated discussions of the chapters of the present Companion for orientation before turning to the detailed, alphabetically arranged articles of the volumes in the Companion series. Although conceived as a separate volume, the Companion
to Philosophy will serve as a useful guide to the other excellent Companions in what amounts to a comprehensive encyclopedia of philosophy. The general reader might begin with the introductory essays and turn to chapters on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics and Political and Social Philosophy, or to historical chapters from Ancient Greek Philosophy to Hume. Cross-references and special interests will lead readers to other chapters." (from the Preface to the First Edition).

"We thank readers for their gratifying response to the first edition of the Companion. The second edition provides new chapters on Philosophy of Biology; Bioethics, Genetics and Medical Ethics; Environmental Ethics; Business Ethics; Ethnicity, Culture and Philosophy; Plato and Aristotle; Francis Bacon; Nietzsche; Husserl and Heidegger; and Sartre, Foucault and Derrida. There are significant revisions or extensions to chapters on Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind, Political and Social Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy and Feminism, and Hobbes. The discussion of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz is now divided between two chapters, and in a new section Malebranche is considered along with Descartes in the first of these. A longer chapter on Medieval Philosophy replaces the chapter by C. F. J. Martin, who was unavailable to extend his work. We welcome our new contributors and hope that readers will continue to be challenged and delighted by the Companion as a whole." (Preface to the Second edition).
Study Guide for the History of Philosophy (General Works)

GENERAL HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY


"Despite the aversion to the Western canon within the world of letters generally and the aversion to the study of the history of philosophy in particular, interest in the canon has prevailed. There are those who will not give it up and who still desire the education that the great works can provide. I am one of those who would wish to sail between the Scylla of analysis and the Charybdis of suspicion, with the desire to return to the Ithaca of the canon. To understand what I intend by the list of 100 great philosophical works in chapter 2, I refer the reader to my comments on the nature of a canon in the introductory chapter. The list of 100 great philosophical works is not intended as a perfect or a hard-and-fast list, and the overview or outline of the history of philosophy that follows the list, in chapter 3, is intended as an
indication of the periods, figures, and major and minor works to be kept in mind in the study of the history of philosophy. I have presented this in schematic form. It does not purport to be a history of philosophy. For that one must go to the histories of philosophy listed at the end of the outline.

The outline is an interpretation of the history of philosophy. Because the canon has disappeared so much from our consciousness, the outline provides an overview, a reminder of what is there in the history of philosophy. The reader may wish first to look at the outline, then move on to the essays of part 2, and from them to come back to the outline as a guide to think through and absorb its order. The method of this book is not that of a linear argument. It is set up dialectically, with interplay between the two rhetorical forms of presentation, narratio and ratio, the narration (the essays) versus the list and outline. It may thus serve the reader as a touchstone and a guide to return to at various times—to enter the reading of works in the history of philosophy or to discover those works and movements of which perhaps the reader was not well aware.

The list of 100 great works and those works in the outline as well as the commentaries on them which are interspersed throughout the outline are drawn from the resources of my personal library. The commentaries are selected from ones I have used. Very likely there are glaring omissions. I have generally not included commentaries on individual thinkers, only works on periods or movements. It has not been my intention to write a textbook, taking a neutral position on the subject. This book is directed toward anyone who may have an interest in the history of philosophy and who may find what it presents useful.

This personal approach is evident in the three essays that follow in part 2. The first offers a view of philosophical reading and the philosophical use of language; the second a view of the origin of philosophy and the philosopher
developed through the speculative use of the history of philosophy, moving from ancient to Renaissance to modern; and the third an exposition of how the philosophy of history affects the conception of the history of philosophy, using Vico and Hegel as holders of two views. These essays present rhetorical, humanist, and historical perspectives on the study and nature of philosophy and the history of philosophy. They are intended as suggestive rather than definitive accounts, with which the reader should feel free to disagree. As with the particular canon that each reader must develop from the larger, more general canon of the history of philosophy, each reader must come to some conclusions about the meaning of this history, about what aspects of it make it agile and alive.

Because some may wish not only to read the history of philosophy but also to write about it, I have included some practical advice on this topic in part 3, as well as a chapter on philosophical literacy containing 700 terms, names, and works that should be known or become known to those who study the history of philosophy and the field of philosophy generally. These are all taken from standard encyclopedias and reference works in philosophy. To my knowledge no one has as yet advanced such a literacy list in philosophy. It may interest the reader as a simple gauge of what should be philosophical common knowledge." (pp. XIII-XV).


Contents: Volume I: From the Beginning to Plato, Editor: C.C.W. Taylor; Volume II: Aristotle to Augustine, Editor: David Furley; Volume III: Medieval Philosophy, Editor: John Marenbon; Volume IV: The Renaissance and Seventeenth Century Rationalism, Editor G.H.R. Parkinson; Volume V: British Empiricism and the Enlightenment, Editor: Stuart Brown; Volume VI: The
"The Routledge History of Philosophy provides a chronological survey of the history of Western philosophy, from its beginnings up to the present time. Its aim is to discuss all major philosophical developments in depth, and with this in mind, most space has been allocated to those individuals who, by common consent, are regarded as great philosophers. But lesser figures have not been neglected, and it is hoped that the reader will be able to find, in the ten volumes of the History, at least basic information about any significant philosopher of the past or present. (...) In speaking of 'What is now regarded as philosophy', we may have given the impression that there now exists a single view of what philosophy is. This is certainly not the case; on the contrary, there exist serious differences of opinion, among those who call themselves philosophers, about the nature of their subject. These differences are reflected in the existence at the present time of two main schools of thought, usually described as 'analytic' and 'continental' philosophy. It is not our intention, as general editors of this History, to take sides in this dispute. Our attitude is one of tolerance, and our hope is that these volumes will contribute to an understanding of how philosophers have reached the positions which they now occupy. One final comment. Philosophy has long been a highly technical subject, with its own specialized vocabulary. This History is intended not only for the specialist but also for the general reader. To this end, we have tried to ensure that
each chapter is written in an accessible style; and since technicalities are unavoidable, a glossary of technical terms is provided in each volume. In this way these volumes will, we hope, contribute to a wider understanding of a subject which is of the highest importance to all thinking people." (from the General Editors' Preface).


The original edition (first nine volumes) was published between 1946 and 1974; the tenth volume was added in 1986, and the eleventh is a collection of essays, already published with the title: *Contemporary Philosophy Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism*, New York, Continuum, 1956.

"How to Study the History of Philosophy.

1. The first point to be stressed is the need for seeing any philosophical system in its historical setting and connections.

This point has already been mentioned and does not require further elaboration: it should be obvious that we can only grasp adequately the state of mind of a given philosopher and the raison d'être of his philosophy if we have first apprehended its historical point de départ. The example of Kant has already been given; we can understand his state of mind in developing his theory of the a priori only if we see him in his historical situation vis-à-vis the critical philosophy of Hume, the apparent bank ruptcy of Continental Rationalism and the apparent certainty of mathematics and the Newtonian physics.
Similarly, we are better enabled to understand the biological philosophy of Henri Bergson if we see it, for example, in its relation to preceding mechanistic theories and to preceding French "spiritualism."

2. For a profitable study of the history of philosophy there is also need for a certain "sympathy," almost the psychological approach. It is desirable that the historian should know some thing of the philosopher as a man (this is not possible in the case of all philosophers, of course), since this will help him to feel his way into the system in question, to view it, as it were, from inside, and to grasp its peculiar flavour and characteristics. We have to endeavour to put ourselves into the place of the philosopher, to try to see his thoughts from within. Moreover, this sympathy or imaginative insight is essential for the Scholastic philosopher who wishes to understand modern philosophy. If a man, for example, has the background of the Catholic Faith, the modern systems, or some of them at least, readily appear to him as mere bizarre monstrosities unworthy of serious attention, but if he succeeds, as far as he can (without, of course, surrendering his own principles), in seeing the systems from within, he stands much more chance of understanding what the philosopher meant. We must not, however, become so preoccupied with the psychology of the philosopher as to disregard the truth or falsity of his ideas taken in themselves, or the logical connection of his system with preceding thought. A psychologist may justly confine himself to the first viewpoint, but not an historian of philosophy." (pp. 8-9).


"There have been many histories of philosophies, but few presented in one large volume for the educated layman. Two such ventures that have endured for many decades,
*The Story of Philosophy* by Will Durant and Bertrand Russell's *A History of Western Philosophy*, are eminently readable, but cover only the high spots of the field. Durant, who was a very popular lecturer on philosophy at Columbia University, primarily discusses only a few of the great men. Nevertheless, his popularization has been a gateway into philosophy for a great many readers during much of this century. Russell wrote his book hastily out of financial desperation while jobless in New York City at the beginning of World War II. Since Russell was a scholar of very few of the topics he covered, and uninterested or hostile to others, his opus is most engaging as Russelliana but hardly as history of philosophy. Both Durant's and Russell's works are still in print and are widely available in paperback editions.

This work is not intended to compete with these classics. During the last half century the number of new serious scholarly findings and interpretations concerning various portions of the history of philosophy has increased enormously. Previously unknown materials by and about various major figures in the history of philosophy have been discovered. The manuscripts of important figures from ancient times to the present have been or are being edited, increasing our understanding of the authors. For example, an edition of John Locke's writings based on previously unknown manuscripts has begun to see print; the edition of G. W. Leibniz's unpublished writings started in the 1920s continues to produce new volumes. New historical perspectives are being cast upon the materials, so that they can now be seen in their full intellectual and social contexts instead of as just isolated systems of ideas.

All of this has led to many multivolume histories of different portions of the history of philosophy. The enormous German *Überweg* history of philosophy, long the standard one for detail, is now in the process of being redone with a substantial increase in depth of coverage.
and amount of material; when completed, it will finally consist of dozens of highly specialized volumes. Large histories of various periods in the history of philosophy have also been issued, as well as countless volumes about individual philosophers.

In the light of all that has been discovered, edited, and reinterpreted, it seems appropriate to attempt to put together much of the new material and many of the new interpretations, as well as updated explanations and analyses of the accepted history of philosophy, in a form in which nonprofessional readers can appreciate the riches now available in the field. I have been concerned to give due attention to certain portions of the history of philosophy that much too often have been overlooked."


"Why should one study the history of philosophy? There are many reasons, but they fall into two groups: philosophical and historical.

We may study the great dead philosophers in order to seek illumination upon themes of present-day philosophical inquiry. Or we may wish to understand the people and societies of the past, and read their philosophy to grasp the conceptual climate in which they thought and acted. We may

read the philosophers of other ages to help to resolve philosophical problems of abiding concern, or to enter more fully into the intellectual world of a bygone era.

In this history of philosophy, from the beginnings to the present day, I hope to further both purposes, but in different ways in different parts of the work, as I shall try to make clear in this Introduction. But before outlining a strategy for writing the history of philosophy, one must
pause to reflect on the nature of philosophy itself. The word 'philosophy' means different things in divergent mouths, and correspondingly 'the history of philosophy' can be interpreted in many ways. What it signifies depends on what the particular historian regards as being essential to philosophy. This was true of Aristotle, who was philosophy's first historian, and of Hegel, who hoped he would be its last, since he was bringing philosophy to perfection. The two of them had very different views of the nature of philosophy. Nonetheless, they had in common a view of philosophical progress: philosophical problems in the course of history became ever more clearly defined, and they could be answered with ever greater accuracy. Aristotle in the first book of his Metaphysics and Hegel in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy saw the teachings of the earlier philosophers they recorded as halting steps in the direction of a vision they were themselves to expound." (p. XI)

"Most histories of philosophy, in this age of specialization, are the work of many hands, specialists in different fields and periods. In inviting me to write, single-handed, a history of philosophy from Thales to Derrida, Oxford University Press gave expression to the belief that there is something to be gained by presenting the development of philosophy from a single viewpoint, linking ancient, medieval, early modern, and contemporary philosophy into a single narrative concerned with connected themes. The work will appear in four volumes: the first will cover the centuries from the beginning of philosophy up to the conversion of St Augustine in AD 387. The second will take the story from Augustine up to the Lateran Council of 1512. The third will end with the death of Hegel in 1831. The fourth and final volume will bring the narrative up to the end of the second millennium."(p. XVIII)
"I shall attempt in these volumes to be both a philosophical historian and a historical philosopher. Multi-authored histories are sometimes structured chronologically and sometimes structured thematically. I shall try to combine both approaches, covering in each volume first a chronological survey, and then a thematic treatment of particular philosophical topics of abiding importance. The reader whose primary interest is historical will focus on the chronological survey, referring where necessary to the thematic sections for implication. The reader who is more concerned with the philosophical issues will concentrate rather on the thematic sections of the volumes, referring back to the chronological surveys to place particular issues in context." (p. XX - from the Introduction to the first volume).

  

  Volume 2: *Nineteenth-Century Philosophy: Revolutionary Responses to the Existing Order*, Edited by Alan D. Schrift and Daniel Conway.
Introduction, Daniel Conway; 1. Feuerbach and the Left and Right Hegelians, William Clare Roberts; 2. Marx and
Marxism, Terrell Carver; 3. Søren Kierkegaard, Alastair Hannay; 4. Dostoevsky and Russian Philosophy, Evgenia Cherkasova; 5. Life after the Death of God: Thus Spoke Nietzsche, Daniel Conway; 6. Hermeneutics:
Schleiermacher and Dilthey, Eric Sean Nelson; 7. French
Spiritualish Philosophy, F.C.T. Moore; 8. The Emergence
of Sociology and its Theories: From Comte to Weber,
and the Philosophy of Art, 1840-1900, Gary Shapiro.
Volume 3: The New Century: Bergsonism,
Phenomenology and Responses to Modern Science,
Edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson and Alan D. Schrift.
Introduction, Keith Ansell-Pearson; 1. Henri Bergson,
Volume 4: Phenomenology: Responses and
Developments, Edited by Leonard Lawlor.

Volume 5: *Critical Theory to Structuralism: Philosophy, Politics and the Human Sciences*, Edited by David Ingram.


Volume 6: *Poststructuralism and Critical Theory's Second Generation* Edited by Alan D. Schrift.


Volume 7: After Poststructuralism: Transitions and Transformations, Edited by Rosi Braidotti.

Volume 8: Emerging Trends in Continental Philosophy, Edited by Todd May.
Introduction, Todd May; 1. Rethinking Gender: Judith Butler and Feminist Philosophy, Gayle Salamon; 2. Recent Developments in Aesthetics: Badiou, Rancière, and Their Interlocutors, Gabriel Rockhill; 3. Rethinking Marxism, Emily Zakin; 4. Thinking the Event: Alain Badiou’s Philosophy and the Task of Critical Theory,
SOME ADVANCED READINGS


  "These analyses are first of all historical. They take up a debate, more than a century old, concerning epochs and the thresholds that separate them. But rather than constructing the ages and their transitions-moments of objective Spirit, constellations of the veiling and unveiling of being, epistemological apparatuses of knowledge/power-I thought it useful to read the languages that Western philosophy has spoken since its birth. At their best, philosophers have made an effort not to be carried away by the fad of the day that passes for common sense; no thought, however, has ever resisted being carried away by its own language. Far from mastering a language, concepts live on it; they are born of words. Hasn't each of our historical idioms always instituted its own fantasmic reality? I have asked myself which have been, concretely,
those human additions of which Nietzsche speaks. Might they always come down to a certain organization of nouns linked in one way or another to the predominant languages? Would "reality" then exist in a Greek, a Latin, a modern vernacular? And might it be this by giving birth to the centuries that spoke those languages and relied upon common nouns as if upon courts of ultimate authority that are essentially self-evident? It will be necessary, if such questions merit consideration, to define epochs by means of the fantasmic organization instituted by a language." (p. 4)

"The history I will attempt to retrace is the one in which the Aristotelian hoson was maximized: the history of norms. I understand this term in its strongest sense, the sense in which it names the authoritative representation that serves, during a given linguistic era, to constitute the phenomenality of phenomena and thereby to legitimize all theoretical and practical rules. In the normative sense, a fantasm cannot be exhausted in regulatory representations. It designates the sovereign principle to which the professional philosopher refers all laws of knowledge and acting, but which in turn cannot be referred to anything else,' the principle that serves as the ultimate reason for all generic principles, the trans-regional canon for all regional canons. This principle makes, absolutely though fantasmically, e pluribus unum—from many, one—not as does a major premise from which other propositions would follow, but rather as a burgeoning production center. Fantasms rule by authorizing not the deduction of a finite corpus of conclusions, but the indefinite association of representations that require that one follow them. Well, such representations are called laws. Hence if laws are measured against the fantasmic authority, then this fantasmic authority will be normative in the sense that one refers to it as to the law of laws.

Is it not the basics of the trade to secure a foundation, not one that is grounded but one nevertheless capable of
anchoring the premises which instruct me in what I may know and what I should do? Understood in this way, a norm is not justified, and in this respect it is fantasmic. But it justifies all that may become a phenomenon during the linguistic epoch that bears its hallmark; in this respect it is hegemonic. If it may be proven that such a referent, non-referable to some superior authority, remains for as long as a language preponderates, then the history to be traced will be that of the Greek, Latin, and modern hegemonic fantasms." (pp. 7-8)

"Because beginnings are compact but ends are revealing, I will read only the opening and closing documents of each linguistic epoch. I intend to analyze the inaugural discourses that institute a law, as well as those that destitute it. When a fantasm attains hegemony, everything proceeds as if philosophy had no other strategy to follow than natalit j–6™ C–™y alone, maximization, tragic denial. But all this is so only as if for the strategy of mortality is never obliterated-singularization is not obliterated, neither is the tragic double bind. The instituting discourses already express the double bind, and the destituting discourses will draw their final consequences from it.

I shall not stop to read instituted discourses that repeat the law for long periods. Therefore, I will say very little about the "one" as manifested in fourth century Attic thought, nor will I hesitate, furthermore, to skip over the thirteenth century scholastic apex of the Latin fantasm, nor, with the German fantasm, to take a shortcut in the trajectory from idealism to materialism and nihilism in the nineteenth century. If these philosophical summits inspire awe it is because they closely resemble the knowledge a neurotic patient imputes to his therapist. And by presuming that each hegemonic fantasm opens onto a non-fortuitous conjunction of legislation and transgression that are equally normative, the therapy effectively takes on the public function given to those who are at the summits: ideal Platonic pacification, the
Thomist "grand system" (if that is the *summum* of Latin thought), the Hegelian dialectic reconciling all oppositions. But in a retrospective reading these cures prove deceptive. Neoplatonists, medieval nominalists, and phenomenologists of occurrent being are there to remind us that there is no recovery from the tragic glimpsed at the beginnings. Hence a warning about the relative volume of the synopses: In the following pages we shall read less about the moments of fantasmic destitution than about those of institution, for at the commencement of each of the periods examined I will seek to isolate the fissure that ends up by shattering an epochal symbolic order. The ends will prove to be, if not foreseeable, at least expected. Through centuries of usage, a language deploys the full range of resources contained in its words. As a closing document for the Greek regime, I will read a treatise by Plotinus describing the one as the event of unification which gathers the singular givens together. Here we will see a return of the middle voice in which I will discern a law of impurity, a principle of contamination, an *a priori* of a counter-law which, by virtue of our mortality, always disperses nomotheses among the singulars and time. Our limiting of the Greek one to its instituting and destituting moments should not be construed to suggest that the language of Plotinus and Parmenides were the same. But what could that mean, the same language? We do not inhabit a language the way a fossil is embedded in a monolith. Nevertheless, the semantic displacements from Parmenides to Plotinus were just shifts. By contrast, with the passage to Latin, an abrupt deployment of contiguous territories took place, a rupture. As we shall see, these contiguities will require that we diachronically stretch out the guiding thread, which is what our topology is. If we come upon thresholds of incommensurability in our history, these can only be the fractures left behind by translations. The transition into a new linguistic epoch casts an aura of irreality on fantasmic "reality." Here my
interest in languages is above all aimed at rescuing the discussion of historical periodization from arbitrariness, which is why I shall pay attention to the great translators, to those who shatter historical continuity-Cicero and Luther." (pp. 39-40).


"It is not enough to distinguish the history of philosophy from philosophy, philosophical from exegetic problems, if we do not at the same time realize that the history of philosophy is philosophy itself as so far actually realized in civilization. An exclusively synchronic development of philosophical problems generates mainly a blindness to one's own presuppositions and to the manner in which historical context shapes in essential ways contemporary consciousness - and unconsciousness - of basic philosophical problems. To see that there is more to be done is quite a different matter than proceeding as if nothing had been done before us. Only an inclusive historical approach has even a ghost's chance of restoring perspective and balance, of forcing the needed reassessment to a successful outcome. My hope is that this book will help make it unconscionable for professors to continue to teach philosophy in the manner that has long become customary - as though the history counted for nothing, or provided only a side-show, especially that part of its history I make known in this book as the Latin Age, to which age, especially in its closing centuries (the period between Ockham and Poinset or Descartes), we owe the general notion of sign taken for granted today insofar as it is a warranted notion and not a mere nominalism. Besides, the history of philosophy is not only philosophy itself as realized in civilization, but also a story, and a good one. Mates has suggested that to tell a story or even
to criticize what others have said or done is incompatible with the search for truth in history. I couldn't disagree more, for it is on narrative that we live as distinctively human animals, and every good narrative has to have a beginning, a middle, and an end, however provisional. My aim has been to tell a 'story of philosophy' somewhere near as well as it deserves to be told in order for something of the many truths at stake to come alive for those who happen to hear the tale - not the only one to be told, to be sure, but still a story of philosophy in the grand manner such a story requires to match its destiny. I have tried to equip the reader, as it were, with seven-league boots, making it possible to traverse twenty-four centuries in such a way as to obtain a vantage opening as far into the future of philosophy, I dare say, as at least the lifetime of anyone born by the time of publication of this book. The last word in any history is never spoken till the race itself is extinct, and not even then. So this is not a history for all time, but only for the first quarter or so, with luck the first half, of the twenty-first century; after which the postmodernism of which it speaks as harbinger will be spoken of rather with words of hindsight and Minerva, according to the saying of Hegel, that the owl of wisdom only flies toward evening." (from the Preface).


"Having already canvassed open concepts, both contemporary formulations of them and some of their variety, most recently in *The Opening Mind: a philosophical study of humanistic concepts* (1977), it seems to me that absolutely basic to further exploration in the area of conceptualization is a thorough inquiry into the history of traditional theories of concepts. Such an inquiry would be valuable if only to test the accuracy of contemporary criticisms of these theories as a series of mistaken views about concepts as entities, or concepts as erroneous readings of the meanings of words, or concepts
as unintelligible abstractions, or - my own view - concepts as closed in their definitive properties, conditions or criteria. Many contemporary philosophers, whether they subscribe to open concepts or to concepts as dispositions, not entities, have offered one or other wholesale doctrine about traditional theories of concepts. The doctrine, as attribution and as condemnation, in this regard, much resembles recent attempts to foist mistaken naming theories of words or denotive theories of meaning and language on traditional philosophy, to be contrasted with some modern, correct theory of naming and meaning, put forth by the particular philosopher-historian in question. Because much evidence by way of historical Analysis of traditional theories of language and meaning has it companied and supported this contemporary critique of them, one would naturally suppose that similar evidence is available to indicate the wholesale condemnation of traditional theories of concepts.

To my amazement and incredulity, I could find no book on the history of philosophical theories of concepts. There are, of course, encyclopedia articles on CONCEPTS; however, these are, without exception, either too brief, too general or delinquent, contain too many inaccuracies and, on the whole, simply repeat the historical cliches of their predecessors. Dictionaries, too, are unhelpful, as are the more detailed Etymologies and Lexicons. What, then, of independently written essays or chapters of books on the different philosophers? Here, one finds a great deal on Kant's or Frege's theory of concepts, and much on Aquinas' or Leibniz'. But there is nothing, except paragraphs in chapters of books or in essays, on Plato's theory of concepts and, even more surprising, on Descartes', since he is preoccupied with what he refers to as 'concepts' when he turns from Meditation to Reply, for example. And the little that there is on these two philosophers - that, for example, Plato's theory of concepts is that concepts are forms among the forms; or
that Descartes means by a concept a variant of an idea - it soon became apparent to me is incorrect.

To one, like myself, who is not a specialist in the history of philosophy, this whole business of an individual philosopher's theory of concepts and of the history of theories of concepts, from Plato on, became confusing. The hope persisted that somewhere, someone - surely some German scholar, whose colleagues had devoted their lives to Plato's theory of justice or to the etymology of arete - had written a long, accurate history of philosophical theories of concepts.

That I could find no such survey dictated the writing of this book, entirely concerned with the history of philosophical theories of concepts. If I am right in claiming that such a survey does not exist, then this history of philosophical theories of concepts is the first. And in this regard, it will have realized one of its aims even if, disagreed with, in its parts or as a whole, it only provokes others to do the history better or differently.

But, it may be asked, is this history needed? Obviously, it seems so to me, first, because any important idea and related set of doctrines about it that have a history enjoin and invite meticulous delineation of them. Second, no contemporary criticism of traditional theories of concepts nor, I think, any putatively original and true theory of concepts and the having of them can long ignore the competing theories of the past. Recent claims about the modernity of the dispositional theory of concepts are falsified and the truth of many variants of this theory are challenged by Plato's theory which, if my interpretation of it is correct, is not only the first dispositional theory of concepts as abilities to move about intellectually and morally in the world, but also the first to imply that concepts are such abilities only on the condition that these are closed, ultimately beholden to the forms or definitions of the forms or of certain classes of things. However, the basic reason why a survey of theories is required - certainly the reason why I have devoted this
book to it - is that a philosopher's theory of concepts is not simply incidental to his work but fundamental in his philosophy in that it determines the overall condition or criterion of what he takes to be the correct statements and solutions of his problems. Why such a theory is needed perhaps also suggests why it has not yet been done: because such a survey, at least as I have conceived it, as a history of the nature and role of concepts, not simply of their ontology, depends on the recent shift in philosophy itself from analysis to the elucidation of concepts. For it is only when elucidation replaces analysis that one can generalize from the elucidation of particular concepts to the overall elucidation of theories of concepts, both past and present. Thus, I have tried to understand the different theories of concepts, not to analyze or to recast the concepts dealt with in the history of philosophy. What do philosophers say or imply concepts are in the concepts they employ? Do they subscribe to the doctrine that all concepts, hence their conveying words, are governed by necessary and sufficient conditions or criteria? How do their theories play the roles they do in their philosophies? These are the questions I have set myself. But, it may also be asked: Is there a history of theories of concepts? Negative answers range from the denial that there are concepts and therefore any theory of them, let alone a history of such theories, to the acceptance of at least concept-talk in the history of philosophy, some articulate theories of concepts, but the rejection of anything as pi and as a history of theories of concepts. If we distinguish, as we must, between Are there concepts? and What are concepts? the affirmative answer to the first, that concepts are neutral intermediaries between words and things, irreducible to anything else, commits us to no affirmative answer to the second, as to what they are, whether sensible, supersensible or neutral entities or dispositions. However, my answer and argument for it (given in chapter 1 of The Opening Mind)
are not relevant to the argument of this book: that there is a history of theories of concepts; that this history encompasses both explicit and implicit theories; and that these theories, different as they are in their ontological answers to Introduction what concepts are, concur in the major doctrine that all concepts are and must be governed by definitive sets of properties or criteria.

That there have been explicit theories of concepts cannot be denied, however these theories are assessed, as fabrications or as ontological truths. Surely, Aquinas, Kant, Frege, and Moore, among many others, both affirmed concepts and theorized about their status and roles. What can be questioned and denied is that these articulated theories point to a history of a single subject rather than, say, to the ambiguity of a 'concept,' in one language or another.

If this objection to a history of philosophical theories stands, it rules out not only my proposed history but all the Encyclopedia articles as well that attempt to trace the history of the words for concept and explicit theories of them, which I question on grounds of inadequacy, not of dubiety. What these articles show is that though 'concept' is ambiguous, theories of concepts are more multiple than ambiguous.

Indeed, this query about the history of philosophical theories of concepts as a single subject much resembles similar worries expressed by those who question the very possibility of a history of (philosophical) theories of tragedy or morality. Here, too, the argument has been that there can be no such history because there is no single subject. Tragedies differ and moralities are too diverse to yield any univocal meaning of 'tragedy' or 'morality.' All the historian can do is to trace the diversity. It is therefore a conceptual illusion to suppose, for example, that Greek tragedy or Aristotle's theory of tragedy and, say, modern tragedy or Schopenhauer's or Nietzsche's theory of tragedy, are historical points in the
same continuum, that can then serve as a single subject for the philosophical elucidation of tragedy. So, too with, say, Plato's theory of morality as against, say, Kant's. Here, too, critics of any putative history of philosophical theories of morality stress that since Plato meant by 'moral' something entirely different from what Kant meant by 'moral,' there cannot be any univocal history of the subject of philosophical theories of morality." (pp. XIII-XVI).


"The goal of this book is to present the thoughts and theories of the major figures in the dominant philosophical traditions throughout history. To be sure, most of the essays are on "Western" thinkers, which label encompasses European, American and other English-speaking philosophers. But the rich history of philosophical thought in India and China is well represented, by no means comprehensively so but in such a way as to convey a picture of major trends of thought. Moreover, a representative sample of Japanese thinkers is included and philosophical thought in Africa is also represented. The concluding section deals with some major Jewish and Islamic thinkers. Inevitably, such a project as this can only proceed selectively and an editorial task that must be faced at the beginning is to choose figures that loom large in the editor’s view of the history of philosophy. Obviously, not everyone will agree with this selection.

I hope these essays will provide stimulating reading for those who sample them. They are written at a level that is appropriate for a reader who is approaching these figures for the first time. But some philosophy is difficult and although an effort has been made to keep technical terminology and mind-boggling argumentation to a minimum, some of the essays will stretch the minds of many readers. Stretching the mind, however. Is a major
part of what philosophy is supposed to do -- the results, one hopes, are deeper insights into the human condition. A bibliography is appended at the end of each essay. It gives a list of the major works of the philosopher under discussion in the essay and it also indicates works written about the philosopher which will provide additional information and a deeper understanding of the figure. The authors of the essays are authorities on the thinkers about whom they write. In most instances, they have written other essays or books about the philosophers in question. The essays in the book are grouped together in accordance with the philosophical traditions within which the thinkers are usually placed. Sometimes, to be sure, the placement is a bit arbitrary. Spinoza, for instance, is included among the European and American thinkers, although he was a Jewish philosopher. Similarly, Averroes and Avicenna are to be found in the section on Jewish and Islamic thinkers, although they are frequently studied as part of Western philosophy. The location of an essay is largely determined by the distinctive tradition with which the thinker discussed primarily engaged. Spinoza, for instance, was concerned first and foremost about the problems inherited from Descartes and the history of European philosophy: Averroes and Avicenna engaged with a distinctive Islamic set of issues, although their philosophies were heavily influenced by earlier Western thinkers.

To assist the reader in tracing the lines of connection (historical and intellectual) among the various philosophers, the names of other thinkers whose work bears some significant relationship to the thought of the philosopher being discussed are given in small capitals. In the case of some of the essays, peculiarities of style are indicated in the "guide to the entries" on the title page of the section." (from the Preface).

"Two events led to the creation of our four-volume series on the history of women philosophers. The first occurred on a sweltering October afternoon in 1980 when I sought comfort in the basement library of City University of New York's Graduate Center. I came upon a reference to a work by Aegidius Menagius, *Historia Mulierum Philosopharum*, published in 1690 and 1692. I had never heard of any women philosophers prior to the 20th century with the exceptions of Queen Christina of Sweden, known as Descartes' student, and Hildegard von Bingen, who lived in the 12th century. Two months later, the second event occurred. I went to the Brooklyn Museum to see Judy Chicago's *Dinner Party*, a sculptural history of the achievements of women. Part of the exhibit consisted of posters listing the names, nationalities and dates of birth of accomplished women, together with brief descriptions of their accomplishments. Some of those listed were identified as "philosophers."

It took sixteen months to obtain a copy of Menagius' book. (A modern English translation of *Mulierum* by Beatrice Zedler (*), a participant in the Project on the History of Women in Philosophy, is available through University Press of America.) Although Menage footnoted his sources, the abbreviation conventions used by him made it difficult to duplicate his research. Little did I know then about the existence of reference works giving commonly used abbreviations for early scholarly materials. My problem was compounded by the need to locate editions of the source materials that would have been available to Menage. As it turns out, many of the women he listed as philosophers were astronomers, astrologers, gynecologists, or simply relatives of male
philosophers. Nevertheless, the list of women alleged to have been philosophers was impressive." (pp. IX-X).

"Research about the history of women philosophers has proceeded in several stages: first, creating a compendium of names, nationalities, and dates of birth of women alleged to have been philosophers. Second, confirming or disconfirming the allegations. In the first stage of research, names appearing in Menage's and Chicago's lists were checked in general encyclopedias, history books, encyclopedias and histories of philosophy, religion, astronomy, mathematics, science, etc. Some of these entries would name other women alleged to be philosophers; names which would then be added to the list. Books about "famous ladies" and "notable females" were read in full, yielding more new names, and frequently, biographical sketches and bibliographical information. As word of the Project spread, new information about previously unknown women philosophers was received. Some of the information came from scholars who were later to become collaborators in the Project; some came from well-wishers impressed by the scope and significance of our work. The same basic method of research was used for the compendium-creating stage for all four volumes. But the methods of research for the second stage - confirming that the woman actually was a philosopher - varied somewhat with each volume's research. Verifying information about pre-17th century women was much more difficult than verifying information about modern and contemporary women philosophers. In order to locate reliable sources about the ancient and pre-modern philosophers, we frequently relied on "free association" of the names with names of male colleagues, male relatives, subject headings for topics the women wrote about, or with names of schools of philosophy and locations with which the women were associated." (pp. XIII-XIV).

(*) Gilles Méenage, *The History of Women Philosophers*, translated from the Latin with an Introduction by
This book is an outgrowth of what has come to be known as "the recovery project" in philosophy. "The recovery project" refers primarily to those efforts to rediscover the names, identities, and philosophical contributions of women philosophers whose existence has been virtually overlooked, neglected, ignored, or lost in the traditional or canonical account of the history of Western philosophy, especially from 600 B.C.E. to 1600 C.E. It was initiated by philosophers who raised a simple but basic question that, at the time, had mostly not been asked (despite how obvious the question seems now): "Could there really have been no women philosophers throughout the history of Western philosophy?" They knew there had to have been women philosophers, but who were they?

Rediscovering these women philosophers has been a labor-intensive effort, undertaken by a handful of dedicated people. Mary Ellen Waithe's pioneering work in the already classic four volume set, A History of Women Philosophers, was a decisive turning point in the generation of the names, lives, and writings of many forgotten women philosophers (1) (see introduction to chapter 4). Many of the commentators in this textbook provided early translations or commentaries on texts in Waithe's series; others published articles and books on individual women philosophers as part of the recovery project.(2)

Their recovery work has generated an ever-burgeoning scholarly literature on women philosophers who currently are absent in the history of Western philosophy (see appendix A). This recovery work in philosophy also continues to be important and actively engaged in by
scholars. That this book focuses on filling a critical gender omission in the history of Western philosophy by including women alongside their historical male philosopher contemporaries neither diminishes the significance of the on-going recovery project work nor overrides the gratitude and admiration due those scholars who are continuing the work, especially in this historically gender-exclusive field, philosophy, to which all contributors to this book have dedicated our professional lives.

This book builds on the success of the recovery project by extending it to the inclusion of women philosophers with their historical male philosopher contemporaries in each of the four main historical periods in the history of Western philosophy: ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary philosophy. With the publication of this book it is no longer scholarly accurate, appropriate, acceptable, or necessary to describe, conceptualize, or teach the history of Western philosophy without women."
(from the Preface by K. J. Warren, XIII-XIV).
(1) See references to Mary Ellen Waithe in lead essay, note 3.
(2) See resources in lead essay, note 3.

Note 3. Four types of source materials were used or consulted for those portions of the book I wrote:
(1) Lecture notes from more than thirty years of teaching, primarily for the lead essay, on almost all the men and women philosopher pairs in each chapter and for background philosophical content of the chapter introductions; (2) "recovery project" texts, primarily to learn about the women philosophers in each chapter (and others in the history of Western philosophy), to write the biographies of the women philosophers and to generate the list of women philosophers in appendix A; (3) Internet Websites, primarily for biographical information for the chapter introductions and the glossary; and (4) some
secondary source material on or in the history of Western philosophy, primarily for those philosophers whom I have not taught.

(2) The "recovery project "material includes the following:


Simons, Margaret A., ed. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Special Issue on the Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir 14, no. 2 (Fall 1999).

(3) The Internet sites I consulted were: [omitted: the list is now obsolete]

(4) The secondary sources included:


(from: Lead Essay: 2,600 Years of the History of Western Philosophy *Without Women*. THIS BOOK AS A UNIQUE, GENDER-INCLUSIVE ALTERNATIVE by Karen J. Warren (pp. 1-26).
Study Guide for Formal and Descriptive Metaphysics

INTRODUCTORY READINGS


"I had two principal aims in writing this book. The first was somewhat personal: I wanted to work out my views on the main problems of metaphysics. (...) My other aim was pedagogical: I wanted to produce a systematic book on metaphysics that would be understandable by the general reader and that would be useful for students in the sort of middle-level course on metaphysics that I teach, from time to time, at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. (...)"
The students attending my course are advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students, and I wanted to have available for them a text that deals with the basic issues of metaphysics in a systematic way and that prepares them for advanced work on specialized topics. A systematic text is important, in my view, because many subjects of general interest in metaphysics, such as the mind-body problem or the perplexities about freedom and determinism, can be adequately discussed only if various issues in basic ontology are already settled, or at least understood. Of course, careful thought about complex or derivative issues often requires one to back up and reconsider one's position on fundamentals. Still, an orderly presentation of issues is, as I see it, particularly desirable in a subject like metaphysics. The difficulty I had in writing the book is at least partly owing to the difficulty of presenting issues in an appropriate order. Metaphysics is an ancient subject on which an enormous amount has been written. To make up one's mind about such subjects as the nature of particulars, the reality of attributes and facts, the possibility of alternative ontologies, and the nature of time, truth, and change (to name just a few), one should be familiar with the jungle of considerations that bear upon them. I have tried to help the reader gain this familiarity by discussing arguments and claims of numerous philosophers, past and present. Having lived through more than one "revolution" in philosophy, I am well aware of the attractions of finding some method that will sweep away all the problems. I now regard such methods as illusory, but the first step in applying them is, in any case, to discover what the problems are. I have done my best to describe these problems, and I offer my solutions for what they are worth.

Although I am far from doctrinaire on matters of philosophical method, I cannot deny that my approach to metaphysics belongs to the tradition of analytic philosophy. The reader will quickly see, for example, that
my approach to ontology owes a great deal to Bertrand Russell, but I have tried to show that Russell's approach grows naturally out of Aristotle, the philosopher who wrote the first systematic treatise on metaphysics. Since analytic philosophers influenced by Russell have relied heavily on such technical devices as the so-called existential quantifier, I have made a special effort to come to terms with those devices early in my discussion. The elements of mathematical logic should be as familiar to undergraduates as high school algebra, but they are not -- and I have therefore offered clear explanations of the few logical symbols that I introduce." (from the Preface).


strains 165; 15. On external pressures exerted by methodological and other arguments 180; 16. On metaphysical pluralism, intrametaphysical and metaphysical progress 194; 17. Some speculations about transcedent reality 208; Summary of these 222; Index 234.

"It is not the purpose of this essay to expound and to defend a particular system of immanent or transcedent metaphysics, but to inquire into the common structure and function of such systems, whether explicitly formulated, e.g., by philosophers, philosophically minded theologians or scientists, or only implicitly accepted. Such an inquiry appears no less worthwhile than are more familiar inquiries into the common structure and function of, say, geometries, scientific theories or legal systems. It resembles them in method and should, if properly executed, counteract the tendency towards an intolerant metaphysical dogmatism without supporting a boundless pluralism. For it is intended not only to exhibit the possible variety of metaphysical systems, but also the strong constraints on it. The essay falls into three parts. The first examines the organization - whether imposed or found - of a person's beliefs about the public world of his experience. It also considers the organization of his practical, including his moral, attitudes towards this world, as well as the nature of aesthetic attitudes and of aesthetic representation.(...) The second part of the essay begins by illustrating the variety and function of categorial frameworks. The function of categorial frameworks consists chiefly in providing their acceptors with criteria of "meaningfulness", as opposed to mere linguistic intelligibility, of "coherence", as opposed to mere logical consistency, of "explanatory power", as opposed to mere descriptive or prognostic effectiveness. Loyalty to these criteria, which may be combined with ignorance or confusion about their origin in their acceptor's immanent metaphysics, plays an important part in the choice of
theories or the direction of research. The procedure of exhibiting the actual and potential variety of categorial frameworks is endowed with some orderliness by showing that, and how, principles of immanent metaphysics may have their origin in special disciplines or regions of thought: logic; mathematics; predictive and instrumental thinking within and outside the sciences; thinking about persons and mental phenomena; thinking about social phenomena and history. (...) Whereas the first two parts of the essay are mainly devoted to an inquiry into the static structure of systems of metaphysical beliefs, the third part inquires into their changes as a result of internal strains and external pressures. The latter are exerted by appeals to philosophical methods which are claimed to yield absolutely valid premises for the derivation of the one and only true system of metaphysics, as well as by more modest arguments which try to transfer the convictions felt by their proponents to those to whom they are addressed. An examination of these arguments, which results in rejecting arguments of the first type and in accepting arguments of the second, leads to a critique of various concepts of progress, be it progress within a system of metaphysical beliefs or progress of metaphysics itself. Although this critique might well have concluded the essay, I thought it appropriate to add a chapter indicating in the barest outline my own categorial framework and transcendent metaphysics. It is meant to enable readers to judge how far I have avoided the danger of confusing my metaphysics with metaphysics in general." (pp. 1-4).


"My own approach to the subject might be put as follows: one way of construing metaphysics is to say that it is concerned to set out in the most general and abstract terms what must hold good of conscious beings and the world in which they live if that world is to constitute reality for them. For this purpose the metaphysician has to set out in the most intelligible form what that reality consists of, given an adequate framework of representation of what it is for something to constitute reality for someone. That will certainly entail saying something about things, their spatio-temporal framework and the persons, or at any rate selves, for whom they are things. I shall try to work out in subsequent chapters what that means. Chapter 2 will discuss in greater detail the metaphysics of appearance and reality, and Chapter 3 the general nature of a philosophical ontology. Chapter 4 investigates the notion of substance - the kind of thing that has often been claimed as basic for ontology. I shall be concerned with the necessary features of substances and how they affect other matters such as their individuation. One commonly recognized characteristic of substances is particularity, and that will lead me in Chapter 5 to discuss the distinction between the particular and the general and also the general problem of universals. A characteristic that is sometimes thought, although mistakenly, to belong necessarily to substance is simplicity of an absolute kind, and on that idea whole systems have been erected, particularly those of monism and pluralism (when the latter constitutes a reaction to
the former). I shall illustrate that fact in Chapter 6 by reference to the monism of absolute idealism as found in Bradley and the pluralism of the logical atomism of Russell and the early Wittgenstein. I shall do that because apart from the relative unfamiliarity of these systems to some readers they afford a comparatively recent example of the opposition between monism and pluralism. They also illustrate one particular working-out of metaphysics in the style of Hegel together with a reaction to it. I shall then proceed in Chapter 7 to an examination of the frameworks in which substances are generally taken to exist; the frameworks provided by space and time. I shall not there consider all questions that might be asked about space and time, since some such questions belong more appropriately to philosophy of science. The questions raised will be those that fit in with the conceptions of metaphysics expounded in the chapters leading up to Chapter 7. In Chapters 8 and 9 I turn to ourselves, discussing first the notion of mind and the place that the mind has in the scheme presented, and second the conception of selves or persons for whom the reality outlined is what it is. A final epilogue will put the issues in perspective and explain why certain questions sometimes discussed under the heading of metaphysics are not discussed here (which is not to say that they should not be discussed)" pp. 8-9.


"This book treats several topics that happen to be very prominent in recent metaphysics. I hope the treatments are not only interesting in their own right, but also serve as good preparation for understanding contemporary discussions. I have tried to present a range of positions on issues, often advocating a particular view, but other times simply presenting alternatives and mentioning strengths and weaknesses. (In some cases the positions I advocate are well known and widely accepted, in others they are not.)

There is an underlying ontological and methodological theme that unites the various discussions in the book: Platonism concerning properties, relations, and propositions. I introduce the theme in chapter 1, where philosophy itself is characterized as the study (and especially the analysis) of certain general concepts, and these concepts in turn are seen as objective entities, typically Platonic properties. In chapter 3, Platonism is
defended as a theoretical hypothesis that helps explain a variety of related everyday phenomena, including our ability to have beliefs about our surroundings, the capacity of our language to refer to external entities, and our ability to communicate with each other. (The postulation of these Platonic entities is likened to the postulation of quarks in physics.)

The Platonist theme appears in the remaining chapters as a methodological tool, as when we insist on knowing just what proposition is being expressed or asserted, what possessing such and such a property entails, and the like. I hope it emerges from the book that the acceptance of this Platonist ontology promotes a sharpness of focus on philosophical material in general that is not otherwise so easily obtained." (from the Preface).


  Contents: Preface; Introduction; Chapter One: The problem of universals I - Metaphysical realism; Chapter Two: The problem of universals II - Nominalism; Chapter Three: Concrete particulars I - Substrata, bundles, and substances; Chapter Four: Propositions and their neighbours; Chapter Five: The necessary and the possible; Chapter Six: Causation Chapter Seven: The nature of time Chapter Eighth: Concrete particulars 2: Persistence through time Chapter Nine: The challenge of Anti-Realism; Bibliography; Index.


  From the Preface: "Metaphysics is a discipline with a long history; and over the course of that history, the discipline has been conceived in different ways. These different conceptions associate different methodologies and even different subject matters with the discipline; and anyone seeking to write an introductory text on metaphysics must choose from among these different conceptions. For reasons I try to make clear in the introduction, I have chosen to follow a very old tradition (one that can be
traced back to Aristotle) that interprets metaphysics as the attempt to provide an account of being qua being. On this conception, metaphysics is the most general of all the disciplines; its aim is to identify the nature and structure of all that there is. Central to this project is the delineation of the categories of being. Categories are the most general or highest kinds under which anything that exists falls. On this conception of metaphysics, what the metaphysician is supposed to do is to identify the relevant kinds, to specify the characteristics or categorial features peculiar to each, and to indicate the ways those very general kinds are related to each other. It turns out, however, that metaphysicians have disagreed about the categorial structure of reality. They have disagreed about the categories the metaphysician ought to recognize; and even where they have agreed about the categories to be included in our metaphysical theory, they have disagreed about the characteristics associated with those categories and about the relations of priority that tie the various categories together. These disagreements have given rise to debates that lie at the very core of the philosophical enterprise; those debates are the focus of this book.


"The conception of metaphysics that informs *A Survey of Metaphysics* is, however, a fairly traditional and still very widely shared one—namely, that metaphysics deals with the most profound questions that can be raised concerning the fundamental structure of reality. According to this conception, metaphysics goes deeper than any merely empirical science, even physics, because it provides the very framework within which such sciences are conceived and related to one another. A core text in metaphysics written from this point of view must aim, first and foremost, to elucidate certain universally applicable concepts—such as those of identity, necessity, causation, space, and time—and then go on to examine some important doctrines which involve these concepts, such as the thesis that truths of identity are necessary and the claim that temporally backward causation is impossible. In addition, it must endeavour to provide a systematic account of the ways in which entities belonging to different ontological categories—for example, *things*, *events*, and *properties*—are interrelated. These, accordingly, are the main objectives of *A Survey of Metaphysics*. A subsidiary objective is to explain and defend the conception of metaphysics which informs the book: for students need to be aware of the many and varied opponents of metaphysics and how they may be countered.

I should emphasize that my aim in this book is to provide a survey of major themes and problems in modern metaphysics, not a comprehensive survey and critique of the views of major contemporary metaphysicians, much
less a systematic history of the subject. Consequently, I tend not to engage in direct debate with the published work of other philosophers, past or present -- although I do refer to it very frequently and have included an extensive bibliography of mostly recent publications. Such direct engagement would have made the book considerably longer and more complex than it already is and, I think, less useful to its intended audience, who need to understand the issues before engaging in current debate or historical investigation for themselves. It should also be stressed, however, that the book is by no means narrowly partisan, in the sense of promoting my own opinions on particular issues whilst excluding mention of others. At the same time, I try to avoid bland neutrality in matters of controversy.” (from the Preface).


From the Preface: "My overall objective in this book is to help to restore metaphysics to a central position in philosophy as the most fundamental form of rational inquiry, with its own distinctive methods and criteria of validation. In my view, all other forms of inquiry rest upon metaphysical presuppositions thus making metaphysics unavoidable-so that we should at least endeavour to do metaphysics with our eyes open, rather than allowing it to exercise its influence upon us at the level of uncritical assumption. I believe that this is beginning to be acknowledged more widely by philosophers as various research programmes for instance, in the philosophy of mind and in the philosophy
of quantum physics—are being seen to flounder through inadequacies in their metaphysical underpinnings. For that reason, I hope that a book like this will prove to be a timely one. Because Chapters 1 and 2 partly serve to introduce themes explored in greater detail later in the book, I have not written an Introduction as such. Doing so would have involved unnecessary repetition. However, it may help the reader if I supply here a brief synopsis of the book’s contents. In Chapter 1, I attempt to characterize the distinctive nature of metaphysics as an autonomous intellectual discipline and defend a positive answer to Kant’s famous question, 'How is metaphysics possible?', distinguishing my own answer from that of various other schools of thought, including some latter-day heirs of Kantianism. A key ingredient in my defence of metaphysics is the articulation of a distinctive and, in my view, indispensable notion of metaphysical possibility—conceived of as a kind of possibility which is not to be identified with physical, logical, or epistemic possibility. Chapter 2 is devoted to an examination of two of the most fundamental and all-pervasive notions in metaphysics—the notion of an object and the notion of identity and explores their interrelationships. In the course of this exercise a central ontological distinction—that between concrete and abstract objects is brought to the fore, my contention being that this is at bottom a distinction between those objects that do, and those that do not, exist in time." (from the Preface).


Contents: Introduction 1; I. The Origin of the Concept of Metaphysics 3; II. The Tradition of the Concept of Metaphysics 17; III. Kant and Metaphysics 40; Iv. Metaphysics and Dialectic 71; V. Metaphysics in Recent Philosophy 95; Vi. Conclusion 124-125.

"No science is subject to such contrary evaluations as metaphysics. Sometimes it is called the queen of all the sciences, sometimes it is outcast and forsaken like Hecuba. (1) The evaluation has changed several times even since Kant. In the present situation, the number of its admirers is matched by the number of its denigrators, and the final outcome hardly seems to be predictable. Such instability is admittedly natural to a position of great honour. But the problem is not, as Kant considered it, just a matter of the ability of metaphysics to perform its task. What is most perplexing is that we cannot find any single definition of metaphysics common to both its admirers and its denigrators. This, I think, is the most important reason why there has been no correct evaluation of metaphysics. The neglect of definition which, as Socrates maintained, should be the primary subject of philosophy, has resulted in many of the disputes of contemporary philosophy. So as to shed some light on this confusion, the present inquiry aims at a concise survey of the usage of the term metaphysics. Metaphysics must not be defined *a priori*; we must reach a definition inductively from the history of metaphysics. For we have without doubt a history of thought which is called metaphysics. An *a priori* concept, which ignores this history, cannot claim universal validity. Even when
one wishes to express a completely original thought, one is not allowed to neglect the history of the concepts one employs.
The history of metaphysics either covers the whole history of philosophy or at least forms more than half of it. But a History of Metaphysics cannot explain the concept of metaphysics itself. In order to make a History of Metaphysics out of the whole of philosophy, one must implicitly presuppose a definition of metaphysics. Therefore, a classification of what philosophers meant by the term must precede a History of Metaphysics. This is just what this inquiry aims at. A comprehensive enumeration of historical usages would not necessarily be effective. Such a task should be entrusted to a lexicon of philosophy.
Our scope must be limited to the most important usages. It is not certain whether the various usages may be reduced to a single meaning or whether they form a continuous series of development. Any metaphysical presupposition must be strictly prohibited. The attempt to arrive at a systematic explanation is of course of extreme importance. But it must be preceded by plain observation of historical facts." (Introduction, 1-2).

(1) Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Vorrede.

**HANDBOOKS AND DICTIONARIES**


"The 264 alphabetically-arranged entries include contributions from many of the world's most distinguished metaphysicians. From the Introduction: "Because it is the most central and general subdivision of philosophy, and because it is among the oldest and most persistently cultivated parts of the field, metaphysics raises special difficulties of selection for a companion such as this. The difficulties are compounded, moreover, by two further facts. First, metaphysics is not only particularly old among fields of philosophy; it is also particularly widespread among cultures and regions of the world. And, second, metaphysics has provoked levels of scepticism unmatched elsewhere in philosophy; including scepticism as to whether the whole subject is nothing but a welter of pseudo-questions and pseudo-problems. In light of this a project such as ours needs to delimit its approach. In accomplishing this, we had to bear in mind the space limitations established by the series, and also the fact that other volumes in the series would be sure to cover some questions traditionally viewed as metaphysical. These considerations led to our including some such questions, which we thought would be covered more extensively in Samuel Guttenplan's A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, for example, or in Peter Singer's A Companion to Ethics, but which should be treated in this Companion, if only briefly and for the sake of a more complete and self-contained Companion to Metaphysics. In addition, we tried to give a good sense of the sorts of sceptical objections that have been raised to our field as a whole. As for the spread of metaphysics across cultures, traditions, and regions of the world, we opted again to include some coverage of the non-western, while at the same time keeping our focus firmly on the western tradition from the Greeks to the present. What is more, even within the western tradition we needed to be selective, especially once we came to the present century."

"The present work seeks to document the most important traditional and contemporary streams in the two overlapping fields of metaphysics and ontology. Both disciplines were, even just a few years ago, seen by many of negligible contemporary interest. The editors, neither of whom had shared this general opinion, were none the less surprised to see how much valuable work had been achieved in these areas not only in the past but also in our own century. The intensity of contemporary work in metaphysics and ontology points indeed to a healthy renewal of these disciplines, the like of which has not been seen, perhaps, since the 13th century". (...) Of the two editors of this Handbook -- who bear equal responsibility for all its parts and moments -- one is and admirer of Leibniz and the 17th-century rationalists and thus finds himself strongly allied to certain modern deductive trends. The other feels more at home in the 13th or 14th centuries and is accordingly critical of the over-enthusiastic and often over-simplistic use of formal logical techniques in contemporary metaphysics. The editors are however equally convinced that it is precisely the tension between the deductive and descriptive approaches to the problems of metaphysics and ontology which will be responsible for the future creative advances in these fields. And they are convinced also that such advances can be furthered by an understanding of the history of metaphysics and ontology., an understanding -- guided by the most sophisticated modern research and by the use of the most sophisticated modern techniques -- of the sort this Handbook has been designed to facilitate." (from the Introduction).

"Most philosophers today who identify themselves as metaphysicians are in basic agreement with the Quinean approach to systematic metaphysics exemplified in the work of Chisholm and Lewis. Indeed, it is probably not much of an exaggeration to say that today’s crop of metaphysicians can be divided fairly exhaustively into those most influenced by the one or the other. That
division is reflected in the debates discussed in the chapters that follow. Those chapters approach the field topically. Each focuses on a fundamental metaphysical issue; the aim is to provide an account of the nature and structure of the debate over the issue. But the chapters are not merely about metaphysics; they are also exercises in metaphysics with authors attempting to advance the debate over the relevant issues. The first three focus on the traditional dichotomy of universal and particular. Zoltán Szabó discusses nominalistic accounts of the phenomena central to the debate over universals; whereas Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz focus on Platonistic accounts of universals. E. J. Lowe closes Part I by discussing problems surrounding the individuation of particulars. Next, there follows a pair of chapters on very general ontological issues. John Hawthorne deals with the concept of identity, and Peter van Inwagen discusses the phenomenon of ontological commitment and attempts to show how the case of fictional discourse is to be accommodated.

Modal issues have been pivotal in recent analytic metaphysics. Here, the central debate has been between those endorsing non-reductive theories of modality and those insisting on reductive accounts of modal phenomena. In his contribution Kit Fine deals with approaches of the first sort; whereas Ted Sider examines approaches of the second sort. In addition, discussion of non-reductive theories can be found in Hoffman and Rosenkrantz's chapter on Platonistic theories of universals.

Part IV focuses on issues bearing on the metaphysics of time and space. One important debate on the nature of time pits what are called presentists against those who construe time as a fourth dimension on a par with the three spatial dimensions. Thomas Crisp examines presentist theorists; whereas Michael Rea discusses fourdimensionalism. In his chapter, Graham Nerlich discusses issues bearing on the debate over the status of
space-time. Finally, Sally Haslanger discusses the different approaches to questions about persistence through time and their theoretical roots in the metaphysics of time.

Part V deals with a series of interrelated issues about events, causation, and physical theory. In the first chapter Peter Simons discusses recent debates about the existence and nature of events. Michael Tooley and Hartry Field each contribute a chapter on causation. Tooley focuses on broader issues about the analysis of our concept of causation; whereas Field examines the more particular case of causation in physical theory. Finally, we have a chapter by Tim Maudlin on the metaphysical implications of quantum mechanics.

The next three chapters focus on questions about the metaphysics of persons and the mental. Dean Zimmerman examines materialist accounts of persons. His chapter is followed by two more general discussions of the metaphysical status of the mental. The first, by Howard Robinson, focuses on general ontological questions about the nature and structure of perceptual and conceptual episodes. The second, by Jaegwon Kim, considers the way questions about supervenience and reduction have come together in recent attempts at providing materialist accounts of intentional phenomena. Then we have two chapters on the problem of freedom of the will. Carl Ginet examines libertarian approaches; whereas Ted Warfield discusses compatibilist accounts of freedom.

Part VII bears broadly on realism and attempts to delineate alternatives to realism. Michael Loux discusses the very influential debates over realism and anti-realism that originated with Michael Dummett and dominated the British philosophical scene in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. Ernest Sosa considers approaches to questions about realism that have their origin in facts bearing on ontological relativity. Finally, Timothy Williamson attempts to lay out the central features of
metaphysical debates over the nature of vagueness" pp. 6-7.


**COLLECTION OF ESSAYS**


"The word 'metaphysics' is derived from the two Greek words *meta* and *physica*, and literally means 'beyond physics.' The Ancient Greeks were very much interested in understanding the workings of the world around them. Hence, in the most general of ways, they sought an understanding of physics. This is most clearly evident in their preoccupation with the notion of change. What happens, they wondered, when a log burns and turns to ashes? How is it that the color of a tree's leaves change? Answers to these and other questions led some to conclude that the world must be composed of fundamental elements, i.e., atoms (the cheek word for unbreakable units), and that the world must function according to the law of conservation of energy (though they didn't express it in this formal way). Along with their quest for an understanding of physics came the realization that an in-depth explanation of the physical workings of the world required going beyond the physical in order to explain it adequately. Concepts with no physical referents are necessary in order to account for that which is physical. Consequently, metaphysics constitutes the foundation upon which the physics qua physical rests.

The notion of 'property' is a good case in point. If we were to inquire of a scientist if physical things possessed properties, he would undoubtedly respond in the affirmative. Such a response would commit him to the existence of properties. But what is a property? The concept of a property is that of something nonphysical. A little reflection will determine that we cannot account for anything physical without making reference to its properties or characteristics. Yet when going beyond the specific properties of a physical thing to analyze the concept of a property, all reference to the particular (physical) thing disappears. At that point, we have gone beyond physics and enter the realm of metaphysics."

(from the Introduction)

Table of Contents


Contents: Sources and Acknowledgements; Introduction; Introduction; Derek Parfit: 'Personal Identity'; Commentary on Parfit; Marya Schechtman: 'Personhood and Personal Identity'; Commentary on Schechtman; Further Reading; Essay Questions: Introduction; Peter van Inwagen: 'The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism'; Commentary on van Inwagen; Daniel
Dennett: 'Could Have Done Otherwise' (extract from Elbow Room); Commentary on Dennett; Further Reading; Essay Questions; Appendix; Introduction; Donald Davidson: 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme'; Commentary on Davidson; Thomas Nagel: 'Thought and Reality' (extract from The View from Nowhere); Commentary on Nagel; Further reading; Essay questions; Introduction; Michael Devitt: "Ostrich Nominalism" or "Mirage Realism"?; Commentary on Devitt; D. M. Armstrong: 'Against "Ostrich" Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt'; Commentary on Armstrong; Further reading; Essay questions; Introduction; David Lewis: extract from Counterfactuals; Commentary on Lewis; Saul Kripke: extract from Naming and Necessity; Commentary on Kripke; Further reading; Essay questions; Introduction; David Lewis: extract from On the Plurality of Worlds; Commentary on Lewis; Sally Haslanger: 'Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics'; Commentary on Haslanger; David Lewis: 'Tensing the Copula'; Commentary on Lewis; Further reading; Essay questions; Bibliography; Index.


This Anthology, intended to accompany A Companion to Metaphysics (Blackwell, 1995), brings together 53 selections which represent the best and most important works in metaphysics during this century. The selections are grouped under ten major metaphysical problems and each section is preceded by an introduction by the editors. Some of the problems covered are existence, identity, essence and essential properties, "possible worlds", things and their identity over time, emergence and supervenience, causality, and realism/antirealism. The coverage is comprehensive and should be accessible to those without a background in technical philosophy.


PART III: Universals and Particulars
1. Bertrand Russell: On the relations of universals and particulars
2. G. F. Stout: The nature of universals and propositions
3. G. E. Moore and G. F. Stout: Are the characteristics of particular things universal or particular?
   2. Panayot Butchvarov: The identity and resemblance theories
PART IV: Identity and Individuation
1. G. E. Moore: Identity
   DISCUSSION: 1. Max Black: The identity of indiscernibles
   2. Edwin B. Allaire: Bare particulars
   3. V. C. Chappell: Particulars reclothed
   4. Edwin B. Allaire: Another look to bare particulars
   5. Panayot Butchvarov: Identity
PART V: Names and descriptions
1. Bertrand Russell: On denoting
   DISCUSSION: 1. P. F. Strawson: On referring
   2. Bertrand Russell: Mr. Strawson on referring
   3. Herbert Hochberg: Strawson, Russell, and the King of France
PART VI: Intentionality
1. G. E. Moore: The refutation of Idealism
2. G. E. Moore: Beliefs and propositions
3. Bertrand Russell: Propositions and facts with more than one verb
   DISCUSSION: 1. Gustav Bergmann: Intentionality

"The purposes of this book are: (1) to make available in a single volume many of the "classics" of analytical metaphysics, works by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and others roughly in the years 1890-1925, (2) to bring together a similar number of recent "discussions" of issues raised in the earlier papers, and (3) to provide an introduction both to metaphysics and to twentieth-century analytical philosophy. In selecting the "classics" my guiding principle has been to include works which have been most influential and which exhibit the most important themes of the movement. The papers by Frege, Russell, Moore, and G. F. Stout have these characteristics. Alexius Meinong's "The Theory of Objects" merits inclusion not only because Russell found the admission of "nonexistent objects" so repugnant, but, also, because in trying to grasp the relation between
thought and reality, a number of thinkers in the analytical tradition, such as Gustav Bergmann and Panayot Butchvarov, have been so strongly attracted to Meinongian positions. The selections by F. H. Bradley are important, not because they are pieces of analytical philosophy (which they are not), but because they represent the kind of thinking against which Russell and the others reacted. All of the "discussion" articles have appeared since 1950. My aim has been to include those which are most closely allied to the "Classics" in style and in substance and which therefore show the continuity of the earlier and more recent thought. Of necessity, some excellent papers, which in every way qualify as works of analytical metaphysics, were excluded. The ones that remain seem to lend themselves most strikingly to the thematic unity of the book. As the reader will discover, certain topics, such as the nature of identity, the existence of universals, the status of nonexistent objects, the viability of artificial languages, and the very possibility of analysis, are almost constantly the focus of concern."
(from the Preface).


Notes on contributors

Introduction

1.1 Abstract entities: Chris Swoyer (University of Oklahoma)

1.2 There are no abstract objects: Cian Dorr (University of Pittsburgh)

2.1 Nailed to Hume's cross?: John W. Carroll (North Carolina State University)

2.2 Causation and laws of nature: Reductionism: Jonathan Schaffer (University of Massachusetts-Amherst)

3.1 Concrete possible worlds: Phillip Bricker (University of Massachusetts-Amherst)

3.2 Ersatz possible worlds: Joseph Melia (University of Leeds)

4.1 People and their bodies: Judith Jarvis Thomson (MIT)

4.2 Persons, bodies, and human beings: Derek Parfit (All Souls College, Oxford)

5.1 The privileged present: defending an "A-theory" of time: Dean
5.2 The tenseless theory of time: J. J. C. Smart (Australian National University) 6.1 Temporal parts: Theodore Sider (Rutgers University) 6.2 Three-dimensionalism vs. four-dimensionalism: John Hawthorne (Rutgers University) 7.1 Incompatibilism: Robert Kane (University of Texas at Austin) 7.2 Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and impossibilism: Kadri Vihvelin (University of Southern California) 8.1 The moon and sixpence: a defense of mereological universalism: James van Cleve (University of Southern California) 8.2 Restricted composition: Ned Markosian (Western Washington University) 9.1 Ontological arguments: interpretive charity and quantifier variance: Eli Hirsch (Brandeis University) 9.2 The picture of reality as an amorphous lump: Matti Eklund (Cornell University) Index.


"Metaphysics is one of the oldest and most central divisions of philosophy, an its study is found in full flower among the Greeks of the fifth century B.C.E. The word metaphysics itself comes from a first-century B.C.E. edition of certain collected writings of Aristotle, assembled under the title Ta Meta ta Phusika, which means no more than 'what comes after the writings on nature' (ta phusika). The topics treated by Aristotle in posthumous edition became the focus of the specialty of metaphysics. Aristotle set out three main tasks in Ta Meta ta Phusika. The first was the study of first principles of logic and causation. The second chore was the reasoned investigation of the nature of divinity. The third was ontology: the exploration of being qua being, or intrinsic nature of existence. In the past two thousand years, the first assignment has been divided variously among logicians, philosophers of science, and scientists. The second task has become the specialized subject of the philosophy of religion. It is the third task, that of ontology, which remains to metaphysics proper today. Ontology has three primary objectives. The first is to establish the basic categories of what there is, or the taxonomy of the ultimate furniture of reality. In one respect, a kind of taxonomy is implied by the very divisions of this book, in which, for example, an entire part is devoted to one kind of thing (such as truth) and another whole part is devoted to another kind of thing (such as events). (...) The second task of ontology is to investigate the relations that hold among different types of things. (...) The third objective of ontology is to delineate the relations that obtain among things in the same category. (...) Though no single book could cover every issue in metaphysics, the volume you are holding surveys some of the most prominent topics in contemporary metaphysics. Each of the nine parts of the book is introduced by a leading scholar on the topic of that part, and each of the articles is accompanied by study questions to help you quickly grasp the key points of the
article. In addition, extensive further readings at the end of each part allow you to delve more deeply. (from the Preface for the Students).


From the Introduction: "One of the most fundamental questions in metaphysics is which (...) metaphysical categories of entities exist. Philosophers have differed markedly over which categories they believe to exist. In David Lewis's suggestive phrase, they have varied widely from 'All-ists' to None-ists', with None-ists accepting only the existence of actual ordinary physical objects, and All-ists accepting all manner of further category of existents (David Lewis 'Noneism or Allism?' Mind vol. 99: 393, January 1990, pp. 23-31). As Lewis remarks, most philosophers fall somewhat in between. Even among philosophers who accept a given category of existents, there is still room for disagreement, however. One might accept the existence of a certain kind of entity without believing that that category of entities is basic. For example, one might think that there are such things as states of affairs, but hold that they are nothing over and above the particular objects and properties and relations involved in them. A theorist who took this view would insist that although states of affairs form a metaphysical category, they do not form a basic metaphysical category. Taking another example, one might hold that although there are particular objects, these objects are nothing more than 'bundIes' of properties, and do not constitute a category of entities in addition to the category of properties. A
theorist who took this view would likewise insist that although particular objects form a metaphysical category, they do not form a basic metaphysical category. As these examples illustrate, disputes over whether or not a given category is basic are closely connected to questions about the natures of such entities. Together, these two sorts of questions -- questions about which metaphysical categories of entities there are and questions about the natures of different kinds of entities -- constitute the central questions in that part of metaphysics called 'ontology'. Ontology is plausibly viewed as the very foundation of metaphysics; and it is the focus of this Reader."


Ambidextrous Universe: Martin Gardner. 13.
Achilles and the Tortoise: Max Black. 15.
A Contemporary Look at Zeno's Paradoxes: an Excerpt from Space, Time and Motion: Wesley C. Salmon. 16.
Grasping the Infinite: José A. Bernadete. 17.
The Paradoxes of Time Travel: David Lewis.

18. How do things Persist through Changes of Parts and Properties?
19. Of Confused Subjects which are Equivalent to Two Subjects: an Excerpt from The Port-Royal Logic: Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole.
23. Some Problems About Time: Peter Geach.

D. How do Causes Bring about their Effects?

Part II: What is our Place in the World?: Introduction.
34. Which Physical Thing am I?: an Excerpt From 'Is There a Mind Body Problem?': Roderick M. Chisholm.
35. Personal
Identity: a Materialist Account: Sydney Shoemaker. 36.
Dividend Minds and the Nature of Persons: Derek Parfit.
C. Is it Possible for us to Act Freely?
47. Addendum to 'Nonabsolute Existence and Conceptual Relativity': Objections and Replies: Ernest Sosa.
57. Nonabsolute Existence and Conceptual Relativity: An Excerpt From "Putnam's Pragmatic Realism": Ernest Sosa 58. Addendum to "Nonabsolute Existence and

"With the exception of the final group of essays, all the readings are made to fall under a series of questions about 'the world'. We assume that the world includes everything that there is -- that is, all that exists. The first and largest part 'What are the most general features of the world,?' includes readings on the problem of universals, the nature of particular things and the manner of their persistence through time, rival theories of the passage of time, absolute space and incongruent counterparts, causation, and a budget of paradoxes: McTaggart's paradox, paradoxes of motion, of the infinite, of time travel, and of intrinsic change. The second, and second largest, part asks, 'What is our place in the world?'. Here are questions about the relation between the way things appear to us and the way they are (sense data, secondary qualities), personal identity (two forms of materialism, a version of Cartesian dualism, and Derek Parfit's 'Buddhism'), the nature of phenomenal experience, and free will. Part Three raises the question of 'anti-realism': Is there just one world, one complete inventory of what there is? Or does what there is vary from community to community or person to person? Part Four begins with reflection on whether there could be an answer to the question, 'Why is there a world?' -- that is, why is there something, rather than nothing? The part ends with two attempts to answer the question by appeal to a necessary being (the Deity of the cosmological and


"With the exception of the final group of essays, all the readings are made to fall under a series of questions about 'the world'. We assume that the world includes everything that there is -- that is, all that exists. The first and largest part 'What are the most general features of the world,?' includes readings on the problem of universals, the nature of particular things and the manner of their persistence through time, rival theories of the passage of time, absolute space and incongruent counterparts, causation, and a budget of paradoxes: McTaggart's paradox, paradoxes of motion, of the infinite, of time travel, and of intrinsic change. The second, and second largest, part asks, 'What is our place in the world?'. Here are questions about the relation between the way things appear to us and the way they are (sense data, secondary qualities), personal identity (two forms of materialism, a version of Cartesian dualism, and Derek Parfit's 'Buddhism'), the nature of phenomenal experience, and free will. Part Three raises the question of 'anti-realism': Is there just one world, one complete inventory of what there is? Or does what there is vary from community to community or person to person? Part Four begins with reflection on whether there could be an answer to the question, 'Why is there a world?' -- that is, why is there something, rather than nothing? The part ends with two attempts to answer the question by appeal to a necessary being (the Deity of the cosmological and
ontological arguments). The final part includes challenges to the very possibility of metaphysics from both positivist and postmodern perspectives". (from the Preface).


  

  

  

  


A few data about contemporary formal ontologists - by Roberto Poli (Trento University).

"A small dictionary of philosophers who have explicitly dealt with formal ontology would be useful. Two observations are important: (1) in this section the expression "formal ontology" will be used in the broad sense to refer to both the formal ontology and the formalized ontology described in the previous section; (2) the qualification "explicitly" is crucial. In effect, the range of formal ontology (in the sense given sub (1) above) is so broad and so ramified that it is difficult to say who has not dealt with it. But if we employ as our criterion the use of the expression "formal ontology" (or something similar) in a sense consistent with the one specified, we find that the list of authors diminishes considerably.

The point of departure is obviously Husserl's Logical Investigations. The author who more than anyone else has developed the categorial analysis of ontology is Nicolai Hartmann. As regards phenomenologists, the Husserlian who has paid closest attention to the theme is Roman Ingarden, especially in his monumental work Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt. Formal domain ontologies have been developed by Ingarden himself (the domain of artistic phenomena with particular regard to literary works and the domain of values),
Hartmann (natural world, social world, art, values), Scheler (values), Reinach (law), Stein (the concept of person), and Plessner (the social world). Among analytic philosophers, we find a constant interest in the relationships between the dimensions of the formal and of ontology from Carnap onwards. Authors who warrant at least brief mention are certainly Goodman, Prior and Quine. More difficult to classify for various reasons are the theories of Bunge and Sommers.

Johansson has developed an innovative categorical approach which reveals the influence of the Brentanian tradition (Husserl and Marty in particular) as well as the Marxian tradition, especially in his analysis of social action. Nino Cocchiarella, Kit Fine and Jerzy Perzanowski are perhaps the most notable of philosophers currently conducting explicitly formal analysis. Cocchiarella has worked in particular on problems of predication and nominalization (issues explicitly analyzed by Husserl), systematically reconstructing so-called theories of universals (nominalism, conceptualism and realism, the latter two with important variants) in a formally homogeneous environment. Of Fine’s many works, particular mention should be made of those which formally reconstruct various fundamental concepts of the philosophical tradition (the concept of substance among others), often starting from their Aristotelian bases. Perzanowski has developed an innovative account of ontology within a Leibnizian framework. From a formal point of view, a distinctive feature of his position is the idea that there are formal structures which precede the distinction between the propositional and the predicative levels and require particular algebraic codification (Perzanowski, The Way of Truth, in: Roberto Poli & Peter Simons (eds.) - Formal Ontology Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1996). One aspect to be noted is that all three of these philosophers work in explicitly formal terms while simultaneously paying close attention to Husserlian matters (Cocchiarella has analysed the already mentioned problems of predication and nominalization; Fine has developed a sophisticated algebraic reconstruction of the third
*Logical Investigation*; Perzanowski was one of Ingarden' pupils).
In the past twenty years, a group of mainly (but not exclusively) analytic philosophers have drawn on the work of one of Brentano’ pupils to develop new formal tools. I am obviously referring to so-called Meinongian semantics, the history of which divides into two main periods. The first was during the mid-1980s and is particularly closely associated with Lambert, Parsons, Rapaport, Sylvan and Zalta. These are authors whose names establish further connections with free logics, relevant logics and paraconsistent logics. The second, more recent, period is associated especially with the names of Jacquette and Pasniczek.
One author who has engaged in dialogue with those just mentioned, although he developed his own and original point of view, was Hector-Neri Castañeda, whose guise theory proposes a wide series of predicative structures both ontological and cognitive. Castañeda' premature death prevented further development of his theory and it remains incomplete.
Also to be mentioned is a minor, mainly American philosophical tradition which although it lies outside the analytic tradition has nevertheless made a major contribution to formal ontology. I refer to the tradition of "dynamic ontology" developed by Peirce, Whitehead, Buchler and Hartshorne and which a fine book by Rescher has recently revitalized (cfr. Rescher, *Process Metaphysics*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1996). Also linked with this tradition is the interesting school of "process theology". Despite its apparent diversity, the "dynamic" tradition in the English-speaking countries has taken up positions which come significantly close to those developed by the German-speaking sister tradition associated with the names of Brentano, Husserl, Meinong and Hartmann. Thorough comparison between the two traditions has yet to be made (worth mentioning among the few that I know is Mohanty *Nicolai Hartmann and Alfred Whitehead, A study in recent Platonism*, Calcutta, Progressive Publishers, 1957).
Other areas of inquiry are Perry and Barwise' situation semantics and Suszko' non-Fregean logics. While the work of the former two authors is so well known that it requires no introduction, Suszko' deserves closer analysis. This I shall provide below when discussing the problem of the identity connective.

Lying midway between the analytic and phenomenological traditions are the studies of Barry Smith and Peter Simons, who deal in particular with the theory of parts and the development of a general mereology which, according to Smith, constitutes the fundamental instrument of ontology. Studies which find inspiration in phenomenology and draw their tools from algebraic topology has been developed by Jean Petitot, who studied under René Thom and has continued his catastrophe theory.

Finally, my own work seeks to overcome the limitations of the two schools of dynamic philosophy (the German "camp" of Brentano and his followers, and the American "camp" of Peirce and Whitehead) by developing a dynamic theory of substances which comprises various interacting sub-theories, principally those of particulars, of the levels of reality, and of wholes (Poli Alwys. *Ontology for knowledge engineers*, Ph. D. thesis, Utrecht, 2001).

These, therefore, are names of the philosophers currently at the forefront of work in ontology." pp. 186-188.


**SUGGESTED READINGS FOR A FIRST APPROACH TO ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEMS**

Content: Preface XI; Acknowledgements XV; Introduction: Being as such 1; First Part: Pure philosophical ontology. 1. What is to be (on Heidegger) 12; 2. Combinatorial ontology 42; 3. Why there is something rather than nothing 89; 4. Why there is only one logically contingent actual world 109; 5. Concepts of existence in philosophical logic and the analysis of being *qua* being 134; Second Part: Applied ontology and the metaphysics of science. 6. Ontological commitment (on Quine) 156; 7. Appearance, reality, substance, transcendence 182; 8. Physical entities: space, time, matter and causation, physical states of affair and events, natural laws 193; 9. Abstract entities, particular and universal: numbers, sets, properties, qualities, relations, propositions, and possibilities, logical, mathematical and metaphysical laws 206; 10. Subjectivity of mind in the world of objective physical facts 233; 11. God, a divine supernatural mind? 253; 12. Ontology of culture: language, arts and artefacts 265; Conclusion: scientific-philosophical ontology 275; Notes 281; Bibliography 309; Index 329-348.

"This book investigates and proposes a theory to solve the most fundamental problems of being. I know how that sounds. But trying to understand the meaning, the undeniable but non-self-explanatory fact and nature of existence, is indispensable to philosophy. Accordingly, we must not shrink from the task, whatever difficulties are entailed. I distinguish between pure philosophical and applied scientific ontology. Pure philosophical ontology deals with such questions as what is meant by the concept of being, why there exists something rather than nothing, and why there exists exactly one logically contingent actual world. Applied scientific ontology advances a preferred existence domain consisting of three categories of existent entities, including existent (we can also say actual) objects, existent states of affairs, and the actual
world. The actual world is itself an entity, one that contains all other entities; it contains all and only actual states of affairs, involving all and only existent objects. The entities included in a theoretical ontology are those minimally required for an adequate philosophical semantics, the things to which we must be able to refer in order to make sense of meaningful thought and discourse, especially in the sciences. These are the objects that we say exist, to which we are ontologically committed.

(...) Pure philosophical ontology, indispensable as groundwork, is only the first major step toward a complete fully integrated ontology. When we know what it means for something to exist, we can then proceed to the details of applied scientific ontology, defending the choice of a particular domain of existent entities. It is in this branch of ontology that we explain the concepts and clarify the existence conditions of physical entities and declare ourselves in favour of or opposed to the existence of numbers, sets, universals, relations, propositions, and abstract objects generally, minds and persons, God as a divine supernatural mind, language, art and other cultural artefacts. The traditional controversies of descriptive and speculative metaphysics are located here, where the stakes are higher than in pure philosophical ontology, in arguments for the existence or nonexistence of specific contested entities.

The two components, pure philosophical and applied scientific ontology, complement one another. No metaphysics of being can claim to be complete if it does not keep each separate and in its proper place while providing satisfactory answers to both specialized sets of problems. It is as much a mistake to investigate only the more tractable problems of applied scientific ontology, say, of whether or not numbers or universals exist, while giving up on pure philosophical ontology, as it would be to devote attention exclusively to the fundamental
problems of pure philosophical ontology to the neglect of making substantive commitments to the existence of real entities in applied scientific ontology. We should not try to establish a domain of existent entities that is not guided by a prior clarification of the concept of being; but having addressed the problems of pure philosophical ontology, we must then move on to fill in the details of a preferred existence domain as a contribution to applied scientific ontology." (from the Preface).


"This book is a text, not a treatise; it is distinctive in its selection and arrangement, rather than the novelty of its material. It is designed for students taking their first courses in metaphysics, and one year in philosophy together with some acquaintance with logic should be sufficient preparation. The work is in three parts. The first is an introductory section in which the aims, methods, and vicissitudes of Western metaphysics are briefly set forth. This part is included to give students a grasp of what metaphysical thinking is, and more confidence that they know where they are and where they can expect to be going. I hope it
will reduce the bewilderment which philosophy so easily engenders in those who approach it. This section is swift and summary. It is not an impartial review, but a broad-stroke sketch of how one man sees the subject. I make no effort to conceal my own opinions here or elsewhere, for in my estimation a bland neutrality serves only to mask the interest, conviction, and even passion in the real life of metaphysics. Those with different views will be able to take steps to correct my exaggerations, misrepresentations, and omissions.

In part II, one branch of cosmology, the philosophy of matter, is treated through a study of atomism as a specimen of theories based on concrete particulars. My approach is quasi-historical; the career of atomism from Newton's time to its contemporary demise is used to illustrate the variety of ways in which cosmologies are vulnerable and resilient. This example provides opportunities for discussion of the relations between science and metaphysics, problems of deduction, and doctrines of primary and secondary qualities. The alternative cosmologies of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Boscovich are introduced by way of contrast. Although there is no attempt at a scholarly treatment, this section does aim to provide some understanding, which every educated person ought to have, of the development of one set of ideas crucial in modern thought.

Part III concerns ontology and is contemporary in theme. It deals with the problems of establishing an inventory of categories of being-in the sense in which concrete particulars constitute one category, and events, sets, or universals are other candidates. Quine's doctrines of canonical notation and ontic commitment are expounded and are then used in a discussion of various candidate categories which introduces the work of Davidson, Goodman, Putnam, and D.C. Williams. I have endeavored to make this abstract material sufficiently comprehensible to allow its inclusion in undergraduate courses at an earlier stage than is at present possible. In
the final chapter I try to stimulate further investigation of Williams' doctrine of tropes, or property instances, as a basic category.

Parts II and III are substantially independent, each containing material for a course of about thirty lectures or their equivalent. Although the ontology of part III comes earlier in the order of reason and is more nearly a first philosophy, I recommend that where both parts are being treated, they be tackled in the order in which they are printed. Part II is less formidably abstract and, being concerned with the character of the material world, lies closer to people's natural concerns and curiosities.

For a course in which part II is given the chief place, the works of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Boscovich, all available in paperback, offer suitable further reading. R. Harré's *Matter and Method* handles some of the same themes, and for a course with more emphasis on philosophy of science, J. J. C. Smart's *Between Science and Philosophy* or *Philosophy and Scientific Realism* would be a suitable companion. Work centered on part III calls for study of Quine's *Word and Object* or *Ways of Paradox*. The Bibliography furnishes further suggestions and information. Metaphysics abounds, to the confusion of the beginner, in technical terms and jargon titles for doctrines. In keeping with the book's purpose as a text, a Glossary has been appended, giving explanations of all such expressions used.

Metaphysics has a rich and many-stranded history, and no one book in this field can hope to be comprehensive. Of the several traditions in formulating and addressing metaphysical issues, this text stays most closely with that branch of empiricism which takes metaphysical problems to rise from, and stand under the judgment of, the more concrete knowledge of the sciences. And within this manner of approach, there are further limitations. The reader is warned that he will find no attempt at even superficial treatment of the philosophy of necessity, or of mind, or of philosophical theology. Nor is there any
attack on the metaphysical problems generated by epistemology—the character of sense data, for example—or on those which arise in moral philosophy, such as the reality of free will or the ontological status of values." (from the Preface).


"The nature of classification. Ontology asks and tries to answer two related questions. What are the categories of the world? And what are the laws that govern these categories? In chemistry, for comparison, we search for the chemical elements and the laws of chemistry; in physics, for elementary particles and their laws. Categories are for ontology what these basic building blocks of the universe are for the natural sciences. But ontology is not a science among sciences. Its scope is vastly larger than that of any science. And its point of view is totally different from that of the sciences. To see how ontology differs from science, we must first of all understand the notion of a category. Our first question therefore is: what is a category? 

(...) The principle of the classification of the elements, however, is the same as at Empedocles's time: *Things are distinguished from each other by means of the properties which they have.* Let us call this 'the principle of classification'.

(...) Someone must have realized that the foundation of all classifications of individual things, namely, the
distinction between these things and their properties, is itself a classification. But it is a classification, not of individual things - individual amounts of water or earth, or individual bits of gold or iron, or individual whales or carps - but of entities in general. It is a classification of any kind of existent. It divides up everything there is into two large groups of existents, namely, into individual things, on the one hand, and their properties, on the other. Every 'ordinary' classification rests on this most fundamental classification of things into individuals and their properties. In order to distinguish this classification from all others, we shall speak of a 'categorization'. Entities, we shall say, are categorized. The kinds of thing which the categorization distinguishes are then called 'categories'. We know that there are at least two categories, that is, two kinds of entity (existent), namely, individual things and properties of individual things."

(pp. 1-3).


Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; 1. The apparent distinctness of identicals 9; 2. Objects and entities 39; 3. Indiscernibility 64; 4. Existence 82; 5. Essence 122; 6. Substances 154; 7. Qualities 184; 8. Accidental connections 212; Appendix A. Relations 239; Appendix B. Idealism 248; Notes 256; Index 267-274.

"The inquiry into being qua being has been identified with metaphysics. But it would be better to use the term 'metaphysics' more broadly, namely, for the branch of philosophy that has as its subject matter the nature of the world, or of reality, rather than the nature of our knowledge, or of our language, or of our sciences about the world. We may then distinguish several levels of metaphysical inquiry. On the least fundamental level metaphysics is concerned with the most general description of the actual world, with the most general
kinds of things there are and with the way they fit together. It asks such questions as whether God exists, whether there are both minds and bodies or only minds or only bodies, and if there are both minds and bodies, how they are related. On this level it is closely connected with epistemology, since the main philosophical difficulties such questions pose for us are epistemological in character.

On a more fundamental level, presupposed by the first, metaphysics inquires into the nature of all possible, or at least all conceivable, comprehensible worlds, and thus only indirectly into the nature of the actual world. Can there be a world that consists only of individuals and not also of properties and relations? Or a world that consists only of properties and relations? Can there be nonidentical but indiscernible things? Questions related to those on the previous level can now be asked in complete independence from the usual epistemological considerations. Can there be a world unless there is God? Can there be a world without bodies? Without minds? On this level metaphysics is closely connected with logic. (Immediately following his introduction of the notion of a science of being qua being Aristotle offers a defense of the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle.) But this connection is no more limited to formal logic than the notion of necessary truth is limited to the truths of formal logic. The criterion of possibility on which it would rely can hardly be mere formal consistency; it must be conceivability or comprehensibility (not of propositions, but of what propositions purport to describe), for, whether we like it or not, we have no other general and ultimate criterion of possibility.

This is why, on this level, metaphysics is also connected with phenomenology, i.e., with the philosophical description of the most general character of the objects of consciousness qua objects of consciousness. On the third and most fundamental level metaphysics is concerned with the concepts and principles on the basis
of which the questions belonging to the other two levels, i.e., the questions about what things there are or at least there can be, must be answered. Instead of these questions, it asks, what is it for something to be in a world, or for something to be a world? It is on this level, I suggest, that metaphysics is best described as the inquiry into being qua being, or, we might also say, as protometaphysics. Any conception of a world presupposes the conception of what it is for something to exist in that world. Any conception of a thing presupposes the conception of what it is for it to be the subject of predication, both accidental and essential. Any conception of a thing presupposes the conception of what it is for it to be identifiable, not in the sense of being merely singled out but also in the sense of being singled out again or in a different way, of being recognized, of being the subject of a true informative identity judgment. It follows that the concepts of existence, identity, essential predication, and accidental predication cannot be understood as standing for constituents of the world, presumably for certain properties or relations. They are the concepts in terms of which we must understand what it is for something to be in the world, what it is for something to have a property or be related to another thing, and what it is for something to be a property or a relation. Yet they apply to any possible world; indeed nothing would be a world were it not for their applicability to it. We may call such concepts, which apply without standing for anything, transcendental. The inquiry into being qua being, or protometaphysics, may then be called a transcendental inquiry." (from the Introduction).

  Translated from the Hebrew by Lenn J. Schramm.
  Contents: Preface XI; 1. The framework of the discussion 1; 2. Ontological reasoning in ancient thought 35; The
entity whose existence is supposed to be necessary 83; 4. The ontological status of the Self 129; 5. Necessity, possibility, and freedom in human affairs 165; Notes 209; Bibliography 219; Index 227.

"The idea behind this volume is that the best way to study ontology is through a close critical analysis of the major ontological problems the 'historical' ones—that is, the problems that gave birth to this field and continue to engage thinkers and scholars to this very day. The totality of Being of Parmenides and the principle of the oneness of being, thought, and language; the debate between idealism and materialism, as illuminated by Plato; the Aristotelian categories and the relationship between the individuum and the collective, or the species and the genus; Anselm's fascinating attempt to prove necessary existence—and that of God, no less—through purely conceptual means; the ontological status of the 'I'; the antinomy of necessity and freedom: these are the issues addressed in this volume. They also demarcate the horizon of present-day ontological discussion." (from the Preface).

"The Subdivisions of Philosophy
By way of introduction to this volume, which aims to explore the classical model of ontological analysis, I shall try to elucidate the concept of ontology that underlies the chapters to follow. It is customary today to apply the term 'ontology' to one of the main branches or subdivisions of philosophical inquiry, alongside epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, and so on. Although this terminology of philosophical branches or subdisciplines is common parlance, among philosophers and laymen alike, it is not unambiguous. Its first and clearest use is practical and methodological: the concept of subdisciplines helps us organize the study of philosophy in schools and universities and label the field of specialization of advanced students, allows us to apply sophisticated analytical tools to one phase or segment of philosophical inquiry and discussion, even when other phases or
segments are not yet ready for this application, and the like.

On the other hand, the concept of subdisciplines, in the sense alluded to above, harbors the danger of fragmenting philosophy, whose broad overview—its synopsis—is, according to many philosophers throughout the ages, part of its very essence. This fragmentation might lead to philosophy’s disappearance from the world or from the map of man’s intellectual occupations.

One way to ward off the danger inherent in the division into subdisciplines is to provide a systematic delineation of their boundaries. The first step in such a demarcation is to discern the unique elements of each subdiscipline, that is, to differentiate among them. Yet we cannot get to the bottom of these differences without comprehending—in advance or as part of this demarcation—the common element that underlies the various subdisciplines. In this way, drawing the boundaries of the different branches of philosophical thought may lead us to a new and more profound awareness of the common stem of this field of intellectual endeavor.

One of the practical advantages of dividing philosophy into subdisciplines is the fact, encouraging in and of itself, that those who immerse themselves for a time in philosophy, with the proper approach, find themselves at home with these divisions. When they encounter some philosophical argument, problem, or theory, they have no trouble allocating it to one of the recognized subdisciplines (except for a small number of borderline cases that belong simultaneously to more than one subdiscipline). But even veteran philosophers would be hard put to set forth clear reasons for their attribution in every case. They would find it even more difficult to give a general characterization of the subdiscipline to which they had allocated the argument, problem, or theory. There is no royal road to such characterizations. Every serious attempt to provide them will inevitably turn into a complex and wearisome intellectual exercise.
The attempt made below to give a general characterization of ontology consists of two steps: (1) a description and analysis of various approaches -- both historical and contemporary -- towards ontological questions, as regards their identification, interpretation, and treatment; and (2) a clarification of several basic ontological distinctions." (pp. 1-2).


**MORE SPECIALIZED WORKS**


  Edited by William Heald.

  Contents: Foreword by Edwin B. Allaire IX-XII; Editor's Note XIII-XX; Editor's introduction 3; 1. Simples and canons 43; 2. Facts and modes 61; 3. Diversity and order
"During the last two decades of his life—from the publication of *Realism* in 1967 until his death in 1987—Gustav Bergmann published only five essays. One, 'Diversity,' his presidential address to the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, appeared in 1968; the other four, between 1977 and 1981. In those decades Bergmann worked as hard and as steadily as he ever had; and he was a hard worker indeed. In the twenty-five years prior to *Realism*, Bergmann published over a hundred essays, many of which are contained in four essay collections, and *Philosophy of Science*.

In his presidential address Bergmann made known his dissatisfaction with certain aspects of his ontology, in particular his essays of the facts expressed by universal and existential statements. (See 'Generality and Existence,' *Theoria*, 28, 1962.) He thus set about to rethink his system. *New Foundations of Ontology* is the result.

The manuscript seems to have been begun sometime in 1974 and completed in late 1975. Bergmann decided to delay its publication: he had reservations about the penultimate chapter, which deals with classes and arithmetic. He never returned to the manuscript per se. Instead, he led himself into the depths of set theory, a subject he had once known well. (Bergmann earned a PhD in mathematics and from 1928 to 1935 published eight papers in mathematics proper.)" (from the Foreword).


"Theories about the ontological structure of the world have generally been described in informal, intuitive terms, and the arguments for and against them, including
their consistency and adequacy as explanatory frameworks, have generally been given in even more informal terms. The goal of formal ontology is to correct for these deficiencies. By formally reconstructing an intuitive, informal ontological scheme as a formal ontology we can better determine the consistency and adequacy of that scheme; and then by comparing different reconstructed schemes with one another we can better evaluate the arguments for and against them and come to a decision as to which system it is best to adopt. This book is divided into two parts. The first part is on formal ontology and how different informal ontological systems can be formally developed and compared with one another. The main point is that a formal ontology connects logical categories -- especially the categories involved in predication -- with ontological categories. The second part of this book is on the formal construction and defense of a particular formal ontology called conceptual realism, which is based on a unified account of general and singular reference in a conceptualist theory of predication. An intensional logic based on deactivated (nominalized) referential and predicative concepts is part of this ontology as well as an analysis of plural reference and predication in terms of a logic of classes as many. A natural realism and an Aristotelian essentialism based on a logic of natural kinds is also part of the framework, which is put forward here as the best formal ontology to adopt."


"This is a work in analytic metaphysics. Its main purpose is to clarify a notion of central importance in metaphysics since Aristotle, to wit the notion of existential dependence. All currently available analyses of the notion are examined and then rejected, and a new account is defended. This work is the first comprehensive one on the topic. The first chapter is devoted to introducing and
explaining some notions which are crucial for the central parts of the work, namely the notions of existence, necessity, (individual and plural) quantification and essence. In chapters 2 and 4 focus is made on the relation of "simple" existential dependence, the relation which holds between two objects when the first cannot exist without the other. Three accounts of simple dependence - each endorsed by some contemporary philosophers, among them Kit Fine, E. Jonathan Lowe, Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith - are presented and then rejected. A new account, inspired by suggestions by Fine and Lowe, is defended. According to that account - the "foundational" account - simple dependence is to be defined in terms of a relation called grounding, which is presented in chapter 3. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with relations belonging to the family of simple dependence, among others (i) generic dependence, (ii) various forms of temporal dependence, and (iii) supervenience, a complex dependence relation largely invoked in current debates on the philosophy of mind. It is shown that foundationalist accounts of these notions - i.e. accounts framed in terms of grounding - are superior to other existing accounts. These chapters also contain some applications of the foundational conception of dependence, in particular a characterization of substances and a formulation of the distinction between two well known conceptions of universals, the Aristotelian and the Platonician conception. The last part of the work is a technical appendix where one can find, among other things, a system for the logic of essence, which is proved to be sound and complete with respect to a possible world semantics.


"The heart of philosophy is metaphysics, and at the heart of the heart lie two questions about existence. What is it for any contingent thing to exist? Why does any contingent thing exist? Call these the nature question and the ground question, respectively. The first concerns the nature of the existence of the contingent existent; the second concerns the ground of the contingent existent. Both questions are ancient, and yet perennial in their
appeal; both have presided over the burial of so many of
their would-be undertakers that it is a good induction
that they will continue to do so.
For some time now, the preferred style in addressing
such questions has been deflationary when it has not
been eliminativist. Ask Willard Quine what existence is,
and you will hear that 'Existence is what existential
quantification expresses.'(1) Ask Bertrand Russell what it
is for an individual to exist, and he will tell you that an
individual can no more exist than it can be numerous:
there just is no such thing as the existence of individuals.
(2) And of course Russell's eliminativist answer implies
that one cannot even ask, on pain of succumbing to the
fallacy of complex question, why any contingent
individual exists: if no individual exists, there can be no
question why any individual exists. Not to mention
Russell's modal corollary: 'contingent' and 'necessary' can
only be said de dicto (of propositions) and not de re (of
things). At the source of the Russellian-Quinean stream
stands the imposing figure of Frege, perhaps the greatest
of logicians, and certainly the greatest since Aristotle. But
logic is not metaphysics, and we shall see that existence
cannot come into focus through the lenses of logic alone.
It is, as Santayana once said, 'odious to the logician.' (3)
This is part of its charm, as the resolute reader will no
doubt come to appreciate.

The critical task of this book is to put paid to deflationary
and eliminativist accounts, thereby restoring existence to
its rightful place as one of the deep topics in philosophy,
if not the deepest. The constructive task is to defend the
thesis that the nature and ground questions admit of a
unified answer, and that this answer takes the form of
what I call a paradigm theory of existence. The central
idea of the paradigm theory is that existence itself is
nothing abstract (hence not a property or a concept or a
quantifier or anything merely logical or linguistic or
representational) but is instead a paradigmatically
existent concrete individual. The idea is not merely that
existence itself exists -- which would be true if one said that existence is a property and one held a realist theory of properties -- but that existence exists in a plenary concrete sense that it cannot be the business of a preface to explain. But the idea may be limned as follows. Existence itself exists of absolute metaphysical necessity and the contingent existent exists in virtue of its dependence on self-existent existence. I submit that this robust theory of existence can be as rigorously defended as any deflationary theory." (from the Preface)


**DICTIONARIES OF ONTOLOGY**


"The present work seeks to document the most important traditional and contemporary streams in the two overlapping fields of metaphysics and ontology. Both disciplines were, even just a few years ago, seen by many of negligible contemporary interest. The editors, neither of whom had shared this general opinion, were none the less surprised to see how much
valuable work had been achieved in these areas not only in the past but also in our own century. The intensity of contemporary work in metaphysics and ontology points indeed to a healthy renewal of these disciplines, the like of which has not been seen, perhaps, since the 13th century".(...)

Of the two editors of this Handbook -- who bear equal responsibility for all its parts and moments -- one is and admirer of Leibniz and the 17th-century rationalists and thus finds himself strongly allied to certain modern deductive trends. The other feels more at home in the 13th or 14th centuries and is accordingly critical of the over-enthusiastic and often over-simplistic use of formal logical techniques in contemporary metaphysics. The editors are however equally convinced that it is precisely the tension between the deductive and descriptive approaches to the problems of metaphysics and ontology which will be responsible for the future creative advances in these fields. And they are convinced also that such advances can be furthered by an understanding of the history of metaphysics and ontology., an understanding -- guided by the most sophisticated modern research and by the use of the most sophisticated modern techniques -- of the sort this Handbook has been designed to facilitate." (from the Introduction).

COLLECTION OF ESSAYS


Contents: Acknowledgements IX; James Bogen: Introduction 1; Robert G. Turnbull: Zeno's Stricture and Predication in Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus 21; Frank A. Lewis: Form and Predication in Aristotle's Metaphysics


Contents: Preface XI, 1. Introduction 1; 2. Is Frege a radical relativist? 3. Frege: existence defined as identifiability 103; 4. Russell's robust sense of reality 123; 5. Russell's forty-four 'No-entity without identity theories 149; 6. The ancient realist basis of conceptual relativity 215; 7. The ontology of the analytic tradition 233; Notes 273; Bibliography 305; Index of names 327; Index of subjects 333; About the author 337.

"The recent renaissance in Frege-Russell studies, though including some excellent work, has confined its quest for the origins of analytic philosophy to the nineteenth century. My book goes well beyond Frege-Husserl
comparisons and historical studies of Russell's idealistic upbringing to give a philosophical evaluation of what the analytic movement really amounts to. My thesis is that a single kind of ontology, 'no entity without identity' ontology, is fundamental to all of Russell's major works from 1900 to 1948, to the work of Frege, Wittenstein, and Quine -- and also to substance metaphysics, its origin over two thousand years ago. Thus my aim is to show that the analysts, far from ending traditional ontology, at bottom continued and even developed it. I cannot see how our understanding of the pluralistic, diverse analytic movement, not to mention the pluralistic, diverse history of Western philosophy, could be more deeply transformed or unified, if I am right.

My methodology was to read the major books of the analysts, many of their lesser works, and a great deal of the secondary literature, gleaning like Rachel in the field of wheat for anything I could find on 'no entity without identity', then to create from scratch new portraits of Frege and Russell as the true analytic progenitors of this kind of ontology.

The specific thesis of my book is that there is a general kind of ontology, modified realism, which the great analysts share not only with each other, but with most great Western philosophers. Modified realism is the view that in some sense there are both real and rational (or linguistic) identities. In more familiar language, it is roughly the view that there are both real distinctions and distinctions in reason (or in language). More precisely, it is the view that there is at least one real being which is the basis for accommodating possibly huge amounts of conceptual relativity, or objectual identities' "shifting" as sortal concepts or sortal terms 'shift.' Therefore I hold that on the fundamental level of ontology, the linguistic turn was not a radical break from traditional substance metaphysics. I also hold that the seeming conflict in the analysts between private language arguments, which imply various sorts of realism, and the conceptual
'shiftability' of objects, which suggests a deep ontological relativity, is best resolved by, and is in fact implicitly resolved by, their respective kinds of modified realism. There are many different sorts of modified realism, but all of them share a common general form." (from the Preface).


"As a book by the founder of phenomenology that examines Frege's ideas from Brentano's empirical standpoint, Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic is both an early work of phenomenology and of logical empiricism. In it Husserl predicted the failure of Frege's attempt to logicize arithmetic and to mathematize logic two years before the publication of the Basic Laws of Arithmetic in 1893. I hope to show that Husserl did so in terms that would prefigure both the account Frege would give of his error after Russell encountered the paradoxes ten years later and the discussions of Principia Mathematica. Moreover, in locating the source of Frege's difficulties in the ambiguous theory of identity, meaning, and denotation that forms the basis of Frege's logical project.
and generates Russell's contradictions, Husserl's discussions indicate that these contradictions may have as serious consequences for twentieth century philosophy of language as they have had for the philosophy of mathematics.

This book is about these Austro-German roots of twentieth century philosophy. It is mainly about the origins of analytic philosophy, about the transmission of Frege's thought to the English speaking world, and about the relevance of Husserl's early criticism of Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic* to some contemporary issues in philosophy. It is more about Husserl the philosopher of logic and mathematics than it is about Husserl the phenomenologist, and it is principally addressed to those members of the philosophical community who, via Russell, have been affected by Frege's logic. This makes it very different from work on Husserl and Frege that has focused on the importance of Frege's criticism of Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and attendant issues. The goal of this book is quite the opposite. It studies the shortcomings in Frege's thought that Husserl flagged and Russell endeavored to overcome. One possible sequel to this book would be a thorough study of Husserl's successes and failures in remedying the philosophical ills he perceived all about him, but that goes beyond the scope of this work, which follows the issues discussed into the work of Russell and his successors." (pp. 3-4).


  Contents: Preface VII; Introduction IX; I. The analysis of perception 3; II. Idealism, realism and common sense 30; III. Thought and belief 53; IV. Moore and Bradley on
As with the idealists Moore and Russell opposed, facts have once again become unpopular. In defending the atomist's correspondence theory of truth, I shall consider Frege's early attack on that theory as well as recent criticisms that reproduce, wittingly or unwittingly, the familiar idealistic patterns. In returning to the idealist's arguments, some 'analytic' philosophers echo themes revived by Sartre, without providing the detailed argument of the latter. By contrast, Sellars attacks atomism at a seemingly vulnerable point. He argues that the atomists did not and cannot resolve Bradley's puzzles about predication. This is a dominant theme behind his attempt to defend the current revival of nominalism—a gambit he shares with Quine. It also reveals a link between the new nominalism and the revival of idealism. Bradley's views thus affect a number of issues discussed, including the connection of Russell's theory of descriptions with questions about concepts, particulars, predication, and judgment. This theory, in turn, provides an obvious link with Russell's critique of Frege, which is explicated and defended. One of the surprising features of recent philosophy has been the unfair, unfounded, and often abusive commentary on Russell's early work and, in particular, his criticism of Frege. Unfortunately, the prevalent assumption that Russell both misunderstood Frege and was guilty of elementary errors has prevented
an adequate understanding of the origin of his theory of descriptions and his analysis of judgment. The early critique of Frege helps to clarify basic features of Russell's philosophy and reveals further connections with the views of Bradley and Moore. It is also crucial for the comprehension of Russell's views about names, reference, existence, and truth. These are important for the analysis of intentional contexts presented in this book. The examination of such fundamental aspects of Russell's philosophy naturally involves a consideration of recent criticisms of Russellian themes by Strawson, Sellars, Carnap, Quine, and others.

What is attempted is the resolution of some issues that preoccupied Russell, Wittgenstein, Moore, and their successors, as well as an explication of some links between Logical Atomism and Moore's early assault on idealism. The book is thus a partial study of the ontology and the history of Logical Atomism." (from the Introduction).


Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Introduction by Knuuttila and Hintikka: IX-XVI; Charles H. Kahn: Retrospect on the verb 'To Be?' and the concept of Being 1; Benson Mates: identity and predication in Plato 29; Russell M. Dancy: Aristotle and existence 49; Jaakko Hintikka: The varieties of Being in Aristotle 81; Sten Ebbesen: The Chimera's Diary 115; Klaus Jacobi: Peter Abelard's investigations into the meaning and functions of the speech sign 'Est' 145; Hermann Weidemann: The logic of Being in Thomas Aquinas 181; Simo Knuuttila: Being *qua* Being in Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus 201; Lilli Alanen: On Descartes's argument for Dualism and the distinction between different kinds of Beings 223; Jaakko Hintikka: Kant on existence, predication, and the Ontological Argument 249; Leila
"The last twenty years have seen remarkable developments in our understanding of how the ancient Greek thinkers handled the general concept of being and its several varieties. The most general examination of the meaning of the Greek verb 'esti' 'einai' 'on' both in common usage and in the philosophical literature has been presented by Charles H. Kahn, most extensively in his 1973 book *The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek*. These discussions are summarized in Kahn's contribution to this volume. By and large, they show that conceptual schemes by means of which philosophers have recently approached Greek thought have not been very well suited to the way the concept of being was actually used by the ancients. For one thing, being in the sense of existence played a very small role in Greek thinking according to Kahn.

Even more importantly, Kahn has argued that Frege and Russell's thesis that verbs for being, such as 'esti', are multiply ambiguous is ill suited for the purpose of appreciating the actual conceptual assumptions of the Greek thinkers. Frege and Russell claimed that a verb like 'is' or 'esti' is ambiguous between the 'is' of identity, the 'is' of existence, the copulative 'is', and the generic 'is' (the 'is' of class-inclusion). At least a couple of generations of scholars have relied on this thesis and frequently criticized sundry ancients for confusing these different senses of 'esti' with each other. Others have found the distinction between the different Fregean senses in this or that major Greek philosopher, or otherwise used the distinction as an integral part of their interpretative framework. Kahn's results show that all these lines of argument are highly suspect.

Independently of Kahn, Michael Frede (in his *Habilitationsschrift* published in 1967 under the title *Prädikation and Existenzaussage*) reached the conclusion that Plato did not - at least not in the *Sophist* -
accept anything like the Frege-Russell distinction, thus striking another blow against the received views. We hoped to include excerpts of Frede's little classic here. Unfortunately, for reasons beyond our help this turned out to be impossible." p. IX

(...) "All these different investigations naturally raise the question: What is the origin of the Frege-Russell distinction? What is its background? In her paper, 'On Frege's Concept of Being', Leila Haaparanta discusses Frege's treatment of being in its historical setting. One of the crucial ingredients in Frege's treatment of being is his idea that existence is a second-level concept (property of a concept). Haaparanta sees the foundation of this assumption in Frege's ideas about the identification (individuality) and existence of individuals (objects), incorporated in Frege's treatment of the senses by means of which we can grasp an individual object. These were according to her inspired by Kant's ideas, especially by Kant's distinction between the predicative and existential uses of 'is'. Even though Kant did not subscribe to or even anticipate the Frege-Russell distinction, he thus seems to have inspired it." (pp. XV-XVI).


Edited by James E. Tomberlin

Contents: Editor's Preface V; Authors' Note IX; Introduction XI; PROBLEMS. I. Edwin B. Allaire: Existence, Independence, and Universals 3; II. Edwin B. Allaire: Bare Particulars 14; III. Herbert Hochberg: Elementarism, Independence, and Ontology 22; IV. Reinhardt Grossmann: Particulars and Time 30; V. Reinhardt Grossmann: Conceptualism 40; VI. Reinhardt Grossmann: Sensory Intuition and the Dogma


"Certain words are crucial in ontological discourse. 'Exist', 'individual', 'particular', 'universal', 'simple', and 'independent' are obvious examples. These essays examine how philosophers have used some of those words. The purpose of the examination is to make sense out of the ontological doctrines in which the crucial words occur as well as out of the arguments that have been made for and against the doctrines. This common purpose is one good reason for bringing the essays
together. Nor is it the only one. The several essays share an awareness of the dialectical connections among the several issues with which they deal. Also, the realism-nominalism issue is the central one; and the essays are all realistic. That is another good reason for bringing them together.

The authors believe that they share a method. If they are right, then there is a third good reason for bringing them together. But it seems pointless to attempt here a statement of the method. A method is best judged by watching it in operation.

Even though the essays are all realistic, their defense of realism is both varied and complex. For this there are three reasons. First, none of the essays defends uncritically any traditional position. Rather, each defends some proposition or propositions which by the method may be shown to be connected with some traditional position. Second, they all put less weight on the proposition itself than on the intellectual motives which have led philosophers to propound it and on the arguments by which they support it. Third, they all make a special point of exploring the dialectical ramifications of the realism-nominalism issue. That is why the common purpose will be best served by allowing each essay to speak for itself." (Introduction).


• Malinowski, Jacek, and Pietruszczak, Andrzej, eds. 2006. *Essays in Logic and Ontology*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.


  Contents: Milton K. Munitz: Foreword V; Charles H. Kahn: On the theory of the verb 'To be' 1; Joseph Owens: The content of existence 21; Jaakko Hintikka: Quantifiers, language-games and transcendental arguments 37; Alex Orenstein: On explicating existence in terms of quantification 59; Milton K. Munitz: Existence and presupposition 85; Bas. Van Fraassen: extension, intension, and comprehension 101; Nino B. Cocchiarella: Whither Russell’s paradox of predication? 133; Fred Sommers: Existence and predication 159; Henry Hiz: On assertions of existence 175; Alvin
Plantinga: Transworld identity or worldbound individuals? 193; Nicholas Rescher: The ontology of the possible 213; Stephan Körner: Individuals in possible worlds 229; Hugues Leblanc: On dispensing with things and worlds 241; Richmond H. Thomason: Perception and individuation 261; Peter T. Geach: ontological relativity and relative identity 287-302.

"The following essays represent the contributions to a seminar on ontology held under the auspices of the New York University Institute of Philosophy for the year 1970-1971.

The possibility of establishing fruitful links between logic and ontology had already been made evident in earlier work by Frege, Lesniewski, Russell, Quine, and Goodman. More recent investigations have sought to expand and deepen these studies, although by no means always through adhering to paths previously established. Developments in modal logic, model theory, and presupposition-free logics have brought to the fore the need to deal with such central concepts as 'existence,' 'possibility,' 'individuation,' 'identity,' and 'necessity,' among others. The studies here included, by some of the leading investigators in the field, are typical of the most promising and exciting research of recent analytic philosophy. Along with those papers whose orientation to ontology is derived primarily from the preoccupations of logicians, a number of additional studies are included that give testimony to the lively and creative resurgence of interest in ontology in contemporary philosophy."

(Foreword).


Philosophical Logic and Philosophy of Logic

MODERN LOGIC: INTRODUCTORY READINGS


"This book is an introduction to logic, as contemporary logicians now understand the subject. It does not attempt to be a textbook, however. There are numerous such books currently available. The point of this one is to explore the roots of logic, which sink deep into philosophy. Some formal logic will be explained along the way. In each of the main chapters, I start by taking up some particular philosophical problem or logical puzzle. I then explain one approach to it. Often this is a fairly standard one; but in some of the areas there is no standard answer: logicians still disagree. In such cases, I have just chosen one that is interesting. Nearly all the approaches, whether standard or not, may be challenged. I finish each chapter with some problems for the approach that I have explained. Sometimes these problems are standard; sometimes they are not. Sometimes they may have easy answers; sometimes they may not. The aim is to challenge you to figure out what you make of the matter."
Modern logic is a highly mathematical subject. I have tried to write the material in such a way as to avoid nearly all mathematics. The most that is required is a little high-school algebra in the last few chapters. It is true that you will need the determination to master some symbolism that may be new to you; but this is a lot less than is required to have a basic grasp of any new language. And the perspicuity that the symbolism gives to difficult questions makes any trouble one may have in mastering it well worth it. One warning, though: reading a book on logic or philosophy is not like reading a novel. There will be times when you will have to read slowly and carefully. Sometimes you may have to stop and think about things; and you should be prepared to go back and reread a paragraph if necessary.

The final chapter of the book is on the development of logic. In this, I have tried to put some of the issues that the book deals with in an historical perspective, to show that logic is a living subject, which has always evolved, and which will continue to do so. The chapter also contains suggestions for further reading.

There are two appendices. The first contains a glossary of terms and symbols. You may consult this if you forget the meaning of a word or symbol. The second appendix contains a question relevant to each chapter, with which you can test your understanding of its main ideas." (from the Preface).


Tenth revised edition (First edition 1982).

"The most immediate benefit derived from the study of logic is the skill needed to construct sound arguments of one's own and to evaluate the arguments of others. In accomplishing this goal, logic instills a sensitivity for the formal component in language, a thorough command of which is indispensable to clear, effective, and meaningful communication. On a broader scale, by focusing attention on the requirement for reasons or evidence to support our views, logic provides a fundamental defense against the prejudiced and uncivilized attitudes that threaten the foundations of our democratic society. Finally, through its attention to inconsistency as a fatal flaw in any theory or point of view, logic proves a useful device in disclosing ill-conceived policies in the political sphere and, ultimately, in distinguishing the rational from the irrational, the sane from the insane.

To realize the benefits offered by the study of logic, one must thoroughly understand the central concepts of the subject and be able to apply them in actual situations. To promote the achievement of these goals, this text presents the central concepts of logic clearly and simply. Examples are used extensively, key terms are introduced in boldface type and defined in the glossary/index, and major points are illustrated in graphic boxes. Furthermore, to ensure sufficient practice in applying the basic principles, the book includes over 2,000 exercises selected to illustrate the main points and guard against the most typical mistakes. In most cases, every third exercise is answered in the back of the book.

New to This Edition.

In this Tenth Edition, the coverage of Inductive Logic in Part III has been broken up into six separate chapters to
allow for greater flexibility in using the text in class. This change also facilitates customization through our Custom program, which lets you select course materials to create an affordable text that matches your syllabus. Also new in this edition, thirteen pages devoted to "Eminent Logicians" highlight the contributions of key logicians in history. The inclusion of these features should help to humanize logic and make it more interesting by connecting it with historical figures who devoted much of their lives to advancing the science of logic.

A new method for testing sorites has been introduced into Section 5.7. This method, which resembles the rules method for syllogisms, is often simpler to apply because it does not require that intermediate conclusions be drawn.

In Section 8.6 the restriction on universal generalization for arguments involving relational predicates and overlapping quantifiers has been replaced by a slightly stricter version. To my considerable surprise, a very good logician came up with an invalid argument that got past the earlier formulation of this restriction.

Also, in Chapter 14 (formerly Section 9.6) more treatment is accorded Ockham's razor in connection with explanations.

The "Logic and Graduate-Level Admissions Tests" appendix, which draws a connection between logic and earning a good score on tests such as the LSAT, GMAT, and MCAT, has been completely rewritten and expanded, paying greater attention to logical strategies." (pp. XVII-XVIII).


"This book is written for all those interested in arguments and arguing—and especially for students enrolled in courses designed to improve their critical thinking abilities. My goal in this work is to present enough theory to explain why certain kinds of argument are good or bad and enough illustrations and examples to show how that theory can be applied. The book includes lively illustrations from contemporary debates and issues and ample student exercises. Responses to some exercises are provided within the book, while the remainder are answered in a manual available to instructors. A central new feature of the seventh edition is that for most of the exercises in the text, on-line supplementations are available. These developments have been made possible by the sustained and energetic efforts of Dr. Jim Freeman of Hunter College, New York. The on-line material includes fill-in-the-blank, true-false, and multiple choice examples; all are machine gradable. Students get immediate feedback on whether their answers are correct, and instructors get reports of the percentage of correct examples the students completed, for each exercise assigned. I present an integrated treatment of cogent argument and fallacies and of formal and informal strategies for analysis and evaluation. In addition to the highly significant feature of Dr. Freeman’s exercise material, this seventh edition includes updated examples; a reordering of some early material on language, clarity and argument; compression of exposition at some points; and a strengthened discussion of inductive reasoning. In
recognition of students' increased used of Internet materials for personal and academic research, relevant pointers on evaluating information from the Internet are included.

My interest in the theory and practice of argument stems from an occasion many years ago when I was asked to review a manuscript on informal Slacks. At the time, I was teaching an elementary course on banal logic to a large group of students who were not too keen on the subject. The greater practicality of the informal logic and the lively interest of the examples in that manuscript led to my own fascination with practical argumentation. I began to study texts in that field and developed my own course on practical reasoning. From that work, this text was generated. Along with many other people, I have done further research on the philosophy of argument since that time, and I have tried to take account of new developments here. Some themes relatively unexplored in the field of argument analysis when this book was first written remain of great interest to theorists today. The topics of conductive argument and analogical arguments are two examples.

This book combines a detailed nonformal treatment of good and bad arguments with a solid treatment of two central areas of formal logic: categorical logic and propositional logic. In addition to the interpretation and evaluation of arguments, the book also explores issues relevant to their construction. The first edition, written between 1982 and 1984, was novel in its combination of discussions of cogent and fallacious arguments, its synthesis of informal and formal approaches, and its sustained effort to present a coherent general theory of argument. Since the early 1980s other authors have adopted a similar approach; thus the combination of topics is less unusual than it was previously. The second edition of this text was written in 1986, the third in 1990, the fourth in 1995, the fifth in 1999, and the sixth in
2003. This current edition, the seventh, was prepared in the summer of 2008. The importance of cogent argumentation is a persistent theme in this work. The types of arguments treated in this book are integral to the development of many areas including law; philosophy; physical, biological, and social science; literature; and history." (pp. X-XI).


  Second revised edition (First edition 2002).

  "This is a comprehensive *Introduction to Logic*. It covers: syllogisms; informal aspects of reasoning (like meaning and fallacies); inductive reasoning; propositional and quantificational logic; modal, deontic, and belief logic; the formalization of an ethical theory about the golden rule; and metalogic, history of logic, deviant logic, and philosophy of logic."
Because of its broad scope, this book can be used for basic logic courses (where teachers can choose from a variety of topics) or more advanced ones (including graduate courses). The teacher manual and the end of Chapter 1 both talk about which chapters are suitable for which type of course.

The first Routledge edition came out in 2002. Key features included: (a) clear, direct, concise writing; (b) interesting examples and arguments, often from everyday life or great philosophers; (c) simpler ways to test arguments, including the star test for syllogisms and an easier way to do proofs and refutations; (d) wide scope of materials (likely the widest of any logic text); (e) suitability for self-study and preparation for tests like the LAST; (f) reasonable price (a third of the cost of some competitors); and (g) the companion LogiCola instructional program (which randomly generates problems, gives feedback on answers, provides help and explanations, and records progress). I’m happy with how the first edition has been received, often with lavish praise.

I have made many improvements to this second edition. I have arranged the chapters in a more logical way; so they now go, roughly, from easier to harder material. I added new chapters on history of logic, deviant logic, and philosophy of logic; so the book is even broader in scope than before. I beefed up informal fallacies, added inference to the best explanation, and corrected some typos. I overhauled three difficult sections: on relational translations, belief-logic proofs, and completeness. I did much tweaking of explanations (for example, see the sections on the star test, Venn diagrams, and proofs). I tweaked some exercises. I added an appendix on suggested further readings. I added a real index (previously there was only an index of names); so now it's easier to research a topic. And I added a convenient list of rules to the inside covers." (pp. IX-X).


"This edition, like the preceding one, is an introduction to logic, requiring no prior knowledge of philosophy or mathematics. It does not aim at communicating or justifying results about logical systems but instead at imparting a skill—the ability to recognize and construct
correct deductions and refutations. Metamathematical results are sometimes mentioned, but only incidentally and as an aid to understanding.

The subjects treated are the same as in the first edition; they are the sentential calculus, the quantifier calculus, the identity calculus, the description calculus, some automatic proof procedures, and a detailed development of a familiar mathematical theory. The treatment of the latter two subjects remains unchanged, except for the placement of the chapter on automatic procedures. In the present edition, as in the earlier one, the four systems of logic are developed by the simple and intuitive techniques of natural deduction; but here the development is continuous and initially unsupplemented.

(...)

Symbolic rather than English arguments are the central subject matter of our text, as its title suggests. But here as in the earlier edition arguments of English play a motivating role. We say that an English argument is valid (in a particular branch of logic) if and only if it has (within that branch) a valid symbolization. In the earlier edition, in sections titled 'Paradoxical inferences', some intuitively invalid English arguments that appear to have valid symbolizations were considered. Then it was claimed that these English arguments cannot be symbolized and hence do not constitute fallacies, for their symbolizations are blocked by subtle restrictions imposed on the notion of a scheme of abbreviation. This attempt to preserve the adequacy of the characterization of validity of English arguments was a step beyond that taken by most, if not all, introductions to classical logic. And it was the point of departure for the profound investigations of the structure of ordinary language by our late colleague Professor Richard Montague (see Montague Formal philosophy: selected papers by Richard Montague, edited and with an introduction by R. H. Thomason, New Haven and London, 1974 and Barbara


"Many college and university courses aim at improving students’ reasoning. The recorded history of recommendations for achieving this goal stretches back to Aristotle. We venture adding to this history because for several years Jaakko Hintikka and various associates
have been developing a comprehensive theory for understanding the nature of reasoning that sheds new light on how students may be encouraged and enabled to achieve creatively disciplined reasoning skills. This theory, the interrogative approach to inquiry, makes it possible to integrate deductive logic and informal reasoning into a unified whole. Its core is what is known as the interrogative model of reasoning.

The interrogative model, which is used consistently throughout the book, offers a uniform framework for studying and teaching both formal logic and argumentation theory, including the analysis, evaluation, and construction of arguments in ordinary English. As in the old Socratic method, reasoning is cast in the form of a sequence of questions and answers, interspersed with logical (i.e., deductive) inferences.

The interrogative model distinguishes definitory rules, which are concerned with reasoning correctly, from strategic rules, which tell how to reason effectively. The former define what is admissible in reasoning, while the latter show students how to make creative use of what is allowed by the definitory rules. Strategic rules thus serve as signposts on the way to excellence in reasoning. By stressing strategic rules this text stays focused on the pursuit of excellence in reasoning.

In the interrogative model all inferences are required to be deductive. This eliminates the problem that an inference might introduce an element of uncertainty. Thus all inferences are strictly truth preserving. The effect is to locate problems with uncertainty in the process of discovering and gathering information rather than in the inference process. The interrogative model can then deploy many different insights to develop strategies for coping with uncertainty about the information available to the reasoner. The Instructor's Manual directs interested readers to a bibliography of the original research on the interrogative model." (from the Preface).
It seems to be a fairly widely held belief among contemporary teachers of logic that one must introduce logic via the propositional, and then predicate, calculus. In particular, one would not, even if he or she believed otherwise, properly or fairly serve novice students by offering them instead something like syllogistic logic. Nonetheless, we intend to do just that here: introduce the subject of formal logic by way of a system that is 'like syllogistic logic'. Our system, like old-fashioned, traditional syllogistic, is a term logic. Our version of logic ('term-functor logic', TFL) shares with Aristotle's syllogistic the insight that the logical forms of statements that are involved in inferences as premises or conclusions can be construed as the result of connecting pairs of terms by means of a logical copula (functor). This insight contrasts markedly with that which informs today's standard formal logic ('modern predicate logic', MPL). That version of logic is due to the work of the great nineteenth century innovator in logic, Gottlob Frege. (...) Today the hegemony of MPL is almost complete. Still, there is a price to be paid. MPL is indeed powerful, but it is not simple and the logical forms which it ascribes to statements are remote from their natural language forms. Traditional formal logic lacked the scope enjoyed by MPL by not being able to analyze a number of types of inference. Yet it did at least enjoy the double advantage of (i) being simple to learn and use and (ii) construing the logical forms of statements as close to their natural
language forms. Clearly a system of formal logic which has the power of MPL and the simplicity and naturalness of traditional logic would provide the best of both logical worlds.

Beginning in the late 1960s Fred Sommers set himself the task of developing a system of formal logic (viz., TFL) that was powerful natural and simple. The challenge faced by Sommers in accomplishing this was threefold. The first was to extend the power of term logic by incorporating into it the kinds of inferences beyond the powers of traditional logic. Those inferences were of three types: inferences involving statements with relational expressions, inferences involving statements with singular terms, and inferences involving unanalyzed statements. The second challenge was to offer a theory of logical form, or syntax, that was natural in the way that the syntax of MPL was not. The third challenge was to provide a symbolic algorithm (a system of symbols along with rules for manipulating them) much simpler than the one employed by MPL (viz., 'the first-order predicate calculus with identity'). During the past three decades Sommers has perfected just such a system of formal logic. TFL is at least as powerful as MPL, and it is far simpler and more natural." (from the Preface).

**PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC: INTRODUCTORY READINGS**


"My concern, in this book, is with the philosophy, rather than the history, of logic. But my strategy has been devised with an eye to the history of the interplay of formal and philosophical issues which I have just sketched. I begin with a consideration of some problems raised by the standard logical apparatus - the interpretation of sentence connectives, sentence letters, quantifiers, variables, individual constants, the concepts of validity, truth, logical truth; I turn, from chapter 9 onwards, to a consideration of the way some of these problems motivate formal innovations, 'extended' and 'deviant' logics, and to the ways in which these new formalisms lead, in turn, to a reevaluation of the philosophical issues; and I conclude, in the final chapter, with some questions - and rather fewer answers - about the metaphysical and epistemological status of logic, the relations between formal and natural languages, and the relevance of logic to reasoning."
And two recurring themes of the book also reflect this historical perspective. What seem to me to be the vital philosophical issues in logic are focussed by consideration (i) of the plurality of logical systems and (ii) of the ways in which formal calculi bear on the assessment of informal argument. More specifically, I shall be urging that, in view of the existence of alternative logics, prudence demands a reasonably radical stance on the question of the epistemological status of logic, and that the interpretation of formal results is a delicate task in which judicious attention to the purposes of formalisation is highly desirable.

I have tried to produce a book which will be useful as an introduction to the philosophical problems which logic raises, which will be intelligible to students with a grasp of elementary formal logic and some acquaintance with philosophical issues, but no previous knowledge of the philosophy of logic. But I haven't offered simple answers, or even simple questions; for the interesting issues in philosophy of logic are complex and difficult. I have tried instead to begin at the beginning, to explain technicalities, and to illustrate highly general problems with specific case studies. To this end I have supplied, for those new to the subject, a glossary of possibly unfamiliar terms used in the text, and some advice on finding one's way about the literature; while, for those anxious to go further, I have included a generous (but I hope not intimidating) bibliography." (from the Preface).


Contents: Preface V. 1. Philosophical logic, the philosophy of logic, philosophy and logic 1; 2. The proposition 12; 3. Necessity, analyticity, and the a priori 33; 4. Existence, presuppositions and descriptions 88; 5. Truth: the pragmatic, coherence and correspondence theories 122;

"The topics to be discussed are: the proposition, analyticity, necessity, existence, identity, truth, meaning and reference. These, at least, are the topics mentioned in chapter headings. In fact the list is more extensive, for in the course of these chapters there are also discussions of possible worlds, realisms of related sorts, anti-realism, and other questions. It is not possible to give an overview of philosophical logic without ranging widely in this way, but it will be clear that because each topic invites, and indeed commands, whole volumes to itself, the discussions I give do not pretend to be more than prefaces to the detailed treatments found in the original literature.

These topics are collected under the unifying label 'philosophical logic' for three principal reasons. It marks their interrelatedness, for a good understanding of any of them requires an understanding of the others. It marks their central importance in all serious philosophical discussion. And it reflects the influence of developments in logic since the late nineteenth century, which have afforded an access of power in dealing with many philosophical problems afresh, not only because we have become technically better equipped for the task, but also because developments in logical machinery have promoted and facilitated a certain methodological style which has proved extraordinarily fruitful in philosophy. That methodological style is analysis.

The invention of symbolic calculi would not have impelled philosophical developments by itself had it not been for the fact, quickly spotted by Frege and Russell, that they immediately prompt a range of philosophical questions, centrally among them questions about the nature of meaning and truth - which is in short to say,
language; and language vitally interests philosophers because it provides our route to a philosophical understanding of thought and the world. The greatest single impetus to current preoccupations with philosophical logic comes indeed from interest in language, to understand which we need progress in this area. (pp. 1-2).

  

  
  Contents: Acknowledgements VIII; List of logical symbols XII; Introduction 1;
  
  Part 1. Elementary structures 13
  
  
  Part 2. Truth and meaning 93
  
  5. Theories of truth 95; 6. Truth, meaning and realism 118;
  
  Part 3. Limits of extensionality 143
  
  
  Part 4. The domain of logic 217
  
  11. The province of logic 219; 12. Logical necessity 254; 13. Logic and rationality 291; Conclusion 321; Notes 324; Bibliography 356; Glossary-Index 371; Name Index 379. "This book is an introduction to the philosophy of logic. But 'philosophy of logic' is an umbrella term which covers a variety of different questions and styles of enquiry. I do not think that there is a single, well established, conception of the subject, and the one offered in this book
does not pretend to represent them all. Although I shall not attempt to give a precise definition, it will be useful to indicate where my own treatment and choice of topics differs from other approaches.

By 'logic' I shall mean, in the usual sense, the theory of inferences that are valid in virtue of their form. It is in general admitted that this definition applies only to deductive logic, and that the theory of inductive inferences does not belong to 'formal logic' in the ordinary sense. (...

Our present use of the term 'philosophical logic' is mostly post-Fregean and post-Russellian. Frege called 'logic' not only his own formal system, but also his reflections about the nature of his formalism and about meaning and truth in general. Although Frege himself does not use the term 'philosophical logic', it is clear that these reflections are close to our contemporary understanding of that term. His insistence on the fact that 'logic' in the wide sense is concerned with language in general and should be kept separate from both psychology and the theory of knowledge justifies Dummett's claim that Frege's inquiries belong also to the philosophy of language and that this discipline holds for him the position of a primary philosophy. Russell proposed explicitly the term philosophical logic for a general enquiry into the nature of 'logical forms'. By this he did not mean only a study of the structure of logical languages, but also of the logical structures of natural languages, which would have both epistemological and ontological consequences.'

Our present conceptions of philosophical logic bear strongly their Fregean and Russelian heritages. Philosophical logic is taken to be continuous with the philosophy of language, and to use logic as a tool for the analysis of thought. But there are two main versions of what philosophical logic is, which differ in the respective weight or authority that is granted to logical analysis. One of them assigns precise limits to this authority, and can be called informal philosophical logic, whereas the other
aims at contorting and extending this authority, and can be called *formal philosophical logic.*" (from the Introduction).


"Logic may be said to be the study of correct and incorrect reasoning. This includes the study of what makes arguments consistent or inconsistent, valid or invalid, sound or unsound (on these terms see 1.2.1). It has two branches, known as *formal* (or *symbolic*) logic and *philosophical* logic.

One of the branches of logic, *formal logic*, codifies arguments and supplies tests of consistency and validity, starting from axioms, that is, from definitions and rules for assessing the consistency and validity of arguments.' At the present time there are two main systems of formal logic, usually known as the *propositional calculus* and the *predicate calculus*. The propositional calculus concerns relations of what it terms 'propositions' to each other. The predicate calculus codifies inferences which may be drawn on account of certain features of the content of 'propositions'.

The other branch of logic, *philosophical logic*, which is my concern here, is very much more difficult to delimit and define. It can be said to study arguments, meaning, truth. Its subject matter is closely related to that of formal logic but its objects are different. Rather than setting out to codify valid arguments and to supply axioms and notations allowing the assessment of increasingly complex arguments, it examines the bricks and mortar
from which such systems are built. Although it aims, among other things, to illuminate or sometimes question the formalization of arguments into systems with axioms which have been effected, it is not restricted to a study of arguments which formal logic has codified." (pp. 1-2).


"Since there are already many elementary logic texts in existence, and since logic is taught today at many levels, we shall explain, first, the specific purposes to which we think this text is suited, and second, how this text differs from other similar texts.
In many philosophy departments today a distinction is drawn between the following topics in undergraduate logic teaching:
(a) general introduction,
(b) techniques of deductive logic,
(c) metalogic,
(d) philosophical uses of logic.
In addition there are texts and courses devoted to advanced work in mathematical logic for students wishing to specialize.
We conceive the present text to be usable in the teaching of (b)-(d), to students who either have had a general introduction to logic or who are allowed (and this is frequent enough) to begin symbolic logic without such an introduction. Topics that we would normally expect to have been covered on the introductory level include the nature of arguments and validity, the use/mention distinction, the nature of definition, and perhaps the use of Venn diagrams and truth-tables. A good example of a book designed especially for this general introductory level is Wesley Salmon’s *Logic* (Prentice-Hall, 1963). After the introductory level, the instructor generally has a choice (or the student is offered a choice) whether to emphasize the philosophical side or the mathematical
side of logic. Here our text is designed specifically for those whose interest is in philosophical aspects and uses of logic. With this aim in mind, we have introduced a number of innovations into the exposition, but at the same time have made sure that the standard body of elementary symbolic logic is covered. (...)

Our main innovations, however, are in the third part, which covers the logic of singular terms. Here we extend the language of classical logic by admitting singular terms, and extend our rules so as to license inferences involving such terms. The resulting extensions of classical logic are called free logic and free description theory. We take care to discuss explicitly the philosophical basis of such notions as possible worlds, domains of discourse, existence, reference and description, utilized in the first three parts, and to compare our approach with historical precedents. This is done, to some extent, as these notions are introduced, and also to some extent in Parts Four and Five.

Although there are today many good treatments of metalogic available, they are generally aimed at more advanced levels of instruction. We have aimed to make our presentation of metalogic more elementary than is usual. First of all, as soon as the student is able to use deductive techniques, he is also in a position to prove the admissibility of further deductive rules. By placing such admissibility proofs in Parts One and Two, a certain amount of proof theory is taught along with the deductive techniques. Part Four is devoted to semantics, that is, to a scrutiny of the adequacy of the logical system developed in the first three parts. Since the book is aimed specifically at the philosophy student, we treat only the finite cases; we believe that in this way the student will be able to master the main theoretical concepts and methods without the use of sophisticated mathematical techniques. It must be noted that here the previous
parallel development of the tableau rules greatly simplifies the presentation.
In Part Five, we discuss the philosophical basis of the logic of existence and description theory, with special reference to the question of extensionality. In addition, we discuss the philosophical uses of free logic in connection with set theory, intentional dosicourse, thought and perception, modal concepts, and the concept of truth. The term "philosophical logic" is used increasingly to designated a specific discipline (indeed, the newly created Journal of Philosophical Logic will be entirely devoted to it), and we hope that Part Five will provide a useful introduction to some of its main areas of research." (from the Preface IX-XI).


"This book is an introduction to the philosophy of logic. We often see an area of philosophy marked out as the philosophy of logic and language; and there are indeed close connections between logical themes and themes in the analysis of language. But they are also quite distinct. In the philosophy of language the focus is on meaning and reference, on what are known as the semantic connections between language and the world."
In contrast, the central topic of the philosophy of logic is inference, that is, logical consequence, or what follows correctly from what. What conclusions may legitimately be inferred from what sets of premisses? One answer to this question makes play with the notion of truth-preservation: valid arguments are those in which truth is preserved, where the truth of the premisses guarantees the truth of the conclusion. Since truth itself is arguably the third member of a closely knit trio comprising meaning, reference, and truth, the connection with philosophy of language is immediately secured. (...)

It is with these issues of truth and correct inference that we are to engage in this book; and central to that engagement, we will find, is paradox. Paradox is the philosophers' enchantment, their fetish. It fascinates them, as a light does a moth. But at the same time, it cannot be endured. Every force available must be brought to bear to remove it. The philosopher is the shaman, whose task is to save us and rid us of the evil demon. Paradox can arise in many places, but here we concentrate on two in particular, one set united by semantic issues, the other by a fuzziness inherent in certain concepts. In both cases the puzzle arises because natural, simple, and what seem clearly reasonable assumptions lead one very quickly to contradiction, confusion, and embarrassment. There is something awful and fascinating about their transparency, there is an enjoyment in surveying their variety, the rich diversity of examples.

But their real philosophical value lies in the purging of the unfounded and uncritical assumptions which led to them. They demand resolution, and in their resolution we learn more about the nature of truth, the nature of consequence, and the nature of reality, than any extended survey of basic principles can give. Only when those seemingly innocent principles meet the challenge of paradox and come under a gaze tutored by realization of
what will follow, do we really see the troubles that lie latent within them.
We start, therefore, at the heart of philosophy of logic, with the concept of truth, examining those basic principles which seem compelling in how language measures up to the world. But I eschew a simple catalogue of positions held by the great and the good. That could be very dull, and perhaps not really instructive either. Rather, I try to weave a narrative, to show how natural conceptions arise, how they may be articulated, and how they can come unstuck. I hope that the puzzles themselves will capture the readers' imaginations, and tempt them onwards to further, more detailed reading, as indicated in the summary to each chapter. The idea is to paint a continuous picture of a network of ideas treated in their own right and in their own intimate relationships, largely divorced from historical or technical detail." pp. 1-3 (from the Introduction).


"This book is an introduction to philosophical logic. It is primarily intended for people who have some acquaintance with deductive methods in elementary formal logic, but who have yet to study associated philosophical problems. However, I do not presuppose knowledge of deductive methods, so the book could be used as a way of embarking on philosophical logic from scratch.
Russell coined the phrase 'philosophical logic' to describe a programme in philosophy: that of tackling
philosophical problems by formalizing problematic sentences in what appeared to Russell to be the language of logic: the formal language of Principia Mathematica. My use of the term 'philosophical logic' is close to Russell's. Most of this book is devoted to discussions of problems of formalizing English in formal logical languages.

I take validity to be the central concept in logic. In the first chapter I raise the question of why logicians study this property in connection with artificial languages, which no one speaks, rather than in connection with some natural language like English. In chapters 2-5 I indicate some of the possibilities and problems for formalizing English in three artificial logical languages: that of propositional logic (chapter 2), of first order quantificational logic (chapter 4) and of modal logic (chapter 5). The final chapter takes up the purely philosophical discussion, and, using what has been learned on the way, addresses such questions as whether there was any point in those efforts at formalizing, what can be meant by the logical form of an English sentence, what is the domain of logic, and what is a logical constant.

In this approach, one inevitably encounters not only questions in the philosophy of logic, but also questions in the philosophy of language, as when one considers how best to formalize English sentences containing empty names, or definite descriptions, or adverbs, or verbs of propositional attitude.” (pp. 1-2).


"Post-Fregean mathematical logic began with a concern for foundational issues in mathematics. However, by the 1930s philosophers had not only contributed to the building and refinement of various formal systems, but they had also begun an exploitation of them for primarily philosophical ends. While many schools of philosophy today eschew any kind of technical, logical work, an ability to use (or at least a familiarity with) the tools provided by formal logic systems is still taken as essential by most of those who consider themselves analytic philosophers. Moreover, recent years have witnessed a growing interest in formal logic among philosophers who stand on friendly terms with computer theory, cognitive psychology, game theory, linguistics, economics, law, and so on. At the same time, techniques developed in formal logic continue to shed light on both traditional and contemporary issues in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and so forth.

In what follows, students who have already learned something of classical mathematical logic are introduced to some other ways of doing formal logic: classical logic rests on the concepts of truth and falsity, whereas constructivists logic accounts for inference in terms of defense and refutation; classical logic usually makes use of a semantic theory based on models, whereas the alternative introduced here is based on the idea of truth sets; classical logic tends to interpret quantification objectually, whereas this alternative allows for a substitutional interpretation of quantifiers. As well, a radically different approach, fundamentally different from any version of mathematical logic, is also introduced. It is one that harkens back to the earliest stages in the history of formal logic but is equipped with the resources demanded of any formal logic today." (pp. 1-2).
ADVANCED READINGS


Contents: Foreword 13; Chapter I. Philosophy of language and elements of semiotics 15; Chapter II. Elements of metalogic 31; Chapter III. From formal logic to symbolic logic 51; Chapter IV. Sentence logic or the logic of sentences. Truth tables 75; Chapter V. Symbolic languages 103; Chapter VI. Well-formed and badly formed formulae evaluation 121; Chapter VII. Tautologies, schemes and rules of inference 139; Chapter VIII. Polyadic connectives 165; Bibliography 191-204.

"In our day there are excellent introductions and first-class manuals, compendia and treatises on mathematical logic, or symbolic logic, or logistic, as it should be called with greater precision."
The present work differs from more widely diffused and better-known ones because of the generous space devoted to the philosophical problems of language. Without an adequate understanding of these problems, there is a risk of losing sight of the value - and at the same time of the utility - of a technique which, far from being an end in itself, has proved to be an irreplaceable instrument for approaching the most difficult philosophical questions. Anyone who follows any review of analytical philosophy or indeed of philosophical logic, will be well aware of this. For an initial orientation in the use of logistical proceedings in extra-mathematical contexts, the reader should refer to the excellent volumes: *Logico-philosophical Studies* edited by Albert Menne - Reidel, Dordrecht 1962 - and *Intentionality, Mind and Language* edited by Ausonio Marras - University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, London 1972 - where it is possible to see, de facto, how the Platonists, empiricists, conventionalists, nominalists, phenomenists, phenomenologists and neo-Scholastics all meet around the same problems and use the same rigorous instruments.

A second point in which the present work differs from others is that it introduces the reader not only to standard symbology and those of the *Principia Mathematica* and of Hilbert, but also to the symbology of Jan Lukasiewicz, thus putting the student in a position to tackle the reading of basic texts such as those of Prior, or the Polish logicians on dialectics - texts which are absolutely unintelligible to those who have not mastered symbolic language, at first sight so strange and far removed, in terms of grammatical rules, from natural languages.

A third and final point in which the present work differs from others is in its rich documentation of logical sources, both ancient and mediaeval. Problems which seem to have been conceived in the 1970s to 1990s are found to have existed already in the time of the ancients,
or the men of mediaeval times. The constant reference to the past not only constitutes an indirect contribution to the history of logic, and hence to the history of philosophy and culture in general, of which logic is an essential part, but it also allows us to understand humanity better today. From the comparison between the men of yesterday and those of today, we can better understand the men of all times, provided that the problems are not flattened out and points of view are not superimposed or perspectives confused."(from the Foreword).


**DICTIONARIES OF LOGIC**


"This volume sets out to provide a reference for students starting out in philosophy, as well as those in other disciplines - such as computing, mathematics, psychology and law - in which logic features prominently. Logic can be thought of in a variety of ways. It is sometimes viewed as the study of consistency, concerned
with asking when statements are consistent and when they are inconsistent. But logic is more often conceived of as the study of consequence - what follows from what. Thus deductive logic studies valid consequence (situations in which the truth of the premisses of an argument forces the truth of its conclusion) while inductive logic studies plausible or probable consequence (situations in which the premisses render the conclusion more probable or sufficiently probable). Important goals of logic include characterizing interesting consequence relationships (e.g., deductive consequence, inductive consequence) and providing practical methods for answering questions about these consequence relationships (e.g., truth tables, semantic trees and proof are three ways of determining whether a conclusion follows from given premisses in deductive logic).

Logic is sometimes held to be the theory of reasoning. While it certainly leaches us a lot about how we can and ought to reason, logics are occasionally applied to tasks that do not obviously concern reasoning, such as to the modelling of hardware in computer science, and so some philosophers view logic and reasoning as somewhat different. Logic is often also distinguished from decision-making: logic is thought to be about theoretical relationships between statements while decision-making is apparently guided by pragmatic considerations such as the utilities or values attached to actions. On the other hand, logics (in particular inductive logics) are sometimes justified by appealing to pragmatic goals such as the goal of minimizing loss and it is clear that the relationship between logic and decision-making is rather subtle.

There is no need to decide these subtle questions in order to study and enjoy logic -- at the very least, logic studies consequence and this is enough to make logic crucial to philosophy and to other disciplines concerned with cogent argument. But bewildering terminology can delay the study and enjoyment of logic; it is hoped that this volume will help the reader to understand some of the
key jargon. The volume is organized in three parts: Key Terms, Key Thinkers and Key Texts (divided into Textbooks and Classics). Entries are arranged alphabetically in each part and a list of symbols used in the book is in the front of the volume. The volume is a collaborative effort, with entries provided by a multitude of authors. Each entry is initialled and the authors are listed in the front of the volume." (pp. 1-2).


**COLLECTION OF ESSAYS**


Wittgenstein, in the *Tractatus* [5.49], seems to suggest that the whole of formal logic—or at least the calculus of truth-functions and the predicate-calculus—is really implicit in the single idea of a proposition in general, that it could in principle be excogitated by pure reflection on this idea alone.' Wittgenstein's suggestion does not itself belong to formal logic. It belongs to philosophical logic. For it is, or may be, the beginning of an answer to some typical questions asked in philosophical logic: viz., What is really distinctive of the forms and constants of logic? or, What general elucidatory account can be given of the notion of a logical particle?

Each of the notions so far introduced forms the topic of a similar question asked in philosophical logic. What, exactly, is *a proposition*? What is meant by saying that a proposition is *true*? What, in general, is the nature of that relation which holds between propositions when one follows from, or is deducible from, another? The attempt to find satisfying answers to these questions forces the philosopher to ask many others, about the nature and functioning of language and of linguistic expressions of many types. For propositions cannot be a subject of study unless they are expressed; and formal logic would have none but a purely mathematical interest unless it were related to actual discourse. So many questions concerning modes of actual discourse, the theory of meaning, the nature and conditions of linguistic communication, come within the scope of the
philosophical logician's inquiries." (from the Introduction).


  Historical, Philosophical, and Mathematical Aspects of Modern Logic and its Applications.


"What is philosophical logic? Philosophical logic is philosophy that is logic, and logic that is philosophy. It is where philosophy and logic come together and become one. Philosophical logic is not a special kind of logic, some species distinct from mathematical logic, symbolic logic, formal logic, informal logic, modern logic, ancient logic, or logic with any other familiar modifier. There is only logic. Logic is the theory of consequence relations, of valid inferences. As such, it can be investigated and presented in many ways, although the mathematical methods of modern formal or symbolic logic have proved extraordinarily fruitful.

Within logic so construed, there are still, of course, many different sorts - as witnessed by the variety of chapters of this volume. Philosophical logic comprises the sorts of logic that hold greatest interest for philosophers. Philosophical logic develops formal systems and structures to be applied to the analysis of concepts and arguments that are central to philosophical inquiry. So, for example, such traditional philosophical concepts as necessity, knowledge, obligation, time and existence, not to mention reasoning itself, are usefully investigated through modal logic, epistemic logic, deontic logic, temporal logic, free logic, probability logic,
nonmonotonic logic, etc. Similarly, logical investigation has contributed immeasurably to our understanding of the structure of language, including the languages of our normal use as well as the formal languages of logic itself, and this resounds throughout philosophy. By the same token, many of the developments within philosophical logic have been motivated by broad philosophical concerns. Intuitionistic logic reflects a particular perspective on the nature of judgment and truth. Many-valued logic grew out of Lukasiewicz’s effort to construct a logic that could avoid the conclusions of fatalism or determinism. Other developments within philosophical logic were driven by philosophical concern regarding logic itself. Relevant logic sprang from a critique of the classical consequence relation; so did free logic.” (from the Introduction).


Preface; Acknowledgments; List of Contributors; Introduction: Logic, philosophy, and philosophical logic: Dale Jacquette

Part I: Historical development of logic.
1. Ancient Greek philosophical logic: Robin Smith; 2. History of logic: medieval: B.G. Sundholm and E.P. Bos; 3. The rise of modern logic: Rolf George and James Van Evra;

Part II: Symbolic logic and ordinary language

Part III: Philosophical dimensions of logical paradoxes

Part IV: Truth and definite description in semantic analysis:
Part V: Concepts of logical consequence
Part VI Logic, existence, and ontology
17. Quantifiers, being and canonical notation: Paul Gochet; 18. From logic to ontology: some problems of predication, negation and possibility: Herbert Hochberg; 19. Putting language first: the "liberation" of logic from ontology: Ermanno Bencivenga; 
Part VII: Metatheory and the scope and limits of logic
Part VIII: Logical foundations of set theory and mathematics
Part IX: Modal logics and semantics
Part X: Intuitionistic, free, and many-valued logics
32. Intuitionism: Dirk van Dalen and Mark van Atten; 33. Many-valued, free, and intuitionistic logics: Richard


Part III. Quantifiers and quantificational theory
Introduction to Part III: 143
Part IV: Validity, inference, and entailment
Introduction to Part IV: 201
Part V: Modality, Intensionality, and propositional attitude
Introduction to Part V: 271
Index 362.
"The essays in this anthology include some of the most important recent scholarship in philosophy of logic. I have deliberately avoided republishing papers that are readily available in other anthologies, or that are more
closely related to philosophy of language or philosophy of mathematics, regardless of their influence in contemporary work in logic. My intention has been to make this volume a more unique distinctive resource that will complement rather than duplicate other selections of readings currently available. Although some of the papers are more technical than others, all are intended for and can be read with good understanding by beginning students in philosophy who have completed a first course in symbolic logic.

My choice of papers has been guided by a sense of major issues in philosophy of logic that have shaped recent discussion and contributed to ongoing research programs in theoretical and applied philosophical logic. To this end, I have organized the papers thematically rather than chronologically, to give the best overview of philosophical issues connected with logical analysis and the development of formal systems of symbolic logic. The papers range from general topics in classical logic to specialized investigations of the concept of meaning and truth, the interpretation of quantifiers in predicate logic, the theory of valid inference and logical entailment, and problems of alethic modality, intensionality, and propositional attitude. These are undoubtedly among the central problems of philosophical logic reflecting some of the most intriguing new directions in the field, but they by no means exhaust the possibilities."

(from the Preface).


**NATURAL LANGUAGE AND LOGIC**


• McCawley, Jamed D. 1981. *Everything That Linguists Have Always Wanted to Know About Logic*  
  *but Were Ashamed to Ask*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.


**PHILOSOPHY OF MODALITIES**


**NON CLASSICAL LOGICS**

“Around the turn of the twentieth century, a major revolution occurred in logic. Mathematical techniques of a quite novel kind were applied to the subject, and a new theory of what is logically correct was developed by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and others. This theory has now come to be called ‘classical logic’. (…) Despite this, many of the most interesting developments in logic in the last forty years, especially in philosophy, have occurred in quite different areas: intuitionism, conditional logics, relevant logics, paraconsistent logics, free logics, quantum logics, fuzzy logics, and so on. These are all logics which are intended either to supplement classical logic, or else to replace it where it goes wrong. The logics are now usually grouped under the title ‘non-classical logics’; and this book is an introduction to them. The subject of non-classical logic is now far too big to permit the writing of a comprehensive textbook, so I have had to place some restrictions on what is covered. For a start, the book is restricted to propositional logic. This is not because there are no non-classical logics that are essentially first-order (there are: free logic), but because the major interest in non-classical logics is usually at the propositional level. (Often, the quantifier extensions of these logics are relatively straightforward.) Within propositional logics, I have also restricted the logics considered here to ones which are relevant to the debate about conditionals (‘if … then …’ sentences). Again, this is not because this exhausts non-classical propositional logics (there is quantum logic, for example), but because
taking the topic of conditionals as a *leitmotiv* gives the material a coherence that it might otherwise lack. And, of course, conditionals are about as central to logic as one can get.

The major semantical technique in non-classical logics is possible-world semantics. Most non-classical logics have such semantics. This is therefore the major semantical technique that I use in the book. In many ways, the book could be thought of as a set of variations on the theme of possible-world semantics. It should be mentioned that many of the systems discussed in the book have semantics other than possible-world semantics - notably, algebraic semantics of some form or other. Those, however, are an appropriate topic for a different book."

(from the Preface to the First Edition, XVII-XVIII)

"The first edition of Introduction to *Non-Classical Logic* deals with just propositional logics. In 2004, Cambridge University Press and I decided to produce a second volume dealing with quantification and identity in non-classical logics. Late in the piece, it was decided to put the old and the new volumes together, and simply bring out one omnibus volume. The practical decision caused a theoretical problem. Was it the same book as the old *Introduction* or a different one? The answer -- as befits a book on non-classical logic -- was, of course, both. So the name of the book had to be the same and different. We decided to achieve this seeming impossibility by adding an appropriate sub-title to the book, 'From If to Is'. Though there are many propositional operators and connectives, the conditional, 'if', is perhaps the most vexed. It is, at any rate, the focus around which the old *Introduction* moves. Whether or not 'if' is univocal is a contentious matter; but 'is' is certainly said in many ways. There is the 'is' of predication (Ponting is Australian'), the 'is' of existence ('There is a spider in the bathtub', 'Socrates no longer is'), and the 'is' of identity ('2 plus 2 is 4'). All of these are in play in first-order logic; they provide the
focus around which the new part of the book moves."


GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES OF PHILOSOPHY

  Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Introduction IX-XIII; I. Bibliographies of individual philosophers 1; II. Subject bibliographies 179; Index 313-332.
  "The present work attempts to list philosophical bibliographies published in all countries since about 1450, when printing was invented, through the year 1974. Non-specialists and undergraduates will find references to the standard bibliographical aids appropriate to their interests and courses. Advanced scholars are directed to the more specialized and abstruse bibliographies. My aim has been to include only bibliographies that have been published separately or appeared as contributions to journals, though I have included a few significant bibliographies which were published as appendixes to monographs or as parts of larger bibliographies. This restriction was necessary in order to make the task of compiling the bibliography manageable. Bibliographies are always incomplete, and all subject bibliographies are
slightly out of date from the time of publication. The present volume is no exception. Like Mozart's Don Giovanni, I have tried to make my collection as extensive as possible, knowing all the while that true completeness is a daydream. Moreover, when I began my work, I had intended to describe each work cited. As the number of entries grew, it became clear, given my present circumstances, that the annotation of each item would be impossible. I therefore elected to write as many annotations as I could for the present edition and complete them in a subsequent larger work. The bibliographies in this volume are divided into two alphabetically arranged lists, numbered consecutively. The first list (1-1395) contains bibliographies on the works of, and literature about, individual philosophers. The second list (1396-2353) contains bibliographies on philosophical topics. Bibliographies that cover more than one topic are cross-indexed; thus a bibliography on the doctrine of Platonic ideas appears under the subject heading "Ideas (Platonic)," but is also referred to by number in the entries under the author heading 'Plato.' Bibliographies of works on or within a school of philosophy bearing the name of an individual (for example, "Cartesianism," "Cartesians," "Marxism," "Marxism-Leninism") are listed among the bibliographies on that individual (for example, under "Descartes, René," or "Marx, Karl").

(...) The definition of "philosophy" is complicated by the fact that much of what used to count as philosophy no longer does. The Bibliotheca Philosophica by Paulus Bolduanus in 1616 and the work of the same name by Burkhard GoIthelf Struve in 1804 contain much that we would not call philosophy today. Some of what Europeans in the last hundred years have called philosophy, Americans now term psychology or sociology or educational theory. Some of what has passed
for philosophy in Britain and America in the last fifty years would not be recognized as such in other countries. The implication is that one must define "philosophy" broadly. The meanings of words change not only from time to time but also from place to place. Words are in some respects like natural species, neither being static. In some organisms that reproduce asexually (some bacteria, for example), the differentiation of one species from another is somewhat subjective. Similar problems arise in differentiating the more complex forms of life that reproduce sexually. The ability to cross usually is taken as the identity mark of species, yet there exist "distinct species" of plants and animals that cannot cross with one another, but can both cross with a third "species." Problems concerning the delimitation or specification of concepts are analogous.

My criteria for the philosophical, therefore, have been rather broad. If a bibliography covers a thinker or a topic that might be considered in a philosophy course or in a work on the history of philosophy, or if the bibliography has been published in a journal that appears in any of the lists of philosophical journals, then I have tended to include it. Nevertheless, I have eliminated some bibliographies that seemed to me to be purely in the field of religion, which comprises its own distinct area of scholarship. I have not restricted myself solely to Western philosophy. If Western thinkers preponderate here, it is because the materials available to me dealt almost exclusively with Western works and because non-Western patterns of scholarship have not produced much in the way of bibliographies. If there is a disproportionately large number of bibliographies on semi-philosophical figures and problems, this is a reflection of the work previously done by compilers of bibliographies: the large number of people interested in belles-lettres, for example, insures that the number of Voltaire bibliographies will be large; the zeal that so often accompanies faith in an idea (Christianity, Marxism,
occultism) guarantees that the number of bibliographies of works related to these faiths will be large.

Four centuries ago Montaigne, lamenting an affliction endemic to scholarship, wrote: "There is more ado to interpret interpretations than to interpret the things, and more books upon books than upon all other subjects; we do nothing but comment upon one another."8 Nevertheless, I offer the reader not only another book about books, but in effect, a book about books about books. My purpose, of course, is to make the vast literature of philosophy more open to philosophers and students of philosophy, many of whom probably would write better in the end if they would read a little more and write a little less." (from the Introduction).


Bibliographies; Chapter 4: General Indexes, Abstract and Review Sources, and Serial Bibliographies; Chapter 5: National and Regional Bibliographies and Indexes; Chapter 6: General Internet Resources and Gateways; Chapter 7: General Encyclopedias, Dictionaries and Handbooks; Part II. History of Philosophy. Chapter 8: Comprehensive History Sources; Chapter 9: Non-Western Philosophy; Chapter 10: Western Philosophy: General, National, and Regional; Chapter 11: Western Philosophy: Ancient; Chapter 12: Western Philosophy: Medieval and Renaissance; Chapter 13: Western Philosophy: Modern through Nineteenth Century; Chapter 14: Western Philosophy: Twentieth and Twenty-first Century; Part III. Branches of Philosophy. Chapter 15: Aesthetics, Philosophy of Art, and Art Criticism; Chapter 16: Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Mind; Chapter 17: Ethics; Chapter 18: Logic and the Philosophies of Mathematics, Science, and Social Sciences; Chapter 19: Philosophy of Education; Chapter 20: Philosophy of religion; Chapter 21: Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy; Chapter 22: Other Branches and Special Topics; Part IV. Miscellanea. Chapter 23: Sundry Currents, Schools, and Movements; Chapter 24: Directories and Miscellaneous Reference Sources; Appendix 1: Core Academic Titles; Appendix 2: Titles especially Suited for Public and School Libraries; Author Index; Title Index; Subject Index.

"This guide to reference sources in philosophy has been compiled and written with a diversity of users in mind. It is intended for professional philosophers and teachers of philosophy; for students of philosophy at both undergraduate and graduate levels; for librarians, as an aid in reference service and collection development; and, to a lesser extent, for the general reader or inquirer who may come to philosophy with little of no background. Not everyone, needless to say, will be equally well served by every part of this guide, and that is undoubtedly true also of the work as a whole. Nonetheless, I have tried to keep
all of these potential audiences in mind throughout, and have tried in particular to gear the level of information provided in the annotations to the audience(s) most likely to take an interest in them and to use and benefit from the work in question. That same principle applies to the introduction (ch. 1), which is addressed primarily to those without a close acquaintance with the field of philosophy, though readers who are not in that position may find parts of it helpful as well.

The present guide succeeds two previous editions of *Philosophy: A Guide to the Reference Literature*, also published by Libraries Unlimited (1st ed., 1986, 2nd ed., 1997). The most radical departure from its predecessors is represented by its organization. It employs what is predominantly a subject arrangement classifying sources first of all in relation to the various divisions of philosophy and its history, in contrast to the primary arrangement by types of reference sources (bibliographies, indexes, dictionaries and encyclopedias, etc.) employed previously." (from the *Preface*).


From the English Preface: "In the course of their studies, most students of philosophy at university or even in secondary education will sooner or later be called upon to produce a piece of original work. Whether this be an M.A. thesis, a doctoral dissertation, or simply a paper to be presented in some course, seminar or exam, such work always requires active research. However, faced with this requirement, many find themselves completely disheartened by the scope and complexity of the task. There are as well many young teachers of philosophy who experience serious difficulties in compiling the material necessary to prepare their lectures, which are meant to introduce to the discipline which they themselves are teaching. It is precisely to these two categories of "apprentice philosophers" that the present work is addressed: not, of course, in order to teach them the art
of composition or pedagogics (in these two fields, innumerable and excellent manuals already exist), but rather to furnish them with a choice of bibliographical references which should prove useful in carrying out philosophical research or in preparing a course in philosophy. With this end in mind, the present short work does not whatsoever pretend to be exhaustive. On the contrary: instead of overwhelming the reader with a mass of information that might easily have discouraged him (or her), I have simply had the intention to provide an accessible guide, which points out the most important and most interesting tools for research or for the preparation of a course. There are a number of previous publications some aspects of which have served as a model for my own project; above all, I must mention the book by L. De Raeymaeker, *Introduction à la philosophie*, 6th ed., Louvain, Publications universitaires, 1967, especially pages 231 to 304 ("Renseignements bibliographiques"); but also R. T. De George, *A Guide to Philosophical Bibliography and Research*, New York, Meredith, 1971; and H. J. Koren, *Research in Philosophy. A Bibliographical Introduction to Philosophy and a few Suggestions for Dissertations*, Pittsburgh (Pa.), Duquesne University Press, 1966; and finally, the unpublished lecture notes of the late Canon C. Wenin, who used to teach the "Introduction to philosophy" course at the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie at Louvain-la-Neuve. For the updating of bibliographical data, I have extensively drawn on the appendix to vol. I (L'univers philosophique) of the *Encyclopédie philosophique universelle*, edited under the direction of A. Jacob, Paris, P.U.F., 1989 (pp. 1741-1908).


"The First Edition of the Encyclopedia of Philosophy included bibliographical essays dealing with philosophy dictionaries and encyclopedias, philosophy journals, and
philosophy bibliographies. To preserve and enhance these essays, they have been reproduced in this Second Edition along with detailed updates. The updates to the bibliographies cover material published between 1965 and mid-2005. All of the references appear in OCLC's WorldCat bibliographic database and are thus available either in mid- to large-size academic libraries, or through interlibrary loan. While the bibliographies are extensive, they are not exhaustive. This is especially true in the case of the journal bibliography, where less readily available non-English-language journals have been excluded, as have journals published for short periods of time. Accessibility was deemed to be more important than exhaustive coverage. The subject coverage includes both general philosophical works and works from the major sub-domains of philosophy. The bibliographic lists show that philosophy is a vital, worldwide discipline. A perusal of the journal bibliography will show that new journals are appearing every year, and the dictionary and encyclopedia bibliography identifies publications in fifty different languages. The constant stream of new journals and the accumulation of philosophical resources in so many languages are indicators of a truly vibrant discipline."


- *The Philosopher's Index. An International Index to Philosophical Periodicals.* 1940.
"The Philosopher’s Index is the world's most current and comprehensive bibliography of scholarly research in philosophy, serving the philosophical community worldwide. Today, The Index contains more than 450,000 records drawn from over 680 journals, originating from more than 50 countries. The literature coverage dates back to 1940 and includes print and electronic journals, books, anthologies, contributions to anthologies, and book reviews. Covering scholarly
research in all major areas of philosophy, The Index features informative, author-written abstracts. The extensive indexing, which includes proper names along with subject terms, enhances the search capability. The Philosopher's Index is owned and published by the Philosopher's Information Center."

  
  "The present publication is not only international in scope but also polylingual, providing abstracts in the language of origin for books in English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish, and in either English or French for books in other languages. In a typical year, well over a thousand books are covered in the Bibliographie. The signed abstracts are intended to be factual and not critical. They vary in length from a few to sometimes more than 30 lines. Entries and abstracts are contributed via "centers of philosophical bibliography" in over 50 countries represented in the Institut International de Philosophie, the Paris-based organization responsible for the Bibliographie and one of several international bodies (UNESCO is another) associated with its publication. The Bibliographie employs a systematic arrangement with 10 broad and rather standard divisions (philosophy in general; logic and philosophy of science; ethics and values; etc.). Indexes are not provided in each quarterly issue -- only cumulated annual indexes in the final issue of each volume. One index formerly combined authors, titles, and title catchwords, but has been reduced since volume 34 (1987) to just an author index, except for anonymous works or others listed by title only. A second, labeled "Index of Names," combines publishers, translators, authors of prefaces, and individuals mentioned in titles or in abstracts. Volume 41 (1994) brought the addition of a subject index, divided into three distinct parts: (1) periods; (2) doctrines, disciplines, and trends of thought; and (3) concepts and categories.

  From the Introduction: "The aim of the bibliography is to list philosophical literature as such; the adjective is understood rather strictly, with the result that scientific disciplines which are related to philosophy, and even the auxiliary sciences of philosophy, are not treated of in their own right; the increasing volume of this literature, plus the availability of specialized bibliographical guides to it, preclude the possibility of incorporating it into the bibliography. Only publications relating to the methods or the philosophy of the sciences, together with publications of a general nature relative to the objects treated of by these disciplines, are referred to. This rule applies particularly to the following disciplines: symbolic logic, linguistics, psychology, aesthetics and theology. In principle, the bibliography is confined to philosophical literature published in the following languages: Dutch, English, French, German, Italian, Latin, Portuguese, Spanish and Catalan. The published works in other languages are only indicated in the cases where they are accompanied by a summary in one of the languages mentioned above."

  A bilingual (French and English) work that lists philosophical periodicals by country and indexes them by subject, by publishing bodies, and by titles.
  "One of the main tasks of the Service for the Exchange of Scientific Information of the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme is to describe for researchers the most useful tools of documentation in their different fields."
It is obvious that amongst these tools scientific periodicals occupy an important place. Articles, more often than books, keep up to date with research trends and provide information on the current scientific scene. Although the periodicals containing these articles are a relatively adaptable and rapid means of providing information, they are often difficult to trace. This is mostly due to their vast and ever-increasing number; also to a confusing duplication of titles, uncertainties about which periodicals are connected to which others, irregular intervals of publication, sudden disappearances and reappearances of titles -- in short, to the particularly unstable existence of these periodicals.  
In 1964, in order to introduce a little clarity into this apparent disorder, and thus facilitate specialised research, the Service for the Exchange of Scientific Information drew up for the International Committee for Social Sciences Documentation the third edition of the World List of Social Science Periodicals, published by UNESCO in 1966. The present list provides an inventory of the principal periodicals in the field of philosophy and though complete in itself, is a continuation of the first list. Soon lists of periodicals in other subjects will appear: psychology, linguistics, African studies.  
The SELECTION of periodicals has been made according to the criteria already established for social science journals. Only periodicals of a scientific character have been listed, i.e. those publishing original studies and articles by university or other specialists. This implies, a priori, the exclusion of all publications whose contents consist of translations, reprints or unsigned articles, and of doctrinal or propagandist periodicals designed to publicise or disseminate an ideology - of whatever kind - rather than to advance knowledge.  
In the specialised branches of the subject it is difficult to know where to draw the line, as the distinction between philosophy in the strict sense of the word, and the history of ideas or some ideological si and is not always clear. On
the whole we have attempted to distinguish between periodicals devoted to philosophical research and those whose principal purpose is to propagate a specific ideology. We have, however, taken it into account that in some countries this latter category also prints pure philosophical studies, and in these cases the titles have been included in the list." (from the Preface).


"This is an international listing of some 5,000 journals, both extant and defunct, in the field of philosophy broadly defined (broadly enough to include borderline journals in religion, psychology, general humanistic studies, etc.). Data provided typically include country and dates of publication, first and (if applicable) last issue numbers, sponsoring organization(s), and previous and subsequent titles. A special section, labeled *Kettenregister* ("chain index"), diagrams complex series of title changes, splits, mergers, and so forth. There is also a classified subject index and a country index." (from H. E. Bynagle - *A Guide to the Reference Literature*, p. 28).


"Traditionally, philosophy comprises five general fields of study: logic, aesthetics, ethics, politics, and metaphysics. In all five fields is represented the continuum from historical to modern contemporary evolutions in philosophical criticism. This book surveys mainly the twentieth-century evolutions of philosophy in an analytic review of English-language serials published all over the world. (...) The bibliography of 335 entries that follows includes newsletters, bulletins, and serials. Three basic criteria determined their selection. First, did the serial have a regular frequency of publication? Irregularity of
distribution poses a problem because readers want a continuous flow of information. Second, did the serial contain articles, summaries, reviews, or some section in the English-language? Publications in Poland, France, Italy, and Israel, for instance, may circulate to English-speaking subscribers without ever or only rarely printing English articles or translations. But these were excluded from the survey. Finally, did the serial serve as a critical forum for discussion within the five traditional field of philosophy? Ideally, the content of journals determines the appropriate field. But in practice even the most specialized journal in, say, aesthetics, may accept articles outside of the field proper, thereby creating an overlap. One alternative to reduce overlap was to expand beyond the five sub-fields to the following list: aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, morality, philosophy of religion, metaphysics (cosmology), philosophy of anthropology, philosophy of education, philosophy of history, philosophy of politics (law), philosophy of social sciences, semantics (language), logic, and general issues. Further divisions of philosophy covered in the journals may be found through the Subject Index." (from the Preface).

  "The purpose of this Bibliography and its annotations can be stated in a very few but powerful words: To make some contribution to the development of WORLD COMMUNITY by facilitating the study of, or at least introduction to, the major philosophers in World History (or global or globalizing history, if one prefers that new terminology); and to so arrange them in historical order that this Bibliography will make possible in American Philosophy Departments the teaching of the Global History of Philosophy instead of, or in addition to, the present courses in the History of (only) Western Philosophy."
Heretofore most of the Materials covered in this survey have been dealt with primarily by those working in the field of "Comparative" Philosophy, or in the "Asia Studies" field, or the "East-West" nexus. This has been necessary for a preparation for what is yet to be realized, but it is not sufficient. It is hoped that the historical approach to the field will vindicate itself from the Materials here presented. 

(...) 
As to mechanics of the apparatus, the following remarks are in order: Cross-references have been kept to a basic minimum, although some will be found, where that has been considered necessary. Needless to say, very few books indeed fit into one single category or even, for that matter, into any single system of classification. In an historical survey in particular, the 'lines' between Intellectual or Cultural History and the (global) History of Philosophy very often become blurred or -- to use another metaphor - sometimes the 'lines' even get crossed and even tangled up, so that one very often gets the wrong number, no matter how many times he dials! Oversights and underestimations, of course, are almost unavoidable in constituting what is virtually a New Field. Estimations of importance are necessary in order to give coherency, even though of course, others of many camps, and often for diametrically opposed reasons, will disagree. It seems that among philosophers even more than in matters political, you can please some of the people some of the time ... but to please all of the people all the time - not even God seems able to do that! The single starred (•) entries are those considered as most essential for the continuation of the basic themes or else those which commend themselves for some particular reason or other usually mentioned in the Annotation. Those double starred (**) are the "sine qua non" books, or books otherwise recommended for special attention. In a few cases, publishers or dates are not listed. In almost
all of these, it is because references thus far available have been incomplete, or because of private printings or customs differing from modern western custom in matters of publication." (pp. XI and XV).


  "In something of a tour de force, Risse has compiled a comprehensive short-title bibliography that attempts to include all independently published works of Western philosophy from the invention of printing, ca. 1455, up to 1800, in (he carefully qualifies) all Western languages accessible to him. This includes not only works of philosophers who lived and wrote within the specified timeframe, but also editions of philosophers from the ancient, medieval, and early Renaissance periods. They amount to an estimated 76,400 titles. These are divided over eight volumes of varying length, defined by a combination of subject-field and genre categories (…) Parts 1-7 are uniformly arranged chronologically by year of publication, within each year alphabetically by author. Each part includes an author index, index of titles of anonymous works, index of authors who are the subjects of others' commentaries, and a topical index. Part 8, which lists printed academic theses in volumes 1-2, is arranged alphabetically by author of the original thesis (*disputatio*), regardless of publication year. Under each thesis entry it lists, where applicable, published responses to it by other writers. The latter are also indexed in volume 3 of Part 8 with references back to the relevant entries in volumes 1 and 2. The ninth volume, titled *Syllabus auctorum*, contains a complete author index, with birth and death dates, places of birth and activity, and profession (as available); a concordance of Latin and vernacular place names; and a short list of abbreviations of monastic orders.

  For nearly every entry in this bibliography Risse provides, besides the customary bibliographic data, one or more
location codes for holding libraries where exemplars are available. These included numerical codes for major German research libraries, alphabetical codes for some 350 additional libraries in Europe and America. As Risse notes, many of the works listed are rare, and some were found only in "smaller" libraries (preface). Those he has personally inspected are marked by an asterisk."


"CONTENT"

The first part of this bibliography is a catalogue of philosophical writings from colonial Latin America which, on the basis of the secondary literature, are presumed to be extant. It is followed by a short appendix listing some colonial authors whose philosophical works are lost, but which perhaps still exist. The second part of the bibliography contains the secondary literature: studies on the philosophy of colonial Latin America as well as subsequently published texts and translations of the works of the colonial authors. It also contains non-philosophical works to which reference is made in the first section. A brief digest of the content of each philosophical work follows the entry.

"SCOPE"

The colonial material belongs to two philosophical currents which are discernible in the period: "pure" scholasticism, an extension of the Iberian scholastic renaissance of the 16th century and lasting well into the 19th century, and "modern" scholasticism, which was influenced by the newer ideas from Europe and usually attempted to reconcile them to the traditional philosophy. This modern scholasticism, already present in the 17th century, becomes a strong force in the second half of the 18th century. Both the "pure" and the
"modern" scholasticism tend to be supplemented after 1810 by non-scholastic philosophies. Hence works written after this date have generally not been registered in this bibliography, except for a few important works continuing the modern scholastic tendency. Most of the primary documents are the traditional philosophy (and theology) *cursus* (classroom treatises on logic, physics, psychology, metaphysics, ethics, and the various theology courses) and *conclusions* (or *theses, asserta*, etc.; lists of opinions defended in scholastic functions), but some other material has also been included (articles in periodicals, "study plans", etc.)." (p. VIII).

**BIBLIOGRAPHIES ON WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS**

- Barth, Else M. 1992. *Women Philosophers. A Bibliography of Books through 1990*. Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University. "Philosophical books written or edited by women are included whatever their subject matter or point of view. Judgments of quality, too, do not come into play, and the only bounds are certain limitations of language and geography dictated by practical considerations: Eastern Europe and non-English-speaking countries outside Europe are not covered. Doctoral dissertations, even those not published, are included "wherever possible" (p. 3), that is, if the information was somewhat readily available. More than 2,800 items are listed, and more than 1,900 names appear in the author index. Entries are not annotated." (from H. E. Bynagle, *A Guide to the Reference Literature*, p. 31).

"Lists and often annotates more than 11,000 philosophical works produced by more than 3,500 women, from the pre-Socratics to near the close of the twentieth century. It is not restricted to "philosophers" in a narrow sense, including for instance such figures as Theosophist Helena Blavatzky and writer Virginia Woolf. The "collaborative" description incorporated in the title reflects the fact that this print volume derived from an online bibliography that invited contributions, corrections, and suggestions from anyone—and provided a mechanism for submitting them—while maintaining editorial control to assure acceptable levels of authenticity and scholarly quality. Lamentably, this online project, known as Noema: Collaborative Bibliography of Women in Philosophy despite holding up an intriguing model for the future of Web-based bibliography, went off-line in July 2003. With it have vanished, at least for now, additions entered subsequent to this print version, which even by mid-2001 (my latest figures) had expanded the bibliography to more than 16,000 records representing over 5,000 women. Entries are arranged alphabetically by authors' last names. Books and (occasionally) works in nonprint media are listed first, then articles, as applicable, by date of publication within each category. There is an index of named persons and subjects. Topical entries in this index tend to be overly broad: an article on adultery, for instance, can't be found under that subject entry (there isn't one) or even under "sex, philosophy of," but only under "ethics, applied." As for indexed names, their most distinctly valuable aspect would seem to be the references to women philosophers writing about other women philosophers. These render this in some measure a secondary bibliography on women philosophers, though not in a full-fledged sense: a work about a woman philosopher written by a male would find no place here."

Schneider, Ulrich Johannes. 1992. "A Bibliography of Nineteenth-Century Histories of Philosophy in German, English, and French (1810-1899)." *Storia della Storiografia* no. 21:141-169. Revised reprint in: U. J. Schneider, *Philosophie und Universität. Historisierung der Vernunft im 19. Jahrhundert*, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 2000, pp. 317-355. "Until the eighteenth century, the history of philosophy, understood as the 'lives and opinions' of philosophers, was mainly the work of scholars; Johann Jakob Brucker's *Historia critica philosophiae* in 1766-1767, when it was printed for the last time in six enormous quarto volumes, is an example of this kind of work (2). At the end of the eighteenth century, a new generation of historians (mainly German) transformed the scholarly tradition by making it the place for a general problematization of philosophical thought, past and present; in addition, they presented the history of philosophy as a narrative. The first document of this new historical interest in philosophy's past is the *Geschichte der Philosophie* by Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, which appeared in eleven volumes between 1798 and 1819 (3). Ever since, this historical interest has remained very productive, and the nineteenth century already witnessed a rapid increase in books on the history of philosophy. The following bibliography documents this increase in the number of books presenting and (re)presenting the historical knowledge about philosophy. Their sheer number is astonishing and makes it almost impossible to highlight individual historians, as one can for earlier centuries (4). In the nineteenth century, this interest in the history of philosophy evidently became more general.
There are reasons other than literary or intellectual ones which may explain this increase in the number of works similar in title and in form. Most of the authors of these histories of philosophy were school or university teachers of philosophy, that is to say pedagogical mediators of philosophical knowledge, including the historical knowledge of philosophy. The bibliography presented here is not, and cannot be, complete. Apart from all the usual bibliographical uncertainties, the very category of the history of philosophy resists precise definition. All the titles listed make the history of philosophy the subject of a narrative. The variations are nonetheless considerable. Some of the books are of several hundred pages, some of less than one hundred. The inclusion of small books is undoubtedly problematic. There are other works which do not make the history of philosophy their explicit subject (and which therefore are not listed here), which nevertheless treat it at greater length than some of those included. With regard to the manifold forms of historiographical work within the area of philosophy, the following list shows not much more than the tip of the iceberg. The bibliography presented here should serve as a basis for further investigation, into the ways of making past events present, the practice of reading old texts and the technique of presenting historical knowledge about philosophy. As in previous centuries, nineteenth-century historical work on philosophy was not autonomous; in ways which have not been sufficiently recognized, it fulfilled pedagogical and institutional needs, and complied with numerous interests which have not yet been analyzed; it dealt with issues which the quantity of titles proves to be urgent, but which are still far from being understood." (pp. 141-142)

(2) Brucker is made an essential figure in Lucien Braun's history of the history of philosophy -- the only complete history of its kind (from the beginnings up to Hegel); cfr. L. Braun, Histoire de l'histoire de la philosophie (Paris,

(3) Tennemann’s work is central in my essay on the origins of the modern, narrative historiography of philosophy; cfr. U. J. Schneider, *Die Vergangenheit des Geistes. Eine Archäologie der Philosophiegeschichte* (Frankfurt am Main, 1990).


**STYLE MANUALS AND STUDENT'S GUIDES**

General Manual of Style:


"This, the sixteenth edition of The Chicago Manual of Style, marks the first edition to be prepared and published simultaneously in print and online. As opportunities for publishing have grown dramatically in an era of electronic publication and distribution, the guiding principles for this edition have been twofold: to recognize the continuing evolution in the way authors,
editors, and publishers do their work, on the one hand, and to maintain a focus on those aspects of the process that are independent of the medium of publication, on the other.

(...) This edition marks an evolution of more than forty years, starting with the landmark twelfth edition, published in 1969. As part of this evolution, and as with the fifteenth edition, Chicago consulted a broad range of scholars and professionals in the fields of publishing and academics throughout the revision process. We also continued to benefit from the many helpful comments and suggestions sent to us by our readers, many of whom come from fields outside of scholarly publishing. Their input, in particular, helped us to keep in mind those principles of writing and editing that remain true regardless of the medium or field of publication." (From the Preface).

- Turabian, Kate L. 2007. *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Seventh edition. "For this seventh edition, Wayne C. Booth, Gregory G. Colomb, and Joseph M. Williams have expanded the focus of the book. The new part 1, "Research and Writing: From Planning to Production," is adapted from their *Craft of Research* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). This part offers a step-by-step guide to the process of research and its reporting, a topic not previously covered in this manual but inseparable from source citation, writing style, and the mechanics of paper preparation. Among the topics covered are the nature of research, finding and engaging sources, taking notes, developing an argument, drafting and revising, and presenting evidence in tables and figures. Also included is a discussion of presenting research in alternative forums. In this part, the authors write in a familiar, collegial voice to engage readers in a complex topic. Students undertaking research projects at all levels will benefit
from reading this part, though advanced researchers may wish to skim chapters 1-4.
The rest of the book covers the same topics as past editions, but has been extensively revised to follow the recommendations in *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th edition (2003), to incorporate current technology as it affects all aspects of student writing, to provide updated examples, and to be easier to read and use." (from the Preface).

"The seventh edition of the *MLA Handbook* is accompanied for the first time by a Web-based component that helps users learn MLA style and understand better the activities of researching and writing a paper. Students, instructors, and librarians have shown great interest in gaining access to the *MLA Handbook* on the Web, and we responded by developing a site that contains the full text of the book with complementary materials. The site includes sample papers with step-by-step narratives showing how the papers were prepared, and each narrative can be explored from a number of perspectives. For example, if you are having trouble defining a topic, you can look at the ways the authors of the sample papers did it. If you are unsure how to evaluate sources for inclusion in your project, you can follow the steps outlined in the narratives. We hope that the new electronic component will help students in every stage of their work. Scholarly research is increasingly conducted in a digital environment, and we are pleased to usher the *MLA Handbook* into that world." (from the Foreword).

"The aim of the third edition of *The Craft of Research* is the same as the first two: to meet the needs of all
researchers, not just first-year undergraduates and advanced graduate students, but even those in business and government who do and report research on any topic, academic, political, or commercial. We wrote it to
* guide you through the complexities of turning a topic or question into a research problem whose significance matches the effort that you put into solving it
* help you organize and draft a report that justifies the effort
* show you how to read your report as your readers will so that you can revise it into one that they will read with the understanding and respect it deserves

Other handbooks touch on these matters, but this one, we think, is different. Most current guides acknowledge that researchers rarely move in a straight line from finding a topic to stating a thesis to filling in note cards to drafting and revision. Experienced researchers loop back and forth, move forward a step or two before going back in order to move ahead again, change directions, all the while anticipating stages not yet begun. But so far as we know, no other guide tries to explain how each part of the process influences all the others -- how asking questions about a topic prepares the researcher for drafting, how drafting can reveal problems in an argument, how writing an introduction can send you back to a search for more sources." (from the Preface).


"Acknowledging your sources is therefore at once an obligation, a service, and an advantage. With a primary source (like the ant statistics), although you go on to give your own interpretation of its data, you're obliged first to tell your reader in a citation exactly what data you are interpreting, who assembled it, and where to find it -- so they can gauge, as you have done, its reliability. But your citation also alerts others who may want to use the data; and by allowing others to test and verify your
conclusions, it enhances your credibility. Likewise with a secondary source (...), you're obliged to credit other people for work they have done and you have built upon; it's dishonest and ungenerous not to credit them. But citing the secondary source also alerts other readers to its existence, and has distinct advantages for you. Where you accept and build upon an idea, citing saves you from having to demonstrate the truth of the idea all over again, and it enlists the source's authority on your behalf. Where you instead challenge or qualify an idea, citing its source makes your argument interesting as a challenge or qualification to a published position. In both cases, careful citing suggests to your reader that you are a trustworthy analyst, strong enough in your own reading and thinking to acknowledge other opinions in your pursuit of the truth. The fear some students have, initially, that citations will make their paper appear less thoughtful could not be less warranted.

Although procedures for using and citing sources differ some what from discipline to discipline, and the best authority for questions about using sources in a particular course is always its instructor, there is considerable common ground among the disciplines. This book summarizes that common ground. It describes the main methods of integrating sources into your paper and for citing them, the basic standards for acknowledging them, and the ways in which they are most commonly misused—along with some steps you can take to avoid misuses in your own writing." (from the Introduction).


"There are three reasons to cite the materials you use:
* To give credit to others' work and ideas, whether you agree with them or not. When you use their words, you must give them credit by using both quotation marks and citations.
* To show readers the materials on which you base your analysis, your narrative, or your conclusions.
* To guide readers to the materials you have used so they can examine it for themselves. Their interest might be to confirm your work, to challenge it, or simply to explore it further.

Taken together, these citations fully disclose your sources. That’s important for academic integrity in several ways.

First, good citations parcel out credit. Some belongs to you for the original work you did; you need to take full responsibility for it. Some belongs to others for their words, ideas, data, drawings, or other work. You need to acknowledge it, openly and explicitly.

Second, if you relied on others’ work in order to tell your story, explain your topic, or document your conclusions, you need to say exactly what you used. Take a simple paper about World War I. No one writing today learned about it firsthand. What we know, we learned by reading books and articles, by examining original documents and news reports, by listening to oral histories, by reviewing data compiled by military historians, and perhaps by viewing photographs or movies. When we write about the war, then, we should say how we acquired our information. The only exception is "commonly known information," something that everyone in the field clearly understands and that does not require any substantiation. (1) There's no need for a footnote to prove Woodrow Wilson was actually president of the United States. But if you referred to his speech declaring war, you would need a proper citation. If you used his words, you'd need quotation marks, too.

Third, your readers may want to pursue a particular issue you cover. Citations should lead them to the right sources, whether those are books, interviews, archival documents, Web sites, poems, or paintings. That guidance serves several purposes. Skeptical readers may doubt the basis for your work or your conclusions. Others
may simply want to double-check them or do more research on the topic. Your citations should point the way.

What citations should not do is prance about, showing off your howl-edge without adding to the reader's. That's just bragging.

Beyond this question of style (and good manners), there is the basic issue of honesty. Citations should never mislead your readers. There are lots of ways to mislead or misdirect your readers; accurate citations avoid them.

For example, they should not imply you read books or articles when you really didn’t. They should not imply you spent days in the archives deciphering original documents when you actually read them in an edited book or, worse, when you "borrowed" the citation from a scholar who did study the originals. Of course, it's fine to cite that author or an edited collection. That's accurate. It's fine to burrow into the archives and read the original yourself. It's dishonest, though, to write citations that only pretend you did.

Good citations should reveal your sources, not conceal them. They should honestly show the research you conducted. That means they should give credit where credit is due, disclose the materials on which you base your work, and guide readers to that material so they can explore it further. Citations like these accurately reflect your work and that of others. They show the ground on which you stand." (Chapter 1).

(1). What counts as common knowledge depends on your audience.

  "The big news about the sixth edition of *Writing from Sources* is its intensive focus on the Internet. For many students, the Web now serves as more than just an effective means of gaining and distributing information—it has become a way of life, a source of instant knowledge, a
shortcut to research. Unfortunately, the Web is at once the friend and the enemy of serious research. As instructors increasingly realize, in comparison with print sources Web material remains unreliable, its quality often abysmal. Whether or not you use a trustworthy search engine or consult a respected database, you are likely to encounter far more dross than gold. And too often our students, seduced by the abundance of online sources and the speed of surfing, lack the knowledge to make the crucial distinctions between a good Web site, a bad one, and one that falls somewhere in between." (p. V) (...)

Here is a summary of the changes in and additions to the sixth edition of *Writing from Sources* that enhance its usefulness as a text, a reader, an exercise book, and a research-essay guide:

An entirely new guide to locating print and Web sources using databases, directories, and search engines
A revised and expanded guide to evaluating print and Web sources, explaining—with copious illustrations—how to avoid the pitfalls inherent in Web research
· A realistic methodology for using computers to take notes from sources and organize them on the screen
A new sample research essay using endnotes in Chapter 9, incorporating a fairly sophisticated level of documentation in exploring the topic of cannibalism from a historical and anthropological perspective
A revised selection of reference sources, emphasizing electronic databases across the disciplines, contained in Appendix A
Expanded and updated guidelines for documenting sources in MLA and APA styles, contained in Appendix B
An entirely new casebook of readings on "Genetic Engineering and Cloning," contained in Appendix E, that can provide the basis for a complete research essay or, alternatively, can be supplemented by student research
A new model for synthesizing sources, in Chapter 4, built around the topic of promotion in elementary school."
(from To the Instructor VI-VII).

  "The more perfectly one's style fits the inner man and reveals its strength and effect, the clearer it becomes that the problem of style is not a problem of word and sentences merely, but of being the right kind of mind. "He who would not be frustrated in his hope to write well in laudable things," said Milton, "ought himself to be a true poem." Does that make the problem of style insoluble? Yes, I am afraid it does. But it shows also that the problem we have been discussing is no petty or merely technical one, but very far-reaching indeed. We may have to agree with Professor Raleigh that "to write perfect prose is neither more nor less difficult than to lead a perfect life." (Conclusion).

  "Philosophy can be an extremely technical and complex affair, one whose terminology and procedures are often intimidating to the beginner and demanding even for the professional. Like that of surgery, the art of philosophy requires mastering a body of knowledge, but it also requires acquiring precision and skill with a set of instruments or tools. The Philosopher's Toolkit may be thought of as a collection of just such tools. Unlike those of a surgeon or a master woodworker, however, the instruments presented by this text are conceptual - tools that can be used to analyse, manipulate and evaluate philosophical concepts, arguments and theories. The Toolkit can be used in a variety of ways. It can be read cover to cover by those looking for instruction on the essentials of philosophical reflection. It can be used as a course book on basic philosophical method or critical thinking. It can also be used as a reference book to which
general readers and more advanced philosophers can turn in order to find quick and clear accounts of the key concepts and methods of philosophy. The aim of the book, in other words, is to act as a conceptual toolbox from which all those from neophytes to master artisans can draw instruments that would otherwise be distributed over a diverse set of texts and require long periods of study to acquire.

For this second edition, we have expanded the book from six to seven sections, and reviewed and revised every single entry. These sections progress from the basic tools of argumentation to sophisticated philosophical concepts and principles. The text passes through instruments for assessing arguments to essential laws, principles and conceptual distinctions. It concludes with a discussion of the limits of philosophical thinking.

Each of the seven sections contains a number of compact entries comprising an explanation of the tool it addresses, examples of the tool in use and guidance about the tool's scope and limits. Each entry is cross-referenced to other related entries. Suggestions for further reading are included, and those particularly suitable for novices are marked with an asterisk. There is also a list of Internet resources at the back of the book.

Becoming a master sculptor requires more than the ability to pick up and use the tools of the trade: it requires flair, talent, imagination and practice. In the same way, learning how to use these philosophical tools will not turn you into a master of the art of philosophy overnight. What it will do is equip you with many skills and techniques that will help you philosophize better."

(Preface).

Part IV: Composing. Part V: Tactics for Analytic Writing. Part VI: Some Constraints on Content. Part VII: Some Goals of Form. Part VIII: Problems with Introductions. Appendix A: "It's Sunday Night and I have an Essay Due Monday Morning." Appendix B: Glossary of Philosophical Terms. Index." "It is often advisable to preview a book. That advice holds here. Skim the entire book before reading it more carefully. Depending on your philosophical background, some parts will be more informative than others. Chapter 1 discusses the concepts of author and audience as they apply to a student's philosophical prose. Both students and their professors are in an artificial literary situation. Unlike typical authors, students know less about their subject than their audience, although they are not supposed to let on that they do. Chapter 2 is a crash course on the basic concepts of logic. It contains background information required for understanding subsequent chapters. Those who are familiar with logic will breeze through it, while those with no familiarity with it will need to read slowly and carefully. Chapter 3 discusses the structure of a philosophical essay and forms the heart of the book. The well-worn but sound advice that an essay should have a beginning, a middle, and an end applies to philosophical essays too. Chapter 4 deals with a number of matters related to composing drafts of an essay. Various techniques for composing are discussed. Anyone who knows how to outline, take notes, revise, do research and so on might be able to skip this chapter. Chapter 5 explains several types of arguments used in philosophical reasoning, such as dilemmas, counterexamples and *reductio ad absurdum* arguments. Chapter 6 discusses some basic requirements that the content of an essay must satisfy. Chapter 7 discusses goals for the form of your writing: coherence, clarity, conciseness, and rigor. Chapter 8 discusses some
standard problems students have with the first few pages of an essay.
Like essays, most books have conclusions that either summarize or tie together the main strands of the work. It would have been artificial to do so in this case, however, since the book as a whole does not develop one main argument but consists of a number of different topics that should be helpful to the student. Appendix A, "It's Sunday Night and I Have an Essay Due Monday Morning," is included for those who bought this book but never got around to reading much of it, and can serve as a conclusion. Many of my students who used one of the first two editions let me know that this was the first part of the book they read, on a Sunday night about six weeks into the semester.
In order to serve the needs of a wide range of students, the level of difficulty varies from elementary to moderately advanced. Even within individual chapters, the level of difficulty can vary significantly, although each section begins with the simplest material and progresses to the most difficult. Thus, a chapter on a new topic might revert from complex material in the previous chapter to a simple level. I believe that intelligent, hardworking students can move rather quickly from philosophical innocence to moderate sophistication.
At various points, I have presented fragments of essays to illustrate a stylistic point. The topics of these essay fragments are sometimes controversial and the argumentation provocative. These passages are meant to keep the reader's interest and do not always represent my view. It would be a mistake to focus on the content of these essay fragments when it is their style that is important. Also, it is quite likely that the reader will disagree with a few or even many of the stylistic claims I make. If this leads readers to at least think about why they disagree, and to discover what they prefer and why, then a large part of my goal will have been achieved.
In the following pages, I often contrast rhetorical elements with logical elements. Going back as far as Socrates, rhetoric has often had a bad name in philosophy. No negative attitude toward rhetoric is implied in this book. "Rhetoric," as I use it, refers to style, that is, to those elements of writing that facilitate communication; and it is a presupposition of this book that these elements are extremely important. After all, like any essay, a philosophical essay that fails to communicate fails in one of its central purposes. *Philosophical Writing* is intended to be practical. It is supposed to help you write better and thereby improve your ability to present *Philosophical Writing* is intended to be practical. It is supposed to help you write better and thereby improve your ability to present your thoughts. Since almost any class may require you to write an essay that analyzes some kind of concept, the skills gained in learning to write about philosophical concepts may prove useful in writing other types of essays." (from the Introduction 5-7).


"*Critical Reasoning and Philosophy: A Concise Guide to Reading, Evaluating, and Writing Philosophical Works* is the culmination of several years of thinking about an integrative, cooperative, and critical approach to teaching introductory courses in philosophy. Philosophers are wedded to a specific type of analytic methodology that requires the honing and use of critical-reasoning skills at different levels: on the one hand, recognizing, reconstructing, and evaluating arguments (usually, those of other philosophers); on the other hand, being able to express themselves philosophically in coherent and tightly argued essays that move philosophical debate forward, however slowly. Students being introduced to philosophy need exposure to these skills and cannot fully
appreciate the need for philosophical analysis without them.
Thus, I have created this text to complement most introductory-level philosophy courses. Its aims, as the title suggests, are to teach students how to read, evaluate, and write philosophy. The book begins analytically by giving students the tools and skills to recognize, break down, and analyze arguments before formally responding to them in writing. It ends synthetically in that, by a book's end, students will have learned how to advance and defend a philosophical position of their own in a critical essay.
The text comprises six sections, each of which contains a number of modules (nineteen in all). These modules are short, self-teaching units that are designed to make critical evaluation of philosophy user-friendly. The large number of modules and small size of each make, I hope, for ready and easy assimilation of the material. Section One looks at introductory issues through three modules (one on philosophy, one on critical reasoning, and one on how to read philosophy). Section Two concerns recognition and reconstruction of arguments in two modules. Section Three comprises two modules on diagramming arguments. The fourth section, on argument evaluation, has five modules that concern principles and components of evaluation, common deductive and inductive arguments, and common fallacies. Section Five, which is mostly non-philosophical in scope, looks at tips for proper writing in four modules. There are three modules in the final section: one on evaluative essays (focusing on evaluating a philosophical view), one on critical essays (focusing on defending a thesis of one's own), and one on a much neglected topic in philosophy classes-revising and rewriting essays. The nineteen modules are complemented by five appendices. Appendix A offers some practice exercises for argument diagramming from famous philosophers. Appendices B and C give, respectively, a sample
evaluative essay and a sample critical essay in an attempt to illustrate the principles and suggestions in the final section. These samples are taken from actual essays from students. Appendices D and E complement the final module on revising and rewriting essays. Appendix D is a sample comment sheet that offers guidelines for students to critically analyze each other's papers. Appendix E is a plan-for-revision sheet that offers guidelines for revising an essay that protects students from beginning a hasty revision.

Overall, I have used drafts of these modules in my introductory courses and have found them to be very helpful tools. I am confident that, even if students cannot distinguish Aristotle from aerosol years after one of my introductory courses, they'll remember many things about what makes an argument good (or bad) and they'll be capable of using these in their everyday-life decisions. I am sure that other philosophers, especially those who find content-based-only approaches to introductory courses on philosophy too limited, will discover that Critical Reasoning and Philosophy is a valuable and effective complement to their courses.

There are a number of other books on the market with similar aims. Many of these are fine books (I list some in my bibliography), yet I have found none that balances concern for reading, evaluating, and writing philosophy in a compendious, user-friendly format—hence, the motivation for writing my own book. In addition, I have chosen a module-based approach to this book so as to introduce students to critical-reasoning skills in short, digestible units that can be learned piecemeal and spread out over the course of a term." (from the Preface, X-XI).

  "I began to compose this companion after grading a stack of midterm papers two feet tall. I noticed that I was making mostly the same comments on each student's
paper. It seemed more economical to write the comments once, and refer the students to the master copy of comments as needed.

If an instructor is grading hundreds of papers, it is often impossible to continue writing detailed criticisms and explanations of mistakes pertaining to the composition of an essay, while remaining engaged with its philosophical content. Consequently, instructors' comments might tend to become less detailed or thorough by the hundredth paper. And the comments that are made can become impatient in tone and cryptic in content. Neither is constructive. Using this companion to address the most common problems students have with philosophical composition will facilitate more substantive, philosophical engagement between instructors and their students.

(...)

This is a relatively short companion. But it contains a number of instructions that you will not be able to internalize immediately. After all, writing is a craft that improves only with disciplined practice. And, even if this companion is successful, it only covers some of the most common characteristics of good writing in philosophy. Students sometimes find that they are asked to write a philosophy paper without first having an idea of what it means to do philosophy or how philosophical writing differs from writing in other disciplines. Part H explains one view of what it means to do philosophy, how to succeed in a philosophy course, how to approach a philosophy paper, and the requirements of academic integrity. Chapter 8 is the most difficult and controversial chapter of this companion, because it is an account of what philosophers are doing when they are doing philosophy. This is neither easy to explain nor likely to elicit much agreement among philosophers. For this reason, your instructor may or may not recommend that you read it, depending on his or her judgment as to whether that view fits well with his or her goals for the
course. That is just fine, as Part I is the practical part of the companion.

In order to use Part I effectively, I would recommend that you first look it over to identify those points that you are encountering for the first time and those points that you suspect are problematic in your own writing. Later, as you compose your paper and work through the drafting process, you can refer back to those points and check them off to make sure that you have addressed them. (Other checklists can be found in sections 1.1, 1.4, and 14).

Your instructor will also refer you in either of two ways to specific parts of the companion. First, he or she might write a numeral in the margin of your paper -- for example, "5" -- indicating that there is a problem in your paper that is addressed in § 5 of this book. Second, he or she might highlight a theme that is problematic in the essay -- for example, the thesis is unclear -- by writing the keyword "Thesis" on your paper. You may then look up the keyword in the Keywords Cross-referenced table (see Appendix I) to find the sections of this companion that contain specific commentary and advice addressing that issue." (from the Preface).


"*Writing Philosophy Papers* goes beyond general instructions on paper writing. The whole book focuses on how to write philosophy papers. The kinds of papers most often assigned in philosophy classes are explained, and a whole chapter is devoted to writing the traditional philosophy paper: the thesis defense paper. Chapter 7 explains how to use specific philosophical resources, with a strong emphasis on Internet research. Whether it's a question about organization, documentation, research, or writing style, the student will now have the answer before submitting a paper to the professor. This should be a relief both to the professor
who reads and grades the papers and to the student who can hardly do a good job of writing a paper if the task itself is unclear. Professors assign different types of papers. *Writing Philosophy Papers* shows students that many paper assignments are hybrids of the basic kinds. In this book the students learn the basic skills, although the actual instructions for their specific classroom assignments will vary. Professors may also specify a preferred style of documentation. Footnotes and endnotes are illustrated in this book. So is the MLA parenthetical documentation. Both methods are clearly displayed in a sample paper in Appendix B. In-text citation and the number system of documentation are also explained. Documentation of Internet sources is illustrated also.

The focus is on philosophy. The many examples throughout *Writing Philosophy Papers* are from philosophical concepts or primary and secondary sources in philosophy. In addition, there is a discussion of philosophy courses, philosophical topics, philosophical reasoning, philosophy journals and research books, as well as the Internet and other research sources." (from the Preface).
This Application collects some Personal Data from its Users.

Types of Data collected
The only type of Personal Data that this Application collects, by itself or through third parties, is: Cookies and Usage data. The Personal Data may be freely provided by the User, or collected automatically when using this Application. Any use of Cookies - or of other tracking tools - by this Application or by the owners of third party services used by this Application, unless stated otherwise, serves to identify Users and remember their preferences, for the sole purpose of providing the service required by the User. Users are responsible for any Personal Data of third parties obtained, published or shared through this Application and confirm that they have the third party's consent to provide the Data to the Owner.

Mode and place of processing the Data - Methods of processing
The Data Controller processes the Data of Users in a proper manner and shall take appropriate security measures to prevent unauthorized access, disclosure, modification, or unauthorized destruction of the Data. The Data processing is carried out using computers and/or IT enabled tools, following organizational procedures and modes strictly related to the purposes indicated. In addition to the Data Controller, in some cases, the Data may be accessible to certain types of persons in charge, involved with the operation of the site (administration, sales, marketing, legal, system administration) or external
parties (such as third party technical service providers, mail carriers, hosting providers, IT companies, communications agencies) appointed, if necessary, as Data Processors by the Owner. The updated list of these parties may be requested from the Data Controller at any time.

The use of the collected Data

The Data concerning the User is collected to allow the Owner for the following purposes: Analytics. The Personal Data used for each purpose is outlined in the specific sections of this document.

Detailed information on the processing of Personal

Data Personal Data is collected for the following purposes and using the following services:

Google Analytics (anonymized: see IP Anonymization in Google Analytics for more details).

You may opt-out of Google Analytics using the Google Analytics Opt-out Browser Add-on.

Cloudflare (only on the main site ontology.co) for best performance see Cloudflare Support for more details.

Additional information about Data collection and processing

Legal action

The User's Personal Data may be used for legal purposes by the Data Controller, in Court or in the stages leading to possible legal action arising from improper use of this Application or the related services. The User declares to be aware that the Data Controller may be required to reveal personal data upon request of public authorities.

Additional information about User's Personal Data

In addition to the information contained in this privacy policy, this Application may provide the User with additional and
contextual information concerning particular services or the collection and processing of Personal Data upon request.

System Logs and Maintenance

For operation and maintenance purposes, this Application and any third party services may collect files that record interaction with this Application (System Logs) or use for this purpose other Personal Data (such as IP Address).

Information not contained in this policy

More details concerning the collection or processing of Personal Data may be requested from the Data Controller at any time. Please see the contact information at the beginning of this document.

The rights of Users

Users have the right, at any time, to know whether their Personal Data has been stored and can consult the Data Controller to learn about their contents and origin, to verify their accuracy or to ask for them to be supplemented, cancelled, updated or corrected, or for their transformation into anonymous format or to block any data held in violation of the law, as well as to oppose their treatment for any and all legitimate reasons. Requests should be sent to the Data Controller at the contact information set out above.

Changes to this privacy policy

The Data Controller reserves the right to make changes to this privacy policy at any time by giving notice to its Users on this page. It is strongly recommended to check this page often, referring to the date of the last modification listed at the bottom. If a User objects to any of the changes to the Policy, the User must cease using this Application and can request that the Data Controller removes the Personal Data. Unless stated otherwise, the then-current privacy policy applies to all Personal Data the Data Controller has about Users.
Information about this privacy policy

The Data Controller is responsible for this privacy policy.

Definitions and legal references

Personal Data (or Data)

Any information regarding a natural person, a legal person, an institution or an association, which is, or can be, identified, even indirectly, by reference to any other information, including a personal identification number.

Usage Data

Information collected automatically from this Application (or third party services employed in this Application), which can include: the IP addresses or domain names of the computers utilized by the Users who use this Application, the URI addresses (Uniform Resource Identifier), the time of the request, the method utilized to submit the request to the server, the size of the file received in response, the numerical code indicating the status of the server's answer (successful outcome, error, etc.), the country of origin, the features of the browser and the operating system utilized by the User, the various time details per visit (e.g., the time spent on each page within the Application) and the details about the path followed within the Application with special reference to the sequence of pages visited, and other parameters about the device operating system and/or the User's IT environment.

User

The individual using this Application, which must coincide with or be authorized by the Data Subject, to whom the Personal Data refer.

Data Subject

The legal or natural person to whom the Personal Data refers.

Data Processor (or Data Supervisor)
The natural person, legal person, public administration or any other body, association or organization authorized by the Data Controller to process the Personal Data in compliance with this privacy policy. Data Controller (or Owner) the natural person, legal person, public administration or any other body, association or organization with the right, also jointly with another Data Controller, to make decisions regarding the purposes, and the methods of processing of Personal Data and the means used, including the security measures concerning the operation and use of this Application. The Data Controller, unless otherwise specified, is the Owner of this Application.

This Application

The hardware or software tool by which the Personal Data of the User is collected.

Cookie

Small piece of data stored in the User's device.

**SUMMARY**
These are the three cookies used by this website June 7, 2015 (date in brackets to expire):

_ga Google Analytics tracking cookie (6/6/2017)
_gat Google Analytics tracking cookie (7/6/2015)
_cfduid CloudFlare cookie (6/6/2016)

For more information about Google Analytics see: Google Analytics Cookie Usage on Websites.

About Cloudflare:

“The ___cfduid cookie is used to override any security restrictions based on the IP address the visitor is coming from. For example, if the visitor is in a coffee shop where there are a bunch of infected machines, but the visitor's machine is known trusted, then the cookie can override the security setting. It does not correspond to any userid in the web application, nor does the cookie store any personally identifiable information.” Note: This cookie is strictly necessary for site security operations and can't be turned off.“ From Cloudflare Support.

Third-party domains:
None.

Data Controller and Owner

Raul Corazzon
Via Panfilo Castaldi, 18
20124 Milano

e-mail: rc@ontology.co
Legal information

Notice to European Users: this privacy statement has been prepared in fulfillment of the obligations under Art. 10 of EC Directive n. 95/46/EC, and under the provisions of Directive 2002/58/EC, as revised by Directive 2009/136/EC, on the subject of Cookies. This privacy policy relates solely to this Application.

Last update: May 24th, 2018.
Informativa sulla Privacy

**Norme sulla Privacy e Siti Web**

Nel maggio 2011 il Parlamento Europeo ha emanato una nuova legge sulla privacy, la EU Cookie Law (legge europea sui cookies - testo in formato PDF) che obbliga i siti internet a richiedere il permesso degli utenti ad utilizzare i cookie relativi ai servizi offerti. La parte più rilevante per l'utilizzo dei cookie si trova nell'art. 5, p. 20 di 26:

«3. Gli Stati membri assicurano che l’archiviazione di informazioni oppure l’accesso a informazioni già archiviate nell’apparecchiatura terminale di un abbonato o di un utente sia consentito unicamente a condizione che l’abbonato o l’utente in questione abbia espresso preliminarmente il proprio consenso, dopo essere stato informato in modo chiaro e completo, a norma della direttiva 95/46/CE, tra l’altro sugli scopi del trattamento. Ciò non vieta l’eventuale archiviazione tecnica o l’accesso al solo fine di effettuare la trasmissione di una comunicazione su una rete di comunicazione elettronica, o nella misura strettamente necessaria al fornitore di un servizio della società dell’informazione esplicitamente richiesto dall’abbonato o dall’utente a erogare tale servizio.»

Questa normativa è entrata in vigore in Italia il 3 giugno 2015.

**Informativa sui Cookie**

Che cos’è un [cookie e a cosa serve?](#) Un cookie è un file di dimensioni ridotte che un sito invia al browser e salva sul
computer dell'utente che visita un sito Internet. I cookie vengono utilizzati per far funzionare il sito o per migliorarne le prestazioni, ma anche per fornire informazioni ai proprietari del sito.

Con la nota "Individuazione delle modalità semplificate per l'informativa e l'acquisizione del consenso per l'uso dei cookie" dell'8 maggio 2014 [doc web n. 3118884] il Garante della Privacy ha stabilito quanto segue:

(Le parti più rilevanti per l'uso di questo sito sono evidenziate in grassetto).

"Al riguardo, e ai fini del presente provvedimento, si individuano pertanto due macro-categorie: cookie "tecnici" e cookie "di profilazione".

a. Cookie tecnici.

I cookie tecnici sono quelli utilizzati al solo fine di "effettuare la trasmissione di una comunicazione su una rete di comunicazione elettronica, o nella misura strettamente necessaria al fornitore di un servizio della società dell'informazione esplicitamente richiesto dall'abbonato o dall'utente a erogare tale servizio" (cfr. art. 122, comma 1, del Codice).

Essi non vengono utilizzati per scopi ulteriori e sono normalmente installati direttamente dal titolare o gestore del sito web. Possono essere suddivisi in cookie di navigazione o di sessione, che garantiscono la normale navigazione e fruizione del sito web (permettendo, ad esempio, di realizzare un acquisto o autenticarsi per accedere ad aree riservate); cookie analytics, assimilati ai cookie tecnici laddove utilizzati direttamente dal gestore del sito per raccogliere informazioni, in forma aggregata, sul numero degli utenti e su come questi visitano il sito stesso; cookie di funzionalità, che permettono all'utente la navigazione in funzione di una serie di criteri selezionati (ad esempio, la lingua, i prodotti selezionati per l'acquisto) al fine di migliorare il servizio reso allo stesso.
Per l'installazione di tali cookie non è richiesto il preventivo consenso degli utenti, mentre resta fermo l'obbligo di dare l'informativa ai sensi dell'art. 13 del Codice, che il gestore del sito, qualora utilizzi soltanto tali dispositivi, potrà fornire con le modalità che ritiene più idonee.

b. Cookie di profilazione.

I cookie di profilazione sono volti a creare profili relativi all'utente e vengono utilizzati al fine di inviare messaggi pubblicitari in linea con le preferenze manifestate dallo stesso nell'ambito della navigazione in rete. In ragione della particolare invasività che tali dispositivi possono avere nell'ambito della sfera privata degli utenti, la normativa europea e italiana prevede che l'utente debba essere adeguatamente informato sull'uso degli stessi ed esprimere così il proprio valido consenso. Ad essi si riferisce l'art. 122 del Codice laddove prevede che "l'archiviazione delle informazioni nell'apparecchio terminale di un contraente o di un utente o l'accesso a informazioni già archiviate sono consentiti unicamente a condizione che il contraente o l'utente abbia espresso il proprio consenso dopo essere stato informato con le modalità semplificate di cui all'articolo 13, comma 3" (art. 122, comma 1, del Codice).

Con la nota del 5 giugno 2015 Chiarimenti in merito all’attuazione della normativa in materia di cookie Il Garante della Privacy ha precisato quanto segue:

• I siti che non utilizzano cookie non sono soggetti ad alcun obbligo.
• Per l'utilizzo di cookie tecnici è richiesta la sola informativa (ad esempio nella privacy policy del sito). Non è necessario realizzare specifici banner.
• I cookie analitici sono assimilati a quelli tecnici solo quando realizzati e utilizzati direttamente dal sito prima parte per migliorarne la fruibilità.

• Se i cookie analitici sono messi a disposizione da terze parti i titolari non sono soggetti ad obblighi (notificazione al Garante
A) siano adottati strumenti che riducono il potere identificativo dei cookie (ad esempio tramite il mascheramento di porzioni significative dell'IP);

B) la terza parte si impegna a non incrociare le informazioni contenute nei cookie con altre di cui già dispone.
- Se sul sito ci sono link a siti terze parti (es. banner pubblicitari; collegamenti a social network) che non richiedono l'installazione di cookie di profilazione non c'è bisogno di informativa e consenso.
- Nell'informativa estesa il consenso all'uso di cookie di profilazione potrà essere richiesto per categorie (es. viaggi, sport).
- È possibile effettuare una sola notificazione per tutti i diversi siti web che vengono gestiti nell'ambito dello stesso dominio.
- Gli obblighi si applicano a tutti i siti che installano cookie sui terminali degli utenti, a prescindere dalla presenza di una sede in Italia."

Che tipo di cookie utilizza questo sito e a quale scopo?

Cookie Tecnici.

Si tratta di cookie utilizzati da [Cloudflare](https://cloudflare.com) per migliorare la velocità di caricamento delle pagine. I Cookie Tecnici non necessitano di consenso.

Cookie Analitici.

Questi cookie sono utilizzati da [Google Analytics](https://analytics.google.com) per elaborare analisi statistiche sulle modalità di navigazione degli utenti sul sito, sul numero di pagine visitate o il numero di click effettuati su una pagina durante la navigazione.

Su questo sito l'indirizzo IP del visitatore è anonimizzato:

“Quando un cliente di Google Analytics richiede l'anonimizzazione dell'indirizzo IP, Google Analytics anonimizza l'indirizzo non appena ciò è tecnicamente possibile
nel passaggio più a monte della rete in cui avviene la raccolta dei dati. La funzione di anonimizzazione IP in Google Analytics impone l'ultimo ottetto di indirizzi IP dell'utente IPv4 e gli ultimi 80 bit degli indirizzi IPv6 su zero in memoria subito dopo l'invio alla rete di raccolta di Google Analytics. In questo caso l'indirizzo IP completo non è mai scritto su disco.”

Per maggiori dettagli consultare: [Anonimizzazione IP in Google Analytics](#)

Per disabilitare i cookie analitici e per impedire a Google Analytics di raccogliere dati sulla navigazione, è possibile installare il Componente aggiuntivo del browser per la [Disattivazione di Google Analytics](#).

Che tipo di cookie NON utilizza il sito?

Cookie di profilazione.

Sono i cookie utilizzati per tracciare la navigazione dell'utente in rete e creare profili sui suoi gusti, abitudini, scelte, ecc. Con questi cookie possono essere trasmessi al terminale dell'utente messaggi pubblicitari in linea con le preferenze già manifestate dallo stesso utente nella navigazione online. Se si utilizzano cookie di profilazione è obbligatorio richiedere preventivamente il consenso dell’utente.

Come è possibile disabilitare i cookie?

La maggior parte dei browser (Internet Explorer, Chrome, Firefox, Safari etc.) sono configurati per accettare i cookie, che possono essere disabilitati utilizzando le impostazioni del browser; per le istruzioni consultare, ad esempio, [Cinque principali accorgimenti](#).

---

**SOMMARIO**

Su questo sito non è richiesto l’utilizzo del banner con la richiesta del consenso da parte dell’utente perché i cookie utilizzati sono solo quelli tecnici (nel caso di Cloudflare) e
quelli analitici in forma anonimizzata (nel caso di Google Analytics), da considerare quindi equiparati a quelli tecnici. A titolo di esempio: questi sono i tre cookie utilizzati il 7 giugno 2015 (la data tra parentesi è quella di scadenza):

- _ga Google Analytics tracking cookie (6 giugno 2017)
- _gat Google Analytics tracking cookie (7 giugno 2015)
- _cfduid CloudFlare cookie (6 giugno 2016)

Per maggiori informazioni su Google Analytics consultare:

[Google Analytics Cookie Usage on Websites](#)

Riguardo al cookie di Cloudflare:

“The __cfduid cookie is used to override any security restrictions based on the IP address the visitor is coming from. For example, if the visitor is in a coffee shop where there are a bunch of infected machines, but the visitor's machine is known trusted, then the cookie can override the security setting. It does not correspond to any userid in the web application, nor does the cookie store any personally identifiable information.”

Note: This cookie is strictly necessary for site security operations and can't be turned off.“

Traduzione: “Il cookie __cfduid consente di ignorare eventuali restrizioni di sicurezza in base all'indirizzo IP da cui proviene il visitatore. Ad esempio, se il visitatore si trova in un Internet Point in cui ci sono molti PC infetti, ma quello usato dal visitatore è attendibile, allora il cookie può ignorare l'impostazione di protezione. Non corrisponde a qualsiasi userid nell'applicazione web, né il cookie memorizza alcuna informazione personale.

Nota: Questo cookie è strettamente necessario per le operazioni di sicurezza del sito e non può essere disattivato”.

Informazioni tratte da [Cloudflare Support](#)

Richieste di terze parti:

Due da Google Analytics.
Cookie installati da terze parti:
Nessuno.

**Log di sistema e manutenzione**

Per necessità legate al funzionamento ed alla manutenzione, questa Applicazione e gli eventuali servizi terzi da essa utilizzati potrebbero raccogliere Log di sistema, ossia file che registrano le interazioni e che possono contenere anche Dati Personali, quali l'indirizzo IP Utente.

**Proprietario del sito web e titolare del trattamento dei dati:**

Raul Corazzon  
Via Panfilo Castaldi, 18  
20124 Milano  
e-mail: rc@ontology.co

**Nota legale**


Ultimo aggiornamento: 24 maggio 2018.
About This Site

This site was created March 13th 2017; a mobile version is available when the screen resolution is less than 480 x 500 pixels.
The site is best viewed with a recent version of one of the following browsers: Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Maxthon, Opera, Safari, UC Browser.

For readers with older browsers another website with an easier menu is available:

- Bibliographia. Mirror Site

Please note that only Internet Explorer version 11 is supported by Microsoft after January 12, 2016.

How to Cite This Website

If you want to cite or link a page of my site please use the main address www.bibliographia.co because the mirror site will not be indexed by the Search Engines to avoid duplicated content.

Note on the Fonts
These fonts are used:

For the text: Georgia (Windows, Apple Mac, Linux);
For the terms in Ancient Greek: Georgia (Windows, Apple Mac, Linux).
For the transliteration of Arabic terms: Arial MS Unicode (Windows, Apple Mac, Linux).
For the logical symbols: Lucida Sans Unicode (Windows); Lucida Grande (Apple Mac); Lucida Sans or DejaVu Sans Condensed (Linux);

If you need to download one of these fonts use these links:

- Georgia
- Arial MS Unicode
- Lucida Sans Unicode

**Mobile Friendliness**

Test the Mobile Friendliness of a website with these tools:

- Google Mobile-Friendly Test
- Bing Mobile Friendliness Test Tool

**Website Status and Performance Monitor**
To check if one of my website is up or down, try the "Uptime" link at the bottom of every page.

To check if a generic website is down you can use:

- [Monitor Any Website](#)

---

**Test the security of a website**

Some links to free tools useful to check Website security:

- [Google Transparency Report](#)
- [Norton Safe Web](#)
- [Sucuri Website Malware and Security Scanner](#)
- [Virus Total](#)
- [Qualys SSL Labs (for testing SSL websites)](#)
- [Free Online Tools for Looking up Potentially Malicious Websites](#)
General Index

Bibliography on Philosophy

Bibliographies of Biblical studies

Bibliography on the Early Christian Literature (I-II Centuries)

Bibliography on the Religious Literature of the Early Judaism

Bibliography on the Philosophy and Phenomenology of Religion

Bibliography of the Sociology of Religion

Bibliographical study guides